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Introduction 
 
 
Over the last three decades, virtually all governments across Western countries have 
been subject to far-reaching reform process of their public bureaucracy triggered by an 
increasing public debt, also following a widespread financial crisis, raising awareness of 
the inefficiency of the old style public administration become „overloaded‟ (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011), shifting citizens preferences and demands for higher quality and 
customized public services. Public sector reforms have been inspired by New Public 
Management doctrine which encouraged the adoption of private sector values, tools and 
managerial practices in the public administrations as a means to boost efficiency, 
effectiveness and value for money in the provision of public services (Hood 1995). 
Among a wide set of techniques and policies outsourcing of public services has known 
an overwhelming diffusion (OECD 2011), not only cross-country but interesting also 
among all the sub-sectors of public administration from central government to the 
healthcare sectors, to education and local government (Dell‟Aringa, Della Rocca and 
Keller 2001).  
Maximizing value for money in the provision of services has traditionally constituted 
the prevailing reason to outsource gathered from the literature (Domberger et al. 1986, 
Domberger and Hall 1996, Domberger and Jensen 1997, Savas 2000, Blom-Hansen 
2003): on the basis of economic appraisal opening service provision to market 
competition should achieve a cost reduction (Greve 2008), since private providers in a 
competitive regime are expected to realize economies of scale and to raise effort or 
productivity with a given input/workforce-combination. Furthermore organisational 
flexibility might be enhanced by focusing limited resources available on key areas and 
tasks, core for the business mission, and outsourcing all peripheral skills and services 
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without undermining the universal provision of public services. Outsourcing might 
improve flexibility in the management of human resources as well, allowing to directly 
employ only those workers performing core activities, highly skilled and valuable to 
keep internal, whilst contracting out the bulk of peripheral workforce, usually low 
skilled and easily replaceable in the labour market. Flexibility by way of contracting out 
may lead also to have access to technology and expertise not available in-house to meet 
one-off needs or needs subjects to fluctuations in quantity over time. 
Despite such potential benefits repeatedly promoted by scholars and practitioners ˗ 
especially in organisational studies and in the field of economics (Prahalad and Hamel 
1990, Barney 1991) ˗ the growing diffusion of outsourcing policies has highlighted 
many drawback as well. Firstly, cost savings may be lower than expected and declining 
over the long term (Domberger and Rimmer 1994, Roberts 2001). Savings might be 
only illusory following the emergence of transactions costs, so new costs related to 
writing and monitoring the contract, above all in small administrations. Thirdly savings 
may be achieved at the expense of the quality of the output (OECD 2002): according to 
this hypothesis efficiency and productivity are enhanced by outsourcing services but 
through a reduction in service quality, notably difficult to measure and monitor above 
all in the absence of hierarchical control (Quiggin 2002, Jensen and Stonecash 2005). 
Moreover scholars started questioning not only the magnitude but even more 
importantly the actual source of this expenditure reduction (Jensen and Stonecash 
2005): unquestionably, outsourcing has promoted a model of competition, but that is 
often largely based on the reduction of labour costs and not on the improvement of 
quality and innovation. Empirical evidence increasingly emerged, arguing that cost 
savings may simply correspond either to reduced employment (Quiggin 2002, Alonso et 
al. 2013) or to an erosion of terms and conditions of employment (Flecker and Hermann 
2009, Petersen et al. 2011) in labour-intensive services where labour costs correspond 
to the largest item of expenditure. 
Despite the growing relevance of the issue, as pinpointed by an extensive literature 
investigating vertical disintegration and restructuring towards outsourcing in private 
sector companies and its impacts on working conditions and industrial relations 
structures (Kalleberg 2003, Marchington et al. 2005, Doellgast and Greer 2007) only 
limited research attention has been devoted so the issue in public sector (Flecker and 
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Meil 2010). Research attention in the public sector indeed has been mainly addressed to 
assess the magnitude of savings and service quality aspects following contracting out 
(Domberger and Rimmer 1994, Domberger and Jensen 1997, Savas 2000), as well to 
investigate the effect for public employment size (Donahue 2002, Greene 2002, Alonso 
et al. 2007). Moreover in existing literature dealing with repercussion for labour-related 
issues following marketization of public services attention has been extensively focused 
on UK where the phenomenon spread much earlier and faster than in the rest of Europe 
(Haskel and Szymanski 1993, Hebson et al. 2003, Cunningham and Nickson 2011, 
Grimshaw et al. 2012). Comparative studies dealing with work configurations following 
outsourcing are to all effects lacking in the public sector (Mathieson and Pedersini 
2009, Hermann and Flecker 2012). 
Given these premises, the aim of the present analysis is to address this gap in the 
literature by investigating how outsourcing in public services impacts on terms and 
conditions of employment, industrial relations structure and union‟s role.  
The issue is particularly relevant if interpreted in the light of the increasing bulk of 
detrimental repercussions pinpointed by growing scrutiny in private sector firms, where 
the phenomenon is overwhelming (Kalleberg 2003, Flecker et al. 2005, Marchington et 
al. 2005, Doellgast et al. 2009, Perraudin et al. 2009). It has been assumed that the 
external restructuring of the companies, involving the dispersion of activities across 
organisational boundaries, has led to a degradation of working terms and conditions 
(Doellgast et al. 2009, Flecker and Meil 2010), since it may trigger competition with a 
cheaper labour-supply, shifting work from highly unionized and better sheltered 
organisations to more vulnerable companies, subjects to market fluctuations, where 
trade union power is low or inexistent. Companies indeed try to benefit from 
differentials in wage levels and working conditions through contracting out of tasks or 
part of services (Flecker 2009). Moreover vertical disintegration processes present 
substantial challenges to employment relation structure as well (Doellgast and Greer 
2007), weakening the bargaining power of union while the dependency relations 
between companies along the value chain can be expected to translate into increased 
disparities and instability in terms of employment and working conditions (Flecker 
2009). 
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Following up this stream of research in industrial relations, the contribution aims to give 
an account of the implications for employment relations structure and working 
condition following restructuring towards outsourcing in public bureaucracies. The 
issue will be explored through a comparative perspective across different countries ˗ 
Italy, England, Denmark ˗ and between public administration sub-sectors ˗ local 
government and healthcare sector. Such two-tier comparative analysis indeed enables to 
identify convergent or, conversely, divergent trajectories that might develop at national 
level across different countries and in parallel between diverse sectors within national 
boundaries. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter reviews the main literature 
concerning outsourcing starting from the definition of the scope of the analysis. Then 
the main theoretical rationales underlying the make-or-buy choice that organisations 
cope with are disentangled, ranging from rational choice-based perspectives to the new 
institutionalist approaches. Finally the chapter introduces the main analytical 
perspectives which dealt with restructuring processes towards outsourcing and 
implications for working conditions and employment relations institutions. 
Chapter 3 introduces the research questions lying at the heart of the research. After 
having discussed the case selection it presents the research hypothesis and the 
methodology.  
The following three chapters 4, 5 and 6 are devoted to the presentation of empirical 
findings: each chapter addresses the issue in one country ˗ respectively Italy, England 
and Denmark ˗ wherein the focus is internally divided between the two sectors under 
scrutiny. Empirical chapters first provides a national overview of public administration 
and public employment structure and functions, complemented by a general framework 
as regards industrial relations regime, institutions and actors. Then the main legislative 
and financial drivers of outsourcing are elucidated. Such background introductory 
section frames the presentation of the empirical findings: each chapters widely 
elucidates the implications following outsourcing on working conditions on the one 
hand, and employment relations on the other hand within the two sectors. The chapters 
are concluded by a brief comparative overview of similarities and differences in 
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outcome trajectories displayed in local government and healthcare sector within each 
national context. 
Chapter 7 instead discusses the results in comparative perspective, disentangling how 
labour-related issues and employment relations structures developed along national and 
sectoral trajectories and then elucidating convergent and divergent patterns. Finally 
explanations to such configurations are put forward. Lastly a concluding section 
highlights the contribution of the present research to industrial relations and 
comparative public administration. 
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Chapter two 
Drivers and impacts of outsourcing 
 
 
Over the last three decades, outsourcing has entered the political agenda of most 
European governments driven by economic and strategic considerations, while 
simultaneously was asserting itself into different academic fields of research as a thorny 
issue to investigate from a multidisciplinary point of observation. Outsourcing has been 
variously defined and conceptualized within the several disciplines approaching the 
issue at stake: undoubtedly it represents a core topic for economists, fully committed in 
assessing economic drivers and financial spillovers, while scholars engaged in 
comparative public administration field focused on outsourcing as an increasingly 
widespread New Public Management-inspired tool adopted to modernize traditional 
bureaucracies. Industrial relations literature has largely debated the phenomenon as 
well, in the guise of an essential component of public sector restructuring process. Thus 
as evident from above outsourcing has received wide research attention from a disparate 
array of disciplines, each embedding the topic within its own specific analytical frame: 
accordingly the definition of outsourcing they provide, the set of ideas and implications 
surrounding the phenomenon, as well as inherent aspects worth to emphasize vary 
considerably across research streams.  
The following section aims to define the notion of outsourcing instrumentally to the 
goal of the present research, recalling the more relevant theoretical approaches which 
frame the concept: the comparative public administration body of thought and the 
industrial relations field. The second part is instead devoted to the main theoretical 
reasons underlying outsourcing policy: the overview widely elucidates economic-driven 
and strategic rationale driving public administration‟s decision to contract services out. 
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A closing section is in the end focused on disentangling implications and consequences 
of outsourcing for labour and working conditions: various research streams indeed 
provide fruitful analytical frameworks to understand and interpret direct or indirect 
effects on job‟s terms and conditions and employment arrangements during 
restructuring processes. 
 
 
2.1 Defining outsourcing as multidisciplinary concept 
 
2.1.1 Comparative public administration and NPM approach 
Since the 1980s, public administrations across Western countries have been subject to 
far-reaching reform processes which began to set aside what is commonly known as 
„classic public administration paradigm‟. This traditional model, deeply influenced in 
Europe by Weberian ideas of bureaucracy, steadily developed over more than a century, 
remaining relatively undisturbed until the late 1970s (Pollitt, van Thiel and Homburg 
2007, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Emphasis was placed on the one side on the 
preparation and enforcement of law to be uniformly followed in the division and 
organization of public sector tasks, while on the other side on the regulation of public 
powers in the relationship between public sector and citizens. Progressively an 
„unending wave of reforms‟ (Pollitt 2002) has emerged as a consequence of increasing 
public debt also following a widespread financial crisis, raising awareness regarding the 
inefficiency of the old style public administration become „overloaded‟ (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011) and shifting citizens‟ preferences and demands for higher quality and 
customized public services. Virtually, every Western government since the 1980s has 
been striving to modernize its public sector, shifting the concern to the search for better 
performance and accountability, pulled alongside the struggle to increase the efficiency 
of public administration and streamlining the procedures (Ongaro 2009). Influential 
commentators (Hood 1991, Osborne and Gaebler 1992) and international management 
networks (OECD), grasping in these streams of transformation a remarkable degree of 
convergence across countries, labelled the common path as New Public Management 
(NPM) suggesting uniformity and communality. Despite the vagueness of the term, „its 
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usefulness lies in its convenience as a shorthand name for the set of broadly similar 
administrative doctrines which dominated the bureaucratic reform agenda in many of 
the OECD group of countries from the late 1970s‟ (Hood 1991:3). Substantially, the 
emerging paradigm refers to a broad multidimensional two-level phenomenon (Pollitt 
and Dan 2011): at the higher level it involves a general theory that assumes the 
improvement of public sector via the importation of business concepts, values ad 
techniques from the private sector; at the operative level it refers to a set of practices 
regarding the reform of organizational structures and the management of public 
personnel (Hood 1991, 1995). As a result, at the higher level implementing NPM-
inspired reforms would have theoretically implied a subsequent double process of 
convergence: a convergence pattern between public and private sectors within each 
country and simultaneously a convergence pattern in public administration models 
across different countries (Bordogna 2008). At the more mundane level, specifically, 
prominent scholars have associated NPM-paradigm with a synthetic categorization of 
seven overlapped dimensions of reform which follow (Hood 1991, 1995): 
 
1. a preference for lean, flat, small, specialized organizational forms over large, 
multi-functional forms (Pollitt and Dan 2011), shifting towards greater 
disaggregation of unit in the public sector, more manageable and specialized 
around a single public sector „product‟. 
2. A move towards greater competition both between public sector organizations 
and between public and private sector organizations. The wide injection of 
competition and market-type-mechanisms (MTMs), including competitive 
tendering and public-private partnership (PPP), allows for lower costs and better 
standards through competition as keystone.  
3. A greater stress on private-sector style of management practices – such as higher 
flexibility in hiring and firing, performance-related pay (PRP) – moving away 
public sector specific methods of running business and managing human 
resources. 
4. A move towards greater emphasis on discipline and parsimony in resource use 
and on active search for available alternatives: less costly way to deliver public 
services, cut in direct costs, raising labour discipline, resisting union demands. 
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5. A shift towards „hands-on professional management‟, implying a more active 
and visible control of public organizations by top managers wielding 
discretionary power, „free to manage‟. 
6. A move towards more explicit standards and measures of performance for public 
sector organizations: accountability indeed requires clear statement of goals and 
the definition of indicators of success. 
7. A shift towards greater emphasis on output measurement and controls, in order 
to allocate resources and link rewards to measured performance and results 
rather than to procedures. 
 
Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow and Tinkler have sharply synthetized these seven 
dimensions as „disaggregation + competition + incentivization‟ (Dunleavy 2006). 
Starting from the above sketched theoretical framework to reform public administration, 
advocates of NPM-inspired reforms endorsed the adoption of market-type mechanisms 
(MTMs) as a feasible response to governments‟ need to secure increased value for 
money in the provision of public services, which represents a long-standing and well-
known issue. Market mechanisms, in fact, may boost efficiency of public services‟ 
delivery leveraging three different aspects of service provision: raising productive 
efficiency by increasing the quality and lowering the production costs; by improving 
budget management efficiency through enhanced awareness regarding costs for service 
provision; by enhancing welfare making public providers more accountable and 
responsive to consumers‟ demands and preferences, thus improving resource allocation 
(Blöchliger 2008). 
MTM represents a rather broad concept which, referring to the OECD very 
comprehensive definition, encompasses ‟all arrangements where at least one significant 
characteristic of market is present‟ (Blöndal 2005). Specifically in the area of service 
provision this production model is featured by a shift in the role of public sector actor as 
services purchaser and providers: if traditionally it performs both roles concurrently, the 
implementation of market-type mechanism leads to significant management challenges 
following the separation of the two roles between public and private sector 
organisations, giving rise to different configurations. Market-type tools indeed range 
from outsourcing (contracting out) to public-private partnership (PPP) and vouchers. 
17 
Despite all the three instruments inherently refer to a private/external provision of 
public services, they differ for the purchasing procedure on the public sector side as 
elucidated below. 
Outsourcing has been variously defined by scholars and practitioners: the OECD 
broadly defines it as „the practice whereby government contracts with private sector 
providers for the provision of services‟ (Blöndal 2005:131). The notion of contracting 
out differs from the idea of public-private partnership widely defined as „more or less 
sustainable cooperation between public and private actors in which joint products or 
services are developed and in which risks, costs and profits are shared‟ (Klijn and 
Teisman 2005: 96). The distinctiveness between the two policies is rather clear-cut: if 
outsourcing implies public organizations bearing the risks of providing the services 
while financial profits pertain exclusively the external contractors, on the other side PPP 
embodies not only the sharing of risks and costs associated with the provision and the 
delivery of services, but public and private organisations also share profits and 
resources which are connected with these products (Van Ham and Koppenjan 2001). 
Economic partnership represents a further institutional model of market-type 
mechanism for the provision of public services, mainly exploited for infrastructures 
development. Private Finance Initiative (PFI), the best-known version of this kind of 
partnership, „involves the use of private finance in the construction, operation and 
maintenance of public infrastructure‟ (Greve and Hodge 2007:180) which is expected to 
be cheaper and quicker than would otherwise have been in case of public finance. In 
addition PFI allows public sector institutions to benefit from private sector expertise and 
innovation capacity, enabled by the mutual learning and sharing of competences which 
take place in joint projects (Pollitt 2005). Private Finance Initiative sharply differs from 
outsourcing process in the source of financing: if in the former case the contract 
establishes a private financing of the projects, conversely in the latter the public 
organization awards the contract to the winning external provider, providing financial 
endowment for the provision of services.  
Vouchers system splits the provision of the public services from their financing. In this 
case, funding remains in government hands in the form of vouchers that are 
subsequently issued to individual citizens, entitling them to exchange the voucher for 
services. Each voucher-holder has the possibility of choosing among a range of different 
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suppliers and paying with the voucher. Even though the voucher-system implies a 
private provision of the service, the funding mechanism completely differs from 
contracting out, as well as the choice of external provider which lies in the hands of 
citizens/users in case of voucher while the decision is taken by the public bureaucrats 
during outsourcing processes. 
A further clarification is necessary in order to frame more specifically the field under 
investigation: internationally indeed, particularly in the United States, the terms 
privatisation and contracting out are often used synonymously, despite they indicate 
rather distinct phenomena (Domberger and Jensen 1997). Privatisation policies entail 
the decision to transfer a physical asset from public to private ownership (Jensen and 
Stonecash 2005): distinctiveness is represented by the shift of ownership of the specific 
asset in privatisation processes, whilst in case of outsourcing the public sector keeps on 
maintaining the ownership, transferring exclusively the responsibility to manage the 
asset in the hand of private sector, thereby splitting asset ownership from service 
provision.  
In a nutshell, public sector contracting out involves „the transfer of service provision 
from the public to an external organization (which is typically in the private sector but 
may also be an in-house team)‟ (Jensen and Stonecash 2005:769) which is done by way 
of a competitive tendering as guarantee of transparency and accountability. The extent 
to which competition is promoted through these policies represents a second distinctive 
feature: if on the one hand outsourcing deliberately implies opening up to competition 
an array of economic activities which were previously immune from it under the 
monopoly of public sector provision, on the other hand external providers may or may 
not operate in a competitive environment. So in case of outsourcing government 
promotes an ex-ante competition among bidders to award the contract for service 
provision, hence a competition for (entering) the market; in the privatisation policies 
competition is in the market itself, largely depending on the economic structure of the 
industry outside public boundaries. A third remarkable difference between the two 
policies concerns the length of the contract. Outsourcing contract lasts for a 
predetermined time lapse, specifying the date at which the arrangement ceases: thereby 
it enables public sector contractor to retain control over contract specifications, entitled 
to assess service provision and to apply sanctions in case of non-fulfilment of contract 
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obligations by external provider. Privatisation, conversely, implies a once-and-for-all 
sale of a publicly-owned asset in which government cedes any entitlements over the 
asset, retaining only regulatory control. 
Thus, narrowing the scope to purposes of the present analysis, research attention is 
focused on contracting out as market-type mechanism belonging to the wide family of 
NPM-inspired reforms of public administration, described as a form of procurement 
where „one organisation contracts with another for the provision of a particular good or 
service‟ (Asher 1987). In the specific case, we refer to public sector organizations – 
local authorities, hospitals, schools, ministries – as purchasers which buy a service in 
the market instead of providing it in-house. In such context, the definition of external 
provider includes organizations ranging from private providers, to charities, mutual and 
coops, organizations from the voluntary sector, to charities and joint-stock companies or 
special firms partly or fully owned by a public organisation.  
Accordingly, outsourcing is defined as the transfer of service provision from the public 
sector to an external organization, but retaining public financing of the activity and 
keeping the overall responsibility for performing the function (OECD/PUMA 1993, 
Jensen and Stonecash 2005). Under contracting out arrangement, indeed, public sector 
organizations continue to bear direct responsibility both for the provision and for the 
quality of the service. Moreover, they keep the duty to finance the service, although the 
work is actually carried out by workers not directly employed in the public sector. 
 
Figure 2.1 Outsourcing as a market-type mechanism 
  
PRODUCTION 
  Public Private 
FINANCING 
Public 
In-house 
Provision 
Outsourcing 
Voucher 
Private User charges Privatisation 
Source: OECD/PUMA 1993, Cepiku 2006. 
Figure 2.1 recaps the main market-type mechanisms applied by public bureaucracies for 
the provision of services, clustering them on the basis of two core dimensions: the 
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source of financing and the type of production which could be alternatively public or 
private. Outsourcing, as already mentioned, is featured by public financing combined 
with private provision of services (OECD/PUMA 1993, Cepiku 2006). 
 
2.1.2 Industrial relations perspective 
Contracting out represents a longstanding debate in industrial relations field as well, 
tracing its origins back to the scrutiny of restructuring processes. Restructuring in fact 
has become a permanent feature of economic development in Europe, concerning both 
private companies and the public administrations, inasmuch both sectors must adapt to 
altered external conditions in order to remain sustainable and effective in the provision 
of services. In recent years restructuring towards outsourcing has increasingly spread 
across European governments, intensified across public sub-sectors and varied in the 
kind of services involved driven by growing financial constraints, shifts in users‟ 
preferences and demands and the search for greater flexibility in service delivery. 
Restructuring however constitutes a multifaceted process which comprises a variety of 
forms responding to different pressures: some of them „have a strategic, proactive 
character while others are more reactive and operational‟ (Eurofound 2013: 5). 
According to the European Restructuring Monitor, an observatory promoted by the 
Eurofound which records all large-scale restructuring events in EU member states, 
restructuring types may be classified as follows: 
 
• (avoiding) bankruptcy/closure: when a business goes bankrupt or it is closed for 
economic reasons, or when trying to prevent bankruptcy or closure; 
• business expansion because of, for example, insourcing: the development of new 
products or services or attracting new customers, including internationalisations; 
• internal restructuring, not covered by any of other types, such as business 
transfer/succession, diversification or change of organizational structures; 
• merger and acquisition: when two companies merge or one company buys 
another; 
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• offshoring/delocalization: when a business‟s activity is relocated or outsourced 
abroad; 
• outsourcing: when a business‟s activity is subcontracted to another company 
within the same country 
• relocation: when the activity stays within the same company, but is relocated to 
another location within the same country. 
 
As easily deducible, within public sector boundaries only few restructuring types are 
applicable or empirically adopted, given that the clusters have been shaped over private 
sector companies. Narrowing the scope for sake of clarity, this study focuses on 
restructuring towards outsourcing, namely when an activity or a service is subcontracted 
to an external company within the country. 
 
 
2.2 Rationales of outsourcing 
 
As anticipated above, starting from the 1980s public sector organisations, likewise 
private firms, involved in the provision of increasingly complex services under strict 
constraints of budget reduction systematically adopted restructuring policies towards 
outsourcing. But despite common analytical roots on which outsourcing is grounded on 
in both public and private sectors, the strategic decision to buy a service in the 
marketplace instead of producing it in-house taken by a public administration inherently 
stands out from a private enterprise according to sectorial distinctiveness. The first 
overwhelming difference regards the ultimate goal the two sectors pursue: if private 
firms are clearly profit-oriented conversely public bureaucracies, despite financial 
constraints they are subject to, are primarily concerned in universally providing public 
services to the whole citizenry on behalf of the state. The nature of decision-makers 
marks a second relevant point of distinction. Managers involved in a private company‟s 
restructuring might expect personal increasing returns stemming from this process, 
being themselves the owner or having direct responsibility of running the firm. 
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Conversely in the case of bureaucracies public managers cannot individually benefit 
from outsourcing policies, excluding of course the illegal practices of corruption to get 
the contract awarded. In the third place, unlike private companies‟ freedom in managing 
restructuring contracts, in term of both duration and selection of external provider, 
public administrations have to guarantee transparency in the process and accountability 
in the investment of public funds by setting a public tender of the services at issue. 
Postulated these premises, it emerges a complex web of driving forces and constraints 
underlying outsourcing within the public context, much complex than in private 
enterprises. So the following section seeks to provide a satisfactory response to the 
question of which variables do underlie the decisional process leading to outsource 
services in public organisations. In other words, which factors are more likely to affect 
such strategic choice? 
 
2.2.1 From the orthodoxy of classic economics to public choice perspective 
Traditionally, economic literature grounds investigation regarding outsourcing over the 
dichotomous choice whether to carry out service production in-house, keeping internal 
the whole stream of intermediate products and processes successively combined to form 
the final output, or alternatively to contract service provision out, delegating the task to 
external providers. The decision to perform an activity inside or outside the boundaries 
of the organisation (Doellgast and Gospel 2012) directly refers to the longstanding 
„make or buy‟ strategic choice (Coase 1937, Williamson 1975) each private and public 
organisation has to cope with. Thus organisations involved in such empirical dilemma 
are pushed to evaluate under which circumstances it is more convenient to produce the 
service by themselves and in which cases conversely it is suggested to buy it externally. 
Despite several factors are likely to affect the outcome of such decision, ranging from 
economic considerations, to the need of higher flexibility during the production process, 
or the possibility to access expertise and know-how not available inside the organization 
˗ just to mention few prevailing rationale (Blöndal 2005) ˗, literature agrees in 
considering cost savings the overriding reason explaining outsourcing strategic choice 
(Domberger et al. 1986, Domberger and Rimmer 1994, Prager 1994, Greene 1996, 
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Domberger and Jensen 1997, Vining and Globerman 1999, Savas 2000, Quiggin 2002, 
Doellgast and Gospel 2012, Young and Macinati 2012).  
Indeed, according to neoclassical theory of the firm (Coase 1937) the primary objective 
each organisation pursues buying a service from an external provider instead of 
providing it in-house is to reduce costs: in Coase‟s model, assuming a perfect 
knowledge of all variables at stake and firms endowed with full rationality, 
organisations are able to choose whether to „make or buy‟ a product simply comparing 
the costs related to the internal production with market price offered by external 
providers. But individual or organization attempting to implement this model ˗ perfectly 
functioning in traditional economic theory ˗ in a real situation would be unable to 
comply with all requirements imposed by the rational decision-making. Not only it is 
highly improbable that a firm could know all the alternatives in the market, or all the 
consequences that follow choosing each alternative, but it might also be unable to 
accurately and effectively rank or order all available alternatives and to compare them 
rationally, namely having clear in mind that ranking is subject to transitivity assumption 
(Simon 1947). 
As a consequence literature started questioning this neoclassical economy‟s theorisation 
concerning firms by putting forward the bounded rationality assumption on the one side 
(Simon 1947) while on the other side by taking into account constraints that 
organisations are likely to encounter when they deal with individual interest. 
Introducing these perspectives imposes to organisations, coping with make-or buy 
dilemma, the consideration of further factors beyond the mere differential in prices. 
Similar assumptions, postulating a misrepresentation of individuals‟ interests involved 
in service production processes had been put forward systematically for the first time by 
public choice theorists (Tullock 1965, Downs 1967, Niskanen 1971, Buchanan and 
Tollison 1984). The lucky expression coined by James Buchanan „politics without 
romance‟ accurately depicts the theoretical foundation underpinning this stream of 
analysis: „public choice theory has been the avenue through which a romantic and 
illusory set of notions about the workings of governments and the behavior of persons 
who govern has been replaced by a set of notions that embody more skepticism about 
what governments can do and what governors will do, notions that are surely more 
consistent with the political reality that we may all observe about us‟ (1984:11).  
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Origins of this school of thought can be traced back to theoretical gap acknowledged in 
political economy: more specifically, following prominent scholars‟ argument what was 
missing in the discipline was the adoption of an economic approach to the analysis of 
collective choice-making in political realm (Buchanan 2003). Thus, the backbone of 
public choice theory is built on the application of methods and tools developed within 
the economic theory to the realm of political or government analysis and to the public 
economy sector. For the present analysis, economic theory might be defined as a body 
of research that enables to intertwine the individual behaviour of market agents ˗ as 
buyers, sellers or producers ˗ and the outcomes resulting for the whole community: 
importantly, these collective results do not belong to the purposes or knowledge driving 
each individual choice (Buchanan and Tollison 1984). Going back to public choice 
theory, it engaged in relating the behaviour of individual agents in political realm ˗ so to 
say choices each individual makes in the government sector fulfiling various tasks, as 
voter, politician, candidate for office, leader of a political party or bureaucrat ˗ to the 
intertwined and complex outcomes resulting for the whole society: in other words, it 
„attempts to offer an understanding, an explanation, of the complex institutional 
interactions that go on within the political sector‟ (Buchanan and Tollison 1984:13).  
As evident, this approach grounds on methodological individualism since it incorporates 
individual behaviour and motivation as linchpins of the analysis: the basic unit is the 
individual acting, choosing and behaving according to his own preferences. Moreover, 
coherently with the assumption derived from the orthodox economic theory of markets, 
each individual owns separate preferences and different goals both in their private and 
their social actions: public choice theory assumes each agent being separated from all 
the others. 
Posit these theoretical foundations, a fundamental postulate of public choice approach is 
that individual behaviour is motivated primarily by self-interest rather than altruism: it 
follows the behavioural assumption that each agent in governmental sector acts as 
utility maximizer. According to theory of the market adopted in economic field of 
study, utility maximization implies the individual definition of utility function, a set of 
preferences describing possible trade-off among alternatives for potential choice. 
Traditionally, on the contrary, political scientists were not likely to adopt such 
economic approach to collective activity: neglecting any analysis of individual 
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behaviour in terms of economic calculus, they more often grounded on the assumption 
that political agents, acting in the pursuit of collective choice, seek to maximize the 
public interest or the common good rather than their own utility (Buchanan and Tollison 
1984).  
Thus agent participating in political decisions, who is a voter or a bureaucrat, embodies 
the homo oeconomicus model featured by full rationality and selfishness, the latter to be 
intended as the desire to maximize his own utility. Full rationality hypothesis assumes 
that each individual is able to rank and order all potential choices that may be placed 
before him in a transitive manner: accordingly a bureaucrat is said to be rational when, 
following his rank of preferences, „chooses “more” rather than “less” and when he is 
consistent in his choices‟ (Buchanan and Tullock 1962:33). 
Adopting public choice approach to bureaucratic decision-making, as a result public 
officials likewise all the other agents in society or in the market, are motivated in their 
behaviour by their own interest (Downs 1967), rationally seeking to attain their goals 
which include income, power, prestige, security, convenience and loyalty, ranked 
differently according to individual preferences. Among other functions and tasks, 
government officials are responsible for providing public services by spending money, 
without being entitled to collect taxes for financing the provision: as a result public 
services are over-supplied and public administrations over-staffed since bureaucrats and 
politicians during the political decision-making process, assumed to behave selfishly, 
exploit service provision as a tool to maximize their own interest or utility (Savas 1987, 
Alonso et al. 2013). Downs‟ analysis „Inside bureaucracy‟ clarifies the reason why the 
public provision of services is inefficient and oversupplied according to public choice 
approach: „since the officials are rewarded for providing better services, and since all 
services could be improved by spending more money, they are encouraged to expand 
their bureaus through greater spending‟ (1964:24). This outcomes is even eased by the 
discretionary power that officials enjoy in taking such spending decision (Buchanan and 
Tollison 1984). Public choice approach took a critical attitude towards the traditional 
arrangements whereby government provide public services, arguing for the introduction 
of incentives or a system of constraints in order to redirect bureaucrats behaviour and 
motivation towards public interest (Boyne 1998). Accordingly they advocate for a 
competitive environment among potential service providers on the grounds that it 
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allows to improve efficiency and reduce costs (Niskanen 1971): competitive pressures, 
as those featuring outsourcing, indeed shift officials‟ decision-making from a 
bureaucratic setting, essentially shielded from market pressures in which they may act 
as utility maximizers and over-supplying services, to a market-setting characterised by 
pressure of competition and the discipline of private sector (Downs 1967, Boyne 1998, 
Cohen 2001, Fernandez et al. 2007, Alonso et al. 2013). William Niskanen in his study 
concerning the „peculiar economics of bureaucracy‟ (1968) investigated, by comparison 
with other forms of economic organization exposed to the same conditions, what 
changes might enable public organisations to boost efficiency in service production, 
given the theoretical assumption that bureaucrats‟ action is driven by the desire to 
maximize their utility through service provision. The scholar promotes three workable 
solutions: „first, and probably most interesting, bureaucratic provision of these goods 
and services could be maintained, but each bureau would operate in a competitive 
environment and face highly elastic demand function. […] Second, the incentives of 
bureaucrats could be changed to encourage them to minimize the budget for a given 
output or a set of outputs. […] Third, the type of goods and services now provided by 
bureaus could be financed through government or foundations as in now the case, but 
the provision of these services would be contracted to private, profit-seeking economic 
institutions‟ (1968:304-5). To summarise, public choice theory endorses outsourcing as 
a tool to brake bureaucrats‟ opportunistic behaviours, since it imposes competitive 
pressures and market constraints to their decisions. 
So opening public services provision to market competition enables to boost efficiency, 
introducing the pressure of competition and the discipline of private sector. 
But despite the overwhelming apologia of outsourcing by public choice advocates as a 
way to cope with inefficiency, deemed as inherently featuring all bureaucracies because 
of their incentive structures that encourage overproduction (Greene 1996), some 
critiques emerged grounding their counter-arguments on different conceptual bases. An 
harsh criticism concerns the presumption incorporated in public choice approach that 
consider human nature intrinsically selfish and lacking of any ethical and moral 
restraint: this pessimistic view is counter-balanced by the idea that individuals are 
differently motivated when they have to deal with collective decisions involving public 
interest as in political realm, rather than when they act in markets for personal purposes. 
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Thus if public choice theorists contend that „persons do not readily become economic 
eunuchs as they shift from market to political participation‟ (Buchanan 2003:17), this 
model seems to have over-emphasized officials‟ motivation to maximize their interest 
(Boyne 1998). 
 
2.2.2 Transaction costs approach 
As anticipated above, a classical argument for outsourcing services is that it saves 
government public funds: nevertheless such market relation may generate additional 
costs which are absent when goods and services are publicly provided. Scepticism of 
this kind has been expressed by transaction costs economists: Williamson identified an 
array of transaction costs which consist of those costs incurred by an organisation when 
opts for buying resources in the market instead of using its own goods, separated from 
production costs. In other words transaction costs concern the use of market pricing 
mechanisms, such as costs related to writing a contract, monitoring the correct 
implementation of the contract, or supervising the external contractors‟ behaviour 
(1975). Advocates of such approach in their turn posit optimal governance mechanism 
for achieving economy efficiency in services provision as the one that enables to 
minimize these costs of exchange (Williamson 1979).  
As multidisciplinary field of investigation, transaction costs theory focuses on the role 
of institutions and economic organisations in achieving efficiency maximization for 
firms and economic systems. It traced its origins back to the work of Ronald Coase, 
who is credited as the first introducing the concept of transaction cost in economic 
theory through his seminal contribution on the nature of the firm (1937). In addressing 
two fundamental questions concerning why do firms exist and for what reason the 
whole production of an asset is not concentrated into a single large firm, Coase 
identified transaction costs as explanatory variable.  
This insight was subsequently further developed by Oliver Williamson starting from the 
„60s, who innovatively investigated circumstances where market transactions are likely 
to fail and instead internal organisation is preferred (1979), adopting transaction costs as 
critical dimension in the choice of different governance structures.  
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Accordingly transaction ˗ rather than commodity ˗ is taken as basic unit of analysis, 
defined as the transfer of a good or service across technologically separable interfaces 
(Williamson 1981). Thus transaction costs correspond to those misunderstandings, 
frictions and conflicts occurring between the partners involved in the exchange that give 
origin to inefficiency and drawbacks during the execution of the transaction, leading to 
information, bargaining and control costs. Taking into account this theoretical premise 
the transaction costs discipline, after a comparison of feasible alternative modes of 
organisation, identifies the most suitable conditions of transactions governance 
grounding on a criterion of efficiency maximization (Williamson 1999). The ultimate 
purpose still remains economizing, to be intended in this case as transaction costs 
minimization. 
This approach to the study of institutions and organisations applies to three levels of 
analysis: at the macro-level it has been applied to the overall organisational structure of 
the firm (unitary, holding company, multidivisional forms); at the middle level it refers 
to the operating parts of the enterprise, investigating which tasks should be performed 
inside the organisation and which outside; finally at micro-level, the analysis concerns 
the way in which human assets are organised (Williamson 1981). For the present 
analysis, gaze is focused on the intermediate level, that is to say to the application of 
transaction costs theory to the make-or-buy strategic dimension that organisations have 
to take into account: in this way efficient boundaries of the firm are defined, 
ascertaining under which conditions „outsourcing (procurement of a good or service in 
the market) experienced contractual problems that could potentially be relieved by 
taking the transaction out of the market and organizing it internally‟ (Williamson 
2012:19). Once the vertical integration dilemma (in more mundane terms, the make-or-
buy choice) is posed, it inherently follows that firm and market have to be interpreted as 
the alternative governance structures at stake whereby order is infused, as a mean to 
mitigate potential conflicts in the relations and that allows to realize mutual gains 
(Commons 1932). This early categorization of modes of governance has been 
subsequently complemented by hybrid organisational structures beside the pure forms 
of hierarchy and market. 
These alternative governance forms differ along three key structural dimensions: 
intensity of incentives, capability to exert administrative control and capability to adapt 
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to disturbances. Market governance is endowed with high-powered incentives able to 
strictly bound agents‟ effort and reward, a high degree of autonomous adaptability 
(Hayek 1945) ˗ namely unilateral adaptability which does not require any coordination 
between the two partners involved ˗ whilst it lacks the capacity to exert hierarchical 
control. On the other side hierarchy combines low-powered incentives with an extensive 
administrative control and a coordinated, or bilateral, adaptability to disturbances 
(Barnard 1938). 
Likewise in public choice theorization, agents‟ features are supposed to influence the 
suitability of one governance structure rather than another: according to the behavioural 
assumption indeed the attributes of human actors that bear crucially are bounded 
rationality and opportunism. Given these cognitive and self-interest characteristics 
embedded in exchange environment featured by complexity and uncertainty, it 
necessarily follows that all contracts are unavoidably incomplete since it is barely 
feasible to cope with all contractually relevant aspects (Williamson 1981). 
The propensity for a specific governance structure is additionally affected by a set of 
critical dimensions featuring transactions of all sorts: frequency of exchange, 
uncertainty and asset specificity. The first variable, frequency of transactions, refers to 
buyer activity in the market and can be characterized as one-time, occasional and 
recurrent, whilst uncertainty involves the environmental disturbances to which 
transactions are subject and which may produce transaction costs by increasing the time 
and the processes an organisation requires to control for environmental diversity. The 
third feature, asset specificity, is nevertheless the most relevant dimension for 
describing transaction: it may arise under three shapes namely site, physical asset or 
human asset specificity. Site specificity relates to strategic location of firms so as to 
minimize transportation costs; physical asset specificity occurs when a specialized tool 
or machinery is required to produce a component; and finally human asset specificity 
refers to specific know-how and skills arising from learning by doing. The reason asset 
specificity is crucial as a dimension grounds on the fact that it constitutes a source of 
bilateral dependency: once an investment has been made in one of the assets with great 
specificity, buyer and seller are incentivized to design a long-term exchange relation 
and to fulfil the terms of the contract. Symmetrically, high asset specificity locks both 
agents into the transaction to a significant degree (Williamson 1981). 
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Outcome following the strategic choice between firm or market, hence between in-
house production or outsourcing, under the lens of transaction costs approach heavily 
depends on the intertwined combination of all these critical dimensions. Accordingly if 
assets present a high degree of specificity associated with increasingly environmental 
uncertainty, hierarchy results to be the most suitable governance structure able to 
minimize transaction costs. Internal production indeed drastically reduces agents‟ 
incentives to sub-optimize or to defect in a bilateral relation, it ensures an easier and 
more complete access to all relevant information concerning the transaction both for 
monitoring its implementation and when dispute settling is necessary and, additionally, 
it enables to better manage uncertainty, also by means of the possibility to exert 
administrative control. 
Conversely, whereas transactions are less frequent and asset specificity is low a more 
flexible organisational form better maximize efficiency in the transaction, such as the 
market which enjoy advantage in both production costs respect since economies of scale 
might be more fully exploited, and in governance costs respect inasmuch external 
procurement allows to avoid some hazards to which in-house production is subject 
(Williamson 1981).  
Unlike public choice approach purposely defined also as a government failure theory 
(Buchanan and Tollison 1984) which claimed for an inherent superiority of the market 
upon the internal public provision of services, Williamson adopting the transaction costs 
lens endorsed that bureaucracy may be well advised to keep on providing some goods 
and services under specific circumstances. Hence public administration is contemplated 
instrumentally, as an alternative transactions governance structure well-suited for some 
purposes, poorly suited in other contexts. 
For instance, with regard to contracting out transactions costs such as asymmetric 
information, costs related to writing specifications and contracts, evaluating tenders, 
cost related to the management and supervision of contracts might eventually outweigh 
the expected cost reduction following outsourcing, making in-house provision more 
appropriate rather than the market solution. Moreover, note that „the common practice 
of condemning public bureaus because they have lower-powered incentives, more rules 
and regulations […] than are associated with a counterpart private bureau completely 
misses the point. Those features have been deliberately crafted into public bureau 
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thereby giving it the desired governance result. The appropriate concern is not that 
public bureaus have these properties but that public bureaus will overreach ˗ in that they 
will be used to govern both those transactions for which they are well-suited and those 
for which they are poorly suited‟ (Williamson 1998:46). 
The incentives to shift exchange from hierarchy to market under specific circumstances 
endorsed by transaction costs theory proponents however might encounter long-term 
pervasive difficulties linked to contractual relations‟ inefficiency and incompleteness. 
Due to the dynamic nature of contractual relationship indeed the terms of exchange may 
change over time following indexation to inflation or variations could be required to 
account for unforeseen external events occurring. Moreover, given the high complexity 
of contractual relations not only it is impossible to anticipate every possible contingency 
when drafting a contract, raising the need to renegotiate the initial conditions with 
associated costs, but it would also be prohibitively costly to include them all within a 
complete contract. Under these circumstances private external contractors ˗ with their 
incentives to maximize profits ˗ may take the opportunity to increase the price they 
charge to public organisations for the provision of services during the course of contract 
renegotiation (Alonso et al. 2013). This phenomenon involving the appropriation of 
economic rent from the bureaucracy is referred to in the literature as „hold-up‟ (Jensen 
and Stonecash 2005). Accordingly if outsourcing should be associated to a public 
expenditure reduction in the first instance, over the long term these potential savings 
may be reversed, diminishing or even disappearing following the opportunistic 
behaviour of private firms which raise prices (Schmalensee 1979, Williamson 1979). 
Vertical integration as governance structure of a firm, associated with all goods and 
services being produced internally rather than outside, should be adopted as mechanism 
for coping with a hold-up problem (Holmström and Roberts 1998). Alternatively the 
public organisation has always the option to return to the market for re-tendering the 
service provision to a different external provider, but incurring in further transaction 
costs which may result to be higher than the loss incurred during contract renegotiation, 
endowing supplier with additional bargaining power within the contractual relationship 
(Jensen and Stonecash 2005). 
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2.2.3 Agency relationships and the principal-agent dilemma 
The thorny problem of policing opportunistic behaviour by external contractors is 
highlighted by the agent theory, another stream of research within the organisational 
economics dealing with factors affecting make-or-buy strategic choice.  
Scholars adhering to this research framework are mostly concerned with resolving two 
problems inherently affecting agency relationship, namely all those situation where one 
party (the principal) delegates tasks to another party (the agent): the agency problem 
and the risk sharing (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Agency problem has to do with 
principal‟s impossibility of constantly monitoring that the agent behave appropriately, 
issue emerging when the two parties present different goals and desires, while risk 
sharing is directly related to different risk preferences characterizing the two parties at 
stake (Eisenhardt 1989). 
From these theoretical issues, agency theory developed along a twofold path, the 
positivist approach and, more importantly as analytical background for the present 
analysis, the principal-agent theory (for further details over the distinctiveness between 
the two streams see: Jensen 1983). 
The point at issue in principal-agent model is the „shirking-information problem‟ (Moe 
1984), namely information asymmetries featuring each contractual relationship. More 
specifically, two fundamental problems whose potential is inherent in all contracting 
relations are at the heart of this theoretical framework: adverse selection and moral 
hazard. In the course of market processes indeed undesired or ineffective outcomes are 
likely to occur when buyers and sellers have asymmetric information or when 
information, values and belief on which decisions of the counterpart are based on are 
unknown: as a consequence the wrong contractor is likely to be picked, or one unable to 
provide the desired product, since the competitive tendering might attract a 
disproportionate number of low-quality or unqualified external providers. These are the 
implications following adverse selection. Instead moral hazard constitutes a form of 
opportunistic behaviour arising from the unobservability of actual actions in the ex-post 
contracting situation: accordingly moral hazard might occur where the behaviour of 
external contractor (the party with more information about its actions or intentions) may 
change to the detriment of the public administration (the party with less information) 
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after the transaction has taken place ˗ in this analysis the issue of the outsourcing 
contract (Barrow 1996). In a nutshell, the agent is shirking (Eisenhardt 1989). 
These two issues that all contractual relations inherently share are notably relevant for 
disentangling principal-agent dilemma, where one party, called an agent, acts on behalf 
of another party, called the principal: since the agent normally has more information 
about his own behaviour or intentions than the principal does ˗ unable to completely 
monitor the agent ˗ the former may have incentive to act inappropriately and misbehave 
as long as the interests of the two actors are not aligned (Moe 1984). Precisely, the 
principal-agent theory raised the problem within contractual relations of motivating the 
provider to act in the best interest of the outsourcer, pursuing the public bureaucracy‟s 
objectives rather than its own interests. According to this approach, such outcome is 
achievable as long as the incentives structure is efficiently designed in the contract, 
making such behaviour advantageous. Consequently, plausible solution for aligning 
agent‟s interests with those of the principal relies on the mitigation of information 
asymmetries through monitoring over agent‟s action and hierarchical control on the one 
side, while on the other side on the structuring of an effective reward system in order to 
incentivize collaborative behaviour.  
Hence the principal-agent theorization of vertical integration implies that contracting 
goods and services outside the organisation does not necessarily result to be the optimal 
solution, since private providers have strong incentives to misbehave in order to 
maximize their profit. Additionally, „although a competitive bidding process may reveal 
alternative estimates of service cost, information on the quality of service actually 
delivered remains asymmetrical‟ (Boyne 1998:700), conferring further power to 
external providers. Indeed once the service price has been agreed in the contract, the 
private provider may boost its profits by reducing service quality (Domberger and 
Hensher 1993), unlike public managers and politicians who do not gain any monetary 
rewards from opportunistic actions in case of in-house provision. 
As paradigmatic solution, public administration should opt for outsourcing when 
contractor “types” (reputations, expertise, honesty) are well known, service outputs are 
easily measured, and negotiations are not plagued by small-numbers problem. 
Knowledge of contractor type is necessary to minimize problems of adverse selection, 
whereby government is in danger of attracting inefficient or unreliable candidates; 
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measurability and thereafter monitoring are important if the government is to minimize 
moral hazard ˗ clearly a „distinct possibility with profit-maximizing producers who can 
keep whatever is not paid out to the government, and who may even be reimbursed for 
unnecessary expenditures and actions that were never taken; and small number points to 
a situation in which the government is ultimately boxed into negotiation with one or a 
few contractors, who, especially after some initial period of performance, have 
knowledge and skills so specialized that they become “irreplaceable” and are in a 
position to reap near-monopoly gains through hard bargaining‟ (Moe 1984:759-60). 
 
2.2.4 The resource-based view 
Despite economic evaluation has represented the prevailing theoretical argument 
explaining outsourcing deeply developed by organisational economists, a second reason 
pushing towards contracting out of public services is based on more strategic 
considerations put forward by scholars within the field of strategic management. The 
common thread underlying this research stream is investigating sources of sustained 
competitive advantage for firms (Porter 1985) by means of the definition and 
implementation of strategies which match firm‟s internal resources and skills, to cope 
with opportunities and risks created by the external environment (Grant 1991). More 
formally, the traditional framework for firm performance structuring this research strand 
suggests that firms might achieve sustained competitive advantages „by implementing 
strategies that exploit their internal strengths, through responding to environmental 
opportunities, while neutralizing external threats and avoiding internal weaknesses‟ 
(Barney 1991:99). The model has been widely developed during the 1980s by 
prominent scholars who mainly focused on the relationship between firm‟s strategy and 
external environment (Porter 1980, 1985), often neglecting the crucial role played by 
internal resources to strategy formulation for achieving competitive advantage.  
Consequently, the resource-based view emerged as a distinct discipline at the end of the 
1980s filling this gap within the strategic management field of investigation, ascribing 
the source of sustained competitive advantage to the internal bundle of valuable tangible 
or intangible resources at firm's disposal, rather than to its positioning and performance 
within the external environment (Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1991, Grant 1991, Peteraf 
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1993). Hence the focus is placed on firms‟ endowment of resources as trigger of long-
standing competitive advantage, on the relationship between profitability and resources, 
as well as on the most efficient way to manage firm‟s resource position over time 
(Wernerfelt 1984). Proponents of this approach accurately define resources as „anything 
which could be thought of as strength or weakness of a given firm‟ (Wernerfelt 
1984:172), which more formally means the whole bundle of tangible and intangible 
assets which in a given moment are tied to the firm, ranging from physical capital 
resources (capital, machinery, technology, firm‟s plant and equipment, raw materials), 
human capital resources (including workers and managers, but also knowledge, 
capabilities, training, experiences and relationships within the firm) and organisational 
capital resources (firm‟s formal reporting structure, controlling and coordinating 
system, its formal and informal planning) (Barney 1991). In order to enable firms to 
achieve sustained competitive advantage, namely a long-lasting position of superiority 
over its current or potential competitors within the same environment, resource-based 
view posit two fundamental assumptions: resources have to be featured by 
heterogeneity over time and imperfectly mobile across firms (Peteraf 1993). Indeed 
resources and capabilities distributed across firms are heterogeneous, each having 
intrinsically differentiated levels of efficiency and productivity which enable firms to 
compete in the market-place leveraging on different resources‟ endowment. We might 
expect from the model that firms with superior resources will earn rents unlike firms 
with marginal resources which can only expect to breakeven. Importantly this condition 
of heterogeneity might be persistent over time in order to effectively allow firms to gain 
a competitive advantage which is sustained. Imperfect mobility on the other side makes 
the resources tradable in the marketplace but more valuable within the firm that 
currently employ them, being somehow specialized to firm-specific need. As a result 
less valuable resources not readily transferable to other competitors remain bound to 
firm along the time as potential source of sustained competitive advantage (Peteraf 
1993).  
Barney (1991) complemented the resource-based view analytical framework by four 
further resources-related attributes which enable firm‟s manager to discern between 
high and low potential resources: in order to be source of competitive advantage 
resources must be first of all valuable, in the sense that they enable firm to implement 
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strategies for improving its efficiency by exploiting opportunities and neutralising risks 
and threats. Rarity in their disposal on the marketplace is an essential characteristic for 
implementing a value-creating strategy not concurrently replicable by the competitors 
lacking that specific rare resource. The same reasoning applies for the resources‟ 
condition of imperfect imitability: valuable and rare resources might lead to competitive 
advantage as long as firms that do not own those resources cannot obtain them in the 
marketplace or reproduce them. Finally the forth requirement for a resource to be a 
source of competitive advantage is the low degree of substitutability: this means that it 
may not be possible for a competitor neither to exactly imitate the resource or to replace 
it with an equivalent one.  
In order to maximize the potential profit that a firm can enjoy a five-stage procedure for 
the formulation of optimal strategy has been put forward by Grant (1991): (1) analysis 
of firm‟s resources; (2) evaluation of firm‟s capabilities; (3) appraisal of potential profit 
that firm can obtain from resources and capabilities; (4) selection of a strategy able to 
maximize this profit; (5) extension and upgrade of firm‟s resources and capabilities.  
At single firm level this theoretical model provides an analytical tool to efficiently cope 
with the make-or buy strategic choice, adopting the bundle of resources and capabilities 
that firms own and exploit as primary source of profit and efficiency maximization: the 
framework indeed allows to disentangle the theoretical conditions under which 
sustained competitive advantage might be achieved through the optimal allocation of 
resources (Barney 1991). According to this perspective firms should identify and 
differentiate between resources which support competitive advantage through their 
intrinsic attributes from other less valuable resources, featured by low potential. It 
necessarily follows that firms should keep internally and develop valuable, rare 
resources and capabilities, difficult to identify and understand, hardly imitable by other 
organisations, not replaceable in the marketplace and imperfectly transferable; whilst 
conversely they should be encouraged to trade or transfer to other competitors those 
resources endowed with low potential in term of value and rarity, easily replicable and 
perfectly transferable in the marketplace. The ultimate goal of the firm‟s action in the 
marketplace is to design a strategy which involves the most crucially important 
resources and capabilities and makes the most effective use of these core resources: the 
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resulting strategy may lead the firm to limit the scope of its performance simply to those 
activities wherein resources guarantee a clear competitive advantage (Grant 1991). 
According to the resource-based view public bureaucracy which aims to provide goods 
and services efficiently should firstly identify highly valuable strategic resources and 
competences it possesses internally, for then developing those related tasks in house; 
while less valuable and highly replaceable resources should be outsourced to external 
firms without affecting its own competitive advantage (Peteraf 1993, Cepiku 2006, 
Young and Macinati 2012). To summarise, the general point is that by analysing 
resources attributes and position an organisation, whether private or public, might reach 
a clear understanding of the optimal strategic allocation of resources and competences 
choosing which are worthwhile to maintain internal and which on the contrary have to 
be more efficiently transferred across borders as necessary condition to meet for a 
sustainable competitive advantage. 
The core competence view introduced by Prahalad and Hamel (1990) provides similar 
insight to efficiently afford the vertical integration issue, shifting the key source of 
competitive advantage on the so-called core competence. Core competence has been 
define as an harmonized combination of multiple resources and specific set of skills that 
distinguish a firm in the marketplace from the other competitors, since it represents a 
relevant source of uniqueness and distinction concerning a task or a product that a firm 
performs uniquely well and none of the other competitors can do in the same way. 
These competencies are built through a continuous process of improvement: they are 
enhanced as they are applied and shared by collective learning within the organisation. 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) provide three tests for identifying core competence in a 
firm: firstly it must provide potential access to a wide variety of markets in order to 
sustain a significant growth; second, it should make a significant contribution to the 
perceived customer benefits of the end product, influencing his choice towards that 
specific product or service; and finally it has to be difficult to imitate by competitors, 
allowing for a competitive advantage in the marketplace.  
Following the argument put forward by this managerial school of thought, to succeed in 
a competitive market firms should focus on their core competences and continually 
work to build and reinforce them, hence surrendering peripheral areas where they are 
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weak for shifting effort over further areas of strength: strongly developing core 
competence is more strategically efficient than vertical integration.  
Despite the core competence model has been theorized as analytical tool to investigate 
private companies‟ strategies, it powerfully applies to public administration as well: 
likewise private sector firms, bureaucracies should concentrate their activities on core 
tasks, sheltering and enhancing internal core competences. Peripheral competences 
might be outsourced or readily transferred to other organisations without eroding the 
core areas. 
To recap, the make-or buy dilemma might be solved by strategic management strategic 
model adopting outsourcing as a way to dismiss some functions where public 
bureaucracies do not hold any core competence in favour of focusing on activities in 
which they own key resources and skills (Brunetta, Giustiniano and Marchegiani 2014).  
Literature clusters firm‟s activities in a variety of way, all sharing the basic distinction 
between core and non-core tasks but each providing a classification grounded on 
different discriminatory criteria.  
The OECD (Blöndal 2005), taking into account the whole array of services which 
public administration might potentially outsource, divides them into three distinct 
groups according to their centrality for the bureaucracies‟ core mission and relevance:  
 
 blue collar support services are generally low-value activities, relatively labour-
intensive and not considered such critical to the firm‟s mission: they include for 
instance cleaning, facilities management, waste management and catering; 
 ancillary services to the core mission of the public administration which usually 
include high-value professional activities (such as ITC infrastructure 
management, human resources management, legal activities and financial 
services) which despite represent ancillary tasks their relevance is crucial for the 
complexity of services involved;  
 mainline functions regarding services considered inherently governmental as 
prisons management, emergency rescue and fire services, job placement 
agencies. Beside those activities clearly core in government‟s mission, further 
crucial services belong to this cluster such as in health care (diagnostic services, 
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rehabilitation, specialized hospital care) and welfare (home-care services, child 
welfare activities). 
 
Grounded on similar theoretical guidelines, D‟Autilia and Zamaro (2005) in their 
systematic comprehensive overview of outsourcing processes in the Italian public 
administration built a synthetic classification of public services involved in outsourcing 
processes, distinguishing them between input and output services. Input services, also 
called support or indirect services, are those whose production is instrumental, despite 
not less strategically relevant, to the provision of final service, whilst output or final 
direct services include all those services that each single administration provide outside, 
directly oriented and devoted to satisfy citizens or users‟ demands. Once again, the 
proximity and the strategic relevance to the organisation‟s core business mark the 
watershed between final and support services, as previously categorized by Porter as 
well (1985). He split up activities between primary and support, defining the former as 
those integral to the firm‟s value chain and the latter as processes facilitating the firm‟s 
value chain.  
Again, adopting a strategic approach to outsourcing, Insinga and Werle (2000) 
developed an analytical framework that each firm may adopt for conducting a 
systematic review of its resources and activities in order to establish an efficient 
strategic plan for outsourcing. The potential contribution to competitive advantage 
constitutes the key resource driving the classification of activities within the firm, and 
accordingly its make-or-buy choice related to each cluster of tasks. Hence, according to 
the specific attitude to generate competitive advantage activities are classified into four 
major categories:  
 
 commodity activities are not source of competitive advantage since they could 
be easily replaced in the marketplace thanks to their wide availability; 
 basic activities are necessary for the daily functioning of the firm but are not 
relevant in term of competitive advantage; 
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 emerging activities are potentially source of competitive advantage since the 
firm holds internal capabilities to perform the task; 
 key activities ensure a sustained competitive advantage to the firm in the 
marketplace. 
 
As rule of thumb, only key activities should be necessarily performed internally, while 
all the other types of tasks may be readily subject to outsourcing processes towards 
external providers without eroding firm‟s potential competitive advantage. This 
planning guide proposed by the two scholars as a tool to discern between high potential 
activities ˗ so the keep in-house ˗ and low potential ones ˗ well suited to be contracted 
out ˗ moved even further in reaffirming the crucial role of the former for company 
performance. Indeed in case a firm‟s capabilities and skills are weak in an area that 
proves to offer significant competitive advantage, it should invest to acquire that 
capability in-house given its relevance; conversely, if the firm is strong in performing 
commodity and emerging activities, not relevant for boosting competitive advantage 
then it should consider purchasing or transferring those activities outside its borders 
while getting value for past investments on them. 
 
2.2.5 The flexible firm model  
Another factor that authors from strategic management field of investigation propose as 
rationale for outsourcing relates to organizational flexibility (Roberts 2001, OECD 
2005, Brunetta et al. 2014). Likewise private firms operating in the competitive regime 
of marketplace, public bureaucracies might require some forms of internal flexibility for 
a more efficient service delivery. Organisational flexibility pursued by firms could be 
grouped into three types: functional, numerical and financial. Functional flexibility 
involves the rapid and smooth employees‟ redeployment between different tasks and 
activities following production method changes for instance; numerical flexibility 
instead concerns the possibility to increase or decrease the workforce in line with the 
firm‟s demand for labour: this necessarily implies a loosening in hiring and firing 
policies which require to be easily implemented. As a third complementary possibility, 
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firms may seek for flexibility in wage and remuneration, markedly diversifying pay 
scale between skilled and unskilled workers or introducing performance-related wage 
systems. The three forms of organizational flexibility are tightly intertwined and 
mutually affected by policy intervention for boosting one form rather than another.  
The seminal conceptualization of flexible firm model developed by Atkinson (1984) 
offers a further – much debated – functional framework which enables organisations to 
boost flexibility of all sorts.  
According to this model organisations should split their workforce between a relatively 
small core workers group, generally encompassing highly skilled employees performing 
key, firm-specific activities ˗ emphasis is placed on their potential to provide functional 
flexibility, loyalty and commitment to the firm‟s mission in return for strong 
employment protection ˗ and a large peripheral workforce with non-standard precarious 
working conditions, used to achieve financial and numerical flexibility. Hence 
peripheral labour force is exposed to market fluctuation, expanding when the market 
grows and declining as the growth contracts, whilst the core workforce is well sheltered 
from this kind of medium term variation. The implication for employees are rather 
clear-cut in term of restructuring processes: outsourcing policies are likely to involve 
peripheral activities in order to enhance numerical and, importantly, financial flexibility 
while the core workers kept in-house allow the firm to enjoy functional flexibility in 
exchange for full-time permanent contracts. 
 
2.2.6 The new institutionalist answers 
So far the analysis introduced all the bulk of theories belonging to new institutional 
economics and those related to strategic management field which deal with outsourcing 
through the lenses of the economic and strategic evaluation: contracting out is endorsed 
as an utility-maximizer tool when firm copes with the make-or-buy dilemma, clearly 
under specific conditions and in case of given circumstances extensively discussed 
above. Beyond economizing in all its shades an alternative rationale for explaining 
outsourcing is provided by the new institutionalism. The first fundamental assumption 
underlying this approach is the renewed emphasis placed on the role of institutions as 
structural feature of society, with some degree of stability over time, in affecting 
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individual behaviours (Peters 1999). The roots of this discipline grounded on an harsh 
critique of the individualistic assumption endorsed by rational choice theory and 
behaviourism approach which attributed a central role to individuals‟ capacity to act and 
decide autonomously, free from any social or institutional constraint. The counter-
argument lays on the view that individual agents are rather embedded in a complex 
environment made by relationships with other individuals, values, norms, formal and 
informal institutions which on the one side influence and on the other side constrain 
their action (March and Olsen 1984).  
New institutional approach aims to clarify the role that institutions play in determining 
social and political outcomes. It does not constitute a unified theoretical body, but 
conversely at least three different analytical approach have distinctively emerged (Hall 
and Taylor 1996, Thelen 1999): the historical institutionalism, the rational choice 
institutionalism and the sociological institutionalism. Despite these three schools of 
thought traced their origin back from a common reaction to behavioural perspective, 
they developed quite independently from each other. Specifically, the historical 
approach and the sociological one might provide fruitful insight for elucidating 
outsourcing decision.  
The basic argument being advanced by historical institutionalism was that to understand 
policy choices made by a government it is necessary to understand its policy and 
political histories (Hall 1986): indeed policy choice made in a specific institutional 
setting, namely when an institution is shaped, will inevitably have a widely determinate 
influence over the policy decisions that will follow. Institutions in this context are 
defined as the whole bundle of „formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and 
convention embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy‟ 
(Steinmo and Thelen 1992, Hall and Taylor 1996:938) which shape the relationship 
between actors in political and economic realms. As clearly stated, the boundaries of 
this definition expand to include not only formalized rules and structures, conversely 
accepting all the disparate set of informal rules, routines and social norms which 
markedly structure individual behaviour in the various segments of politics and 
economy (Peters 1999). A crucial role in the establishment of institutions is played by 
ideas: exerting an independent role, they constraint and limit the available range of 
acceptable decisions that agents might adopt, providing a set of ready solutions for each 
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policy problem arising in a specific domain. Accordingly, institution formation derives 
from the collective acceptance of an idea which consequently becomes embodied into 
the structural persistent form of an institution, influencing future policies. As 
anticipated, institutions as socially constructed entities ˗ in the sense that embody shared 
cultural understandings, cognitions and interpretative frames ˗ inevitably constitute a 
legacy of concrete historical processes (Thelen 1999) constraining all following actions 
and decisions. Indeed policies adopted at any time are inherently influenced by policy 
choices made earlier: as a result historical institutionalists argue that once the initial 
policy and institutional choice in a policy area is made, then the pattern emerging will 
persist over time structuring future policy choices through what it has been labeled path 
dependency (Nelson and Winter 1982, Hall and Taylor 1996, Pierson 2000). Path 
dependency as analytical tool has been widely exploited by scholars within this 
approach to explain the emergence of national distinctiveness in political economy of 
policy areas (Immergut 1992): indeed they rejected „the traditional postulate that the 
same operative forces will generate the same result everywhere in favour of the view 
that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the contextual features of a given 
situation often inherited from the past‟ (Hall and Taylor 1996:941). 
Translating this notion into the field currently under investigation, outsourcing policies 
could be read as strategic decisions embedded into a path dependent institutional 
context: once a specific pattern towards contracting out of services is taken by political 
actors involved, it is likely to become “locked in”, binding future make-or-buy 
decisions that agents have to cope with driving towards the same outsourcing path. As a 
result all relevant agents are expected to adjust their strategies to accommodate the 
prevailing institutionalized pattern, increasingly recurring to the market as alternative 
solution to the in-house provision of public services.  
A branch of historical institutionalism stressed the unintended outcomes and inefficient 
consequences generated by the legacy of consolidated institutions in contrast to a more 
rational choice-based decision-making according to which agents opt for the most 
efficient policy, able to modify their decision in order to maximize or at least satisfy 
their preferences. The question of institutional change indeed, namely the capacity of 
existing patterns to change, represent a thorny issue for historical institutionalists. 
Change has been theoretically treated through the concept of “punctuated equilibria” 
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(Krasner 1984): according to this approach institutions persist in an equilibrium state 
determined by enduring legacies following the initial seminal decision called point of 
punctuation (Peters 1999). This equilibrium is reversed as soon as a new punctuation 
occurs implying a „rapid bursts of institutional change followed a long period of stasis‟ 
(Krasner 1984:242) driven by the legacy dictated by the new emerging decision.  
Collier and Collier similarly elucidated the process of change in historical 
institutionalism through the notion of „critical junctures‟ (1991): according to these 
authors, periods of continuity and inertia driven by past legacy are punctuated by critical 
institutional events, represented by breaking points when substantial institutional 
change occurs (Krasner 1989, Ikenberry 1994), thereby opening a window of 
opportunity for a new path to emerge and consolidate itself.  
Going back to vertical integration dilemma, outsourcing processes might represent an 
enduring legacy following the initial political decision to contract out some services, 
constraining in that direction future policy decisions as well, up to the point where a 
breaking event takes places such as a change in the government in office which may opt 
for taking services back in-house, or a scandal occurs concerning tendering processes.  
A second fruitful application of new institutional approach is represented by the 
sociological perspective which enumerates a longstanding tradition of research 
concerning institutions (Peters 1999) tracing its origin back to the seminal work by Max 
Weber on the development of rational institutions in modernizing societies (1976). 
Within the sociological institutionalism field of study a variety of different approaches 
to institutions emerged: the present analysis devotes a brief discussion only to those 
perspectives having a specific relevance as explanatory theories to outsourcing 
decisions at comparative level. Despite internal differences, all these stream arose 
within the branch of organisation theory challenging the traditional theorization of 
institutions, particularly public institutions, seen as the product of a mere rational 
calculus to build the most efficient structure able to perform all those tasks related to the 
modern society. Against this, sociological institutionalists put forward the assumption 
that some institutional forms and procedures were not adopted by organisations simply 
as the most effective structure to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but 
conversely to conform to a diverse set of culturally-specific practices, „akin to myths 
and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organizations […] as a 
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result of the kind of process associated with the transmission of cultural practices more 
generally‟ (Hall and Taylor 1996:946). Given this premise, the core issue that scholars 
within this field typically address relates to search for explanations to elucidate why 
organisations adopt specific sets of institutional structures, procedures and symbols with 
a particular insight on the diffusion on similar practices across organizational 
boundaries and across countries.  
Beyond this consideration, three further characteristics constitute the common 
theoretical roots on which all the various approaches within sociological 
institutionalism are grounded, and that furthermore distinguish it from the other new 
institutionalisms. Firstly, institutions are much more broadly defined: without limiting 
the notion only to formal rules, practices and procedures it comprises also the varied set 
of structures related to culture such as symbol systems, morale templates and cognitive 
scripts that constitute a sort of cultural interpretative framework guiding agents‟ 
decisions and actions. The role of culture in explaining institutional structures is 
particularly emphasized. Secondly, sociological institutionalists stress the cognitive 
dimension of institutional impacts: through social constructivist analytical lenses 
institutions not only affects actors‟ behavioural choices, but importantly shape 
individuals‟ identity, their self-images and basic preferences. Accordingly decision-
making processes do not involve only a rational analysis for pursuing the maximization 
of own preferences, but it represent a way to express their deep believes and identity as 
well. Third, it adopts a distinctive approach for elucidating institutional practices 
establishment and change: unlike the efficiency assumption endorsed by other new 
institutional perspectives, sociological one posit that organisations implement a specific 
institutional form, usually widely valued within their particular cultural environment, as 
a way to boost the social legitimacy of organisation itself and its components. The focus 
of this approach is clearly on what confers legitimacy or social appropriateness to an 
institutional arrangements, neglecting all the debate concerning means-ends efficiency 
or utility maximization. Not least indeed scholars admitted that according to this body 
of thought inefficient institutional structures are seldom adopted and consolidated (Di 
Maggio and Powell 1983).  
A substantial version of sociological institutionalism evolved around the notion of 
institutional isomorphism as answer to why relatively akin institutional forms emerge in 
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different social and political settings (Di Maggio and Powell 1983). The fundamental 
paper by Di Maggio and Powell revisited the famous metaphor of “iron cage” 
developed by Weber for explaining why organizations get increasingly similar while 
they are evolving or changing, profoundly grounding the debate over the symbolic and 
cultural dimensions of organisations. According to the authors, organisations‟ structural 
change does not originate from the search for higher competitiveness or the need for 
efficiency but is rather the result of a process of homogenization, specifically „a 
constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units‟ 
(Hawley 1968) that face the same set of environmental constraints in a given 
organisational field. Accordingly, despite variations in the business goals, in the long 
run organisations ended up embedded in a constraining environment that limits their 
capacity to change freely, bounding the range of available scenarios at their disposal for 
changing and modifying their institutional structure. Hence once a practice becomes 
well established and collectively acknowledge, an inexorable pressure towards 
homogenization spreads across organisations which are pushed to adopt that practice 
rather than a different one, perhaps even less efficiently. The notion of isomorphism 
well synthetizes the process according to which individual organisational efforts „to deal 
rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead […] to homogeneity in structure, 
culture, and output‟ (Di Maggio and Powell 1983:147). The rationale for such outcome 
must be attributed to the institutional version of isomorphism (Kanter 1972) which posit 
that the major factors driving organizational decisions are the search for political power 
and social legitimacy. This assumption has been widely elucidated by Meyer and 
Rowan through the idea of legitimacy of rationalized formal structure as myth and 
ceremony (1977). According to these scholars organisations are pushed to adopt 
ceremonially prevailing structures institutionalized within the society and collectively 
acknowledge practices which work as powerful myths: in doing so they are likely to 
raise their legitimacy, gaining stability and enhancing survival prospect, even if this 
conformity process in the short run often conflicts with efficiency orientation. 
Accordingly the formal structure of organisations embedded in a specific environment 
inevitably become isomorphic with the institutionalized myths, to be intended as 
organizational practices which embody legitimacy on the ground of their rational 
effectiveness. Isomorphic adaptation with environmental institutionalized myths lead to 
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crucial consequences for organisations, since they may incorporate structures which are 
externally legitimized, rather than in terms of efficiency and utility maximization. 
Transposing the analytical frame regarding isomorphism to the empirical context of 
outsourcing decisions, it follows that public bureaucracies seeking an optimal solution 
for the provision of services will necessary be influenced by institutional environment 
in which they are deeply embedded. Once powerful organisations have forced the 
environment introducing outsourcing as a regular institutionalized practice, other 
organizations facing the same constraints will adjust their services provision 
accordingly. But isomorphic adoption of contracting out policies does not necessarily 
imply that it constitutes the most efficient structure in terms of utility maximization 
among the range of possibilities: indeed unlike forerunner adopters which „are 
commonly driven by a desire to improve performance‟ (Selznick 1957) in utilizing 
outsourcing as specific institutional structure for the provision of goods and services, as 
soon as this practice spreads a threshold is reached beyond which drawing upon the 
market provides legitimacy rather than boosting efficiency and reducing public 
expenditure. Competitive tendering, once institutionalized, is then perceived as a more 
legitimate or successful process for delivering services, despite the efficiency-related 
doubts of the acquired practice and procedures. 
Di Maggio and Powell however made a step further in identifying three mechanisms by 
which institutional isomorphic change may occur: coercively, mimetically and 
normatively. Coercive isomorphism, deriving from coercive formal and informal 
authority, is underway when pressures towards homogeneity are exerted by other 
organisations in the institutional environment, by cultural expectations within the 
society or by binding normative bodies. Mimetic isomorphism, conversely does not 
derives from authority‟s diktat, but is implemented as a response to environmental 
uncertainty or goals ambiguity: in other words copying other organisations‟ practices 
perceived as legitimated and successful serves as a quick response to new challenges or 
arising uncertainty to cope with. Finally normative isomorphism stems from 
professionalization, to be intended as „the collective struggle of members of an 
occupation to define the conditions and method of their work, to control the production 
of producers, and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational 
autonomy‟ (Larson 1977, Di Maggio and Powell 1983:152). 
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The same mechanisms apply to outsourcing practice as well. Contracting out might be 
preferred to in-house public provision because it could offers to public administration a 
quick viable response to the public debt or services‟ inefficiency, legitimized by the 
previous adoption in other public administrations to cope with the same problematic. 
Alternatively it may simply be coercively imposed by a new normative, as in the case of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering in the English municipalities, or more rarely 
outsourcing could be exploit by bureaucrats working in procurement offices as a tool to 
improve their status within the organisation.  
 
To summarise, the previous section has provided an overview of the complex web of 
drivers and rationales underlying the decision to outsource public services. Different 
conceptual bases have been suggested as underpinning these processes.  
Maximizing value for money in the provision of services constitute the prevailing 
reason to outsource gathered from the literature: public bureaucracies are likely to adopt 
this market-type tool on the basis of economic evaluation, since outsourcing is supposed 
to reduce government expenditure and boosting efficiency by the means of opening 
service provision to the competition of market discipline. Beyond financial pressures, a 
second reason to outsource stands from strategic considerations. Organisational 
flexibility indeed may be enhanced by focusing limited resources available on key areas 
and tasks, core for the business mission, and outsourcing all peripheral skills and 
services without undermining the competitive advantage of the organisation. 
Outsourcing might improve flexibility in the management of human resources as well, 
allowing to directly employ only those workers performing core activities, highly 
skilled and valuable to keep internal, whilst contracting out the bulk of peripheral 
workforce, usually low skilled and easily replaceable in the labour market. Flexibility 
by way of contracting out may lead also to have access to technology and expertise not 
available in-house to meet one-off needs or needs subjects to fluctuations in quantity 
over time. 
Unlike these rational calculus behind outsourcing policy, grounded on efficiency 
maximization, the make-or-buy choice might be instead driven by institutional pressures 
coming from the external environment. Outsourcing in this perspective becomes a 
cutting-edge policy to implement following the example of forerunner public 
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organisations or countries; a flag that political competitors may wave to gain legitimacy 
and support in occasion of electoral campaign; a symbolic policy to exploit for re-
allocate risks and responsibilities. In other circumstances furthermore outsourcing might 
simply be a bound choice, conditioned by previous decisions having long-term 
consequences: contracting out a service in fact could lead to loose internal skills and 
technology, making future back-sourcing potentially not feasible or particularly 
expensive. 
Finally outsourcing may be driven by ideology: traditionally indeed liberal political 
parties, in their endorsement of market virtues, have promoted the injection of private 
sector competition and discipline in the provision of public services as the panacea for 
public administrations‟ red tape and inefficiencies. This political orientation might be 
addressed also to public employment, as a way to purposely downsize it and reduce its 
cost (Quiggin 2002). 
Even though outsourcing may have several potential benefits, literature reports many 
disadvantages as well. Firstly, cost savings may be lower than expected and declining 
over the long term (Domberger and Rimmer 1994, Roberts 2001); moreover scholars 
started questioning not only the magnitude but even more importantly the actual source 
of this expenditure reduction (Jensen and Stonecash 2005). Savings might be only 
illusory following the emergence of transactions costs, so new costs related to writing 
and monitoring the contract, above all in small administrations. 
There are of course a number of positive factors acting in that direction as more 
efficient work practices, economies of scale, stronger incentives and rewards to increase 
productivity and new technologies but also fallouts. Cost savings indeed may be 
achieved at the expense of the quality of the output: according to this hypothesis 
efficiency and productivity are enhanced by outsourcing services but through a 
reduction in service quality, notably difficult to measure and monitor above all in the 
absence of hierarchical control (Quiggin 2002, Jensen and Stonecash 2005).  
Budgetary savings could arise through a deterioration in employment conditions rather 
than an improvement in input utilization (Domberger ad Jensen 1997, Blöndal 2005). 
Detrimental consequences for labour in general following restructuring processes 
increasingly entered the research agenda initially focusing on firms in the private sector 
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for then expanding to public bureaucracies as well. For its relevance, the issue deserves 
an accurate overview, provided in the next section.  
 
 
2.3 Impacts of outsourcing on labour 
 
Restructuring policies towards outsourcing represent a burdensome challenge for labour 
issues. On the one side contracting out is purposely exploited for downsizing internal 
workforce (Quiggin 2002), but on the other side even when the process is driven by 
strategic or financial purposes impacts of some sort on workers involved are almost 
unavoidable. Outsourcing indeed leads to the creation of intertwined links between 
public and private organisations, triggering a shift in organisational boundaries which 
become increasingly blurred and overlapped (Grimshaw et al. 2004). Tracing their 
origins back from private sector firms‟ vertical disintegration experiences, some 
literature streams give an account of how these inter-firms relationships impact directly 
on work organisation and employment conditions (Flecker et al. 2005, Flecker and Meil 
2010). 
 
2.3.1 The vale chain perspective 
The value-chain analysis (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986, Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 
1994) represents a useful analytical tool for disentangling how external restructuring 
processes impact on employment relations and on the quality of work. This field of 
investigation grounds on the increasing globalization and interconnectedness of 
production flows of good and services across national boundaries as new scenario for 
economic activities. Relevant sectors of production indeed are conducted within 
multinational firms or through governance structures that link enterprises and 
organisations together in a bulk of outsourcing and contracting arrangements, whose 
investigation requires a more comprehensive analytical framework which enables to 
take into account the nature of this web of links, how they are structured and managed, 
and their implications in terms of winners and looser in the process. 
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The starting point for understanding the changing configuration of inter-firm relations is 
contained in the notion of value chain developed by scholars in international business 
field. As expressed by the label, the core unit of analysis shifted from the individual 
firm to chain or organizational network defined as „the process by which technology is 
combined with material and labour inputs, and then processed inputs are assembled, 
marketed, and distributed‟ (Kogut 1985:15). Put in a more succinct way, it refers to „a 
network of labour and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity‟ 
(Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986:159). Within the value chain analysis a bulk of similar 
and overlapping definitions and concepts have proliferated, substantially different labels 
to discuss similar content as global commodity chains, value-added chain, production 
network. For the present analysis the value chain concept is adopted for being deemed 
as the most inclusive (Gereffi et al. 2001). 
The analytical framework relating to the idea of value chain is built as a network-based 
methodology for analysing patterns of production and the way in which value is created 
and distributed along the different segments of the chain and then appropriated by the 
various actors involved. In this perspective, production chain is understood as consisting 
not only of the phases involving the material production of the final good, but also as 
„webs connecting that set of productive activities with the social reproduction of human 
labor power as a critical input into this process‟ (Bair 2003:155-6).  
The cornerstone of this model is that each organisation should identify which activities 
and technologies keep in-house and which conversely are more suited to be outsourced 
to external providers as a way to upgrade its position within the marketplace. Facing the 
make-or-buy dilemma firms should alternatively adopt the most suited governance 
structure within a range of five basic configurations that Gereffi formalized in his 
seminal work on „the governance of global value chains‟ (2005): market, modular, 
relational captive and hierarchy. The choice of governance structure critically depends 
on three key determinants: the complexity of information required to sustain a particular 
transactions; the codifiability of information and requirements to transmit; the capability 
of suppliers in relation to those requirements. Market-type governance is expected when 
transactions are easily codified, requirement specifications are rather simple and the 
suppliers own the capabilities to efficiently perform the activity. On the opposite 
extreme of the typology there is hierarchy ˗ namely in-house production ˗ well suited 
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when activity specifications cannot be codified, the complexity of task is high and 
highly competent providers are not available in the marketplace. In between three 
intermediate configurations are suggested in case of high task complexity but 
specifically modular vale chain is suited when transactions are easily codified and 
suppliers possess the capability to perform the task, relational value chain when 
suppliers own the capabilities to efficiently perform the activity but whose information 
are difficult to codify, and captive value chain when the codifiability of information is 
high but providers have low capacity. Each governance type provides a different trade-
off between benefits and risks to outsource, with specific implication for labour and 
labour process (Bair 2005).  
Drawing on and moving beyond this assumptions, a research branch emerged starting to 
incorporate the value chain perspective into labour-related issues and industrial relations 
field (Bair and Ramsay 2003, Knorringa and Pegler 2006, Riisgaard and Hammer 
2011): building on the existing body of literature then Lakhani, Kuruvilla and Avgar 
(2013) developed a broad analytical framework for disentangling these intertwined 
relations. As anticipated, the core assumption laying the foundations of their 
theorization is that different value chain configurations lead to dramatically different 
employment relations strategies and implications for labour. More specifically these 
structures and outcomes are understood to vary according to four main criteria: the 
degree of influence of lead firm in determining employment relations strategies and 
practices in supplier firms; the level of skills and knowledge of employees at disposal of 
supplier firms, which is tightly related to the nature of activities to perform; stability of 
employment (tenure and type of employment) in the supplier firm; national institutions 
and legislation shaping supplier employment structures (Lakhani et al. 2013:450). 
Implications for labour result by matching the five configurations of value chain and 
these four features of the employment system, as shown in table 2.1. 
Market configuration, suited when tasks are relatively simple and easy to codify, is 
likely to be associated with an employment relations structure featured by low workers 
skills levels with low job stability. Working conditions are usually settled by supplier 
firm which has all the convenience to keep labour costs as cheap as possible in order to 
remain attractive in the marketplace compared to other suppliers. Moreover the high 
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replaceable nature of low-skilled workers in the labour market has a detrimental effect 
on work terms and conditions, which are likely to be very flexible and poorly protected.  
 
Table 2.1 A configurational framework of employment relations 
Value chain 
configuration 
Nature of task 
requirements 
Employment system criteria 
Lead firm 
influence on 
supplier 
employment 
relations 
Skill and 
knowledge 
of 
employees 
in supplier 
firm 
Stability of 
employment 
in supplier 
firm 
National 
institutional 
influences 
on supplier 
employment 
relations 
Market 
Low task 
complexity 
High task 
codifiability 
High supplier 
capability 
Low Low Low Local 
Modular 
High task 
complexity 
High task 
codifiability 
High supplier 
capability 
Low Moderate Moderate Local 
Relational 
High task 
complexity 
Low task 
codifiability 
High supplier 
capability 
Moderate High High 
Local and 
Lead 
Captive 
High task 
complexity 
High task 
codifiability 
Low supplier 
capability 
High Low Low 
Local and 
Lead 
Hierarchy 
High task 
complexity 
Low task 
codifiability 
Low supplier 
capability 
High High High Lead 
Source: Lakhani et al. 2013: 449. 
 
Similar implications for labour are detectable in captive value chain configurations 
where outsourced activities are usually complex and codifiable, but external suppliers 
lack the capabilities to perform the task. It follows a high degree of dependence of 
suppliers on lead firm which may deeply influence employment relations in supplier 
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organisation, establishing advantageous labour cost of generally low workforce skills 
levels. As in the previous case, workers are likely to have low levels of employment 
stability, poorly protecting contracts and low salaries. 
Modular and relational configurations instead are expected to offer respectively 
moderate and high level of employment stability to workforce involved, usually high-
skilled and well trained to perform complex tasks. In these cases, given limited 
influence of lead firms over external providers associated with the remarkable relevance 
of these activities for lead firm, employment relations are characterized by low degree 
of turnover, an increasing number of core employees and rather protected jobs. 
Implications are even more positive in the relational value chain because of the high 
degree of mutual dependence between lead and supplier organisations. 
The more stable and well sheltered from market fluctuations or race-to-the-bottom 
salaries are working conditions guaranteed by hierarchy, regarding workers directly 
employed by the lead firm. The high complexity and uncodificable nature of tasks, 
associated with the lack of competent providers in the marketplace push the firm to keep 
these activities in-house where high-skilled are at disposal in return for stable and 
advantageous job terms and conditions.  
In a nutshell, different forms of dependence and power relations between core 
organisation and external providers emerge according to the types of value chain 
governance adopted with its own specific inter-firm relationship, deeply influencing 
labour and working conditions (Flecker 2009). The concept has received extensive 
application in manufacturing industry, where power was located within the core units of 
the chain, while new peripheral tasks were extended to outsourced company providing 
low-level work under precarious conditions (Flecker and Meil 2010). Recently, the 
value chain debate has been shifted from goods production to services activities, 
become meanwhile increasingly disintegrated through outsourcing strategies (Huws 
2006, Hasle et al. 2014).  
Despite this framework was mainly thought to explain inter-firms relations in 
multinational companies or enterprises outsourcing or relocating tasks outside national 
boundaries, it provides a useful cognitive schema to understand implication for labour 
and employment relations structure in vertical disintegration processes occurring in 
European public administrations as well. An example of fruitful application is 
55 
represented by the WORKS (Work Organisation and Restructuring in the Knowledge 
Society) Project – Changes in Work (www.worksproject.be), a pan-European research 
project which aims at developing the understanding of the major changes in work in a 
context of knowledge-based society. More specifically it deals with the analysis of how 
workplaces, jobs, allocation, working conditions and industrial relations change 
following the restructuring of value chains. For this purpose, a complex case studies 
research design has been settled including different sectors (clothing industry, food 
industry, public sector, post sector and rail), within which a variety of business 
functions have been selected (design, production, logistic, customer service and ITC) 
across several European countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, UK, France, Belgium, 
Netherland, Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary). Evidence 
from the public sector studies depicts a fragmented overview of working conditions, 
featured by remarkable changes following restructuring events towards outsourcing 
(Flecker 2010). Employment-related issues are prominent above all in non-
Scandinavian public administrations which witnessed a numerically-relevant transfer of 
personnel to the private company taking over as service supplier (Flecker et al. 2008, 
Flecker and Meil 2010). In several cases, the transfer has meant a shift from public 
sector collective agreement to private provider‟s terms and conditions, usually less 
protective, more flexible and more poorly remunerated. There were also cases of 
workers made redundant during the process.  
Quantitative employment changes however were accompanied by qualitative 
implications as well: outsourcing led to the fragmentation of job terms and conditions of 
workers previously employed under the same contracts, with respect to status, wages, 
intensity of work and job security for example (Flecker 2009). The overall picture is 
dominated by a deterioration of working conditions, both in terms of salary (Flecker and 
Meil 2010) and in terms of work-related benefits such as pension scheme, 
maternity/paternity leaves, sick-pay scheme which become increasingly depleted by the 
new external employers (Flecker 2009). The transition was instead smoother in Swedish 
and Norwegian contexts where, thanks also to the supportive action of unions, terms 
and conditions of employment stayed roughly the same in return for more flexibility 
demanded to employees and works become heavier (Flecker et al. 2008). The demand 
for higher contractual flexibility has meant a shift from stable permanent contracts to 
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temporary arrangements as a way to recruit flexible staff who can deal with changing 
workloads.  
Moreover, value chain restructuring in public sector organisations depicted a dominant 
trend towards standardization and intensification of work regimes. Private providers 
indeed boosted the codification of knowledge and tasks, accordingly making workers 
easily replaceable and emptying their bargaining power in the labour market. In addition 
understaffing for performing the activities has necessary led to a notable work 
intensification, which may be actually translated into increasing working hours, higher 
workload and prolonged work shifts (Flecker and Meil 2010). Finally public services 
outsourcing triggered a widespread feeling of job insecurity, regarding not only workers 
directly affected, but the whole public workforce fearing a potential involvement in 
further future restructuring processes. 
In a nutshell case studies demonstrate how value chain restructuring is often purposely 
exploited as a way of circumventing public sector employment standards, traditionally 
higher compared to the private sector contracts (Flecker et al. 2008, Flecker and 
Hermann 2011). Literature indeed has repeatedly suggested how outsourcing „weakens 
labour and destabilizes industrial relations institutions‟ (Flecker 2010:17) for two main 
reasons: firstly, as just anticipated, because the very motive of vertical disintegration 
could be to avoid employment regulation; secondly because external private providers 
are less likely to be covered by collective agreements. Industrial relation investigation 
indeed has repeatedly demonstrated as contracting out involves a profound change of 
scenario for trade union‟s action, as a consequence of an evolving working 
environment. Atomization of companies following restructuring and the subsequent 
dispersion of workers represent relevant obstacles to union‟s traditional role in 
organizing and representing at the workplace. Accordingly trade unions tend to be far 
weaker and work relationships far more fragmented and individualized: bargaining 
systems indeed are divided and coverage becomes less comprehensive (Flecker and 
Hermann 2011), with detrimental consequences for work terms and conditions as stated 
above. The tendency towards decentralization of collective bargaining, from national or 
sectoral level to company level, represents a further implication of restructuring 
(Mathieson and Pedersini 2009): in many cases this has led to a shift from single to 
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multi-employer bargaining with a subsequent fragmentation of job term and conditions 
agreed (Grimshaw et al. 2004). 
Similar insights are provided by further studies dealing with restructuring within public 
sector: despite the research interest for implications on labour issues following 
outsourcing and privatisation processes has been growing in the last decade, evidence 
are still limited (Domberger and Jensen 1997, Quiggin 2002, Grimshaw et al. 2004, 
Jensen and Stonecash 2005, Böhlke 2008, Hermann et al. 2008, Schönauer 2008, 
Flecker 2009, Mathieson and Pedersini 2009, Flecker 2010, Cunningham and Nickson 
2011, Flecker and Hermann 2011, Huws and Podro 2012, Smith 2012, Hasle et al. 
2014). Moreover focus was placed on various market-type mechanisms for restructuring 
value chain in public sector beyond outsourcing policies: Mathieson and Pedersini 
(2009) investigated impacts on labour and industrial relations following liberalisation 
process in local public transport across two countries: Italy and UK; while Hermann, 
Brandt and Schulten (2008) elucidated the process of re-commodification of public 
work after liberalisation of postal services in Europe. Smith (2012) instead adopted as 
trigger of the transformation of employment the establishment of a public-private 
partnership in UK; Böhlke (2008) studied the impact of hospital privatisation on 
industrial relations and employees in Germany. 
Although considering liberalisation and privatisation policies, the PIQUE Project ˗ 
Privatisation of public services and the impact on quality, employment and productivity 
(http://www.pique.at) ˗ interestingly investigated between 2006 and 2009 the main 
implication for job quality, employment conditions and productivity following the 
restructuring processes for the provision of public services. The analysis was carried out 
across six countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Sweden and UK) including 
four type of public services: postal service, electricity distribution, local public 
transportation and hospitals. 
Overall picture is dominated by a deterioration of job and a fragmentation of 
employment, likewise evidence emerged in the WORKS Project. The object of reducing 
services‟ expenditure, a fundamental rationale driving these restructuring experiences, is 
achieved in a twofold manner: both by downsizing, through non-replacement of retirees, 
voluntary redundancy packages ad early retirement (Flecker and Hermann 2012), and 
reducing labour cost by cutting salaries (Flecker and Hermann 2009, Schulten and 
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Böhlke 2012). Liberalisation and privatisation notably impacted on job flexibility as 
well: flexible working hours represents one of the main measures adopted by private 
suppliers (Flecker and Thörnqvist 2012), together with a rise in overtime and night 
work (Flecker and Hermann 2009) and the split of work-days (Flecker and Hermann 
2012). Work intensification constitutes a further spread consequences shared by all 
sectors under examination: under considerable time pressure the pace of work rapidly 
increased as well as work-loads due to understaffing, whilst work shifts became longer, 
not only exceeding the eight hours but even approaching physical limits of workers 
(Flecker and Hermann 2012). 
The introduction of competition and private sector discipline in formerly protected 
markets impacts significantly on employment relations structures as well, challenging 
the traditional labour discipline of the public sector. In order to reduce labour costs 
indeed, liberalised and privatised companies tried to withdraw from public sector 
collective agreements, usually rather expansive, setting up new forms of cheaper labour 
regulation (Schulten and Brandt 2012). Although the study highlights national 
differences and variations, case studies share some common implications. Firstly 
„regarding collective bargaining, liberalisation has usually led to a two-tier system with 
relatively stable bargaining structures at the level of the incumbent and a rather 
decentralised and fragmented bargaining structure with low bargaining coverage at the 
level of the new competitors‟ (Schulten and Brandt 2012:140). Furthermore, these 
restructuring processes enforced the fragmentation of collective bargaining since new 
competitors emerged under very differentiated collective agreements or not covered at 
all by regulation: as a consequence the previous relatively homogeneous workforce is 
then split between “old” and “new” employees or core and peripheral workers covered 
by very heterogeneous contracts and regulation (Brandt and Schulten 2009). Finally 
liberalisation and privatisation pushed towards a decentralisation of bargaining 
structures, shifted from national or sectoral level to workplace (Schulten and Brandt 
2012). 
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2.3.2 Labour market segmentation perspective 
The labour market segmentation theory represents a further methodological framework 
for developing knowledge of how restructuring of value chain impacts on employment 
issues and working conditions. This body of thought elucidated indeed the role of 
employer‟s practices and strategies at the workplace level in creating persistent 
inequalities within the workforce. The main argument put forward is that firms 
purposely pursue strategies at their organizational level which „led to the persistence or 
persistent recreation of labour market segments, with no tendency for the capitalist 
system over time to erode divisions or upgrade employment for all groups‟ (Rubery 
2006:2). Moving beyond this common assumption, two main variants of segmentation 
theory developed in the 1970s: the Marxist approach promoted by Edwards, Reich and 
Gordon (1975) and the institutionalist version developed by Doeringer and Piore 
(1971). 
The Marxist-oriented contribution traced its origins back to the shift from a context of 
progressive homogenization in both working condition and labor market reinforced 
until the end of the XIX century to the emergence of monopoly capitalism‟s pressures 
over firms to tighten their control over the labour process, not only by gaining stronger 
control over the production, but more importantly through a conscious manipulation of 
the labour market itself. According to Edwards et al. (1975) indeed the source of 
segmented labour markets dates back to management strategies actively pursued, under 
the pressure of political and economic forces, for a twofold aim: on the one side it 
allowed to maximize profits while on the other side enabled management to minimize 
workers‟ solidarity. Indeed by breaking up jobs in small specialized activities requiring 
little training and limited skills, the firms promote in higher positions workers who 
perform well independently from their skills and knowledge endowment, profiting from 
their work. Moreover this standardization of tasks inevitably reduces the scope for 
direct confrontation between management and workforce, purposely removing ground 
for protests and preventing the development of group solidarity. Thus segmentation was 
deliberately design to increase control over labour, splitting workforce into 
insurmountable submarkets, distinguished by distinct working conditions and 
employment arrangements as a response to „the increasingly homogeneous and 
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proletarian character of the work force [which] generated tensions which were manifest 
in the tremendous upsurge in labor conflict that accompanied the emergence of 
monopoly capitalism‟ (Reich, Gordon and Edwards 1973:360). Recalling the 
terminology of dual labour market theory, outcome of segmentation process is the 
creation of primary and secondary segments, differentiated by employment stability 
features. Primary labour market „require and develop stable working habits; skills are 
often acquired on the job; wages are relatively high; and job ladder exists‟, whilst jobs 
in secondary labour market „do not require and often discourage stable working habits; 
wages are low; turnover is high; and job ladders are few‟ (ibid.: 359-60). Traditionally 
white-collar workers were consciously selected to enter the primary segment and 
internally promoted along job ladders, while blue-collar staff remained relegated to 
secondary segment losing the possibility of any potential mobility pattern. This 
dichotomization enables employers to diversified workers‟ actual experiences in the 
workplace, accordingly undermining the basis of their solidarity, which leads to 
common opposition to management.  
For the dual labour market theorists (Doeringer and Piore 1971) instead the basic 
assumption lays on institutional foundations: there are institutional structures affecting 
labour market ˗ such as labour market regulations and social policies ˗ whose outcome 
is reflected in a sharp distinction between internal and external market arrangements. 
Internal market might be defined by organizational boundaries, but also by a craft or 
professional community, which through the outlining of rules and practices distinguish 
insiders from all the remaining workers, the outsiders. Dualization process thus implies 
the division into two parallel markets featured by distinct rights and privileges. 
Accordingly workers belonging to primary sector enjoy job stability, high salary, 
opportunities for career mobility and fair treatment in the workplace, while conversely 
workers who gain access only to secondary sector are poorly paid, unstable, 
characterized by high turnover and bad workplace conditions. The allocation of workers 
in the primary or secondary labour market depends upon their endowment of economic, 
political and social resources: as a result women, young workers and migrants are more 
likely to ended up in the latter while highly skilled, male workers are easily employed 
within the former. Moreover, given the limited mobility between the two segments, 
once trapped in the secondary market the possibility to move to the primary are very 
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limited. Indeed as hypothesized by Palier and Thelen (2010) these inequalities are more 
likely to become institutionalized, rather than transitory.  
This body of literature devoted also extensive attention to the organisation of work and 
employment at the inter-firm level: it has been argued that the restructuring practices 
adopted across the value chain utilize, and at the same time create, segmented labour 
markets (Edwards et al. 1982). Hence, outsourcing practices at the workplace and 
organizational level are responsible for creating and reproducing inequalities „motivated 
by interests of tapping into different market segments where wages are at a lower level, 
even though the work still requires commitments and skills‟ (Doeringer and Piore 1971, 
Rubery 2006:9). According to labour market segmentation perspective, contracting out 
might negatively impacts on labour and employment conditions: it suggests indeed that 
public administrations which traditionally employ primary sector workers could take 
advantage of lower labour costs by externalizing tasks to secondary sector workforce 
characterized by short-term employment relationships, little or no prospect of internal 
promotion, and the determination of wages primarily by market forces. 
If early segmentation theory was mainly concerned on explaining why inequalities and 
segmented labour market arose and persisted in a context of steady growth rate and high 
employment demand, subsequent discussion refocused the debate on the new forms of 
segmentation emerging, associated to firms‟ search for organizational flexibility and 
restructuring processes. The flexible firm model as developed by Atkinson (1984), 
already discussed in the previous section, offers a further – much debated – functional 
point of view: organisations split their workforce between a relatively small core 
workers group, providing functional flexibility, loyalty and commitment in return for 
employment protection, and a large peripheral workforce with non-standard precarious 
working conditions, used to achieve financial and numerical flexibility. According to 
this perspective, segmentation could be expected to be triggered by internal 
reorganization in the search for more flexible labour in production process (Flecker and 
Meil 2010). Public organisations increase their internal flexibility by outsourcing 
activities and tasks to external suppliers, which in turn transfer the flexibility demand to 
their employees (Arzbacher et al. 2002). As a result, service contracts increasingly rely 
on non-standard contracts and temporary forms of employment applied to peripheral 
workforce to fulfil the demand of flexibility expressed by core firms (Flecker 2009).  
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The issue is directly related to the dualization literature (Palier and Thelen 2010, Thelen 
2012), according to which „firms actively pursued a strategy of separation of the 
workforce, which divided employees into core and fringe workers‟ (Hassel 2012:3) as a 
mean to achieve savings and flexibility through more liberal employment rules for 
peripheral workers. Outsourcing it has been argued to be beneficial for core workforce, 
since it can work as a buffer, sheltering them from company restructuring, budget 
constraint and market fluctuations and pouring all these risks on peripheral workers. 
Competing literature strands however emerged, questioning the soundness of 
dualization assumption: outsourcing, instead of cushioning core workers, negatively 
affects this workforce segment as well (Flecker 2009, MacKenzie 2009), putting 
growing pressure even on permanent workers in standard employment relations and 
raising the „levels of insecurity even within the zone of integration‟ (Dorre 2005, 
Flecker 2009). Restructuring processes toward outsourcing indeed challenge the 
traditional idea that core and periphery are clearly distinguished according to level of 
skills and commitment required by the lead firm, raising the need to reconsider the 
core/periphery model (Purcell and Purcell 1998). Indeed it modifies the „power relations 
between employers and labour and thus put pressure on the core workforce to make 
concession of their employment conditions‟ (Flecker 2009:253, Caprile 2000, 
Marchington 2005, Doellgast and Greer 2007). Moving even further Gavroglou 
underlines that „the insecurity of the periphery that may have initially sheltered the core 
tends to gradually creep into the core as well: the working conditions of the peripheral 
workers begin to act as a benchmark for the core workers who feel increasingly 
pressured to accept a worsening of their working conditions‟ (2007:15). 
The extent to which outsourcing still buffers core workforce is an open question which 
necessarily deserves further investigation (Flecker et al. 2008). 
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Chapter three 
Case selection and methodology 
 
 
3.1 Aim of the study and research questions 
 
While during the post-war decades public services and more generally public-related 
tasks were mainly provided in-house by the state, the last three decades have witnessed 
an unending wave of restructuring towards outsourcing of traditional publicly provided 
services across European governments. So far, analysis of these processes widely 
focused on consequences for cost developments, commonly quantifying the extent to 
which contracting out leads to savings (Domberger et al. 1986, Domberger and Hall 
1996, Domberger and Jensen 1997, Savas 2000, Blom-Hansen 2003, Greve 2008), and 
on assessing quality standard accomplishment by external contractors (Domberger and 
Rimmer 1994, OECD 2002, Jensen and Stonecash 2005). Research interest only 
recently, and rather rarely too, has taken into consideration implications of restructuring 
processes towards outsourcing on labour terms and conditions (Grimshaw, Rubery and 
Marino 2012) and employment relations structure (Hermann and Flecker 2012). 
Additionally, within this stream of study, scholars‟ attention has been only occasionally 
devoted to outsourcing as a phenomenon in its own right and its consequences for 
labour, while the concept has been often treated crosswise. Hermann and Flecker (2012) 
for instance, in their comparative study on privatization of public services and impacts 
for employment, dealt with contracting out as one of the various employment 
procurement tools that companies might exploit during privatization and liberalization 
processes, while Grimshaw, Rubery and Marino (2012) considered outsourcing as one 
of the factors affecting pay rate in local governments, alongside austerity measures. 
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Thus, existing literature and practitioners‟ reporting left wide room for further empirical 
research concerning how organizational restructuring towards outsourcing impacts on 
labour and industrial relations structure. The urgency for further and more systematic 
investigation is enhanced by negative and perverse effects of restructuring processes 
highlighted by previous studies carried out in private sector companies (Flecker et al. 
2005, Marchington et al. 2005, Doellgast and Greer 2007, Flecker 2009, Perraudin et al. 
2009). 
Hence the first objective of the present study is to investigate the impacts of outsourcing 
process of public services on terms and conditions of employment and industrial. 
relations institutions in different European countries and across diverse public 
administration sub-sectors. This research design based on a double level of comparison 
˗ a cross-country national level comparison and a cross-sectoral comparison between 
different subsectors within public administration ˗ is plotted, first of all, to address the 
lack of systematic comparative analysis in the literature dealing with this specific issue, 
and secondly to test whether the phenomena under scrutiny develop trajectories which 
display similarities or, conversely, differences across countries and/or across sectors. In 
other words, the research aims to test a convergence/divergence hypothesis, namely to 
investigate whether consequences on working conditions and employment relations of 
outsourcing processes, embedded in different national institutional contexts and diverse 
segments of public administration, do follow convergent trajectories along the same 
pattern, or conversely, whether they do diverge according to different legislative and 
institutional national arrangements and/or to different peculiarities and constraints 
characterizing public sub-sectors. In other words: does the country matter? Does the 
sector matter? 
The solid tradition of research into the comparative public administration field, after an 
initial enthusiasm in supporting the double convergence idea following NPM-related 
reforms ˗ that is to say converge between public administrations across countries 
associated to a convergence pattern between public and private sectors within each 
country ˗, embraced the idea that, instead of an all-encompassing trend of convergence, 
countries clustered according to similarities in their national institutional and legislative 
setup (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011 provide a useful classification). Public management 
reforms, accordingly, developed along trajectories shaped by national specific 
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arrangements (Bordogna 2008). Likewise, theoretical expectations regarding impacts on 
labour issues of outsourcing, as a NPM-related tool implemented across European 
public administrations, might follow the same pattern typified by national 
distinctiveness. Moreover, the long-lasting debate about differences between industrial 
relations models across countries (Bach, Bordogna, Della Rocca and Winchester 1999, 
Visser 2008) lays the foundations to argue for distinctive patterns regarding 
implications for industrial relations regimes across national contexts.  
In addition to this macro-level comparison at national level, even more interestingly, a 
meso-level comparative analysis integrates the study, testing the 
convergence/divergence hypothesis across public sub-sectors. Research attention in 
industrial relations field, in fact, has recently been shifted from the lengthily scrutinized 
country-level to sectoral developments, deepening similarities between the same sectors 
across different countries (Bechter, Brandl and Meardi 2011, 2012). This stream of 
study pinpointed the potential for comparing sectors of activity, rather than the 
variability of national models, in their tendency to develop similar features across 
national borders following the internationalization of economic markets and the 
promotion of sectoral governance at the EU level, fostered as an emerging specific level 
of social dialogue. Accordingly, this study puts forward the hypothesis that sectoral 
similarities might be detected across public administration sub-sectors as well, driven 
by sector-specific features and constraints of which the analysis tries to give an account. 
Before moving on, it is fruitful to unfold more closely the concept of convergence 
adopted in the present research. Within the industrial relations context, earlier 
categorizations by Hay (2000) and Marginson and Sisson (2002) differentiate between 
four different senses of convergence: convergence in the pressures and constraints 
placed upon a particular political economy (input convergence); convergence in the 
policies pursued by particular states (policy convergence); convergence in the 
consequences, effects and outcomes of particular policies (output convergence); 
convergence in the processes sustaining the developmental trajectories of particular 
states (process convergence). Translated into this specific domain, the theoretical 
questions researched in the present study refer to the third meaning, namely output 
convergence following restructuring policies towards outsourcing. 
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3.2 A double-level comparative research design 
 
3.2.1 Country selection and research hypothesis 
In exploring these issues, the study grounds evidence on a comparative case-study 
analysis, covering three countries and two sectors, chosen through a theory-based 
selection.  
The choice of countries, as anticipated above, has been driven by the assumption that 
specific national institutional arrangements might affect trajectories displayed by 
impacts of outsourcing (Jaehrling 2014): accordingly, since the focus of the analysis 
addresses labour-related issues and consequences for employment relations we might 
expect industrial relations regimes having a leverage with these patterns, both paving 
the way to detrimental consequences and working as a buffer, warning negative 
implications. For instance an extended labour market regulation as well as strong 
employment relations structure may act as mediators in alleviating and controlling the 
negative impacts of restructuring process (Jaehrling 2014), while a regime which puts 
emphasis mainly on market adjustments and self-regulation, hence minimizing the role 
of employment regulation and organized labour institutions could enhance perverse 
effects on work terms and conditions (Gallie 2007). 
Accordingly Italy, England and Denmark are the countries under scrutiny as they each 
answer to different industrial relations frameworks. Existing classifications of these 
models provide rather similar insights grounded on a list of typical industrial relations 
dimensions (union density, union fragmentation, employers‟ association density, 
collective bargaining coverage, degree of collective bargaining centralisation, 
interaction of social partners with the state) but labeling differently the various cluster 
of countries (Gallie 2007, Visser 2008, Bechter and Brandl 2012). The present study 
makes reference to industrial relations regimes classification adopted for private sector, 
but taking into account that public sector industrial relations not always match the 
traditional national types, as Bechter and Brandl demonstrated (2012: 61). Indeed, if the 
model fits well in the Danish case, where the public sector industrial relations system 
corresponds to the national one, on the other hand the Italian and the English public 
sector industrial relations regimes do not completely match the traditional national type: 
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in those cases differences between the two sectors are clarified. As the analysis will 
show, these differences between public and private sector employment relations scheme 
are extremely relevant since they might have an impact on variables under scrutiny, 
since outsourcing process led to blurred and overlapped labour relationship between the 
two sectors. 
Italy is clustered in the State-centered group, together with the Mediterranean countries, 
characterized by a rather high degree of union density, above all in the public sector 
where the rate is around the 50% (see graph 3.1) and a very high collective bargaining 
coverage, around the 80% at national level, but with a percentage amounting to 100 in 
the public sector: these rates are close to the Danish ones, but diverging from this 
national type for a lower degree of centralization of collective bargaining process.  
 
Graph 3.1 Public sector and national union density, 2009 
 
Source: National union density: J. Visser, ICTWS database 3.0. Public sector union density: Bordogna 
2007, Adam 2011, Visser 2011, Brandl and Traxler 2012. 
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45 degree line which indicates points where the two % are equal. The black 
line is the least squares regression line indicating the average relationship between the two. 
 
The fragmentation of social partners‟ organisations is very high, especially in the public 
sector where is the highest among EU member states as clearly shown by graph 3.3 and 
there is a moderate involvement of social partners with the state, which traditionally, in 
the Mediterranean employment model, has played a relevant coordinating role, while 
retaining a relatively liberal arrangements in the sphere of labour relations (Gallie 
2007). 
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Graph 3.2 Public sector and national collective bargaining coverage, 2009 
 
Source: National collective bargaining coverage: J. Visser, ICTWS database 3.0. Public sector collective 
bargaining coverage: Adam (2011) 
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45 degree line which indicates points where the two % are equal. The black 
line is the least squares regression line indicating the average relationship between the two. 
 
 
England is classified by Visser (2008) within the group of Liberal countries which 
presents as features: an average organisational density, both on the union and the 
employer side (see graph 3.1); a high collective bargaining coverage in the public 
sector, much higher compared to the whole economy including private sector activities, 
where the coverage rate stands below the half of public sector rate (see graph 3.2); a 
rather low fragmentation of social partners organisations as shown in graph 3.3 and a 
very decentralized collective bargaining level. These institutional distinctive features 
match with what Gallie (2007) labeled a market employment regime, which puts 
emphasis mainly on market adjustments and self-regulation, hence minimizing the role 
of employment regulation and organized labour institutions, seen as negative rigidities. 
Accordingly, employment conditions and job rewards are self-regulated by the well-
functioning market, while institutional role and controls by organized labour are 
reduced to the lowest level: terms and conditions of employment indeed are regarded as 
a matter of individual employers, rather than a collective issue. 
Denmark belongs to the Organised Corporatism model, displaying a high degree of 
organizational density, one of the highest in Europe both in the public and private sector 
(see graph 3.1) together with other Scandinavian countries; a very high collective 
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bargaining coverage, slightly higher in the public compared to the private sector, but 
however above the 80% as shown in graph 3.2 and a relatively high fragmentation of 
social partner representativeness in terms of high number of both unions and employers‟ 
associations (graph 3.3). 
 
Graph 3.3 Union fragmentation in the public sector and in private sector, 2009 
 
Source: Number of public sector unions: Adam (2011). Number of private sector unions: Bechter, Brandl 
and Meardi (2011). 
 
Note: The bars represent the number of unions in the public sector: these unions are compared to the ones 
in nine private sectors. The sample covers manufacturing and services, and both internationalized and less 
internationalized sectors: steel, sugar, tanning and leather, civil aviation, railway infrastructure, sea and 
coastal water transport, hospitals, hairdressing and other beauty treatment, and telecommunications. The 
black dotted lines with balls indicate the maximum and the minimum number of unions from the selected 
nine private sectors. Public sector union fragmentation is higher than in each of none private sectors if the 
blue bar exceeds the ball on the top of the dotted line. 
 
 
Denmark employment regime has been also described by Gallie (2007) as inclusive, 
where regulations and policies are designed to extend employment and employment 
rights as largely as possible, providing welfare and security to all workers, minimizing 
differences within the labour market: accordingly high protection to weaker categories 
of workers is guaranteed. In countries within this cluster, the Scandinavian group, 
organized labour has a strongly institutionalized role, interacting with the state and 
employers‟ associations for a relatively universalized protection of work terms and 
conditions. 
Hence, as anticipated above, I expect employment relations model having an impact on 
consequences of outsourcing in the different countries, bringing convergence hypothesis 
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into contention: consequences on labour do not necessarily converge towards a similar 
low road pattern following contracting out, but conversely industrial relations regime 
and its related institutions intervene as mediating factors. 
Accordingly, an extended labour market regulation as well as strong employment 
relations structure may act as buffer in alleviating and controlling the negative impacts 
of restructuring process: it follows that an employment regime characterized by high 
collective bargaining coverage in both the public and private sector, linked to a high 
union density across both sectors, more likely guarantees high standard working 
conditions, protecting both core workforce with standard open-ended contracts and 
peripheral workers with non-standard temporary contracts. So I expect working 
conditions and industrial relations structure in Denmark remaining relatively stable and 
well-protected during restructuring towards outsourcing for workers employed in the 
public sector involved in the process. Theoretical expectations within Italian public 
administration resemble pretty much those just mentioned for the Danish case: a widely 
protective labour regime for public employees, combined with an extensive collective 
bargaining coverage and high union density guarantee a continuity in work terms and 
conditions. 
Conversely, a regime which puts emphasis mainly on market adjustments and self-
regulation, reducing in this way the role of employment regulation and organized labour 
institutions might pave the way to detrimental consequences for labour, since workforce 
is let free to compete in a market regime featured by weakness of employment relations 
structure and devoid of strong job protection. These theoretical premises suggest that 
the English national context may lead to such a scenario, enhancing perverse effects on 
work terms and conditions. 
 
3.2.2 Sector selection and research hypothesis 
Within each country, two sub-sectors of public administration have been selected 
according to several dimensions: local government and health care constitute the sectors 
under scrutiny. For sake of comparability, within the local government sub-sector a 
narrower and more precise selection of cases had to be done since the category across 
the three countries under investigation gathers together very different administrative 
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levels and public bodies. Municipality, as the most decentralized level of government, 
however shares very similar characteristics across Italy, England and Denmark, making 
it a sound case to analyse. 
The selection has followed a two-step path, in order to verify firstly the comparability of 
the two sectors, and second to check whether these specific sectors could represent 
suitable empirical cases to disentangle my theoretical puzzle. Among the whole range of 
public administration branches, local government and healthcare sector have 
experienced the most intensive restructuring process towards outsourcing of public 
services, traditionally provided in-house. Over the last decades in fact the two sub-
sectors, more than other public sectors, have been pushed to reduce their expenditure 
under the pressure of increasing public debt, stricter spending constraints, shifting 
citizens‟ preferences and the demand for better quality and more customized services. 
Moreover, to a different extent, all European countries experienced the aftermath of the 
global economic downturn, combined with the crisis of welfare state: the last thirty 
years have witnessed a turbulent transition from the "Golden Age" of marked expansion 
to a "Silver Age" of permanent austerity (Ferrera 2007). Accordingly, the traditional 
capability of in-house provision of services in the hand of municipalities and health care 
organisations has been challenged, exposing them to market competition and 
restructuring in an extensive manner. Therefore investigation within these two sectors is 
theoretically relevant. Moreover, both sub-sectors employ high rate of public personnel 
since they constitute labour-intensive activities, that is to say sectors in which labour 
represents a significant item of expenditure: in Italy in 2010 local government – which 
includes regions, provinces, municipalities and chambers of commerce – employed 
588,168 permanent employees, corresponding to the 18% of the total public 
employment, while national health service employed 682,183 permanent workers, 
around the 21% of the total. Only public school sub-sector exceeded these shares, 
employing 1,052,495 employees, equal to the 32% of total public employment 
(Bordogna and Neri 2012, Ministero Economia e Finanze – Ragioneria Generale dello 
Stato). According to UK National Accounts 2012, public employment in England is 
split into a three-fold classification between central government (2.1 million employees 
including government departments, executive agencies, public bodies controlled by the 
stat, HM Forces and the National Health System which specifically employed 1,245,000 
72 
individuals), local government (2.1 million staff) and public corporations (386.000 
employees) (Office for National Statistics 2012). In Denmark in 2012 the number of 
employees in the municipal sector was 443,000, equal to 59% of the total public 
employment, while the regional sector employed 122,000 individuals (16%) of which 
179,000 working in the healthcare system (Mailand 2012, Statistic Denmark 2012). It is 
reasonably conceivable that in these sectors labour cost might account for a production 
factor that public authorities can leverage when they deem necessary a reduction in 
public expenditure.  
Again, local government and health care sector have in common the fact of employing 
both blue-collar workers – as street cleaners and gardeners in the former; cleaners and 
laundry workers in the latter – and white-collar ones, highly skilled professionals – such 
as nurses and social workers involved in home care, ITC technicians and architects in 
municipalities; medical professional and nurses in the health care sector ˗: contracting 
out process, in countries under scrutiny, has involved both categories of workers in the 
two sectors. 
Two further features guarantee a reliable comparison of these two sectors across 
countries: concerning municipalities, they constitute the more decentralized government 
level, entitled to provide to its own community a wide-spreading list of public services 
which range from technical tasks – roads maintenance, waste collection, green areas 
maintenance – to professional services as home care and social services. The 
municipality provides broadly similar services across countries, unlike other local 
government levels, for instance province, county or region, which largely differ among 
countries under scrutiny, both in terms of territorial extension and for the nature of 
services provided. Moreover, I exclusively selected countries which adopted national 
health system funded out of general taxation, thus excluding the cluster of countries 
which opted for a national health insurance system, like Germany, funded out on 
insurance basis. A last remark concerns the kind of tasks and services health care 
sectors are committed to provide in their respective countries. As just mentioned, the 
systems under scrutiny guarantee universal care on the basis of citizenship and wholly 
financed by general taxation: accordingly health care structures across Italy, England 
and Denmark provide broadly similar and comparable services, subsidizes by direct 
funds transfer from the state and free at the point of delivery. 
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Beyond these similarities which guarantee the soundness of the comparison, the 
selected sectors differ along some specific dimensions which might trigger divergent 
trajectories of outsourcing, hence explaining potential different implications for labour 
as well.  
The main rationale of outsourcing lies on economic basis, namely the search for a better 
value for money in the provision of services: the dominant economic literature agrees 
on the „cost containment aspect, relating it to potential benefits of decreasing 
expenditure while increasing efficiency‟ (Brunetta, Giustiniano and Marchegiani 
2014:276). As a consequence, public organisations subject to stricter expenditure 
containment and public funds cut are expected to opt for contracting out of services as a 
strategic choice more systematically, in order to reduce labour costs which often 
account for the most relevant share of production costs.  
Over the last decades, municipalities in the countries under scrutiny have undergone 
alternately either general administrative reform or legislative pressures which, to 
different extent, modified the institutional role of this decentralized level of 
government, pushing them towards outsourcing. The 2001 structural reform of the 
“Titolo V” (Part V) of the Italian Constitution modified the allocation of competences 
across decentralized levels of government – regions, provinces and municipalities – 
according to the principle of vertical subsidiarity: the reform aimed at boosting the 
financial and decisional autonomy of decentralized administrative levels and shifting 
functions to the level as low as possible, in order to bring public services closer to final 
users. As a result, municipalities, hereafter endowed with financial autonomy both in 
terms of income and expenditure (art.119), found themselves committed to provide a 
wide range of administrative services funded out on their own local taxation and 
shrinking money transfers from the central government. Within the 2001 reform, 
indeed, the growing number of competences attributed to local governments has not 
been concurrently accompanied by an adequate increase of their fiscal autonomy, 
necessary for affording to finance an increasing number of services. In addition, a series 
of austerity measures which trace their origins back to the implementation of the 
Internal Stability Pact (ISP) in 1998 (law no 488/1998) following the adoption of the 
EU Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), introduced a stricter regime of expenditure for the 
local governments to pursue the public finance targets necessary at respecting the 
74 
financial SGP criteria. In the annual Stability Pact (that is the budget law of the state), 
the government defines the whole financial targets for municipalities which focus on 
their public debt containment though the setting of legal constraints on their 
expenditure, including personnel costs. In case of breach of ISP targets, sanctions on 
municipalities include a cut in financial transfer from central government, a cap on 
current expenditures and investments and the freeze of any hiring of permanent or 
temporary staff (decree law 112/2008, art. 76, co. 3; decree law no. 78/2010, art. 14, co. 
3, converted in law no. 122/2010; legislative decree no. 149/2011, art. 7, co. 2; law no. 
183/2011, art. 8, co. 4) (Bordogna and Neri 2012). Since 2008, financial targets for 
municipalities became particularly stricter and severe, even harder to reach. These 
austerity measures deriving from the ISP and related to municipalities expenditures 
have been accompanied by further legislative interventions directly targeting public 
employment size. The decree law 112/2008 in fact cut down staff turnover of 10% for 
the 2009 (municipalities had the possibility to hire new employees to an expenditure not 
exceeding 10% of the labour cost of retired employees during the previous year), 20% 
for the years 2010 and 2011, 20% for 2012.  
English municipalities, although did not undergo any similar reform, have been subject 
to a series of decisive legislative interventions which triggered the regulatory regime of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT): starting from the Local Government 
Planning and Land Act in 1980, which introduced CCT for a limited range of jobs, 
mainly blue-collar tasks as highways maintenance and building maintenance, then 
extended in 1988 to most of the manual services, covering refuse collection, street 
cleaning, schools catering, grounds and parks maintenance. As a third step, the tasks 
covered by the Local Government Act had been widened in 1992, including white-
collars activity such as professional, financial and technical services. Besides legislative 
pressures towards contracting out, the sector has been hardly hit by budgetary 
reductions: municipalities have been required to cut spending by 27% in real terms 
between 2010-11 and 2014-15 (Bach and Stroleny 2012). 
In 2007 the Danish government enacted a huge structural reform which completely 
reshuffled the territorial partition of the decentralized levels of government: 271 
municipalities were amalgamated to 98 and 14 counties were liquidated and replaced by 
5 regions with a narrow range of responsibilities. The reform aimed at taking advantage 
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of economies of scale and improving welfare service by a reshuffle of competencies and 
functions between levels of government. The process of reallocation resulted in 
municipalities as „net-gainer of areas of responsibility‟ (Mailand 2012:1) as welfare 
services for instance. 
On the other hand, health care systems across countries under scrutiny have experienced 
waves of reform which intervened less vigorously on their functioning and financing. In 
Italy, the above mentioned 2001 structural reform conferred the responsibility to 
provide healthcare to regions under a regime of financial autonomy supported by state 
funding, which registered a progressive decrease. The 2007 administrative reform in 
Denmark reshuffled competence related to healthcare, putting it in the hands of regions 
and funded out on general taxation transferred from the central level, in this case 
without remarkable cuts. 
The only case that has witnessed rather strong pressure to restructure towards 
outsourcing is the National Health System (NHS) in England: indeed, the National 
Health Service and Community Care Act in 1990 introduced the idea of internal 
market into healthcare supply, opening up the possibility to test the market also for the 
provision of clinical services, which remained till that time a strict prerogative of public 
organisations. Again, the NHS Plan in 2000 brought about the biggest change to 
healthcare in England since the NHS was formed in 1948. The reform had the aim to 
modernize the NHS, improving the way services were delivered as a means to expand 
the choices available for patients. This has meant also introducing greater plurality 
within the health services provision: the legislation indeed explicitly encourages private 
provision of clinical services and expands the role of Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) 
for the building and management of new hospitals. Despite these legislative pressures, 
healthcare „which experienced unprecedented increases in funding prior to 2010 
remains a government priority and is relatively protected in real terms‟ (Bach and 
Stroleny 2012:5). Given these premises, I expect that structural reforms and internal 
pressures, both legislative and economic, occurring at municipal level might act as an 
incentive to outsource tasks with the aim of reducing public expenditure, hence leading 
also to detrimental implications for labour, considered the main production factor ˗ a 
relevant expenditure item ˗ for the provision of municipal services. On the contrary, 
health care systems seem to be more sheltered from pressures of this kind: accordingly I 
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might expect job terms and conditions to be more protected for workers involved in 
restructuring, buffered by less stringent financial constraints. 
A second strategic reason underlying the choice of outsourcing is that it allows 
organisations to dismiss some functions, normally requiring technical skills in favour of 
focusing more on activities in which they still prefer holding key resources and skills, 
usually core competences: literature provides wide evidence of the fact that, despite the 
last years have witnessed an increasing number of core activities put out to tender 
(Flecker 2009, Lethbridge 2011, Huws and Podro 2012) organisations preferably 
contracted out routine management operations, technical and limited strategic value 
tasks performed by blue-collar or low skilled staff where economies of scale are 
feasible, enabling them to focus extensively on core activities. In a nutshell, ancillary 
services are more likely to be outsourced, as they are considered strategically less 
important by public administrations. Municipalities and healthcare sector organisations, 
although they both employ blue and white collar staff to carry out tasks under their 
competence ranging from technical to professional services, present different workforce 
composition. Municipalities have constantly increased, over the decades, the share of 
white collar workers in order to perform professional functions – such as home care or 
front-office services –, but still they require a copious technical staff fulfiling several 
core assignments of high relevance for the community as road maintenance, road 
cleaning, green areas and park maintenance, waste collection, school cleaning and 
maintenance. Health care systems, on the contrary, though needing technical staff as 
well, mainly employ highly specialized professionals to carry out core function, like 
specialized doctors and lab technicians. Accordingly, given the empirical evidence that 
technical functions, fulfiled by low skilled workers, are more likely to be outsourced 
than professional services, I might suppose municipalities outsourcing more 
extensively, compared to health care systems, in order to achieve economies of scale 
and reduce labour cost. Meanwhile they focus on core functions, negative implications 
are expected for technical job terms and conditions: since their skills are easily 
replaceable in the labour market, outsourcing may trigger competition with a cheaper 
labour-supply. 
The search for greater flexibility in the management of workforce represents a third 
motivation underlying the strategic choice of contracting out some tasks. Thus 
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organisations are more likely to outsource those activities which are not performed on a 
daily basis, hence not requiring permanent staff ˗ such as maintenance, technologies 
repair services ˗ or tasks with unpredictable seasonal peak as road cleaning maintenance 
during snow folders, needing high flexibility in staff and required availability also 
during night time or holiday working hours. As a consequence, given the high rate of 
workforce flexibility that municipalities require for fulfil their assignment, they are 
more likely to adopt outsourcing policies, with following implications employment 
conditions for workers involved. 
A further distinctive feature between the two sectors is the degree of visibility of 
services they provide, which is directly linked to their sensitivity. Healthcare is 
commonly considered, if not the public service for excellence, surely one of the 
essential functions that government has to provide, hence constantly under the severe 
gaze of public opinion and mass media. The relevance of the issue is immediately clear 
when one thinks of scandals related to health service malfunction or medical 
malpractice and public opinion‟s shocked reactions (there are many examples in Italy 
and England for instance). Nothing similar is conceivable regarding local government 
context. Thus given the sensitivity of functions performed in healthcare sector, and the 
related visibility, I expect more cautious outsourcing processes which could lead to 
raising difficulty in managing workforce and subsequent implications for the quality of 
services. As a consequence, labour and working conditions are expected to remain more 
sheltered compared to local government. 
 
 
3.3 The case-study method 
 
A case-study method has been developed to provide insight into the research questions. 
This methodology allows to develop an in-depth investigation of labour issues ˗ such as 
labour workload, speed of work, workers complaints ˗ whose analysis is hardly feasible 
by adopting other methods. In addition, the lack of comparative data covering these 
issue, systematically collected across countries over time, halts any attempts to 
investigate the issue quantitatively.  
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Likewise, previous academic studies in the field facing similar difficulties exploited the 
benefits of this method (Hermann and Flecker 2012).  
A theory-driven selection led to choose six case studies: two for each country under 
scrutiny, one for each sub-sector. Thus one municipality and one hospital have been 
selected within each country as case studies to explore in depth, following a primary 
criterion: they had to show a far-reaching and longstanding use of outsourcing. The 
deployment of effects over labour conditions and industrial relations structure does not 
immediately follow the process of restructuring, but vice-versa it requires a certain time 
span to systematically display detectable implications. Not only, a long standing 
tradition of outsourcing within the case studies has the advantage of enumerating, 
instead a single tendering round as in latecomers municipalities in the adoption of 
outsourcing policies, several tendering rounds for a single service: this allows to set a 
sort of longitudinal study of outsourcing implications along different contracting 
rounds. Further, an extensive implementation of contracting out, involving different 
tasks and different kind of skills, allows to check the reliability of findings by 
confronting evidence deriving from different processes, relating to a wide range of 
diverse services. In other words, this criterion should enable to pinpoint the regular 
systemic impacts of restructuring towards outsourcing and thus excluding exceptional 
or atypical implications.  
A second criterion driving the selection was the continuity in office, during the interval 
under scrutiny, both of the public personnel designated for dealing with public tender 
inside the administration they belong and trade unions officials appointed in branches of 
competence of selected cases. The investigation over implications of outsourcing for 
labour and unions role, tracing the analysis back from the origin of the process and 
reconstructing the impacts over time, is a complex task: no systematic studies have been 
conducted up to the present, comparative data are lacking and the task is further 
complicated by carrying out a longitudinal case studies analysis through interviews and 
documentary analysis. Continuity in office for key actors involved in the process allows 
to ride out some of these limitations: these key informants indeed hold historical 
memory of the facts, they own documents and reports related to processes under 
scrutiny and could pinpoint further key actors involved. 
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These criteria have been verified through interviews conducted in each country at 
national level with representative from employers‟ organizations both in healthcare 
sector ˗ managers in regional health department in Italy; National Health System (NHS) 
Employer in England; managers in regional health department in Denmark ˗ and 
municipalities ˗ National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) in Italy; Local 
Government Association in England; Danish Municipalities (KL) in Denmark ˗ and 
officials from the main public sector trade unions ˗ CGIL, CISL and UIL in Italy; 
Unison, Unite, GMB, Unite and Royal College of Nurses in England; 3F, FOA and 
DSR in Denmark ˗. These key informants during the interviews drew up a list of 
suitable cases to explore and provided me further relevant observations in order to select 
cases satisfying these preliminary selection parameters. 
The selection of case studies has taken into account the geographical position and the 
economic development of areas in which municipalities and hospitals are located. 
Suitable case studies had to be located in urban areas, hence excluding rural and 
mountain areas: preliminary analysis showed as in the latter contexts difficulties may 
raise during tendering processes since this kind of strategic choice for the provision of 
services has to be inherently profitable both for contracting organisations and for 
providers: of course this is not always the case. This particularly holds in Denmark 
where the number of private contractors is still limited and the private provision of 
services in particular areas of the country (small islands, rural areas lacking 
connections) is not cost-effective for external providers. The degree of economic 
development constitutes an other discriminating factor affecting the selection. Beyond 
the reasoning just mentioned which holds also in this context, a further implication 
concerns the Italian situation. National key informants and related literature provide 
evidence that Southern regions, historically less wealthy than Northern and Central ones 
and with incredibly high unemployment rate, exploit outsourcing processes as a 
corrupted mechanism to contract services to companies and providers well close, or 
affiliated to the political party in office giving origin to a network based on political 
nepotism. In addition infiltration of organized crime in tendering processes is an issue 
constantly on the agenda to be aware of. In this context, outsourcing often has to do 
with political nepotism for ensuring contracts and job places, more than regarding a 
strategic choice for the provision of public services. 
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Hence the decision to investigate in depth municipalities and hospitals located in areas 
featured by marked urbanization and remarkable economic development. 
Following such first pre-selection, further criteria have been settled specifically for 
municipalities and hospitals. First of all, the municipalities must be neither the country 
capital city nor capital city of any other level of government: this parameter allows to 
exclude cities committed to perform further specific tasks related to their additional 
administrative role and which may vary across countries. Moreover capital cities 
represent peculiar cases, both for their competences and their dimension, rather than 
representative case studies and as much as possible subject to generalization. Secondly, 
they had to have experienced political turnover of party in office during the time span 
under investigation, in order to ensure variability in the ideology driving the council in 
establishing outsourcing agenda.  
Finally, a dimensional criterion was singled out in order to select representative 
municipalities, taking into account differences across countries in terms of total 
population, population density, country surface ( km
2
) and municipalities size (table 
3.1). 
Italy has a total population of a little less than 61 million (ISTAT 2014) distributed over 
a surface of 301 km
2
, with a the density corresponding to 201 inhabitants/km
2
. England 
hosts around 53 million inhabitants on a surface equal to 130 km
2
, less than half of the 
Italian one: accordingly the density results double compared to Italy, reaching values 
around 400 inhabitants/km
2
 (Office for National Statistics 2013). Denmark is the 
smallest country within the selection, both in terms of population (only 5.6 million 
inhabitants) and of surface (43 km
2
), with a relating density corresponding to 129 
inhabitants/ km
2
 (Statistics Denmark 2014). National cases under scrutiny widely differ 
also concerning municipalities dimensions. The average population recorded in 
municipalities corresponds to around 7,500 inhabitants in Italy (and median equal to 
2,449), 242,000 inhabitants in England (median equal to 138,830), and 57,000 in 
Denmark (median equal to 42,748): a rather patchy context of analysis.  
As well-known, the large majority of the 8,057 Italian municipalities are very small: the 
80% has a population below the average, corresponding to 7,544 inhabitants, while 
between the remaining 1,654 municipalities with a population above the average the 
68% has less than 20,000 inhabitants (ANCI 2014): accordingly, 520 cities in Italy 
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record a resident population above the threshold of 20,000 inhabitants and only 147 
more than 50,000, a more comparable population to average size of English and Danish 
municipalities. 
 
Table 3.1 Size and population of municipalities: Italy, England and Denmark 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: data related to Italy: ISTAT 2014, ANCI 2014. Data related to England: Office for National 
statistics 2013. Data related to Denmark: Statistics Denmark 2014. 
  
Italy  
(2014 Q3) 
England 
(2013 Q4) 
Denmark 
(2014 Q3) 
Total population 60,780,377 53,012,456 5,556,442 
Surface (km2) 301,340 130,278 43,094 
Density (inhab./km2) 201 406 129 
Total municipalities 8,057 359 98 
Mean population 7,544 242,434 56,967 
Median 2,449 138,830 42,748 
Municipalities below the mean 6,40 (79%) 264 (74%) 72 (73%) 
Municipalities above the mean 1,65 (21%) 95 (26%) 26 (27%) 
English local government is made up of 359 very big municipalities, of which the 50% 
accounts for more than 139,000 inhabitants, while approximately the 26% has a resident 
population above the average value corresponding to 242,000 inhabitants. The 2007 
structural reform reshuffled Danish local government, creating 98 large municipalities 
with a rather balanced population: the median almost corresponds the average value, 
which means that the 50% of municipalities has a population below 42,000 inhabitants 
while the remaining 50% is located above that threshold, with very few outliers and a 
high concentration of cases around the average.  
Given these premises, I selected three medium-big municipalities (considered medium-
big according to the reference categories within each country) which strive for being as 
much representative as possible within each respective national context. Regarding 
Italy, I firstly excluded all medium-small municipalities below 50.000 inhabitants, then 
a city with around 140.000 inhabitants was chooses, the average population of the 
remaining cluster of cities. In England the average size of city is notably higher than in 
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Italy: hence the selection has involved the cluster of municipalities above the median, 
considering suitable cases those with a population around 380.000 inhabitants, the mean 
value of this cluster. Finally in Denmark the municipality was selected with a 
population size around the median (42.000 inhabitants) since municipalities cluster 
around this value. 
Further criteria have been settled specifically for hospitals selection as well. First of all, 
for sake of comparability I selected as case studies hospitals devoted to secondary care, 
namely health care services provided by medical specialists and other health 
professionals who generally do not have first contact with patients, for example, 
cardiologists, urologists and dermatologists. They include both chronic care (also 
defined long-term care) and acute care (short-time treatment for a brief but serious 
illness, injury or other health condition, such as emergency department).  
A second distinctive feature across healthcare systems concerns the decisional level at 
which the outsourcing agenda is settled. In Italy the legislative decree no 502/1992 and 
the following legislative decree no 229/1999 set the legislative framework regarding the 
territorial articulations of healthcare structures: within each region, the law established 
as public independent bodies, endowed with decisional and economic autonomy, the 
Local Health Authorities (LHA) ˗ covering the areas of competence corresponding to 
the provinces and including one or more hospitals ˗ and the main Italian hospitals (AO) 
featured by highly specialized departments. The bodies of directors in chief of both 
these structures are entitled to adopt outsourcing strategies. In England the National 
Health System (NHS) was extensively reformed by the National Health Service & 
Community Care Act (1990) which defined new forms of healthcare provision and 
introduced the idea of „internal market‟. Health Authorities indeed ceased to run 
hospitals but „purchased‟ care from their own or other authorities' hospitals become 
NHS trusts, encouraging competition between them. Since 2004 NHS trusts have been 
allowed to apply for foundation trust status, implying a significant amount of 
managerial and financial freedom: currently almost all the previous NHS trust eligible 
for becoming foundation got the new status. The body of directors within each NHS 
foundation trust set its own outsourcing agenda. The 2007 structural reform in Denmark 
attributed healthcare responsibilities to Regions, which represent the venue where 
decisions making about outsourcing occur: hence the regional council establishes the 
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agenda for all the hospitals under its competence. The selection of hospitals has taken 
into account these cross-national differences in order to choose comparable cases. Thus 
the analysis has involved: an LHA in Italy for untangling the decisional process and a 
single hospital within the LHA competence where the policies have been implemented; 
a region in Denmark as decision-making level and a specific hospital in the region; a 
NHS foundation trust in England since it is endowed of managerial autonomy. 
 
 
3.4 Data collection and analysis 
 
As anticipated, a case-study method has been developed to provide insight into the 
research questions, based on double-level comparative analysis over time: a cross-
national comparison of outsourcing implications in three countries within two sub-
sectors of public administration. Data collection was based on an in-depth qualitative 
analysis carried out through 75 semi-structured interviews (25 conducted in Italy, 24 in 
England and 26 in Denmark) and documental analysis, split up into two stages. The first 
stage of the fieldwork involved semi-structured interviews with the employers‟ 
associations in health care sector and local government and trade-unions‟ 
representatives at national level across Italy, England and Denmark: these interviews, 
matched with related documents, internal reports and academic literature enabled the 
selection of the six case studies satisfying the above mentioned criteria. In addition, data 
gathered during this first phase allowed to trace the phenomenon of outsourcing back to 
its origin within each country, of which the whole picture will be provided, including 
distinctions between the two sectors under investigation.  
Further, the second stage of fieldwork involved the in-depth analysis of each case study, 
conducted through semi-structured interviews with key informants inside each case: 
representatives from the employers‟ side (councillors and mayors in the municipalities; 
local representatives from employer associations in both sectors; managers and 
administrative staff employed in procurement departments in both sectors; HR 
department managers in both sectors; managers in service area in municipalities), trade 
unions officials in local branches involved in the specific case studies both for health 
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care sector and municipalities, shop stewards elected inside workplaces for both sectors 
and finally some scholars and practitioners particularly committed to investigate this 
issue. These expert interviews with key informants, based on a rather standardized set of 
topics, covered a detailed description of the outsourcing process, traced back to its 
origin; main motivations underlying the strategic choice to outsource; main actors and 
stakeholders involved in the process; changes in employment conditions for employees 
involved in the process; changes in work organization for employees involved in the 
process; extent to which employees involved have been made redundant or fired; 
implications for employment relations structure in terms of kind of unions‟ involvement 
in the process, unions‟ responses and strategies adopted, main level of collective 
bargaining for workers involved in the process, impacts for union membership 
following outsourcing, strengths and weaknesses of unions‟ strategies during this 
process; future expectations. All the interviews were recorded, literally transcribed and 
analysed through thematic analysis using the software tool ATLAS.ti. Data collected 
through interviews were complemented by a documental analysis based on a wide range 
of secondary sources – such as academic literature, legislation, annual reports, internal 
PowerPoint presentations, collective agreements, practitioners‟ reports, related surveys, 
employers‟ associations and unions internal documents and newspaper articles. 
Data were collected through fieldwork in Denmark between March-June 2014, in 
England between September 2013 and January 2014 and in Italy between July-
November 2014. 
Credibility was actually gained through triangulation of sources, interviewing actors 
from multiple sides of the process – employers, trade unions officers and employees – 
(Healy and Perry 2000). 
 
 
85 
 
 
 
 
Chapter four 
The case of Italy 
 
 
4.1 Public administration: structure, functions, employment relations  
 
4.1.1 Structure and functions 
With a population of about 60 million inhabitants Italy is a unitary state which, since the 
early 1970s, attributes strong autonomy on administrative and regulatory matters to the 
regional level of government, powers further strengthened by the 2001 constitutional 
reform. The administrative structure of the state, beyond the central government, is 
made of a three-tier level decentralized government comprising 20 regions ˗ five of 
which provided with a special statute conferring an even stronger autonomy ˗, 109 
provinces, two of which with a special autonomy statute and about 8,000 municipalities. 
Not only Italy is featured by a marked fragmentation of the most decentralized level of 
government, as clearly emerges from these figures, but the distribution of municipalities 
in terms of resident population displays a clear-cut preponderance of very small and 
small local authorities. The large majority ˗ around 70% ˗ of municipalities indeed 
counts a population of less than 5,000 inhabitants while almost the totality (more the 
90%) has less than 20,000 inhabitants. It follows that large resident population is 
registered in a residual rate of municipalities: only 12 cities count more than 250,000 
inhabitants (www.anci.it). Despite this unbalanced distribution towards limited 
dimension, the distribution of the population is instead rather balanced although about 1 
out of 6 citizens live in municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants (Bordogna and 
Neri 2012). 
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Since the late 1990s the president of each region and province, the mayor of the 
municipalities and the council members are directly elected by universal suffrage every 
four year. Regions and municipalities, despite their wide administrative and regulatory 
autonomy, enjoy only limited scope to levy local taxes: they are indeed mostly funded 
by transfers from central government. 
In terms of functions and responsibilities, they are carried out at different administrative 
levels. At the central state level there are ministries and agencies, including internal 
revenue agencies, the judiciary, police corps and all the defence forces, fire-fighters 
corps, compulsory social security and the public education of all grades, with the 
exception of vocational training provided at regional and local government level. Public 
university and research institutions have administrative autonomy but are mainly 
financed by the central government. The organisation, management and provision of 
health care services, under the national policy coordination of the Ministry of Health on 
the basis of financial resources transferred by the central government, are direct 
responsibility of each region following the process of decentralization occurred in Italy 
in the early 1990s (Bordogna and Neri 2011). Finally social services are mostly 
provided at local government level. 
Such allocation of responsibilities traces its origins back to a series of reform which 
started in the 1990s, often stimulated by growing financial difficulties of the state. The 
Bassanini law (law 59/1997), from the name of the Ministry of Public Function, 
structurally modified the allocation of responsibilities across administrative levels 
through the application of the subsidiary principle: the new regulatory framework 
granted to municipalities a higher degree of autonomy in the selection of services to 
provide as well as in the definition of their organizational structures. The logic of the 
reform hence pursued a double purpose: on the one side it aimed at shifting functions 
and responsibilities from a centralized towards a more decentralized level proximate to 
citizens, whilst on the other side it provided greater legal and managerial autonomy to 
local governments as a means to boost their accountability and make them more 
responsible in their economic and strategic choices. 
The process of decentralization has involved the National Health Service as well during 
the 1990s, where some elements of internal competition and changes to strengthen 
managerial autonomy have been introduced (Vicarelli 1994). Before the formal 
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establishment of the National Health Service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale) in 1978 
(law 833/1978), the decree of the President of the Republic 616/1977 had already 
devolved administrative functions in the matter of social services and health care from 
the central state to the regions. The 1978 reform created the Local Health Units (Unità 
sanitarie locali), local centres of healthcare service provision covering the whole 
country, moving a step further along the decentralization path from the Ministry of 
Health to the regional authorities. A new regulatory framework during the 1990s 
(legislative decree 502/1992; legislative decree 517/1993) reorganised the Local Health 
Units and modified their status through a transformation into companies called Local 
Health Authorities (LHA) (Aziende sanitarie locali) provided with their own legal, 
accounting, organizational and financial autonomy: they constitute a centralized 
decision centre generally composed of several hospital units covering the geographical 
area of the province (Vicarelli 2004). A similar status was achieved also by a number of 
hospitals (Aziende ospedaliere) which satisfied specific criteria in terms of the variety 
and relevance of services supplied, as well as organizational complexity. Despite from a 
legal point of view the newly created health authorities are allowed to autonomously 
manage their own resources, their autonomy is restricted by regional guidelines and 
bound within financial thresholds set at national and regional level. 
 
4.1.2 Status and structure of public employment 
At the end of 2013 the Italian public administration, as legally defined by the legislative 
decree 29/1993
1
, employed about 3,336,000 individuals: they constitute the 14% of the 
total employment within the country in the same period and around the 5.5% of the total 
population. About 21% of public workforce is employed in the health care sector, 32% 
in the education and 18% in the local government sector (including regions, provinces, 
municipalities, chambers of commerce), 5% in the ministries and 16% in the police 
corps and defence forces (Ministero Economia e Finance – Conto Annuale della 
Ragioneria Generale dello Stato 2013). After a long time-lapse of overall stability in 
                                                          
1
 According to the legislative decree 29/1993, public administrations include public schools and educational 
institutions of any grade; the autonomous firms of the State (fire-workers and, until 2007, State monopolies like 
tobacco); regions, provinces and municipalities; public universities; chambers of commerce and their associations; all 
public hospitals and organizations of the National health service; non-economic public bodies at national, regional 
and local level (mostly social security).  
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staffing level, if not even of increase, since 2009 the amount of public personnel started 
to gradually decline following a series of strict austerity measures adopted by the 
government in the aftermath of the financial crisis discussed below. 
As in several other European countries, public employees in Italy still exhibit distinctive 
characteristics compared to those working in the private sector of the economy, as for 
instance a higher degree of juridification of employment relations and „their marked 
dependence on the administrative structure of the state‟ (Bordogna, Dell‟ Aringa and 
Della Rocca 1999: 76). However starting from the end of the 1960s such clear-cut 
differences started to decline through a gradual shift of public employment regulation 
towards private sector discipline, which traces its origin back to three waves of reform 
in 1992-93, 1997-98 and 2009. 
The distinctive status of public employment regulation started to decline in 1969 when 
the government partially recognized collective bargaining rights to a limited groups of 
public employees, starting from public hospitals‟ one for then spreading to other sectors 
(Bordogna, Dell‟ Aringa and Della Rocca 1999). A further step towards the effective 
privatisation is represented by the framework law on public employment 93/1983 
(Legge quadro sul pubblico impiego). Despite still preserving the unilateral regulation 
of several aspects of the employment relationship, this law extended collective 
bargaining to most of public administrations‟ employees, identifying the scope of 
agreements (including wage rate, working time and work organisation) and defining 
actors involved in the bargaining and procedures. Nevertheless labour law scholars 
punctiliously pinpointed that employment relations in the public sector was not fully 
privatized yet after the law 93/1983, since negotiated agreements still needed to be 
converted into a decree of the President of the Republic in order to be effective and 
binding (Bordogna, Dell‟ Aringa and Della Rocca 1999). In addition the replacement of 
unilateral regulation with collective bargaining right occurred without abolishing the 
special prerogatives attached to the status of public employment, but conversely in 
addition to them, giving origin to what has been called a regime of „double guarantee‟ 
or „pluralism without market‟ (Giugni 1992, Bordogna 1994). Inevitably such regime 
led to remarkable difficulties, „notably, uncontrolled wage claims and leapfrogging 
settlements, union fragmentation and frequent conflict, which soon became 
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unacceptable for the entire industrial relations system, as well as for the needs of public 
expenditure control‟ (Bordogna, Dell‟ Aringa and Della Rocca 1999: 77). 
As a consequence in 1992-93, the joint pressures of such serious problems arisen from 
the regime of double guarantee in public employment, the increasing economic pressure 
linked to the 1992 financial crisis and the urgency to meet the Maastricht criteria for 
European Monetary Union led to the approval of a new wide set of regulations 
concerning the Italian public administration. The so-called „first privatisation‟ wave 
occurred in 1993 represented the first structured attempt to „contractualize‟ and 
privatize employment relationship of the large majority of public employees (law 
421/992, converted into legislative decree 29/1993) which, beyond determining job 
terms and conditions through collective bargaining ˗ as opposed to unilateral regulation 
on the part of the government ˗, reduced the special prerogatives attached to the status 
of public employment, removed the public law statute and shifted controversies from 
the administrative courts (applying administrative law) to ordinary tribunals under the 
civil code. According to this major reform, public employees‟ employment relationship 
is determined through collective agreements negotiated between the representative trade 
unions and ARAN, the public agency for compulsory representation of public 
administrations in collective bargaining at national level. ARAN was purposely created 
in 1993 ˗ then amended in 1997 ˗ as a means to both replace a multiplicity of 
fragmented parties previously involved in negotiations and to insulate the process from 
political and parliamentary intervention: it followed a greater transparency in the 
negotiations and a higher degree of autonomy from external pressures. 
Overtaken the unilateralism in force prior to 1993, collective bargaining was fully 
recognized as the main method of employment regulation, based on a two-tier 
bargaining system established by legislative decree 29/1993 along the lines of the 
bargaining structured adopted in the private sector: the main pillar is represented by 
national level bargaining where representative trade unions and ARAN negotiate 
collective agreements sector by sector (central government, local government, health 
care sector, public education sector, public universities); the second pillar consists of the 
decentralized level negotiations within each single public organisation, between the 
employer ˗ if required supported by ARAN ˗ and the workplace workers‟ representative 
bodies (rappresentanze sindacali unitarie ˗ RSU). The national agreements, beyond 
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general terms and conditions (including wage rate, working-time, work organisation, 
overtime, workloads and mobility) binding for the whole workforce within each sector, 
establish specific matters and financial thresholds to apply to company level 
negotiations, according to the model of „centralized decentralization‟ (Traxler 1995, 
Bordogna and Winchester 2001). 
Further tools and values imported from the private sector were introduce in the Italian 
public sector via the legislative decree 29/1993: „managerial prerogatives and 
responsibilities were strengthened, also on personnel and employment relations matters, 
with, intendedly, increased autonomy from politicians and trade unions, subject to 
stricter financial controls and tighter performance assessment systems. Automatic wage 
increases and career promotions linked to seniority were substituted with more 
discretionary, selective, performance-related mechanisms. This reform was approved 
with the substantial endorsement of the main trade union confederations‟ (Bordogna and 
Neri 2012: 9). 
Italian public sector underwent a „second privatization‟ wave between 1997-99: this 
reform (legislative decree 396/1997; legislative decree 80/1998, so-called „second 
privatization‟; legislative decree 387/1998; consolidated in the legislative decree 
165/2001 entitled General Rules on Public Sector Employment) (Norme generali 
sull’ordinamento del lavoro alle dipendenze delle amministrazioni pubbliche ) 
substantially strengthened and innovated several matters relating the employment 
relationship previously introduced by the legislative intervention in 1993. Specifically 
the legislative decree 80/1998 further emphasized the role of collective bargaining, 
underlying its regulatory primacy over the law in case of overlapping matters of 
legislative interferences. Moreover the bargaining structure was further decentralized, 
on the one hand entitling local administrators with stronger autonomy in local level 
wage definition and, on the other hand widening the scope of the negotiation at 
company level to cover organizational and human resources management matters ˗ 
previously employer‟s prerogatives. The financial controls by the Court of Auditors on 
collectively negotiated agreements at both centralized and company level have been 
remarkably softened, while stricter performance appraisal procedures were introduced 
for both managerial and non-managerial staff. Finally the regulation of employment 
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relations for top state managers was „contractualised‟ removing the unilateral 
determination of terms and conditions set by legislation or administrative acts.  
The regulatory framework arisen from the 1992-93 and the following 1997-99 waves of 
reforms crucially modified employment relations structure of public employees, 
bringing terms and conditions closer to those applied in the private sector by reducing 
legal differences between the two sectors. Nevertheless some of these measures inspired 
to the NPM doctrine generated perverse effects and unexpected results (Bordogna 
2008), „partly due to their incomplete or inappropriate implementation, and partly due 
to weaknesses in their original design‟ (Bordogna 2013: 519). Among others, they gave 
origin to a dynamic of wage increase around 10-15 percentage points higher than in the 
private sector in the 2000-2007 period, as an effect of collective agreements negotiated 
at decentralized level, especially in local government and health care sector (ARAN 
2009, 2010 and 2011). Such outcome moreover was due to a devolution of wider scope 
for negotiation and autonomy at workplace level which was not accompanied by the 
implementation of adequate institutional arrangements to strengthen financial 
responsibility of individual administrations. 
Some of the weaknesses and difficulties arisen from the regulatory framework of the 
1990s have been addressed by a third wave of public employment reform occurred in 
2008-09. Moreover this severe legislative intervention „was embedded within an 
increasingly vociferous campaign against the alleged unbearable privileges of public 
employees and their persistent inefficiency, if not parasitism, even after privatization‟ 
(Bordogna 2013: 523). Newly elected government constantly stressed the rhetoric of 
public sector inefficiency, identifying public personnel as idlers, loafers and slackers in 
the eyes of public opinion and citizens. 
The overall structure of employment relationship was maintained, but the new center-
right government issuing the so-called Brunetta reform, from the name of the Ministry 
of Public Function (law 15/2009; legislative decree 150/2009), reversed the reform 
pattern undertaken during the previous decades. This legislation indeed shrank the 
scope and the role of collective bargaining, constraining negotiation in highly 
prescriptive rules; it strengthened employers and managerial discretion to unilaterally 
decide on a number of matters previously subject to collective bargaining ˗ especially 
concerning the organisation of work and HRM issues ˗ while at the same time it cut 
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down financial resources and limited the degree of autonomy for decentralized level 
agreements. As a consequence employment relations and HRM practices „were partially 
rejuridified, to the detriment not only of the autonomy of collective negotiation but, in 
some respects, also of managerial prerogatives‟ (Bordogna 2013: 521-2). Moreover, the 
Brunetta reform purposely challenged unions‟ prerogatives in the sector and downplay 
the role of workplace representative bodies leaving them only the right of information 
on issues regarding the organisation of work and HRM matters, deleting the possibility 
to open negotiations.  
Additionally, the uncontrolled wage dynamics that arose from the regulatory framework 
of the 1990s paved the way for the introduction of stricter rules binding salary increase 
and career promotions, made conditional on selective procedures and performance 
appraisal systems by the new legislation. In addition tighter centralized controls by the 
Court of Auditors and government were reestablished to monitor not only the respect of 
both national and decentralized level agreements with the financial threshold set by the 
state budget law, but also their conformity with the fundamental principles of the 
reform, as transparency, meritocracy and selectivity.  
 
4.1.3 Social dialogue framework and institutions 
As far employment relations are concerned, Italy has traditionally followed an approach 
grounded on voluntarism between social partners: hence legal institutions are limited 
while autonomy of the parties involved is rather high. As a voluntarist system, the main 
sources of rules are national and intersectoral agreements: the fundamental background 
of industrial relations is constituted by the central tripartite agreement of 23 July 1993 
(Accordo interconfederale 23 luglio 1993) which set a new institutional framework for 
income policy, restructured bargaining procedures, modified forms of workplace union 
representation and created a systematic two-tier structure for collective bargaining 
restructuring the links between the two levels. 
The two-level bargaining structure based on industry-wide and decentralized 
agreements allows for extensive bargaining coverage and comprehensive national 
standards through sectoral agreements. Additionally, taking into account specific 
features of the Italian economic and employment context (such as an average medium-
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small size of companies; industrial and economic disparities between the north and the 
south of the country) the second bargaining level helps to accommodate such 
differences between large and small enterprises located in diverse areas of the country. 
However collective bargaining at company level is restricted to matters and practices 
that have not already been covered by the industry-wide agreements. 
An exception to the voluntarist approach is represented by industrial relationships in the 
public sector which, conversely, have been shaped by a long tradition of state 
intervention in the definition of procedural rules for collective negotiation, of partners 
entitled to take part to negotiation, of wage structure and amount of financial resources 
available for both national and decentralized level bargaining. The structure of 
collective bargaining in the public sector was systematically introduced by the 
legislative decree 29/1993, which envisaged a model of „centralized decentralisation‟ 
(Traxler 1995, Bordogna and Winchester 2001) resembling to that implemented in 
private sector as set by the 1993 tripartite agreement.  
Collective bargaining for the large majority of public employees ˗ the „contractualised‟ 
personnel as defined by the legislative decree 29/1993 ˗ is based on a two-level 
structure. At the higher level, nation-wide sectoral collective agreements are negotiated 
between representative trade unions and ARAN, which compulsory and 
monopolistically represents public employers at national level, to determine in a 
uniform way the normative working conditions and inflation-linked wage increases. At 
the lower level, decentralized level collective agreements are negotiated between the 
local employer (assisted by ARAN if explicitly required by the public employer) and 
the workplace employees‟ representative bodies (RSU) assisted by local union 
branches, regarding salary increases linked to productivity and performance appraisal 
within financial threshold established by the national agreements. Until the 
implementation of the Brunetta reform, work organisation as well as HRM issues were 
negotiated at decentralized level: since 2009 they became prerogatives of the employer. 
The nation-wide bargaining sectors or units (comparti) were initially eight: ministries; 
non-economic public bodies (mostly compulsory social security); public schools; 
autonomous state firms (mostly fire-fighters); national health system; regions and local 
authorities, among which municipalities, provinces and chambers of commerce; public 
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universities and public research bodies. Between 1998 and 2007 bargaining units were 
increased to 12, and finally cut down to a maximum of 4 by the 2009 Brunetta reform. 
Collective agreements at sectoral level are made up two parts: the normative content is 
valid for four years, while the wage and economic part is agreed for two years. 
The compulsory and monopolistic representation of ARAN for all Italian public 
administrations in national-level negotiations ensures 100% coverage of national 
collective agreements. Conversely, in the private sector of the economy there is no 
formal extension mechanism for collective agreements, as these agreements are 
generally binding only for companies and employees affiliated to those associations that 
sign the collective agreements. Official statistics on the coverage of collective 
bargaining in the private sector are not available, but EIRO figures based on the 
ICTWSS Dataset
2
 put it as over the 80% in 2009. Despite this high rate, collective 
agreements at company level are much less widespread, covering only 30-40% of the 
workforce. 
Representation of public employees at workplace level has been regulated by the 
legislative decree 396/1997 which set the regulatory framework for constituting 
workplace employees‟ representative bodies (RSU, Rappresentanze sindacali unitarie). 
All members are elected with universal suffrage and secret ballots every three years in 
each public administration site with more than 15 employees, basically on a similar 
model to that introduced in the private sector by the 1993 tripartite agreement. The 
result of elections confers relevant union prerogatives, among which amount of working 
time off and paid leaves for union activity and the right to collectively bargain at 
decentralized level. 
Concerning the right to strike, there are no particular restrictions for public employees 
but services at minimum level must be guaranteed in essential public services as 
regulated by the law 146/1990 (subsequently amended and supplemented by the law 
83/2000), to be meant as all those services which satisfy the constitutionally protected 
rights of the individual to life, safety, health, mobility, education, information, to name 
but a few. 
                                                          
2
 ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention 
and Social Pacts in 34 countries between 1960 and 2012, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour 
Studies (AIAS), Amsterdam. 
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Working time represent an important issue collectively negotiated, especially relevant in 
the last decade given the emphasis placed by employers on the need to increase time 
flexibility. The statutory normal working week is 40 hours and the maximum statutory 
working week (including overtime) is 48 hours according to the legislative decree 
66/2003. However there are remarkable differences across sectors: in 2012 the 
collectively bargained weekly working time was 38 hours in the chemicals sector, 40 
hours in the retails and 36 hours in the public administration. 
 
4.1.4 Trade unions 
Trade union association is a constitutional right in Italy embodied in Article 39 of the 
Italian Constitution (Libertà sindacale) which guarantees freedom to organize, join a 
union and engage in trade union activities at the workplace, without discriminating 
between public and private sector employees. It follows that there are no legal 
restrictions on union organisation and representation for a large part of public personnel, 
except for a few distinctions for the police corps and the armed forces
3
. 
Trade union density has been relatively stable in recent years and however above the 
EU28 average after a sharp decline in the previous decades. Administrative data of the 
three main confederations show that in 2012 about 37% of employees was member of a 
union in the whole economy (excluding retired members), only one percentage point 
lower compared to union density recorded in 1995. The rate is much higher in the 
public sector, where unions constitute the stronghold of the trade union movement, 
feature that is not only an Italian peculiarity, nor a recent one (Visser 2006): the density 
rate rapidly increased in the 1960s and the 1970s and, although a decline in the last two 
decades, it is around the 50%, even above the 60% if only managerial staff is considered 
(Bordogna and Neri 2011, 2014). 
The main unions are affiliated to three major union confederations: CGIL 
(Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro), CISL (Confederazione Italiana 
Sindacato dei Lavoratori) and UIL (Unione Italiana del Lavoro). Historically the 
confederations represented different political orientations which have become less clear-
cut over time: CGIL was mostly linked to the left parties (the former communist and 
                                                          
3
 They are indeed allowed to join representative organisations, but which cannot be affiliated to any trade 
union confederation. 
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socialist parties which both disbanded in the early 1990s) and political affiliations are 
still rather relevant; CISL was closed to the former Christian Democratic party 
(disbanded in the early 1990s as well) but including also sympathizers with parties 
located in the center-left of the political spectrum. Finally UIL was mostly associated 
with the non-communist, reformist left, namely the Socialist party and the Republican 
party. In addition to unions affiliated to these three confederations, in the Italian 
scenario is characterized by several other confederations and further independent 
autonomous unions, in particular in the transport and the public services sector. The 
three main confederations are organized on an industry basis, with separate industry 
federations for the chemical sector, metalworking, the public sector, 
telecommunications, construction and so on. 
Italian public sector unionism displays three distinctive features in comparison with the 
private sector. First of all, as already mentioned, a remarkable higher union density is 
registered over the entire post-World-War-II period compared to the rate in the private 
sector of the economy: on average public sector rate overcomes the private sector one of 
some 15 or more percentage points (Bordogna and Neri 2011). Second, a much greater 
organizational fragmentation of the structure of representation, well beyond the 
historical division along political and ideological streams across the three main 
confederations. Such fragmentation is due to the proliferation of several independent 
crafts and occupational unions which are not affiliated to any confederation but traced 
their roots back to the typical professional and occupational segmentation of public 
sector labour market: the establishment of unionism of this kind was in addition 
facilitated by the high disruptive power these occupations enjoy because of their 
strategic position, which allows „forms of industrial action which have a 
disproportionate effect on the users of services and the general public in comparison 
with the cost of the action itself‟ (Bordogna, Dell‟ Aringa and Della Rocca 1999: 91). 
As a result more than 300 unions have been registered in the public sector, of whom 
more than 200 has fewer than 100 members and 100 has fewer than 10. Third, a 
generally strong organizational presence at workplace level featured by an almost 
universal diffusion of workplace employees‟ representative bodies. 
The issue of fragmented unionism in the public sector is directly connected with the 
question of union representativeness: such huge proliferation of unions indeed open up 
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the question of setting clear criteria to select organisations entitled to bargain and to 
enjoy union right, as periods of leave for union activities. Given the strong pressure 
exercised by small unions for being admitted to negotiations, the government dealt 
structurally with the issue of representativeness in 1997 (legislative decree 396/1997, 
article 7, which modified the article 47 of the legislative decree 29/1993). According to 
this new legislative framework, unions admitted to sectoral negotiations at national 
level are those which have a representativeness of at least 5% within the relevant sector 
(or bargaining area), computed as the average between an „associative‟ and an 
„electoral‟ criterion. The associative criterion is the percentage of check-offs (deleghe) 
collected by a union out of the total number of check-offs within the bargaining area. 
The electoral criterions instead corresponds to the percentage of votes collected by a 
union out of the total number of votes cast for the election of employees‟ representative 
bodies at workplace.  
 
 
4.2 Austerity measures as drivers of outsourcing 
 
Italy has a public debt which has always been above the 100% of GDP since the advent 
of Euro and one of the largest in the EU: this is why in the years following the 
economic crisis, severe programs have been adopted to control budget deficit, cut 
expenditure and increase revenues. Public sector expenditure and public employment 
relations have been crucial targets of government austerity measures since the first 
austerity package in 2008 (decree law 112/2008).  
Overall three main types of programs have been implemented: provisions aimed at 
drastically reducing the number of employees; measures targeted to salaries of public 
personnel and the reform of pension system. 
First of all, according to the decree law 112/2008, very tight replacement ratios were 
introduced in the entire public administration: staff turnover ˗ both at managerial and 
non-managerial level ˗ was cut down to 10% in 2009 (it implies that new entrants were 
allowed only for an expenditure equivalent to 10% of the labour cost of retired 
employees in the previous year), 20% in 2010 and 2011, and 50% in 2012 (Bordogna 
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2013). The overall effect on staffing level was already visible in 2010: „at the end of the 
year the total number of public employees was 4% lower than in 2008, with a decrease 
both in the number of permanent employees (3.6%) and even more in the number of 
employees with flexible contracts (almost 13%)‟ (Bordogna and Neri 2012: 14). The 
freeze of turnover was further strengthened and prolonged in 2010 (decree law 78/2010) 
and in 2011 (decree law 98/2011 and 138/2011), then confirmed by the Monti 
government through the so-called legislation on the spending review in 2012 (decree 
law 95/2012). 
A second set of austerity measures introduced in 2008 and subsequently strengthened in 
2010-11 concerns the containment of wage dynamics for public employees. After the 
bargaining round in 2008-09 for the renewal of the economic part of collective 
agreements with very moderate wage increases, close to half of the increase agreed 
upon in 2004-05 and 2006-07 (ARAN 2011), the decree law 78/2010 (article 9) 
cancelled the wage round of national negotiation for the 2010-12, removing any 
possibility of recovery in the following rounds. Subsequent legislative interventions 
extended the freeze of collective bargaining to 2013 and 2014. 
Collective bargaining at decentralized level, instead, was not frozen but subject to rigid 
financial constraints, including the ban of exceeding the amount of resources utilized in 
2010: it followed that the only endowment of resources left at the disposal of local 
parties for negotiations was a limited portion of the so-called „efficiency gains‟ realized 
within each organization, after certification at central level.  
Hence salary rates of individual employees were forbidden to exceed in 2011-13 the 
level of 2010, measure extended by a 2011 government provision to the end of 2014. 
The overall effect is a significant shrinkage of the wide gap in wage rate between 
private and public sector over the 2000-07 time-lapse (ARAN 2011), following a 
progressive slowdown in salary dynamic for public employees in 2008-09 and a 
substantial freeze since 2010. 
The third pillar of the austerity package adopted by the Italian government in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, as a means to reduce the wage bill and total expenditure 
of public sector is the reform of the pension system (which moreover included private 
sector workers as well). Obeying to a 2008 sentence of the European Court of Justice 
and to a recommendation of the EU Commission, the government raised from 2012 the 
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standard retirement age for old age pension for female public employees from 61 to 66, 
in line with the provision regarding male colleagues. In addition, the value of pension 
treatments was reduced by lowering the protection from inflation, and shifting the 
whole employees from an earnings-related system to a contributions-related one. 
From the above brief synthesis of the main austerity measures adopted, the government 
will to downsize public employment and cut down the overall expenditure of public 
administrations clearly emerge; moreover the large majority of measures have been 
adopted unilaterally, without previous consultation and negotiation with unions, even 
purposely against union protests. 
General austerity provisions to apply uniformly across sectors have been complemented 
by further legislative interventions targeting specific public sector divisions. 
 
4.2.1 Austerity measures in local government 
Over the last decades, municipalities in the country have undergone alternately either 
general administrative reform or legislative pressures which, to a different extent, 
modified the institutional role of this decentralized level of government, pushing them 
towards outsourcing. Indeed local governments have been particularly hit by 
increasingly sector-specific tighter measures of austerity, even before the need to 
contain public debt in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers crack in 2007. Specifically, 
they traced their origins back to the implementation of the Internal Stability Pact (ISP, 
Patto di Stabilità Interno) in 1998 (law 488/1998) following the adoption of the EU 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The ISP indeed required to all decentralized levels of 
government, ranging from regions to provinces and municipalities, to contribute in 
pursuing the public finance targets aimed at respecting the financial SGP criteria. The 
national legislation, through the annual Stability Act (that is the budget law of the state) 
and other legislative interventions, defines the whole financial targets for local 
government institutions which focus on public debt containment. In order to pursue 
such targets, the legislation imposed a set of legal constraints on municipality 
expenditure, including personnel cost. 
In case of breach of ISP targets, sanctions on municipalities include a cut in financial 
transfer from central government, a cap on current expenditures and investments and the 
100 
freeze of any hiring of permanent or temporary staff (decree law 112/2008, art. 76, co. 
4; decree law no. 78/2010, art. 14, co. 3, converted in law no. 122/2010; legislative 
decree no. 149/2011, art. 7, co. 2; law no. 183/2011, art. 8, co. 4) (Bordogna and Neri 
2012). Since 2008, and especially from summer 2011, financial targets for 
municipalities became particularly strict and severe, even harder to reach, while 
regulations have been progressively intensified as a means to reassure financial markets 
and keep the interest rates of the public debt at sustainable levels. Cuts in financial 
transfers from the central government to decentralized levels of government have been 
decided, amounting to 0.36, 0.49 and 0.47 of GDP respectively in 2011, 2012 and 2013 
(OECD 2011). 
Moreover, a ban on any new temporary and permanent hiring, including stabilization of 
temporary workers, was introduced where the ratio between personnel expenditure and 
total current expenditure of a municipality exceeds 50%. This upper limit in the ratio, 
originally introduced in June 2008 (decree law 112/2008, art. 76, co.7), was lowered to 
40% in May 2010 (decree law 78/2010, art. 14, co. 9) and raised again to the current 
level of 50% in December 2011 (decree law 201/2011, art.28, co. 11-quarter). 
The outcomes of these austerity measures deriving from the ISP in terms of reduction in 
municipalities expenditures have been further hardened by the above illustrated 
legislative interventions directly targeting public employment size.  
Beside austerity measures, the central government purposely intervened for encouraging 
contracting out as policy tool for reducing public expenditure and increasing 
management economies. The debate around outsourcing in the public administration is 
rather recent in Italy, dating back to the mid-1990s in the context of general reordering 
of local government regulation: according to the law 142/1990 titled “Regulative 
framework of local authorities” (Ordinamento delle Autonomie Locali) (art. 22) indeed 
local governments may provide public services within their responsibilities either in-
house or by outsourcing. In the latter case they are allowed to contract the service out to 
an external private provider or they may constitute a joint-stock company or a limited 
liability company in majority public shareholding, wholly or partly owned by the local 
authority. A further cornerstone is set down through the law 498/1992 and the Decree of 
the President of the Republic 533/1996 which allowed the establishment of shared 
capital company in minority public shareholding for the provision of public services. 
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Subsequently such discipline regarding outsourcing in local authorities has been 
incorporated into the legislative decree 267/2000 called “Consolidated law of local 
authorities” (Testo Unico degli Enti Locali). 
A turning point however was represented by the political election of the centre-right 
party called “Forza Italia” led by Silvio Berlusconi. In the budget law for the year 2002, 
the law no.448/2001 ˗ the first issued by the new-elected government ˗, the will to foster 
market competition in public services production is much emphasized. In order to get 
management economies, article 29 authorized public administrations to buy services 
previously provided in-house in the market, in a twofold manner: both by establishing 
private law bodies to which entrust the execution of services and by outsourcing them to 
external providers through a public tender. 
The promotion of outsourcing as policy tool which enables to boost economies of scale 
and to enhance efficiency is reiterated also in article 24 and 32 dealing with 
municipalities‟ expenditure containment: externalization was indeed conceived as a 
further means for achieving financial constraints set within the ISP framework.  
The relevance of this new discipline has to be understood in the light of austerity 
measures launched in Italy since 1998, cutting central state transfer to local 
governments, the freeze of turnover as well as increasingly strict limits set over 
municipalities expenditure in accordance with the respect of the Internal Stability Pact. 
In this sense, municipalities have been affected twice by government austerity 
measures: „first, by the legislation directly targeting public sector employment levels, 
pension system and salaries; and indirectly, by the measures deriving from the internal 
stability pact and the connected legal constraints on local government expenditures‟ 
(Bordogna and Neri 2012: 16). 
To summarize, heavily reduced transfers from central government along with tighter 
constraints on overall expenditure, including personnel costs, in conjunction with the 
limited power to levy taxes at local level led municipalities to own much fewer 
resources ˗ in terms of both staffing level and financial resources ˗ to directly provide 
public services. As a consequence externalization processes and alternative way of 
service delivery quickly spread within Italian local governments, also encouraged by 
legislative pressures from central government. 
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The possibility set by law to establish various kinds of semi-autonomous organizations, 
partially or entirely controlled and funded by the municipalities, such as “joint-stock 
companies”, “special firms”, foundations” or “institutions” entitled to provide public 
services has been widely exploited by local governments in recent years to overcome 
personnel and financial constraints. In particular municipalities levered on the 
interpretative uncertainty about the application of the legislative framework illustrated 
above: it was not clear indeed whether constraints applied only to municipalities in strict 
sense or, adopting a more encompassing definition, also to the whole range of semi-
autonomous organizations controlled by the local governments. If during the last decade 
and until 2008 these organisations have been generally excluded from the scope of ISP 
and relating constraints, since then „the courts and the legislation reacted against these 
elusive practices, which especially concerned the joint-stock companies‟ (Bordogna and 
Neri 2012: 17). As a result currently not only joint-stock companies, but since 2013 also 
special firms and institutions are included in the scope of application of ISP framework, 
hence subject to strict economic constraints. A more recent legislative intervention in 
2014 (legislative decree 66/2014) finally rationalized the complex panorama of these 
various type of semi-autonomous organisations ˗ around 7,800 at the end of 2012 as 
reported by Cottarelli (2014). The government drastically imposed to downsize the 
number of these organisations through either the closure or the merge with other 
companies: indeed they turned out to be in the large majority too small (figures 
provided by Cottarelli counted 3,000 companies employing less than 6 employees) 
(Cottarelli 2014: 20) or at a loss. 
 
4.2.2 Austerity measure in healthcare sector 
The financial constraints that the government put in place for health care sector have 
been more limited in their scope compared to those set for municipalities and applied 
much more recently. 
As anticipated the current organisation of health care services stem from a series of 
legislative interventions occurring in the 1990s and 2000s: the health authorities have 
been allowed to autonomously manage their own resources, but their autonomy is 
restricted by regional guidelines and bound within financial thresholds set at national 
and regional level. Until 2010 however the central government has overall guaranteed a 
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sound stability in the levels of financial transfer towards the National Health System, if 
not even complemented by further specific funds endowments, as set in the annual 
budget laws. Furthermore, the financial targets focusing on public debts and public 
expenditure containment defined by the annual budget law of the state in respect of the 
Internal Stability Pact initially did not apply to health organisations. 
However, starting from 2010 onwards, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, the 
Minister of Health progressively reduced the resources for the NHS to be then 
reallocated across the 20 regions (law 122/2010; law 163/2010; law 228/2012, the 
budget law for the year 2013; decree law 95/2012, converted into the law 135/2012, the 
so-called Spending Review bis). The growing pressure of public debt on the Italian 
financial structure raised the necessity for health care system to actively contribute to 
the reduction of public expenditure. Along with budget shrinkage indeed the 
government froze staff turnover for those regions that breach financial targets with 
regard of health care expenditure (decree law 125/2010, art.2, co. 2-bis; converted into 
the law 163/2010; modified by the law 220/2010, the budget law for the year 2011). 
Additionally, in the recent years the regional government of Emilia-Romagna ˗ the 
region where the case study under scrutiny is located ˗ has directly intervened on the 
subject through the annual definition of Framework Guidelines for the Planning and 
Financing of the Regional Health Service (Linee di programmazione e finanziamento 
del Servizio Sanitario Regionale). The region firstly provided general recommendation 
to all health authorities to contain their expenditure in order to contribute to the financial 
sustainability of the Regional Health Service, and to achieve financial targets set at 
national level (law 191/2009, the budget law for the year 2010). In addition, the regional 
government set as spending cap for personnel for the 2010-2012 period the amount 
spent in 2004 diminished of 1.4%, target to be achieved through cut down in turnover 
and new hiring, including temporary contracts (deliberation of the regional council 
D.G.R. 1544/2010), in compliance with the Framework Program for Healthcare (Patto 
per la Salute) for the 2010-2012 period signed every three years by the central 
government, regions and autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano (agreement 
included in the law 191/2009, budget law for the year 2010). 
Such regional austerity measures then became progressively stricter and severe: since 
2011 indeed the region introduced a further cut of 7% on temporary staff costs for the 
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year 2012, compared to the amount estimated in the budget plan and a general 
recommendation to contain permanent hiring (D.G.R. 732/2011; D.G.R. 653/2012). 
Moreover in 2013 the regional council cut down staff turnover of 25% for the 2013 
(meaning that health authorities have the possibility to hire new employees to an 
expenditure not exceeding 25% of the labour cost of retired employees during 2012) 
(D.G.R. 199/2013); it froze staff turnover for administrative staff ˗ both managerial and 
non-managerial ˗ (D.G.R. 217/2014) while new hiring of temporary and permanent 
personnel have to be previously authorized by the Regional General Direction of 
Healthcare and Social Policies within the Annual Plan for Recruitment (Piano annuale 
di assunzione). 
 
 
4.3 The case of the Italian municipality 
 
The Italian municipality under scrutiny, selected according to the criteria elucidated into 
the methodological section, with a population of about 102,000 inhabitants (Istat 2014) 
is the capital city of a province in the region Emilia-Romagna, located in the Centre-
North of Italy. The municipality has been historically ruled by both right and left-wing 
political parties in rotation (mainly the Christian Democrat party, the Communist party 
and the Socialist party) while since the last two decades coalition of centre-left parties 
have continuously maintained the majority in the municipal council. 
In order to fully understand how outsourcing of municipal services impacted on work 
organisation and terms and conditions of employment it is relevant to frame the context 
in which such processes were embedded, elucidating firstly the main reasons underlying 
the decision to put some services out to tender and second to which activities and 
services we are referring in this case study, and consequently to what kind of workers‟ 
skills. 
Outsourcing process in the Italian context started relatively early ˗ compared to 
latecomer countries such as Scandinavian governments (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011) ˗ 
and this is particularly true in the region Emilia-Romagna where the municipality under 
scrutiny is located. Such region in fact, historically ruled by left-wing governments, 
despite a strong orientation towards a public provision of services as part of a 
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programmatic framework strictly interconnected with a specific political profile (even 
more evident in the case of healthcare services as explained later), has also displayed 
path-breaking and innovative policy solutions for an effective provision of public 
services, anticipating financial pressures which would have vigorously intervened 
pushing towards outsourcing as emergency measure only later on. This orientation is 
confirmed by the national secretary of union CGIL-FP (Funzione Pubblica, the CGIL 
branch representing public personnel) dealing with local governments, who until 2008 
worked as regional secretary in Emilia-Romagna for the local government sector: 
„Emilia started far and away before there were financial constraints or penalizations 
regarding public personnel: at that point in Emilia-Romagna we were ahead‟ (Interview 
12). 
Hence embedded in a wider wave of reform of the public administration inspired to 
New Public Management paradigm, the local government started in the 1990s a process 
of restructuring towards outsourcing of several municipal services following a pattern of 
ascending parabola-shaped. The evolution of such process clearly reflects a 
consolidated pattern of externalization ˗ that could be tracked across several European 
governments ˗ that traditionally starts from a limited range of blue-collar, manual or 
technical tasks and activities, more manageable in calls for tender given the high 
codifiability of tasks, for then developing to encircle several complex white-collar 
professional services. Such trajectory of outsourcing diffusion characterizes not only the 
Italian municipality but overall all the case studies under scrutiny. 
Hence, in the early 1990s, the local government embarked upon the first outsourcing 
process, putting out to tender roads and buildings (schools, public buildings) 
maintenance service and green areas and parks maintenance service which overall 
involved around 350 workers. The main rationale underlying this first attempt to 
externalize municipal services was the search to reduce the costs for performing blue-
collar tasks as reported by a council member who at that time was the general secretary 
of CGIL-FP in the city:  
 
[the council] did put it out to tender because they couldn‟t afford all the costs; more 
personnel was required for the maintenance but this meant increasing costs since the 
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collective agreement for local government was better than the one applied by private 
companies for technical staff‟ (Interview 20). 
 
Outsourcing of cleaning services in municipal building and schools has followed, along 
with waste collection and waterworks management. Other technical services contracted 
out during the 1990s involved the local transport and the management of the graveyard 
(including maintenance and daily opening). More recently in the early 2000s, instead 
the council outsourced in a joint tender with the Local Health Authority catering service 
providing food both for schools, meals on wheels and for hospitals patients: the contract 
included beyond the provision of meals, the construction of a new centralized catering 
centre in replacement of the various kitchens dislocated within municipal schools and 
hospitals. 
If until 2000 outsourcing was exclusively limited to peripheral services to the business 
function of the municipality (even if a long discussion might be devoted to whether 
meals on wheels for elderly, for instance, constitutes a peripheral tasks or conversely a 
core social service in a municipality), since then a second phase of externalisation took 
place encompassing a wide range of white-collar tasks, traditionally considered core 
services. The local government embarked upon the externalisation of the information 
point for the youth and more importantly the provision of a large part of social services 
involving both social workers and nurses (as home care, residential home services) and 
nursery schools. Finally the municipality opted for selling also the previously council-
run pharmacies: in this case the introduction of market-type mechanisms in the public 
sector took the shape of mere privatisation process, rather than of contracting out.  
The Italian scenario in terms of market-type discipline and tools for the provision of 
public services is indeed quite patchy and complex since the general concept of 
privatisation/externalisation unfolded through a variety of policy arrangements in the 
Italian legislative body. Beyond outsourcing in strict sense ˗ namely externalising a 
service through an invitation to tender ˗ local governments have the possibility set by 
law to establish various kinds of semi-autonomous organizations, partially or entirely 
controlled and funded by the municipalities, such as “joint-stock companies”, “special 
firms”, foundations” or “institutions” entitled to provide local public services (Rossi et 
al. 2010), and more specifically those tasks and services aiming to fulfil social 
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responsibilities and to promote civic and economic development of local authorities 
(legislative decree 267/2000, art. 112). Hence such organisations endowed with legal 
personality, entrepreneurial autonomy and their own statutes (legislative decree 
267/2000, article 114) are allowed to provide public services on behalf of the 
municipalities but within the regulatory framework of the private sector: for instance 
services are provided upon payment of the correspondent charge, while workers are 
directly employed by this organisations through private sector contracts.  
This legislative provision contained in the “Consolidated Law of Local Governments” 
has been widely exploited by the municipality under investigation for a twofold reason. 
On the one side the establishment of semi-autonomous organisations enabled to 
overcome both financial constraints on municipal expenditure capacity and the cap set 
on hiring or replacing internal personnel given that until 2013 such companies were 
exempt from the application of austerity measures; on the other side the statutes of these 
companies regulated by the private sector discipline provided for higher flexibility in 
human resources management. 
Provided this context, the municipality started a sort of third phase of public service 
marketization: the large majority of technical activities initially externalized through 
competitive tender have been transferred under the responsibility of municipal special 
firms, as in the case of local transport, waste collection, green areas and parks 
maintenance, waterworks management, building maintenance, roads maintenance and 
graveyard management. 
With respect to social services instead, the production process is rather fragmented 
between in-house provision, private providers and cooperatives, while importantly the 
local government maintains the unilateral responsibility of planning and control, 
resources allocation and regulation. Over the last decade indeed the municipality 
through an incremental process outsourced parts of social services, including the 
management and the care services of a residential home for elderly, a quota of home 
care service, a day-time rehabilitation centre for disabled persons.  
Subsequently in 2009 the regional council, acknowledged the current state of the art 
within the area of social services provided by fragmented mixture of public and external 
providers issued a specific regulative framework for harmonizing the service delivery 
and cost across the whole region. The so-called accreditation procedure (sistema di 
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accreditamento) traced its origin back to the resolutions of the regional government 
772/2007 and 514/2009 (delibere della Giunta Regionale dell’Emilia-Romagna), in 
application of the regional laws 2/2003 e 20/2005, where the criteria and guidelines 
framework for the accreditation of social services are set. The accreditation procedure 
has the manifold purpose to ensure high quality of services and care structures through 
the fulfilment of strict requirements, to shift the regulation of the relation between 
public administrations as clients and the external providers from outsourcing contracts 
to service contracts and to harmonize service cost. Substantially, „it removes external 
provision of social services from the regulation set in the Procurement Code (Codice 
degli Appalti) for integrating it in a different normative context ruling a market of 
external providers strongly regulated by the public actor‟ (Interview 17). 
According to the new legislative framework, initially transitorily until 2010 and then 
permanently since January 2015, each municipality has to validate within its own area 
of responsibility all providers of social services satisfying specific requirements set by 
the region, entitling them in this way to provide the service. The municipality, once 
computed the service needs, transfers the provision of such service through a public 
notice wherein specificities regarding the service are defined: only compulsorily 
accredited providers are allowed to submit their projects among which the municipality 
select the organisation to whom transfer the responsibility of the service by the means 
of a service contract (contratto di servizio) (law 448/2001, art. 35; reforming the 
legislative decree 267/2000, art. 113 and 113-bis). The service contract plays a central 
function in defining and regulating the relationship between the municipality (as client) 
and the external companies (providers), transferring the production of public services 
within a highly regulated environment for accommodating the general interest of 
citizens/users. A pivotal role however is played by the public actor as regulator and 
supervisor of service contract, financing the provision of services and establishing the 
allocation of costs between users and local government. 
Moreover, according to the new regulatory provision, since 1 January 2015 each 
municipalities is required to overcome mixed-management provision of social services 
within the same structure: in other words each care structure (residential home, day-time 
centre for disabled persons) has to be run by only one provider, either public or private 
one.  
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A third market-type mechanism implemented by the local government for the provision 
of public services directly involving municipal educational services for the infancy is 
the so-called “local integrated public/private system” (sistema territoriale integrato 
pubblico/privato), as defined by the regional laws 1/2000 and 6/2012. According to 
such system, the region set common functioning requirements and service standards for 
both public and private crèches as a tool to guarantee high quality standards harmonized 
between private and public providers and „to restore some unclear situations‟ (Interview 
24).  
At the beginning of 2015 indeed the municipality counts on 6 public nursery schools, 1 
outsourced crèche, 3 private nursery schools and 12 contracted crèches. Two public 
nursery schools have been closed down during the last years, one for an intervention of 
building renewal and the second to host children from kindergarten previously located 
within the first crèche and currently inaccessible. Contracted crèches (nidi in 
convenzione) are schools owned and managed by private organisations or cooperatives, 
authorized by the municipality to provide the service on behalf of the public actor itself 
which in exchange pays a monthly contribution for each child. Such kind of nursery 
schools are selected through a public invitation to tender which awards the service to the 
private company fulfiling two main requirements: the location in a specific area of the 
city lacking of places for infants and the number of infants enrolled with private 
contract. 
Unlike contracted crèches, outsourced one are selected by the mean of a call for tenders, 
externalizing the service on the basis of an economic evaluation of the bid and quality 
assessment of the educational project presented by the bidders. Moreover if in the 
former case both public and private service is provided, in the latter the school provides 
services exclusively for the public administration. 
The system planned by the region is defined as integrated since outsourced, contracted 
and public nursery schools on the supply side have to fulfil the same requirements, 
while parents, as users on the demand side, enjoy the same access right in any crèche, 
meaning the same monthly fee and the same criteria for the admission. Within the local 
integrated system, also non-contracted private crèches running their own private 
business in the territorial boundaries of the municipality have to be authorized to 
provide educational services by a commission ˗ composed of the municipal manager of 
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educational services, engineers, physicians and pedagogues ˗ entitled to verify the 
fulfilment of strict specific requirements.  
A sort of fourth phase in the externalization trajectory of the Italian municipalities 
concerns the centralization of calls for tender at national or regional level, strictly 
intertwined with the creation of an electronic market of the public administration for the 
purchase of goods and services through the so-called e-procurement system. 
As part of a wider and long-standing reform of the public administration inspired to 
NPM doctrine, the government set an innovative legislative framework with a twofold 
rationale. On the one hand such reform answered to the need to boost ITC innovation 
and utilization within an overloaded and often inefficient public sector as a means to 
increase its efficiency, whilst on the other hand the government aimed to systematize 
the overall system of public procurement, for enhancing transparency, accountability 
towards citizens and reduce costs. 
The spirit of such reform wave became pragmatic and evident in 1997 when the 
Minister of Economy and Finance (MEF) on purpose established a limited company 
fully owned by the MEF itself called CONSIP s.p.a.: the company was created to 
support, advise and back up Italian public administrations within the sphere of goods 
and services public procurement, functioning also as national centralized purchasing 
body through the electronic market (Decree of the Minister of Treasury, and Economic 
Planning 24 February 2000; Decree of the President of Republic 101/2002; Law 
350/2003, the budget law for the year 2004; law 296/2006, the budget law for the year 
2007; Decree of the Minister of Treasury, and Economic Planning 12 February 2009). 
Specifically the electronic market for the public administration is regulated by the 
Regulation implementing the Procurement Code (Regolamento di Attuazione del Codice 
degli Appalti) (Decree of the President of Republic 207/2010, enforcing the legislative 
decree 163/2006, the Code of Public Procurement regarding goods and services) 
(Codice dei contratti pubblici relativi a lavori, servizi e furniture) and by the law 
296/2006 which in article 1 conceives the recourse to the electronic market for all 
central and peripheral administrations for the purchase of good and services below the 
Community reference threshold (corresponding to 207,000 euro). 
Tracing the example set at national level, the region Emilia-Romagna through the law 
11/2004 instituted an Agency for the development of its own telematic market called 
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“Intercent-ER”, with the purpose to optimize, rationalize and simplify goods and 
services procurement for public administrations in the region. The Agency is entitle to 
manage a telematic system of e-procurement both for single administrations and at 
centralized level through a standardization of tenders as a mean to contain public 
expenditure by reducing the cost of outsourced services; to boost efficiency, 
transparency and accountability within procurement processes; promoting the use of 
ITC tools for public procurement; guarantee high quality standards in goods or services 
contracted and to enhance competitiveness within the marketplace for the provision of 
public services. The municipality under scrutiny has voluntarily adhered to the 
invitation to tender of cleaning service for instance promoted by the regional Agency. 
The municipal orientation towards outsourcing clearly emerges not only because the 
local government represents one of the promoter bodies of Intercent-ER Agency but 
moving even further it decided to build its own “electronic market”. Indeed the Decree 
of the President of Republic 207/2010 conceived in article 328 that each administration, 
fulfiling the obligation to use the electronic market for the procurement of goods and 
services, might alternatively draw upon CONSIP s.p.a. or establishing its own internal 
electronic market. The municipal electronic market works as an on-line platform where 
the municipality advertises call for tenders and private providers, previously registered 
on the platform, may submit their bid, simplifying in this way the bureaucratic 
procedures for public procurement. 
Hence the main rationale underlying the decision to outsource an increasing number and 
variety of public services provided by the Italian municipality has evolved over time 
from the search for cost reduction in the service production to the need to quickly 
respond to increasingly stricter austerity measures. When the local government first 
embarked upon the externalization of maintenance services during the 1990s ˗ much 
before the introduction of budgetary constraints linked to the ISP and the following 
legislative provisions freezing the possibility to hire personnel ˗ was mainly driven by 
the will to cut the cost of services, complemented by a new spreading ideology, inspired 
by NPM doctrine, questioning „what should public sector do?‟ (Interview 5). New 
Public Management indeed conceived a moving back of the public actor, opening the 
public sphere of service provision to external organisations driven by market discipline. 
Such orientation cut-across political divisions since municipalities run by both left and 
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right-wing parties launched restructuring processes towards outsourcing during the 
1990s „regardless the composition of their councils‟ as reported by the regional 
secretary of CGIL-FP (Interview 1). In a nutshell initially the pure accountancy logic 
prevailed. 
The implementation of ISP and the subsequent strict budgetary constraints for 
municipalities as a way to reduce public debt markedly enhanced the recourse to 
outsourcing starting from the late 1990s-early 2000s: as reported by both trade union 
officials and the director of HR department in the municipality „the abrupt cut of money 
transfers from the central government‟ (Interview 1) associated to „rigid 
recommendations of budget reduction‟ (Interview 16) represented the main pressures 
towards the externalization of public services. Trade unions however, in particular the 
CGIL, interpreted this kind of market-oriented response to financial cap as being only 
marginal and somehow specious: the municipality, under cover of budgetary 
constraints, actually exploited outsourcing as a tool to delegate outside public 
boundaries increasingly complex functions, „lacking of political foresight‟ (Interview 
1). Quoting a trenchant statement of a trade union official from CGIL-FP:  
 
the causes of outsourcing, at the end of the day, might be a mix between a 
responsibility of the management of municipality, not only at political level, but also 
of indolence in running services ever more complex, both regarding employment 
relations and directly concerning their organizational complexity. So at a certain point 
they started thinking, even in a quite ideological way, that was better to reduce 
problems contracting services out, despite it was not necessarily more convenient in 
economic terms. (Interview 12) 
 
More recently a further pressure drastically drove the municipality to externalize 
especially social and educational services: the introduction of strict measure freezing the 
possibility to hire new personnel or replace staff raised the need to draw upon external 
companies for the provision of labour-intensive services, namely those services whose 
main item of expenditure is represented by personnel cost. As reported by almost all 
key-informants interviewed, once the difficulty of hiring new employees raised the 
municipality was necessarily obliged to outsource those services where it was 
experiencing a shortage of labour such as in social and care services (Interview 17, 
Interview 6). The municipality indeed, because of personnel-related austerity measures, 
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reduced its staffing level from 1200 employees in 2006 to around 690 at the end of 
2014: such figures well express the strictness of government pressure on local 
governments. During this most recent phase however, also unions softened their 
position understanding the actual manifold difficulties the municipality was facing: 
„externalization has intervened at this point like a sort of obligation, as a need. If I can‟t 
hire, how can I provide a service that I have anyway to provide? The only way is 
contracting it out‟ (Interview 20). 
Hence the municipality tried to circumvent legislative constraints exploiting loopholes 
in the regulation: the austerity packages until 2013 indeed did not cover the whole bulk 
of semi-autonomous organizations, partially or entirely controlled and funded by the 
municipalities to whom local government transferred various responsibilities. This has 
allowed the municipality to recover the lack of personnel, hiring new staff for providing 
public services but directly employed by external semi-autonomous bodies. Ironically 
commenting such paradoxical outcome, a key-respondent interviewed said:  
 
the mayor, cunningly but also up to your neck in it, thrust personnel expenditure out of 
the municipal budget item, doing a miracle! Miracle in the sense that even if they are 
still providing the same services as before, now the Internal Stability Pact and staff 
freezing are achieved! (Interview 12) 
 
Outsourcing however, beyond economic and legislative pressures, has been exploited to 
leverage flexibility in personnel management as well: the director of HR department 
indeed did not deny how: 
  
workers employed by private companies are more flexible, more willing to work 
longer hours, less unionized, less prone to make claims. So if I need to provide a 
service on Saturday or Sunday it is worthwhile, I mean, it is much easier by 
outsourcing. (Interview 16) 
 
Hence strategic evaluations complemented economic rationale as summarized by two 
commentators:  
 
it is clear that the two aggressive grips are the cut to public expenditure linked to the 
Internal Stability Pact and the ban of hiring: these are two pincers that push towards a 
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reorganization of public service management through the search, within a renewed 
relationship between public and private, of new organizational set-up for those 
activities previously performed in-house. (Interview 8)  
 
And again:  
 
the explanation for outsourcing is due to that jungle of laws that we have in the public 
employment, that represents one of the issue not only for union activity, but also for 
municipal administrators as well in the management of services, with the ban of hiring 
complemented by economic crisis…thousands of strings and snares that make 
unbearable, even only from a technical point of view, to keep all the services in-house. 
Hence the municipality undertook this road, backed by the unions I have to admit it, 
following explanations that were more technical rather than political. Therefore it was 
a response of emergency; it was a compulsory path: there was no alternative. 
(Interview 7) 
 
 
4.3.1 Impacts on terms and conditions of employment 
The above described trajectory of outsourcing has impacted on public employees 
involved in restructuring events, leading to consequences for their terms and conditions 
of employment as well as work organisation. First of all externalization processes might 
alter the employment status of personnel, through a shift of job from public to private 
sector following the transfer of the service outside the organisational boundaries of the 
local authority. 
Unlike outcomes emerged in the other two countries selected for the present 
comparative research, all the public personnel employed by the municipality was 
relocated within different municipal offices and services. The overall picture is indeed 
rather peculiar: despite the law enables public administrations to transfer their staff to 
the external organisations (both public or private) when a business unit is transferred 
outside the organizational boundaries (legislative decree 165/2001, article 31), 
nevertheless the municipality kept in-house the whole staff. In addition redundancies 
have been carefully prevented (Interview 3), even if also in such case the legislation 
allows public administration to make personnel redundant through mobility procedure 
in case of staffing level surplus (legislative decree 165/2001, art.33). 
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More in detail, following the externalization of maintenance services all the manual 
workers involved have been relocated within the municipal offices dealing with 
environment, urban planning, local transport, infrastructures and maintenance. Despite 
all those employees maintained their public status and the application of collective 
agreement of the public sector, their competence and skills in some cases resulted to be 
somehow downgraded, instead of being appraised, since blue-collar workers with low-
skill background ended up performing unsuitable tasks with regard to their know-how. 
As reported by the council member in transport and environment committee who daily 
collaborates with those workers  
 
outsourcing has led these people to be here working on environment issues, 
assessment of air quality, integrated waste management. They are putting a lot of 
effort in that but this is not the job they have been recruited for and that they wanted to 
do because they have those specific capacities. (Interview 20) 
 
A similar outcome occurred during the externalization of other services as well: even if 
the case of sale of part of council-run pharmacies is much closer to a pure privatisation 
than to a contracting out process, all pharmacists directly employed by the municipality 
were relocated within the remaining council-run pharmacies. Same fate has interested 
cleaning staff or public personnel working at information point for the youth who have 
been maintained within the local government. In the latter case the maintenance of 
internal staff has been possible thanks to some specifications included in the tender 
invitation: the municipality indeed opted for outsourcing hours of front-office service 
provided by workers employed by the private company who fill public personnel 
shortage (Interview 16). 
Furthermore interviews conducted at national and regional level with trade union 
officials and Officers from the National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI ˗ 
Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani) on the whole confirmed this positive trend 
being rather widespread not only across municipalities in Emilia-Romagna, but more 
widely at country level (Interview 5, Interview 8; Interview 1). 
Various factors intertwined to bring about such outcome in the Italian municipality. 
Firstly, the cap set by central government on the possibility to hire new staff or to 
replace it led the council towards a severe staffing level shortage: as mentioned public 
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employees reduced from 1200 to about 700 in less than a decade. As a consequence 
when externalization events occurred, staff was redeployed as a means to fill part of 
these gaps. However, in several cases such redeployed employees were relocated only 
temporarily before most of them retired, hence enhancing the lack of employees 
(Interview 16). A second explanation regards union responses to such processes. Their 
strategy to cope with outsourcing indeed was mainly focused, successfully, on the 
protection of employment and terms and conditions of public employees: during each 
restructuring event they constantly monitored the fate of personnel, ensuring they keep 
public status and contract through the redeployment within the local authority in 
accordance with municipal council and managers (Interview 3, Interview 9). On the 
employer side, finally, the procurement office of the municipality entrusted with the 
responsibilities to draft tender notices always include social clauses concerning the 
transfer of personnel as a means to prevent redundancies: as reported by an official from 
the procurement office  
 
we prepare call for tenders based on the most economically advantageous bid, but 
where the reintegration of the whole staff from the outgoing company is rewarded as a 
way also to guarantee continuity between different providers in the provision of a 
public service. (Interview 6)  
 
Despite not strictly binding, social clauses of this kind contributed in preventing public 
personnel transfer or redundancies.  
A partial exception to this tendency is represented by the workforce involved in 
technical services when those tasks have been delegated to a semi-autonomous 
organisation partially controlled by the municipality. In that specific case workers 
involved had the option to either remain within the municipal offices (the large majority 
opted for this former possibility) or to be voluntarily transferred to the external 
company (only a few workers accepted), agreed upon specific contractual clauses to 
follow including the time-lapse of application of public sector collective agreement and 
the definition of private sector collective agreement which would have succeeded. 
Transfer of few units of personnel have been registered in the events of outsourcing of 
graveyard management and in the service of authorization release to circulate in the 
historical city centre: these two services were provided by two different semi-
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autonomous organisations where the municipality transferred also the public personnel 
previously allocated on those services. 
Public personnel involved in the provision of social and educational services for the 
infancy (nurses, teachers, social workers) all maintained the same employment within 
the municipality: in such cases indeed contracting out processes were implemented to 
supply staffing level shortages, given the ban to directly hire new public employees. 
More in detail, social services outsourcing used to take the shape of externalization of 
hours of assistance: the external providers obtaining the contract then decided how 
many workers were required from time to time to provide the agreed amount of hours of 
work. As clearly explained by the director of social service department in the 
municipality:  
 
little by little social workers were retiring and we replace them through a cooperative; 
we have never considered to completely outsource social services starting from a 
given time, but we tried to integrate municipal personnel with cooperative personnel. 
Hence the externalization often got through “the acquisition” of labour. (Interview 17)  
 
So the configuration of contracting out pattern in this case moved very close to the 
slippery slope of manpower provision through agency work. 
Likewise, outsourcing and the adoption of market-type relations for nursery schools has 
followed a similar rationale: the municipality did not plan out a complete 
externalization of educational services for the infancy, but rather to integrate the public 
supply of crèches with the private or contracted one, as a way to overcome financial 
constraints set for municipal expenditure and the ban to employ further personnel. Such 
orientation was prompted also by the regional council which, through the legislative 
framework on the “local integrated public/private system” encouraged the joint 
management of public and private actors for the provision of educational services. As 
clearly explained by the director of educational service department in the municipality, 
this legislative intervention was necessary  
 
also to give a boost to the integrated system because in the early 2000s the 
municipality started to be affected by financial problems but also by inefficiency. We 
weren‟t able to increase the service as required by the population since at that time the 
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demand for crèches was really high and we couldn‟t manage to guarantee the service 
for at least the 33% of infants between 0-3 years old as suggested by the European 
Union. (Interview 24) 
 
It has followed that municipal nursery schools, which employ exclusively public 
teachers, integrated their staffing level where necessary by hiring temporary public 
employees, availing themselves of a three-year personnel waiting list. Instead private 
crèches, both contracted and outsourced, directly employ their own private staff. 
Contracting out of catering constitutes a peculiar case in terms of implications for the 
status of employees involved: the municipality, in collaboration with the Local Health 
Authority, implemented a wide outsourcing project of catering service (encompassing 
meals on wheels, meals for crèches and for hospital patients) which included also the 
construction of a brand new centralized catering centre in replacement of the various 
kitchens dislocated within municipal schools and hospitals. Throughout this 
restructuring event all the permanent staff (both ancillary staff and cooks) maintained 
the public status and the application of public sector collective agreement but despite 
formally remaining municipal public employees, they have been asked to work on 
secondment basis for the cooperative who got the contract. Temporary personnel 
employed by the local government was instead transferred to the external cooperative 
shifting from public to private worker status. The cooperative maintained all the 
transferred staff: although there was no legal obligation personnel reintegration 
represented an incentive to obtain the contract inserted in a social clause. Private 
workforce directly hired by the cooperative integrated public staff and replaced them 
permanently in case of retirement or temporarily during holidays. The ultimate goal of 
such contracting project was to gradually replace the whole public personnel with 
private employees provided by external providers. 
The shift in employment status occurred during some outsourcing processes above 
reported has had, subsequently, implication for terms and condition of employment, 
including wage rate, allowances and the application of diverse collective agreements. 
The overall picture, as above described, is characterized by contractual stability for the 
large majority of public employees involved: despite the externalization of the service 
where they used to be employed, through the relocation within municipal offices to 
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perform other tasks they were enabled to maintain the application of public sector 
collective agreement, specifically the one agreed for local governments, so the same job 
terms and conditions. This was the case of manual workers doing maintenance services, 
catering staff with permanent contract, cleaning staff; but also of white collar employees 
such as nurses, teachers and social workers providing social and educational services. 
However transfer of public personnel to the new-come external providers has followed 
restructuring events in some cases, leading to different consequences for terms and 
conditions of employment. When the municipality externalized maintenance services to 
a semi-autonomous organisation, workers up against the alternative option of either to 
remain within the municipal offices or to be voluntarily transferred to the external 
company, the large majority opted for the former possibility. A small group however 
decided to move to the external organisation after having agreed upon specific 
contractual clauses to follow: more in detail they kept the public sector collective 
agreement for a given time-lapse, then followed by the application of the private sector 
collective agreement of reference. Foundations and special firms indeed have a private 
legal status, which means that the terms and conditions of employment for their 
employees are regulated by private sector collective agreements rather than by the local 
government agreements negotiated with ARAN. Collective agreements applied by 
private companies for blue-collar workers have been usually less convenient in terms of 
salary and allowances, except for the contract for green-areas maintenance staff. 
FederAmbiente (Federazione Italiana Servizi Pubblici Igiene Ambientale) indeed, the 
employers‟ association representing companies running their business in environmental 
services and public sanitation, agreed upon a collective agreement that is more 
advantageous compared to the public sector one (Interview 7, Interview 9). Conversely 
contractual conditions guaranteed by all the other collective agreements applied in the 
private sector, as the one for waste management industry or maintenance, are less 
convenient for workers those in the public sector one. 
Some detrimental consequences for working arrangements have been reported also by 
ancillary staff and cooks transferred to the cooperative providing catering service: 
alongside permanent public employees on functional secondment, also temporary public 
personnel transferred to the private provider and workers directly hired by the 
cooperative worked at the centralized catering centre. If the former group was subject to 
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a change in management, the second group of workers instead experienced a shift from 
public sector collective agreement to the private sector agreement of reference, namely 
the tourism industry agreement after a three-month probationary period: also in this case 
terms and conditions agreed in the private sector by the cooperative were less 
convenient than those applied by the municipality (Interview 14). 
Moreover in many cases the cooperative opted for individual contracts, often „weak 
temporary contracts‟ (Interview 14) like fixed-term or apprenticeship contract, 
particularly disadvantageous for newly hired and young workers. Remarkable 
differences concerned also the working hours set by the cooperative for transferred 
workers: once reintegrated the personnel, the private employer not only „drastically 
reduced working hours for the precarious staff, usually 15 hours per week, that means 
three hours per day covering only lunchtime‟ as reported by a trade union official 
(Interview 4), but in addition it signed annual contracts suspending their job ˗ and 
consequently their wage ˗ from June to September when schools were closed as a tool to 
reduce exceeding manpower during summertime. Permanent staff instead employed by 
the municipality but on functional secondment to the cooperative went through a shift in 
job organisation: this has meant that holyday, shifts, leaves and workload were managed 
by the private provider at its conditions (Interview 14). 
The increase of workload represents an issue that affected crosswise the large majority 
of catering staff following outsourcing, regardless the nature of their contract: but such 
repercussion on work hit in particular public personnel on functional secondment during 
summertime when manpower reduction heavily raises their workload (Interview 9; 
Interview 7). 
Moreover the scenario unfolded by the externalization of catering service sheds light on 
a further notable implication for staff and work organisation: the creation of a multi-tier 
workforce. Following outsourcing indeed the service was provided by segmented group 
of workers (public employees on secondment basis, transferred employees, private 
employees directly recruited by the cooperative) performing the same task at the same 
workplace, endowed with very similar skills background but hired at very diverse terms 
and conditions of employment according to the nature of their employer. 
The issue of two-tier workforce is even more remarkable within the social service area. 
The above described regional legislative provision concerning the accreditation system 
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for external providers intervened indeed, among other purposes, for restoring such 
contractual fragmentation and harmonizing the services. More in detail, as explained by 
the director of social service department: 
 
the regional council is expected to expressly overcome all those situations of mixed-
management: public personnel and private personnel who do the same job with 
different salaries, different protections, side by side was a rather widespread form of 
mixed-management. (Interview 17) 
  
Phenomena of mixed-management have been spotted in home care services, but also in 
residential home for elderly, reported as emblematic example:  
 
the municipality run 216 beds in that residential home for non-self-sufficient elderly 
persons, 50% managed by public personnel employed by the municipality and the 
remaining 50% through subcontracted hours of assistance carried out by external staff, 
who also replaced public personnel when necessary. That was a real mixed-
management, but “mixed” sometimes means…where virtuous experiences came to 
light through a partnership between workers, but it also gave rise to a certain degree of 
exploitation. (Interview 17) 
 
The municipality moreover included social clauses in both calls for tender and 
accreditation procedures, requiring to external providers the application of collective 
agreements of reference for their personnel employed on public services. If on the one 
side such social clauses guaranteed minimum standards in terms and conditions of 
employment for private workers, on the other side they did not smooth the inequalities 
between public and private sector collective agreements, the former however more 
advantageous for employees compared to the latter. As commented by a council 
member who was appointed for a three-year period president of a residential home 
where both public and outsourced nurses used to work: 
 
I can ensure you that there, where we had the public system complemented by the 
services provided by a cooperative, you noticed that employees of the cooperative all 
tried to enter public employment: there must be a reason!. (Interview 20)  
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Similarly a two-tier workforce was established in the educational sector for the infancy 
through the regional framework on local integrated public/private system, where the 
coexistence of public and private teachers in the public area of nursing schools was 
institutionalized by such system. Likewise the area of social services, professional 
teachers with the same educational background perform the same work for the 
municipality but with very different contractual conditions.  
With the purpose to guarantee at least the fulfilment of minimum requirement in terms 
and conditions of employment and preventing a race to the bottom competition among 
private nursery schools, social clauses in both calls for tender and accreditation 
procedures are included, requiring to external providers the application of collective 
agreements of reference for their personnel: as well expressed by the director of 
educational service department 
 
we cannot oblige a cooperative to apply our contract [public sector collective 
agreement], we are allowed only to ask the respect of the industry contract; so if it is a 
socio-educational cooperative they have to apply the collective agreement of socio-
educational cooperatives. (Interview 24) 
 
Despite such social clauses, remarkable contractual differences however persisted 
between public employees and cooperative workers: municipal teachers have a contract 
of 36 working hours, of which only 30 spent with infants and 6 devoted to integrative 
activities such as training, meeting with parents, working group for activities planning; 
while teachers employed by the cooperatives weekly work 38 hours with infants. In 
addition the former, by contract, work 10 months per year, the latter at least 11 months. 
More importantly, the hourly wage rate paid in the public sector is much higher than the 
rate agreed in the cooperative collective agreement: a trade union official from CGIL-
FP, union category which represents also cooperative workers, pinpointed that the 
actual gap in salary is around 250-280 euro per month, with subsequent detrimental 
repercussions for pension scheme as well. 
The cost variance for providing the service between public, contracted and outsourced 
nursery schools clearly mirror such differences in personnel labour cost: the 
municipality indeed pays a per capita monthly fee corresponding to around 1,100 euros 
in public crèches, 890 euros in contracted crèches and 760 euros in outsourced one (in 
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this last case for a part-time service until 1.30 p.m.). As usefully synthetized by the 
director of educational services referring to cooperative and private crèches  
 
clearly the cost is different because the contract applied is different, working 
conditions are very different but always complying with collective agreements. Surely 
they are less convenient for employees (Interview 24) 
 
In addition to inequalities in contractual arrangements, disparities are reported also in 
union rights: workers employed by social cooperative indeed are entitled to fewer hours 
for assembly as well as fewer leaves for union activity compared to public employees. 
A trade union official from CISL-FP added that „we are assisting to a race to the bottom 
also from union rights point of view‟ (Interview 7) and it is true for social cooperative 
industry overall, including those providing social services as home care or care in 
nursing home. 
Financial pressure on municipal budget, associated to increasing demand for flexible 
and customized public services has led the municipality, beside outsourcing the 
services, to increase the workload for the staff directly employed as a means to reduce 
the external provision ˗ and related costs ˗ supplied by cooperatives. The case of 
municipal summer camp clarifies the point. During summertime, in conjunction with 
schools closure, the local government used to organise a summer camp for children, 
whose management was traditionally outsourced to a cooperative. This externalization 
was due to the fact that public teachers and educators enjoy in their public sector 
collective agreement of 32 days of holyday complemented by an amount of days of 
leaves so-called „days at disposal‟ to cover the whole time-lapse of school closure, but 
during which workers might be required to work (Collective agreement of local 
governments art. 31 c.5). Until 2014 the municipality has always opted to outsource the 
service, not least also for preventing union industrial action, but starting for 2015 the 
summer camp will be held by public educators, increasing their annual workload. 
Restructuring processes towards outsourcing of municipal services impacted also on the 
degree of flexibility regarding human resources management.  
The externalization of catering service indeed enabled the municipality to adapt staffing 
level at disposal to the demand of catering service, reducing personnel costs when the 
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request of meals decreases such as in summertime when schools are closed. The tender 
indeed is based on meal cost: the municipality and the cooperative agreed upon the cost 
the former pays for each meal provided by the latter; subsequently the final expenditure 
for the service varies according to the number of meals produced. Such variable cost is 
complemented by personnel cost relating to public cooks and ancillary staff the 
municipality still employs, however limited in number and gradually diminishing since 
once retired they are replaced by subcontracted workers. Through such contractual 
arrangement the staffing level became an exclusive responsibility of the cooperative 
which in turn dumps flexibility on employees, with repercussions on the security and 
continuity of employment. 
Likewise the externalization of social services enabled the municipality to leverage on 
external workforce flexibility through the accreditation system. The municipality indeed 
specifies in the tender the amount of hours of assistance or the kind of service each 
accredited external organisation has to provide, regardless the staffing level necessary to 
fulfil contract obligations. Hence if on the one hand this market-type system guarantee 
stable and well-protected working conditions to public employees thanks to the 
application of public sector collective agreement and permanent contracts, at the same 
time shifts the burden of flexibility, both in terms of working conditions and of 
contractual security, on private companies‟ workers. The director of social service 
department underlined as outsourcing  
 
was a lever of flexibility that the municipality can manage for its purposes, to restore 
some inefficiencies also in service management, thanks to the possibility to bring 
labour cost down. (Interview 17) 
 
The same rationale applies to the context of outsourced and contracted private crèches. 
More generally, the analysis of outsourcing of municipal services sheds light on the 
issue of two-tier workforce, not only concerning contractual arrangements, but also in 
terms of diverse degree of work flexibility and job stability.  
The establishment of semi-autonomous organisations to supply technical services such 
as waste collection, roads maintenance and municipal cemetery management 
represented a further source of flexibility from a multiple point of view. As above 
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elucidated these institutional bodies, endowed with financial and organizational 
autonomy regulated by private sector discipline, enabled the municipality to overcome 
budgetary constraints set by central government since they were not subject to austerity 
measures despite providing public services on behalf of the local government as arm‟s 
length organisation. Beyond financial and economic flexibility, these bodies enjoy 
higher flexibility in terms of personnel management (hiring and layoff, working time 
organisation, overtime, wage rate) since they apply private sector collective agreement 
and regulation: in other words „they are not subjects to all the bans of public 
administration‟ (Interview 8).  
Business-related risks constitute the bleak side of such organizational flexibility, 
involving also public employees who voluntarily accepted to be transferred to external 
companies. In case of bankrupt, for instance, all workers may be easily dismissed and 
previous public staff cannot be relocated again within the municipality since the shift 
from public to private sector collective agreement removed those high employment 
protections ensured by public contract (Interview 7; Interview 12). Higher flexibility in 
this case is translated into decreasing job security. 
A further empirical example of how restructuring towards outsourcing impacts on job 
flexibility and stability is provided by an on-going process regarding the service of 
release of authorization to circulate in the historical city centre: the tasks was contracted 
out to a semi-autonomous organisation to which the municipality transferred also three 
public employees involved in the service. At the end of 2014, as the expire of the tender 
was approaching, the local government assessed the possibility to take the service back 
in-house, but the external company required to the municipality in such case to 
internally relocate the staff as well as the task. Because of the cap on staffing level and 
expenditure, the municipality probably could not manage to reintegrate the three 
workers: as a consequence the only workable alternative might be a new call for tender 
including a social clause which compulsory require to absorb the personnel. The 
working fate of such workers involved in restructuring event is still pending.  
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4.3.2 Impacts on employment relations structure and union strategy 
Outsourcing of municipal services, as empirical evidence presented in the previous 
section display, has led to what a trade union official defined as the „the drama of 
breaking up of production chain‟ inherently intertwined with a subsequent 
„fragmentation of work on the one side, and on the other side to fragmentation of 
workers‟ rights‟ (Interview 5). Changes in terms and conditions of employment and 
work organisation affected to a diversified extent public and private sector employees 
involved in restructuring events, paving the way to repercussions for employment 
relations as well as unions actions and strategies. 
When the municipality embarked upon the first processes of externalization during the 
1990s the response from the trade unions representing public employees, in particular 
CGIL-FP and CISL-FP, was prompt and vigorous as witnessed by various union 
officials in office at that time: „we made a mess!‟ (Interview 12). Since the early phases, 
union action was strictly focused on the one hand on campaigning against 
externalization of municipal services, while on the other hand on organizing strikes and 
protests with the purpose to safeguard public employment. Such strategy turned out to 
be rather successful in its ultimate goal to maintain public employees in the public 
sector: the large majority of personnel involved indeed was relocated within the 
municipality at the same contractual conditions set by public sector collective 
agreement of local authorities. The limited cases of staff transfer involved either 
workers who voluntary opted for moving to the private company ˗ as in the case of 
manual workers transferred to semi-autonomous organisations ˗ or public temporary 
employees as during catering service restructuring. If union‟s attitude of firm opposition 
surely played a remarkable role in reaching such outcome, workers‟ representatives also 
admitted how  
 
we didn‟t agree in principle with outsourcing, but we have never had the problem of 
workers moved away, in the sense that we always relocated them in the municipality. 
(Interview 12) 
 
During the 1990s indeed, the local government has usually accommodated unions‟ 
request: it has traditionally been rather prone to internally relocate the personnel as a 
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way to prevent breaches in the collaborative relationship with unions. A city 
councilman replicated that such cooperation might be explained by the search for „social 
peace‟ (Interview 20) while according to the director of HR department was also driven 
by the purpose to „avoid hassles with unions‟ (Interview 16). Furthermore, before the 
implementation of austerity measures, the municipality was still endowed with enough 
resources and economic autonomy to redeploy the employees, bearing these personnel 
costs. The relocation within the municipality was further facilitated because  
 
in local governments job position and competence are set by collective agreements, 
while in healthcare sector all the job positions are defined by the law. Health sector 
has this problem of additional rigidity because it is difficult to relocate the personnel. 
(Interview 12) 
 
Italian legislative framework however provides further employment protections during 
restructuring processes: the Civil Code in article 2012 (incorporated than in law 
428/1990 which fulfilled obligations arising from EU legislation including the Directive 
77/187/CEE, the Acquired Rights Directive, on the safeguard of employees' rights in the 
event of transfer of undertakings) guarantees to transferred workers that the same terms 
and conditions applied by the client organisation are maintained also by the 
subcontractor which reintegrates the staff. Such clause has been included also in the 
collective agreement for tourism industry (the one applied to catering staff) which 
explicitly protects terms and conditions during transfer between undertakings 
(Collective agreement for workers in tourism industry 2010-13, article 97). Hence these 
regulative provisions constitute addition tools that union may leverage to buffer 
employment conditions in the event of outsourcing. 
But broadening the perspective from the local to regional and even national level, the 
picture that emerges from interviews with key-respondents is permeated by a severe 
self-critical appraisal of union response to externalization and privatization processes. 
Such a posteriori criticism traces its origin back from a generalized underestimation of 
the phenomena. While outsourcing was gradually diffusing across municipalities for the 
provision of a growing number of public services, hence affecting more and more 
workers, unions mistakenly underrating its size in numerical terms and its sweep in 
terms of services and kind of personnel skills involved, embarked upon an overall slow 
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and belated response. The officer for international policies of CGIL-FP, discussing 
outsourcing phenomenon at comparative level across European countries, reported how  
 
during the initial phase of debate on outsourcing, that in the Anglo-Saxon world 
started to assert itself, in Italy it seemed like totally inexistent. The debate on the issue 
of externalization and privatization arrived very late here with respect to the evolution 
it has had in other contexts; and it was completely different from the great struggles of 
English unionism against privatization, or from the phenomena in Nordic countries ˗ 
let me put it in this way, not of acceptance but in a less dramatic way ˗ of 
collaboration between public and private. (Interview 15) 
 
A series of intertwined reasons might provide an explanation of such slow and belated 
reaction of unionism in coping with restructuring processes more generally, instead of 
focusing only on the protection of public employment and to shelter from market 
competition core services, namely social services and education.  
During the 1990s indeed the representative role and the collective strength of trade 
unions were undisputed, and thanks to a notably high rate of membership they 
represented a stable interlocutor of the government at both national and local level. 
Additionally, during that decade contracting out policies usually did not affect 
employment relations of public personnel, considered the main focus of union action: 
indeed they were usually relocated within public offices or more rarely transferred at 
very convenient conditions (Interview 7). As third factor, interplaying with the just 
mentioned explanations, come into play the fact that externalization had predominantly 
involved manual and technical services so far (as cleaning, roads maintenance and 
waste management), deemed as non-core tasks to the business mission of the local 
governments. 
A national union official admitted that:  
 
we have underestimated what has happened in the last 20 years and we have always 
thought that we could get by, that however our bargaining power wouldn‟t have been 
brought into question. In this we have been weak: in our reaction, in the construction 
of situations of conflict not only regarding the contract but more widely on the general 
issue of public administration, because of some wrong choices made by trade unions 
which were questioning themselves on their role and their preservation, in this way 
losing sight of the overall problem of labour. (Interview 5)  
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What lacked in the Italian scenario of unionism was exactly a more encompassing 
evaluation of the challenges that outsourcing was unfolding, ranging beyond the 
overriding concern for public employment to embrace a discussion on the future of 
public sector in general in an era of increasing financial straits under the pressure of 
market competition, complemented by a wider consideration of implication for labour 
in general terms, including repercussion for terms and conditions of employment in 
subcontracting companies as well. Union responses indeed have been very fragmented, 
mainly organized at municipal level where externalization policies were implemented, 
but „there has never been an out-and-out strategic response‟ (Interview 15), a systematic 
opposition to market competition in the public sector as general issue.  
Such awareness of the limitations in union responses are well synthetized by the opinion 
of the general secretary of CGIL-FP in office in the municipality during the early stages 
of externalization:  
 
union, in my opinion, has the blame to have protected ˗ I mean, reasonably that it‟s not 
a blame ˗ current public employees, without trying to achieve more high-toned goals 
such as replacing those employees who retired. During the early stages of 
privatization, the mechanism was always the same: we don‟t touch public staff, we 
guarantee them economic compensation and their rights, but we need to increase the 
service to citizenship which is demanding. We cannot ask to our public employees to 
work more because they are already busy enough so we outsource the service. You, as 
a union, have the satisfaction to avoid arguing with your members but you‟re not able 
to collect new members and this is the consequence of such behaviour: trade union is 
losing memberships because it hasn‟t been able to enrol new members, it has only 
safeguarded its members. But this course of action, avoiding to confront with your 
own membership has helped the counterpart to go on with outsourcing, also because 
the union has had this blame: it never asked to its members to fight this battle. 
(Interview 20) 
 
The quotation sheds light on a further limitation in union action: such self-referential 
stance assumed during restructuring processes drove them to focus their struggle 
exclusively on public personnel currently employed by the municipality who constituted 
the core workforce and their core membership as well, but missing the opportunity to 
leverage on their bargaining power to encompass a wider audience of workers, as those 
private workforce involved in subcontracting contract. 
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However if in the early days union response to externalization events ˗ despite the 
awareness of all its intrinsic limitations ˗ has successfully achieved the organizational 
purposes to safeguard terms and conditions of employment for their members, since the 
2000s „union has been climbed over by the reality‟ (Interview 15). While unionism was 
holding fast on its stance, the municipality started outsourcing core municipal services, 
ranging from social services to crèches, subcontracted to several private companies and 
cooperatives, leading as a consequence to a growing fragmentation on the employers‟ 
side, mirrored by a remarkable diversification also in contractual arrangements applied. 
As elucidated in the previous section the creation of a two-tier ˗ or even multi-tier ˗ 
workforce has followed, unfolding a dramatic scenario for the provision of public 
services where employees with the same educational background work side by side at 
the same workplace performing the same task but hired with very different job terms 
and conditions according to the public or private nature of their employer. Such 
fragmentation has further weakened union bargaining power and its capacity to 
collectively represent and organise at workplace level (Interview 7). 
A further challenge to union action was the establishment of semi-autonomous 
organisations for the provision of some technical services as waste collection or roads 
maintenance: such bodies, despite partially of fully owned by the municipality, 
constitute in all respects private companies, endowed with financial and organisational 
autonomy, run through private sector discipline both with regard economic 
accountability and concerning staff‟s contractual arrangements. Subcontracting services 
to such organisations has implied also a transfer of workers from the municipality to the 
private body, accompanied by a shift from the public to private sector collective 
agreement, featured by different contractual conditions and diverse degree of 
employment protections as described in the previous section. Also in this case unions 
underrated these restructuring events, understood as an organizational alternative form 
of in-house provision, hence neglecting the repercussion on public employees involved. 
As admitted by a trade union official:  
 
I‟m telling you a story where unions make a poor showing, but when the public 
personnel moved to joint-stock companies, unions very seldom realized that they were 
outsourcing workers. (Interview 12) 
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Hence, during the 2000s the scenario unions were facing with turned out to be even 
more fragmented and challenging if one considers also the intervening pressure of 
austerity measures implemented for local governments: the cap on hiring and on 
replacement of retired workers led to a decrease in public staffing level from 1200 
employees in 2006 to around 700 at the end of 2014. Nevertheless unions branches in 
the municipality perpetuated strategies similar to those carried out during the 1990s, 
already proved to be, if not ineffective, surely limited in their scope and lacking of a 
long-term systematic approach. Unions indeed kept on organising only public 
employees, despite gradually decreasing in numerical terms, and campaigning against 
the privatization of nursery schools and social services. Key-respondents from both the 
employer‟s and the unions‟ side agreed in interpreting such response as only partial in 
coping with the phenomenon and rather limited in its effects. A trade union official 
from CISL-FP told:  
 
we focused, from a union point of view, and this is a sort of self-criticism, in a myopic 
and short-sighted way exclusively on the protection of public personnel. Surely we 
are, as category representing public function, those entitled to safeguard public 
employees, clearly that is our ultimate mission, so from that point of view we did our 
job, yet losing sight of the overall picture. If now, in retrospect with the experience I 
gained I should deal with this process again since the very beginning, surely I would 
involve the confederation, the CISL, which deals with the social issue in general, 
including service quality for citizens and for undertakings, what citizens and 
undertakings do really need. So I would rate much more importance to the issue rather 
than the specific value concerning the staff, because actually we, as local branch, 
managed the issue together with the mayor and the municipal administrators but 
neglecting an appraisal of the impacts on services and on overall expenditure. Actually 
we saw such opportunity and there was not any alternative solution, there was no 
alternative: and since it was an inevitable path we tried to protect public employees as 
much as we can. (Interview 7) 
 
Interestingly the director of social service department interviewed, describing union 
responses to the externalization of services under his responsibility utilized exactly the 
same word: myopic. Specifically in his opinion: 
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union stood still on conservative positions, a bit myopic in the sense that when there 
were situations of mixed-management, unions did not worry to guarantee good 
working conditions or to struggle for overcoming them; the most important thing was 
to preserve the employment for all public personnel, but it was a myopic battle since if 
in a care centre the 10% of staffing level is public and 90% is private, the problem is 
only to protect that 10%? In my opinion there is something beyond that 10%, as labour 
equity. But our interlocutors, unions representing public employees have in mind that 
aspect and not to safeguard the in-house provision of services: while they were 
shouting to not reduce the in-house direct provision, it was already shrinking. 
(Interview 17)  
 
He concluded stating how among unions:  
 
there is much resistance, much defence of public employment, but very self-referential 
which does not look at the whole tendencies of working conditions. (Interview 17)  
 
An enlightening example is provided by the case of workers from social cooperatives 
who, within the internal structure of the main union confederations, are represented by 
the category of public function, jointly with public employees: despite such 
organizational proximity should have simplified the collective representation of both 
groups of workers during restructuring events, actually unions focused their action 
narrowly on public personnel, often neglecting the implications for workers hired by the 
cooperative. It is important to specify that this strategy was also oriented to safeguard 
first of all their members involved in outsourcing processes, more numerous among 
public employees rather than within cooperatives. However embedded in a wider 
perspective of labour protection, such orientation turned out to be unsatisfactory.  
A very recent event of restructuring in educational services for the infancy witnessed a 
sort of adamant stance of unions along such strategic pattern: when the municipality 
closed down two public crèches unions fiercely reacted opposing the decision. Indeed, 
despite all public teachers and ancillary staff working in those nursery schools were 
relocated in other public structures, the share of service was subcontracted to contracted 
crèches for the next years, meaning an increasing workload for private schools replacing 
public supply. Unions campaigned against this further quota of educational service 
outsourced fearing a freeze in the recruitment of temporary public staff enrolled in 
waiting lists. Once again their focus was concentrated on the issue of precariousness in 
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public employment, acting to prevent a possible municipal decision to definitely close 
those two public nursery schools down, implying a further decline in public staff. 
Over the last decades when outsourcing waves took place, the municipality has been 
ruled by government coalition of different political orientation: however the various 
municipal councils which came in succession have overall always consulted unions 
before undertaking restructuring processes. If on the one hand the legislative decree 
165/2001 included within the subject matters of collective bargaining between public 
employer and union issues concerning work organisation and restructuring as union‟s 
prerogatives at workplace, on the other side the municipality under scrutiny recorded a 
long-standing tradition of cooperation between social partners as reported during 
interviews by various respondents (Interview 16; Interview 9). Workers‟ representatives 
at workplace level are generally informed and consulted, being their role taken in high 
esteem notwithstanding a permanent conflicting orientation permeates their relationship 
with respect to the issue of outsourcing as reported by a union official who gained a 
longstanding experience in the municipality (Interview 9). For instance the director of 
HR department reported that  
 
unionization is a determining factor to take into account in the public administration: 
negotiation with unions indeed is an hurdle difficult to overcome also in virtuous 
system as this municipality where unions‟ requests on working hours arrangements for 
instance are kept under control. However relationship with unions has to be translated 
and adjusted to the context: sometimes you force the hand, other times you need to 
manage the relationship because however union‟s role has positive aspects. A lot of 
information also for adjusting and realigning our work organisation came directly 
from their warnings that it is important to consider. (Interview 16)  
 
In addition both unions and municipal administrators are well aware that reaching a 
joint agreement on sensitive issues involving public personnel „avoid to have hassles 
with unions‟ (Interview 7). The municipality indeed acted particularly carefully during 
externalization processes of catering since it implied both a transfer of temporary 
personnel to the private company and a functional secondment of permanent public 
employees: unions not only have been consulted, but in the latter case signed a written 
agreement as well with the municipality to functionally transfer the staff (Interview 9). 
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Such scenario featured by a sound cooperation drastically changed when the Brunetta 
reform in 2009, shrinking the scope and the role of collective bargaining, purposely 
challenged unions‟ prerogatives in the sector and downplayed the role of workplace 
representative bodies (RSU) leaving them only the right of information on issues 
regarding the organisation of work and HRM matters, deleting the possibility to open 
negotiations on such matters. Moreover it strengthened employers and managerial 
discretion to unilaterally decide on a number of matters previously subject to collective 
bargaining ˗ especially concerning the organisation of work and HRM issues. All union 
officials interviewed witnessed a remarkable weakening of their bargaining power on 
work organisation:  
 
Brunetta with his law removed the core of collective bargaining: as a consequence if 
before Brunetta you could bargain also on the bit of service to outsource, today after 
Brunetta reform the decision to how, where and what outsourcing is a prerogative of 
the employer. (Interview 3) 
 
The municipality in the last years took advantage of such reshuffle of competences 
allocated between collective bargaining and employer‟s unilateral decision, in favour of 
the latter: consultation became mere information during the last tendering rounds, 
change pushed also by a municipal council which in large majority supports the process 
of opening public services to market competition (indeed only one council member is 
steadily against outsourcing) (Interview 20). 
Nevertheless very pragmatically a trade union official observed as, even if the 2009 
reform of public administration deeply hollowed out the role of collective bargaining on 
HRM issues, still unions can leverage on their right to be preventively informed as 
legislative tool to keep on monitoring outsourcing procedures and pointing out potential 
problematic situations (Interview 7). 
About two decades of incessant externalization of municipal services gradually 
undermined the initial fierce opposition of trade unions, marking a change in their 
political and ideological evaluation of the phenomenon. The initial antagonism to any 
event of restructuring, whether manual or professional services were involved, was 
featured by a well-established belief in the fundamental role of public sector in the 
provision of public services in general, meant as public goods, universally accessible 
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and supplied by a strongly motivated personnel thanks to favourable terms and 
conditions of employment as those guaranteed by local government collective 
agreement. Such opposition was lately replaced by a partial opening ˗ not to be 
confused with acceptance however ˗ towards market-type mechanisms when strictly 
technical tasks were involved, as in the case of roads maintenance or green areas 
maintenance: such readiness to dialogue was marked on the one side by the a strategic 
focus of union action on what they considered core services to the mission of the 
municipality (namely social services and education), while on the other side by positive 
outcomes for public employment following outsourcing, since all the staff was however 
relocated within the municipality at the same contractual conditions. A third step in 
union‟s stance traces its origin back to the externalization of social services and 
educational services for the infancy which lately got a foothold: the inescapable 
diffusion of marketization across every kind of municipal service paved the way to a 
final, despite reluctant, acceptance of the phenomenon. Not only the last stronghold of 
union struggle, the in-house provision of core public services, was demolished but that 
occurred under the pressure of both left and right-wing coalitions running the 
municipality during the last four mandates, losing the historical back-up of left-wing 
political parties, traditionally closed to union‟s position. A trade union official 
witnessed how „it has been a bipartisan political phenomenon, implemented by 
everyone from right-wing and left-wing parties: at the end it has been locally accepted 
by unions because, more or less, we thought “it‟s ok, they do not expel workers”. Then 
in the last years the situation grew worst‟ (Interview 15).  
Beyond an overall picture characterized by a resigned acceptance of the irreversibility 
of the state of the art, from a more pragmatic point of view union recognized that the 
strictness of austerity measures left very limited leeway to the municipality (Interview 
9). Union officials indeed admitted to ended up in a thorny and uncomfortable stance of 
ideological noncompliance with the marketization of public services, but complemented 
by a sort of awareness of the difficulty in finding an alternative policy solution to tackle 
the constraints set on municipal expenditure and the ban to hire new personnel:  
 
I talk to you with heart in hand, at this stage of the development I don‟t know if I 
would embark upon a struggle to take nursery schools back in-house because I‟m not 
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convinced that the municipality still holds the capacity and the resources. (Interview 
12) 
 
Restructuring towards outsourcing of municipal services has negatively impacted 
union‟s membership rate for various reasons. First of all externalization, and the 
subsequent fragmentation of employment at workplace level linked to the multiplication 
of employers with whom union branches have to deal with, undermined the capacity to 
collectively organise and represent workers.  
Recalling his longstanding experience as general secretary of the CGIL-FP local branch 
in the municipality, a key-respondent explained how  
 
union is trying to regain workers‟ trust, it is questioning on how to be more 
representative, but in this situation for being representative you have to look for 
member one by one. Collective representation is easy-peasy: I go into a municipality 
where there are 700 employees and I can manage with a general assembly to tell my 
version of the story to 700 workers. It‟s easy: I tell a good story, leveraging also on 
populism and I can convince all those people. But when you deal with workers with 
non-standard contracts or self-employed employee you have to contact person one by 
one and explained to each of them what you can do for them and this is really hard, so 
nobody does that. Union has become a little bit bourgeois. (Interview 20) 
 
Not only their „representative role was weakened, but also the capacity to influence 
decision-making‟ (Interview 7). Such gradual marginalization of representative bodies 
at workplace level necessary led to an exit of workers. Moreover when these processes 
involved also a transfer of personnel from the public employer to a private company, the 
scenario becomes even more „jagged and spotty‟ (Interview 14) further complicating 
union‟s action. 
Unions indeed came under a decrease of their membership rate (Interview 16) both 
because they lost members and because they did not collect new members (Interview 7). 
During staff transfer to semi-autonomous organisations or to private subcontractors, 
occurring also through a shift from public to private sector collective agreement, 
workers have to renew their membership to the new union category: it is exactly along 
that shift that members got lost because  
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we [unions] are not adequately structured to follow employees in these situations. We 
are split into categories that dialogue among them but not strictly enough, so when we 
cope with these cases we should make synergy between categories and swap workers 
that means make them signing union card. When you are transferred you are no more 
a public employee so you have to sign a new union card for getting membership in the 
new category. But during this transfer we are not so efficient. (Interview 7) 
 
In addition a share of the shrinkage in membership rate is due to the freeze of new 
hiring and to the possibility to replace retired public employees within the municipality: 
physiologically staffing level is decreasing and subsequently also union members in the 
local government (Interview 5). 
Well aware of the delay in tackling with repercussion of outsourcing for labour in 
general terms, including the creation of two-tier workforce at workplace level and 
growing inequalities in working conditions, unions put forward a set of strategic actions 
to intervene.  
A first plan of action, stemming from a general reflection over the future of collective 
bargaining that unions are developing at confederal level, contemplates at workplace 
level large and encompassing bargaining institutions as a means to harmonized terms 
and conditions of employment for the whole staff, regardless the public or private 
nature of their employer. An inclusive negotiation at company level indeed might 
prevent perverse processes of contractual dumping through which employers take 
advantage of differences in wage rate and allowances subcontracting services to the 
most convenient providers in terms of labour costs (Interview 1). That may be the case 
for instance of nursery schools area where the wide gap in service cost between public, 
outsourced and contracted crèches, ascribable to inequalities in labour cost, might 
trigger a race to the bottom in salaries as a means to boost saving. Further inclusive 
collective bargaining should harmonize  
 
for all workers in a specific workplace not only economic conditions already agreed in 
national agreements, but also the organisation of work, workers‟ safety and job 
security which vary according to the national collective agreement of reference. 
(Interview 5)  
 
138 
Inclusiveness then should be translated in this context also in encompassing bargaining 
institutions for employees with nonstandard and temporary contracts more and more 
often applied both by subcontracting companies as a means to reduce internal labour 
cost and making their bid more convenient and by the municipality to achieve financial 
cap on personnel expenditure (Interview 1, Interview 5). A more encompassing 
negotiation institutions finally might be implemented also at sectoral or industry level to 
overcome disparities generated by a two-tier workforce: „for the same job we can‟t 
accept diversified salaries and diversified rights!‟ (Interview 1). 
Involving public opinion and citizenship to lend support to union action (Interview 7) 
through information and awareness campaigns might constitute a second strategy. An 
incisive response to outsourcing should draw together stances from all the stakeholders 
involved, hence beyond workers also citizens as service users who constitute not only 
an heavy critical mass ˗ ranging from elderly people, parents, children, young people, 
teachers, nurses ˗ but also a copious group of electors for the municipality. A wider 
reflection then is needed „middling the citizen, stopping to think exclusively to worker‟s 
salary for starting to seriously talk of service quality‟ (Interview 5). Ex post struggles 
against externalization should make way for ex ante awareness campaigns where  
 
we explain to citizens what would happen in case of outsourcing of a residential home 
rather than domiciliary care services: we would explain that the service would make 
worst and cost more in terms of local taxation. Only in that way, with the support also 
of the confederation and the category of retired people we could fix something: this is 
the way we should follow. (Interview 7) 
 
Importantly, an effective synergic response might include the voice of public employees 
as well: „it won‟t be an easy task for unions asking to our members in the municipality 
to express solidarity with other private workers earning less money and enjoying less 
rights‟ (Interview 1). Such strategy however is particularly tricky both for unions 
representing public employees and for employees themselves since it may trigger a 
downward competition in terms and conditions of employment: the harmonization of 
collective agreements between private and public sector might mean an improvement 
for the former but at the same time a worsening for the latter. 
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A third way is based on a reshuffle in service provision across municipal boundaries. 
The region Emilia-Romagna indeed is pushing towards the merger of small 
municipalities (Regional law 21/2012) establishing municipalities unions with the 
purpose to share the provision of services and removing expensive redundancies of 
administrative offices. As underlined by a trade union official „we should think to 
manage and provide services on the base of municipalities unions‟ (Interview 12) rather 
than resorting to private supply. As explained by the regional secretary of CGIL-FP  
 
in 2012 the region issued the law 21 that was the institutional reform for local 
governments: we endorsed the reform and signed an agreement as category 
representing the public function to manage the transformation of local governments. 
The regions aimed to reduce the fragmentation since we have many small 
municipalities below the 5,000 inhabitants, and for boosting synergies as a way to 
avoid operations of externalization. Moreover the region would have also financed 
those municipalities which decide to merge. (Interview 1) 
 
Interestingly, almost none of the key-informants interviewed contemplated taking 
services back in-house as a bearable solution. 
 
 
4.4 The case of the Italian Local Health Authority 
 
The Italian Local Health Authority (LHA) under scrutiny, selected according to the 
criteria elucidated into the methodological section, ensues from the merger of three 
previous Local Health Units. Located in the Region Emilia-Romagna in the Centre-
North of Italy, it includes in terms of geographical area of competence also the 
municipality analysed in the previous section: overall it covers with its health services a 
population of around 290,000 inhabitants and employs about 3,500 employees including 
both medical and administrative staff. 
Overall the health care sector has been subject to much more limited financial 
constraints compared to the local governments in the last decades; moreover the region 
capped hiring only since 2010 and initially through rather mild measures. Comparing 
economic and legislative pressures affecting the two sectors under investigation, the 
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regional secretary of CGIL-FP in Emilia-Romagna, hence getting the pulse on the 
situation at regional level confirmed that  
 
there hasn‟t been huge processes of externalization in healthcare because the balanced 
budget achieved by the regional council entailed that limitations were larger in local 
governments but more limited on hospitals. From that point of view the balanced 
budget allowed to guarantee the direct provision of the large majority of services and 
the absolute totality with regard of healthcare services. (Interview 1) 
 
Reasons driving outsourcing in this case indeed have been primarily strategic: the board 
of directors running the LHA set a long-time strategic plan of interventions to enhance 
the efficiency of the whole structure through a rationalization of expenditure; to increase 
services flexibility and with the purpose to rationalize the allocation of services and 
activities, in particular technical and support one, within the buildings. Outsourcing was 
purposely exploited as policy tool to achieve, or to contribute in pursuing, such 
operational goals. Each restructuring event to externalize a services indeed was 
preceded by a set of preliminary studies that the technical staff of the LHA implements 
to assess the feasibility of the project, the overall expenditure, the cost-benefit analysis, 
the repercussions on internal personnel and to pinpoint potential alternative solutions 
(Interview 18). For instance the joint project between the municipality and the LHA for 
the externalization of catering service to a unique provider exactly arose from the 
preliminary study which identified the joint tender between the two administrations as 
the most efficient policy solution, establishing synergies and economies of scale as 
reported by an officer from LHA procurement office (Interview 11). 
Outsourcing policies were exploited firstly to reduce costs for the provision of some 
specific services, in particular support services to the healthcare core mission of the 
administration: the private provision of cleaning, catering, laundry service, heating plant 
management meant to rationalize such services both financially and in terms of staffing 
level. Beyond savings as relevant driver indeed, contracting out allowed the LHA to 
boost flexibility in workforce management (Interview 11). In healthcare, sector featured 
by work peaks and emergencies, flexibility in human resource management turns out to 
be fundamental, given that the board cannot prearrange in a definitive schedule all the 
activities. As underlined by the administrative director of the structure, by outsourcing  
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we gained absolute flexibility with the personnel: there is greater flexibility above all 
in the immediacy of necessities that might raise on an issue. (Interview 18)  
 
A flexible management however is complemented also by a difficulty in finding 
qualified staff suitable to perform that kind of manual tasks: the director of logistic unit 
of LHA, responsible to coordinate all this range of support activities explained that  
 
outsourcing is ever more driven by the lack of qualified workers, and not by savings. 
I‟m referring to skills required by my unit, all medium-low skills for catering, laundry 
service, cleaning, transport, cloakroom: if you ask to employment agency they suggest 
workers who barely can read and write. (Interview 21)  
 
Greater flexibility by outsourcing translated also in increasing handiness in managing 
workforce when is employed by external companies:  
 
contracting out allows to avoid pests with staff. You only deal with one interlocutor 
instead of your 10 cooks or 4 unions. So for us as client is much more convenient 
because I call the referee from the company for explaining what I want and then he 
reports to all his employees. (Interview 21)  
 
Further taking into account the peculiar sensitivity required at workplace, 
externalization enables the LHA to easily replace personnel in case of issues, unlike 
public personnel. 
Outsourcing in addition played a relevant operative role within the strategic plan for 
rationalizing the LHA as a whole. A recent intervention involved the establishment of 
an analytical laboratory, including relative technologies, in the rooms previously 
occupied by the laundry service: contracting out laundry activities thus enabled the 
LHA to clear some space for accommodating the laboratory (Interview 11), otherwise 
difficult to host within the structure. Moreover, this tender provided a further not 
negligible benefit as explained by the administrative director of the LHA:  
 
we have to structurally reorganize the hospital as quickly as possible and the fastest 
solution is to outsource the service to an external company for getting a twofold 
advantage: economic because for 12 years we save a lot of money for running the 
analysis, and operational because along those years we will have the possibility to 
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constantly update the technologies. We made this choice essentially for building a 
modern and efficient laboratory, containing well-performing technologies, quickly and 
often updated, as a means also to be competitive in the marketplace. (Interview 18)  
 
The contract indeed allowed to attract private financing, thanks to a business plan 
oriented at selling services also outside the organizational boundaries upon payment of 
a fee established by the LHA itself, in such way investing in brand new and updated 
technologies. 
The strategic plan includes also the renewal of the internal café which will be contracted 
out in the next years through a tender which allocate the management ˗ and related 
profits ˗ of the cafeteria for an agreed time-lapse in return for the renewal of the 
structure (Interview 18). 
Excluding both any ideological rationale (Interview 1) and economic pressure linked to 
the financial crisis (Interview 11), the main driver underlying restructuring processes in 
the LHA was basically strategic, as proved also by the unusual decision to keep building 
maintenance in-house (conversely outsourced in the large part of Italian LHAs). The 
administrative director, with the support of logistic unit, opted for internally retaining 
such responsibility fulfilled by a group of 13 technicians with a deep longstanding, 
hence hardly replaceable, knowledge of the LHA structure.  
Additionally the region Emilia-Romagna, through legislation and council deliberations, 
provided clear guidelines to Hospital Authorities and Local Health Authorities in the 
matter of private supply of services. Since the mid-1990s indeed the regional healthcare 
network has undergone a gradual merging shifting from 41 LHAs to 19, then became 17 
and finally 14 after the fusion among 4 authorities in Romagna (the Eastern area of the 
region); such independent bodies however during the last decade voluntarily decided to 
constitute associations of LHAs called “Vast Areas” (Aree Vaste) with the purpose of 
sharing responsibilities and realize economies of scale at optimal level, more centralized 
than the local level of each single authority but closer to the specific requirements of the 
territories compared to the regional level (Interview 22). 
In 2004 the LHA under scrutiny, together with other 6 LHAs of the Western area of the 
region, established the Northern Emilia Vast Area, the so-called AVEN (Area Vasta 
Emilia Nord): the principal goals, in line with the programmatic guidelines set by the 
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region, include the development and implementation of activities aimed at fostering 
synergies and resources sharing; the search for innovative solutions for implementing an 
integrated system of goods and services procurement, in order to achieve economies of 
scale; the design, implementation and management of an integrated logistics centre (a 
central warehouse) for the storage, management and distribution of health goods.  
The underlying rationale was to remove, where feasible, redundant services and 
activities across administrative units by sharing responsibilities, like in case of the 
central warehouse for health goods, as alternative policy solution to outsourcing. 
The same rationale can be tracked down in the matter of structural interventions that 
LHAs plan to implement: as reported by the director of health facilities office in the 
region quoting as an example the Planning and Financing Guidelines for the Authorities 
of the Regional Health System for the year 2014 (Linee di programmazione e 
finanziamento delle aziende del Servizio Sanitario Regionale per l’anno 2014): 
 
concerning the realization of new interventions, the design must involve internal 
personnel if available in staffing level of technical offices; to this purpose it is required 
as first priority to the Local Health Authority acting as client to verify the availability 
of professional resources also in the other Authorities of the Regional Health System. 
(Interview 19)  
 
Once again the stance the region adopted in the matter of privatization and contracting 
out is clear-cut, as synthetized by a regional union official:  
 
over the last 10 years the region is working on this integration process: this has led to 
synergies, efficiency, economies of scale, avoiding from this point of view to 
outsource, but keeping the direct in-house management and control over processes of 
service provision, allowing to save money like for instance with the central 
warehouse. (Interview 1) 
 
It is rather evident that the orientation of the region towards outsourcing is similarly 
reflected in both sectors under scrutiny: legislative provisions like the law 21/2012 
driving small municipalities to merge as alternative solution to outsourcing for jointly 
providing public services goes hand in hand with the gradual process of fusion between 
Local Health Authorities and the creation of Vast Areas as optimal level of management 
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to provide health services by generating economies of scale and sharing facilities and 
support activities.  
Following these premises, the LHA under scrutiny undertook a process of outsourcing 
much more restrained in scope compared to the Italian municipality, largely limited to 
some manual services, trend that can be tracked down in the healthcare sector at 
regional level (Interview 1) and more generally in Italy as witnessed by a national 
secretary of CGIL-FP (Interview 5). On this point the director of health facilities office 
in the region underlined also that  
 
politics, broadly speaking, plays its game because clearly if you work for rationalizing 
the structures of the healthcare organisation, you are inclined to outsource what is not 
core probably. Over the last years, the regional council member for health said: the 
Regional Health System has to be rationalized, rationalized meant as saving in 
everything is not close to the patient. What you save can be invested in healthcare for 
patients, for core business: so we save money on support stuff to put money in 
patient‟s care. (Interview 19) 
 
The LHA started the restructuring process in the 1990s embarking upon the outsourcing 
of cleaning. It followed then between the late 1900s-early 2000s the subcontracting of 
heating plant management, the internal transport service both for goods and patients, 
internal pharmacy management, surveillance and concierge services. More recently 
instead the LHA externalized the construction and management of a parking lot, the 
laundry service and the catering. This latter as already widely elucidated was 
implemented through a joint tender together with the municipality, involving the 
construction of a new centralized kitchen centre. Interestingly the board of directors 
opted for kept internal the building maintenance service, rather peculiar and unusual 
choice. 
Restructuring process in the LHA under investigation was mainly limited to manual 
activities listed above, coherently with the strategic plan the administration was 
pursuing: in the matter of core services indeed only rare cases have been indeed 
reported. The LHA subcontracted a very limited share of patient‟s assistance service 
performed by social-health workers (operatori socio-sanitari OSS) considered a core 
service since the direct care of patients is involved: these social-health workers in fact 
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are required, for instance, to distribute meals; to assist patients in the care of personal 
hygiene; to allocate medications and to collect sanitary waste in patient‟s rooms.  
At the end of 2014 moreover the LHA was completing the construction of a new 
analytical laboratory through a tender and was planning the renewal of internal café by 
outsourcing both the renovation and the management of the structure to an external 
company (Interview 18). 
Overall however the whole area of health services, involving care and treatments of 
patients has been kept in-house: such further step in the marketization path of health 
care indeed has never been taken into consideration as feasible in the LHA under 
analysis, unlike some experiences that are increasingly spreading in other Italian regions 
like in Lombardy. 
 
4.4.1 Impacts on terms and conditions of employment 
Likewise the case study of the Italian municipality, the whole workforce maintained the 
employment: the large majority within the public administration through a relocation, 
while a small share was transferred to private subcontractors as confirmed by an officer 
from procurement office (Interview 11). More in detail cleaning staff was retrained and 
located at disposal of the various operative units to fulfil manual requirements while 
workers involved in the internal transport of patients, the stretcher bearers and porters, 
were partly redeployed across wards and partly shifted on functional secondment to the 
private company but being in most of the cases very closed to the retirement age they 
gradually diminished in number. Similarly the staff working in security and concierge 
service was maintained on the service as long as they retired, from time to time replaced 
by external personnel. The construction and management of parking lot represented a 
brand new interventions therefore the subcontractor to which the tender was awarded 
brought its own staff since the beginning of the activity; while in the case of analytical 
laboratory the contract agreed with private company established that building and the 
provision of relative technologies were subcontracted to a private company while the 
human resource management of qualified personnel working in the lab was a 
prerogative of the LHA. 
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During the subcontracting of the laundry instead the LHA included in the tender notice 
a social clauses requiring to bidders to reintegrate the workforce, clause that was set on 
as non-compulsory requirement but only attributing additional points according to the 
tender point system. The contract however was awarded to a subcontractor which did 
not fulfil the social clause: subsequently it took 4 public employees on, but on 
functional secondment that translated into the retention of formal contractual 
arrangements with the LHA and the operational management under the responsibility of 
the external company running the service. The remaining public personnel was instead 
relocated within the healthcare structure as drivers or performing ancillary functions in 
meals delivery.  
Transfer of public personnel has instead interested the externalization of catering 
service which has followed dynamics very similar to those occurred at municipal level: 
the joint tender indeed contained a social clauses requiring to bidders to compulsorily 
reintegrate public staff, under the strong pressure of trade unions representing public 
personnel, which was copiously involved in the service with both temporary and 
permanent contracts. Throughout this restructuring event the large majority of 
permanent staff (both ancillary staff and cooks) maintained the public status and the 
application of public sector collective agreement but despite formally remaining 
municipal public employees, they have been asked to work on functional secondment 
basis for the cooperative which won the contract; while a few employees were relocated 
within the LHA to fill vacancies on some technical tasks. A large number of temporary 
personnel was instead transferred to the external cooperative shifting from public to 
private worker status. 
At a first glance, a comparative perspective between the two Italian case studies sheds 
light on some initial similarities and differences. In both public administrations indeed 
restructuring events towards outsourcing of public services did not drastically impacted 
on public employment, which remained numerically stable in early stages thanks to the 
relocation of personnel within the administrations or the adoption of functional 
secondment arrangement. Only a residual share of staffing level was contractually 
transferred to private companies, shift translated into a change in status as well from the 
public to private status with repercussion on the collective agreement to apply. However 
externalization, complementing constraints on personnel recruitment set by national 
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austerity measure, trigger a dynamic of gradual replacement of public workforce with a 
private one: regardless of the nature of contractual relation, when public employees 
involved in outsourced services retire, workers hired by private subcontractors 
automatically fill the gap as a replacement for the public vacant position (Interview 19). 
In the long-term such pattern is increasingly shrinking public employment, reversing the 
initial trend. A remarkable figure is provided by the case of municipality, which subject 
to the intertwined pressure of these dynamics reduced its staffing level from 1200 to 
about 700 units in the time-lapse 2006-2014. 
But conversely, the extent to which public employment was affected by restructuring 
events differs between the two cases. The municipal workforce involved in any form of 
change due to outsourcing was numerically larger than the staffing level in the LHA, 
primarily because the former public administrations externalized a wider range of 
services compared to the latter, subsequently entailing repercussions for a larger share 
of employees. In second place austerity measures affecting staffing level, such as cut 
down in replacement ratio and the freeze of new hiring hit much hardly the local 
governments than the healthcare sector. Finally if such austerity measures represented 
one of the most relevant rationales driving the municipal council towards outsourcing 
policies, the board of directors running the LHA conversely adopted a more strategic 
approach to externalization, as a mean for instance to attract private funding and new 
technologies to support the tasks of their internal public staff (for instance in the case of 
the analytical laboratory).  
On this point, interestingly, the director of the logistic unit who coordinates among 
others catering, cleaning service and laundry service underlined as  
 
talking about my services I believe that they have a social background and we made a 
mistake in throwing it through the shredder. The dissolution of such social function is 
really my regret in externalizations, it‟s really a sorrow. (Interview 21)  
 
The words of the LHA officer refer to a sort of social function played by public 
administration in integrating those unskilled workers or persons with mental of physical 
disabilities to perform some easy manual tasks, workers who private companies would 
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never recruit given their limitations and low productivity. Outsourcing of those services 
inevitably deprives public bodies of this social purpose. 
Even though outsourcing of services in the LHA affected a limited share of workers, 
most of whom internally relocated, it has had repercussion on working conditions and 
labour as well, in particular for transferred employees. Following the subcontracting of 
catering, indeed, temporary employees transferred to the private company went through 
a drastic cut of weekly working hours, consequently leading to a decrease in their 
monthly salary, already lower on average compared to the wage rate the LHA used to 
pay them by applying the public sector collective agreement. Moreover as reported by a 
union official from CISL-FISASCAT, the branch representing catering staff in private 
organisations who monitored the transfer  
 
the perception is that they would have preferred to stay in public employment because 
there they could enjoy of higher protections. The perception is this, even if during the 
transfer they haven‟t been subject to particularly detrimental troubles. It is clear that 
the culture of being a public employee is different from being an employee of a 
private firm. Take for instance the situation where the demand for meals decreases: if 
you are in a public organisation nothing changes; in the worst of the cases instead of 
working in the kitchen you are redeployed on a different task but however you stay 
there. If the demand for meals decreases in a private company an issue related to your 
employment may raise. We might say that employment protection is rather different. 
(Interview 14) 
 
Similarly to the municipality, these dynamics triggered the creation of a two-tier 
workforce: catering service indeed was carried out at the centralized kitchen centre 
where used to work side by side employees with remarkable differences in salary and 
contractual arrangements due to the fact they were hired by diverse employers. Health 
sector collective agreement indeed guaranteed to catering staff higher wage rate, 
stronger employment protections against layoff, better allowances compared to the 
correspondent contract applied in the private sector, namely the tourism industry 
collective agreement. A trade union official from CGIL-FP told that  
 
it was very important for us to monitor these tenders obviously because we had as 
members several permanent workers from LHA; so for us the transfer from public to 
private sector, for us and for them, has meant a very heavy contractual change, 
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burdensome for us and for them. Above all for them because they realized that shifting 
from public to private sector meant a series of differences in terms of wage rate and 
rights, and they became aware of that. (Interview 4)  
 
A second repercussion following outsourcing concerns the growing workload for 
personnel. Workload indeed knew a sharp increase both for transferred personnel and 
for public staff on functional secondment since the subcontractor raised the speed of 
work and, as anticipated, used to suspend contracts for municipal transferred workers 
during summertime when schools are closed and to reintegrate them in September, 
enhancing workload for remaining workforce. After a long negotiation with unions 
however the company accepted to slightly increase staffing level during summertime, 
even if of only few units (Interview 4). 
Stretcher bearers and porters reported a remarkable raise in workload as well when they 
were located on functional secondment to the subcontractor: the new employer indeed 
cutting the staffing level increased the peaks of works for public employees, required to 
work longer shifts and overtime dealing with a peculiar working context featured by 
continuing emergencies. Workload became particularly burdensome in such kind of 
physical tasks, performed by ever more old workers. 
Union officials interviewed from the main confederations however expressed an overall 
satisfaction in the matter of implications for employment conditions following 
restructuring events in the LHA: beyond the case of catering indeed terms and 
conditions of employment remained almost unvaried thanks to the application of the 
public sector collective agreement which provided for high protections and convenient 
contractual arrangements. The role of unions and workers‟ representatives at the 
workplace played an important role in monitoring outsourcing processes involving 
personnel transfer and in the large majority of tenders in negotiating with the board of 
directors the relocations of public employees within the LHA as alternative to the 
transfer. 
Such outcome was feasible through a fruitful collaborative relations between social 
partners, but helped by the fact that the limited number of restructuring events impacted 
only marginally on workforce, involving very few units of personnel compared to the 
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case of municipality. The analysis if the LHA indeed did not pinpoint other negative 
repercussions on labour so far. 
 
4.4.2 Impacts on employment relations structure and union strategy 
Union action likewise in the municipality was primarily focused on keeping core 
healthcare services in-house, limiting externalization to support technical activities to 
the core mission of the LHA, namely the provision of health care to patients as 
underlined by the general secretary of the local branch of CGIL-FP:  
 
historically we as trade union, we have always struggled against outsourcing, and we 
obtained a positive result since we said: if you, Local Health Authority wants to 
externalize you must do that for services that we do not consider core, namely 
everything specifically concerning healthcare assistance must not be touched. This is 
the campaign we put forward and I have to admit that the result we got is noteworthy. 
(Interview 2)  
 
Union opposition to outsourcing in healthcare sector translated into several public 
campaigns:  
 
we organized a bicycle ride stopping in public workplaces to distribute flyers and 
explaining what the dismantlement of public health might mean; or the initiative 
called “Health to the Streets” where we checked for free blood pressure and in the 
meantime we try to explain to citizens what was happening with the privatization of 
healthcare. (Interview 2)  
 
Such strategy of users involvement, neglected in the municipality but ex post 
reconsidered, was instead fruitfully exploited by unions in healthcare which promptly 
recognized that  
 
public opinion does not notice if you‟re outsourcing. If the service gets worse they get 
angry however with the public administration because there is little awareness, and 
maybe also little interest in public goods: citizens are not informed about how actually 
services are provided in their community. There is really little awareness and very 
little involvement of users. (Interview 7) 
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However as specified by union officials such campaigns were purposely oriented to 
inform and alert citizenship to the general issue of marketization of healthcare system 
and implications for labour and service quality, rather than to oppose a specific 
restructuring event. In the latter case unions usually opted for coping with the problem 
by exploiting institutional channel of direct negotiation with the LHA board of 
directors.  
Such strategy was complemented, as anticipated by a continuous monitoring process 
both during restructuring in order to safeguard employment and following the tender to 
check the correct application of collective agreements. The role of union was strategic 
in the former phase to prevent redundancies of temporary public employees and to 
safeguard employment to all public personnel through either a relocation in the 
municipality or a functional secondment to the private providers as explained by a trade 
union official:  
 
we worked to keep all the jobs there were previously; our work was trying to maintain 
the same number of jobs even if shifted for the LHA to a cooperative, so in the 
transfer we worked for that goal. (Interview 2)  
 
But union action was important also for the entire duration of the tender to ensure the 
respect of terms and conditions agreed upon in collective agreements (Interview 4) and 
to prevent a race to the bottom in contractual conditions that outsourcing often triggers.  
Consultation and negotiation among social partners have represented a mandatory step 
to overcome before implementing outsourcing policies: the board of directors indeed 
have always consulted trade unions during the decision-making process which includes 
the decision to undertake externalizations, negotiation on social clauses, repercussions 
for labour and future scenarios for personnel (Interview 11). Moreover the formal 
approval of unions is required when public staff is involved in transfer towards private 
organisations, further incentivizing the LHA to activate prior consultation with unions. 
Additionally unions leveraged on the strict collaboration they built with workers‟ 
representative, both in private companies and in the LHA, who acted as “watchdog” at 
workplace, then reporting in case of employer‟s negligence and related issues. A trade 
union official, in a nutshell told that „I prefer keeping open all channels of discussion 
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and dialogue, even if through modalities which might lead to disputes, but always 
keeping the dialogue open with the local health authority because I think it‟s the only 
way to get results, given that economic resources are really scanty. Therefore I prefer 
keeping a leading role together with our workers‟ representatives which play a very 
important role because during negotiations trade unions and workers‟ representatives 
have to decide together, make evaluations together, every year sitting at the bargaining 
table and assess, deepen, search jointly with the LHA shared solutions‟ (Interview 4). 
Importantly, despite the Brunetta reform in 2009 drastically reduced union prerogatives 
on HRM issues and work organisation, shifting also restructuring decision from the 
sphere of collective bargaining between social partners to the mere right of information 
for unions, the LHA has maintained a collaborative relationship with the counterpart, 
keeping on consulting them when the personnel was involved. 
As evidence from the analysis of the case study shows, in the health sector outsourcing 
processes did not undermine, or only to a limited extent, industrial relations institutions 
and their role in collectively represent employees in the public sector, putting forward 
the primarily importance of public administration and employment in providing 
universal and fundamental services like healthcare. It must be specified however that 
the region Emilia-Romagna, where the LHA is located, is featured by a long-standing 
tradition social dialogue, where unions have historically played a pivotal role supported 
by a political hegemony of left-wing parties which ruled the regional council over the 
last three decades: such collaborative dynamic between social partners is particularly 
strong in healthcare sector where  
 
the model has hold despite the pressures coming from the privatization processes and 
the dismantle of collective bargaining by the Brunetta reform. (Interview 1)  
 
Comparing the healthcare sector with local government the regional secretary of CGIL-
FP also added that „we tried to held in the municipalities as well, but we had a hard 
time, not everywhere we managed to keep the model working‟ (Interview 1).  
Overall however, such employment relations model of negotiation and coordination 
between social partners is detectable also in local governments but in that case  
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on the employer side a financial logic prevailed on a logic of strategic developments 
of municipalities, while in health care prevailed a development logic to reorganize the 
system. (Interview 1)  
 
These different rationales driving externalization processes in the two sectors 
unavoidably impacted also on industrial relations institutions.  
Therefore the scenario depicted in healthcare sector deviates from the one displayed in 
the municipality, widening the focus on a larger scale, regional or even national, some 
common causes for reflection arise between the two public administrations. 
Trade union officials in both sectors indeed pinpointed the risks related to a strategy 
fully focused on the safeguard of core services: underestimating the relevance of 
support peripheral services was the initial mistake they did, that subsequently led to a 
gradual fragmentation of the whole production chain within hospitals. The national 
secretary of a trade union representing public employee, a posteriori, expressed doubts 
on the strategy they adopted as union confederation:  
 
we tried to oppose outsourcing but maybe with some weaknesses because we were 
engaged with safeguarding core activities of health authorities. Hence externalizations 
started from low-skilled labour that could be contracted out because it was excluded 
from core services, but that was the initial drama that we little by little dragged, so 
worsening the situation and letting outsourcing growing. (Interview 5) 
 
Such weak opposition was also due to the fact that overall unions have guaranteed the 
safeguard of employment for all the staff involved, or reporting the words of a union 
officials „we governed the phenomena of outsourcing with regard of personnel, because 
those workers were relocated in other functions and not made redundant‟ (Interview 5), 
neglecting somehow potential repercussions for the overall management of health 
services and their quality. Given the current state of the art indeed unions exclude any 
possibility to take those support services back in-house since hospitals lost not only the 
workforce to directly provide the services but also the know-how to organise and 
control them. Likewise in the municipality however they recognize the necessity to 
widen the scope of union strategy, focusing on the protection also of service quality by 
placing citizens and public employees in a pivotal role though a synergic action between 
citizens, patients and public personnel (Interview 7). 
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Moreover if union membership is still stable in healthcare sector in general, unions are 
considering a renewal in their strategy fearing a future decline on the one side following 
the gradual replacement of retired public employees with private workers from small 
companies or cooperative usually less unionized (Interview 5), while on the other side 
suspecting a potential wave of marketization involving core services as well.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
As the two Italian case studies show, restructuring events towards outsourcing of public 
services raised labour-related issues in terms of inequalities in terms and conditions of 
employment and working conditions: such consequences, in turn, modifying the 
scenario in which unions used to act through the organisation and the collective 
representation of workers, undermined their role and their capacity to impact during 
externalization processes. Despite some similarities in how outsourcing impacted on 
public employees‟ contractual provisions and job organisation between the two sectors 
have been pinpointed, the analysis sheds light on remarkable divergences as well, 
noteworthy to be discussed (see tables 4.1 and 4.2 below for a comparative synthesis).  
Public personnel in both the municipality and the Local Health Authority directly 
involved in subcontracted services was in large majority redeployed in different offices 
or to perform new tasks within the administration they were hired: such relocation 
allowed to most part of the staff to maintain the public status and the application of 
public sector collective agreement. In many cases however the redeployment translated 
into functional secondment to the subcontractors: even though they formally remained 
employees of the public administration they belong, the private company functionally 
reintegrated these workers in its staffing level, getting the prerogative to coordinate their 
work organisation, namely to decide in the matter of working hours, shifts organisation, 
leaves, holiday and workload. 
Transfer of personnel occurred for a limited share of employees, mainly temporary 
workers who shifted from the public sector to private employers. Their contractual 
provisions subsequently followed the same trajectory: the application of public sector 
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collective agreement was replaced by the private sector collective agreement of 
reference.  
Overall the comparative picture displays a high degree of protection of public 
employment during restructuring events, provided by strong legislative protections: a 
protective regulation concerning public employees in general (preventing redundancy 
and dismissal) is complemented by specific protections in the matter of restructuring 
events such as the article 2012 of the Civil Code ensuring to transferred workers 
between undertakings the same terms and conditions of employment, and the social 
clauses included in invitation to tender requiring to bidder to reintegrate the workforce 
involved. Such regulative framework is backed up by a fierce stance of union against 
outsourcing, which focused their action on the protection of public employment with the 
purpose to avoid redundancies and maintain the jobs. 
Even though implications for labour following outsourcing have been somehow 
contained in their scope, some detrimental repercussions were reported in both case 
studies. Public employees internally relocated ended up doing a job that in most of the 
cases was not appropriate for their skills since they were recruited to perform a specific 
different task. Public employees instead in functional secondment to the subcontractors 
experienced a remarkable increase in workload while transferred staff, subject to a shift 
from public to private sector collective agreement, underwent a remarkable drop in 
wage rate and working hours. 
A further issue that externalization policies triggered was the creation of a two-tier (or 
even multi-tier) workforce: subcontracted public services indeed were provided by 
diverse segments of workers working side by side, endowed with the same educational 
background but subject to unequal contractual arrangements according to the nature, 
whether public or private, of the employer. Traditionally, public sector collective 
agreements are more advantageous in terms of both salary and allowances, but also in 
the matter of union rights and employment protections compared to contracts agreed in 
the private sector companies.  
Beyond such convergent implications, the comparative investigation of the municipality 
and the Local Health Authority pinpointed notable divergent trajectories. Firstly, the 
healthcare administration drew upon outsourcing policies within a long-term strategic 
plan to rationalize and improve the whole structure: hence the provision of a limited 
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range of support technical services involving low-skilled workforce was externalized. 
Conversely the municipality, driven by strict austerity measure constraining its financial 
endowment and staffing level, resorted to such market-type tool for the provision of a 
wide array of both technical and core services: in this case the reshuffle of job 
arrangements and contractual provisions involved a numerically relevant group of 
municipal employees. These differences in the scope of the phenomenon and in the 
extent to which personnel was affected mirrored also a diverse degree to which 
outsourcing events negatively impacted on labour and employment relations. 
Employment fragmentation, deterioration of job terms and conditions, growth of 
contractual inequalities between employees are all repercussions which were reported 
by key-respondents interviewed more seriously and harshly in the municipality rather 
than in the Local Health Authority.  
Likewise, employment relations and labour institutions were subject to a remarkable 
weakening in the municipal context where outsourcing policies gradually eroded union 
capacity to collectively represent and organise employees, undermining their bargaining 
power during restructuring processes. Conversely social partners in the LHA preserved 
a collaborative relations which enabled union to be always consulted before contracting 
out services involving personnel and to constantly monitor the development of such 
processes in the matter of contractual provisions evolution and workforce transfer or 
redeployment. Finally if the Brunetta reform in 2009, shrinking union prerogatives to 
collectively bargain on matters regarding work organisation and HRM, contributed in 
further demolishing union role in the municipality, it left employment relations rather 
unaltered in the LHA. 
 
157 
Table 4.1 Labour-related variables affected by outsourcing in the Italian municipality and Local Health Authority 
 
ITALY - MUNICIPALITY ITALY – LOCAL HEALTH AUTHORITY 
Public employment in services 
outsourced 
Large majority of public personnel relocated within the 
administration. 
Once retired, replaced by subcontracted workers. 
Large majority of public personnel relocated within the 
administration. 
Once retired, replaced by subcontracted workers. 
Transfer of public personnel to 
private providers 
Transfer limited to temporary public personnel. 
Functional secondment to the subcontractor for a share 
of permanent employees. 
Transfer limited to temporary public personnel. 
Functional secondment to the subcontractor for a share 
of permanent employees. 
Redundancy None None 
Size of public employment 
Decreasing from 1,200 to 700 in the time-lapse 2006-14 
(not only due to outsourcing, but also as a consequence 
of austerity measures freezing hiring) 
Stable around 3,500 units 
Collective agreement applied 
Public sector agreement for permanent public 
employees relocated and in functional secondment. 
Private sector agreements for transferred personnel. 
Public sector agreement for permanent public 
employees relocated and in functional secondment. 
Private sector agreements for transferred personnel. 
Wage rate 
Lower in private subcontractors compared to public 
sector (only exception FederAmbiente collective 
agreement) 
Lower in private subcontractors compared to public 
sector 
Workload 
Increasing for transferred personnel and staff in 
functional secondment 
Increasing for transferred personnel and staff in 
functional secondment 
Inequalities in contractual provisions 
Two-tier (or even multi-tier) workforce in several 
outsourced services, especially in nursery schools and 
social services 
Two-tier workforce only in catering service 
Social clauses in tender to reintegrate 
the staff 
Always included Always included 
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Table 4.2 Employment relations-related variables affected by outsourcing in the Italian municipality and Local Health Authority 
 
ITALY - MUNICIPALITY ITALY – LOCAL HEALTH AUTHORITY 
Union stance towards outsourcing 
Fragmented opposition to single externalization events: 
lack of systematic institutional stance 
Systematic opposition to outsourcing in healthcare 
sector 
Union strategy and responses 
Focus on keeping core services in-house (education and 
social services) and sheltering public employment. 
Industrial action. 
Focus on keeping healthcare services in-house and 
sheltering public employment. 
Campaign to inform employees and users 
Workplace representatives 
Always elected in both the municipality and private 
subcontractors 
Always elected in both the municipality and private 
subcontractors 
Union consultation 
Always consulted before outsourcing until the Brunetta 
reform in 2009 
Since then union only informed 
Always consulted before outsourcing 
Collective bargaining on HRM and work organisation-
related issues 
Relationship between social partners 
In the relation with unions, municipality complies with 
legislative requirement in terms of information and 
consultation. 
Union often seen as an obstacle during restructuring 
events 
Collaborative long-standing tradition of social dialogue: 
shared purpose to safeguard the quality of healthcare 
services 
Challenge to union  
Workers transferred in catering 
Fragmentation of employment  
Two-tier workforce 
Production chain fragmentation 
Membership 
Decreasing (not only due to outsourcing: municipal 
staffing level physiologically diminished following 
strict austerity measures) 
Rather stable 
Users’ involvement 
Union awareness of this lack: need to involved citizens 
in campaigns 
Citizens involvement in campaigns to raise awareness 
of the risks in externalizing healthcare services 
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Chapter five 
The case of England 
 
 
5.1 Public administration: structure, functions, employment relations  
 
5.1.1 Structure and functions 
England, with its 53 million inhabitants, is one of the four countries making up the 
Great Britain, together with Scotland, Wales and the Northern Ireland.  
According to the UK national accounts, the public sector is divided between central 
government, local government and public corporations. Central government covers all 
organisations for whose activities a government Minister is accountable to Parliament: 
thus apart from the armed forces, it includes all administrative departments of 
government, the civil service and its executive agencies and non-departmental publicly 
constituted bodies financially dependent upon the central government ˗ such as research 
councils, national museums – and the National Health Service.  
Local government instead is constituted of 353 local authorities, displaying some 
variations in their structure and functions. There is a broad division between two-tier 
authorities ˗ counties and districts ˗ with the latter providing more local services on a 
larger county-wide basis and unitary authorities which are concentrated in London and 
other large Metropolitan areas providing all kind of services.  
Local authorities are run by elected bodies although their autonomy is constrained by 
central government regulation which shapes their taxation power and set strict rules 
regarding budget balance on annual basis. However, three-quarter of local government 
revenue expenditure is financed by money transfer from the central government, 
complemented by addition resources raised „in the form of property tax paid by local 
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residents (council tax) and income generated from housing, leisure and other services 
with strict rules covering the trading activities of local authorities‟ (Bach and Stroleny 
2014: 345). Local government has the responsibility for a wide range of local services: 
more than half of the expenditure is devoted to adult and children‟s services, while other 
services include housing, planning, environmental services, highway, cultural and 
leisure functions and a squeezing portfolio of directly managed schools. Importantly, 
local governments have the statutory duty to provide key services such as social care, 
but further services like youth services are only discretionary, therefore much 
vulnerable to budgetary reductions as financial transfers established at national level 
decrease. 
Greater London has a different system for local government: the administrative area is 
split up in 32 London boroughs each run by an elected council, plus the City of London 
covering a small area at the core governed by the City of London Corporation. The 
London borough councils and the City of London Corporation provide the majority of 
services, including education and social services, whereas the Greater London Authority 
is responsible for the key strategic services of public transport, the police, economic 
development and emergency planning. 
As anticipated, the central government not only controls the large majority of local 
government revenue spending, but has also continually intervened to limit their 
discretionary power to raise council taxes and levies. Such restriction stemmed from an 
increasing conflict between central government ministers and locally elected members 
or councillors related their own political party affiliation: this tension since the early 
1980s has led to a gradual shift in the constitutional balance of power from local to 
central level. As a consequence „local government has been viewed as the poor relation 
in the public sector in terms of the lack of government recognition of its contribution, 
unfavourable public expenditure settlements and the extent of central government 
intervention. This position stems from a legacy of tense central-local government 
relations, especially during the 1980s, and scope for government to engage in blame 
avoidance and blame diffusion strategies (Bach and Stroleny 2014: 345). 
Finally, public corporations are companies or quasi-corporations with some degree of 
financial independence from central government, which however directly or indirectly 
appoint most of the senior managers. They are endowed with a substantial autonomy to 
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carry out business activities such as the Royal Mail and the London Underground Ltd. 
These companies indeed gain more than half of their income by selling goods and 
services in the market. 
The National Health Service (NHS) since it was founded in 1948 has been considered 
as a core part of the central government: it was created to make comprehensive 
healthcare universally available among citizens and free at the point of delivery. It was 
featured by public ownership and public provision of healthcare services largely funded 
by general taxation. The NHS provides the majority of healthcare in England, including 
primary care, in-patient care, long-term healthcare, ophthalmology and dentistry. The 
central government is not the employer: district health authorities (DHAs) and family 
health service authorities (FHAs) which have been merged and health service trusts are 
actually the employers of public staff employed in the various hospitals across the 
country. The NHS in England was headed by Secretary of State for Health, who chaired 
a supervisory board including the minister of health, chief medical officer and non-
executive member. 
In 1990 the government reformed the NHS under the National Health Service and 
Community Care Act which pursued the separation of the purchasing of health care 
from its provision by introducing the idea of internal market into the supply of 
healthcare. As a consequence health authorities ceased to run hospitals but purchased 
healthcare services from their own or other authorities' hospitals. The healthcare 
providers became independent NHS trusts established under the National Health 
Service and Community Care Act in 1990, generally serving either a geographical area 
(the service area of an hospital) or a specialised function including acute hospital, 
ambulance service, community care, and mental health. In any particular location there 
may be several trusts involved in the different aspects of healthcare for a resident. 
Each NHS trust is headed by a board consisting of executive and non-executive 
directors, and is chaired by a non-executive director: they are directly accountable to the 
Secretary of State for Health who directly or indirectly appoints board members. The 
1990 Act reshuffled power relations in the NHS eroding the chain of command running 
from the Secretary of State to the Health Department and then to RHAs and DHAs, 
giving to purchaser authority more power in choosing their providers. Moreover NHS 
trust has a certain degree of autonomy on financial matters ˗ not only regarding budget 
162 
planning but also in seeking external funding within agreed limits ˗ and considerable 
discretion on personnel and employment-related issues. Trusts indeed became the new 
employers of NHS staff replacing the DHAs: it followed that they are allowed to set 
their own terms and conditions of employment, they can devise their own local 
bargaining and consultation arrangements. 
Labour came to power in 1997 with the promise to remove the internal market and 
abolish fundholding, claiming that they would have reversed Conservative intention to 
privatise the NHS. However in his second term Blair renounced this direction, pursuing 
measures to strengthen the internal market as part of his modernization agenda of the 
NHS. NHS Plan in 2000 brought about the biggest change to healthcare in England 
since the NHS was formed in 1948. The reform had the aim of improving the way 
services were delivered in order to expand the choices available to patients. This meant 
also introducing greater plurality of health services provision: the legislation explicitly 
encouraged the private provision of clinical services. Moreover it expanded the role of 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) for the building and management of new hospitals. 
In 2004 the Secretary of State for Health announced the creation of NHS foundation 
trusts with the purpose to encourage all NHS trusts to reach the foundation status: it 
meant obtaining greater managerial and financial autonomy when compared to NHS 
trusts which are now managed by the NHS Trust Development Authority. The 
introduction of foundation trusts status represented a turning point in the history of the 
NHS and the way in which hospital services are managed and provided.  
A more recent reform was issued in 2012 under the Health and Social Care Act which 
set an extensive reorganization of the NHS: the reform transferred responsibility of 
health care budget planning from the abolished Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to several 
hundred Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGS), NHS organisations set up to organise 
the delivery of NHS services in England partly run by the general practitioners (GPs). 
CCGs will commission the majority of health services, including emergency care, 
elective hospital care, maternity services, and community and mental health services 
provided by both public and private structures. The Act has become associated with the 
perception of increased private provision of NHS services since GCCs constitute a 
major point of access for private service providers. Under the new system, a new NHS 
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Commissioning Board called NHS England, oversees the NHS on behalf of the 
Department of Health removing responsibility from the Secretary of State for Health. 
 
5.1.2 Status and structure of public employment 
Public administration overall employs in England about 4,561,000 public employees, 
corresponding to 18.4% of total employment. About 46.1% is employed in central 
government (2,104,000 employees including NHS), about 45.4% in local authorities 
(2,071,000) and the remaining 8.5% in in public corporations (386,000). Moreover 
more than half of public employees in central government works in the NHS (about 
1,245,000) (Office for National Statistics ˗ ONS 2012). 
Within the general framework of public employment, the status of civil servants has 
been historically distinctive: they indeed have been treated in common law as a separate 
category of public employees with special status. As “servant of the crown” they in 
theory might be dismissed at any time at the will of the crown, but in practice 
employment law has been extended to civil servants as well. Hence their formal legal 
status has been indeed uncertain until the High Court established in 1991 that civil 
servants were employed directly by the Crown under contract of employment: as a 
consequence freedom of association, right to strike are applied, while their terms and 
conditions of employment are negotiated through collective bargaining. 
Since the post-war period public employment size increased continuously until the early 
1980s: in 1981 indeed 29% of all employees worked in the public sector (Bach and 
Kolins Givan 2011). Such growth stemmed from the nationalization of the major coal 
industry (1946), electricity (1947), railways (1947) and gas (1948), as well as the 
establishment of the basis if the substantial welfare state though the reform of healthcare 
(1948), education and social security provisions (Winchester and Bach 1999). 
Subsequently, a decline in size and scope of public employment resulted from the 
policies of Conservative governments in office from 1979 to 1997 when all nationalized 
industries were privatized and increasing range of public service functions were 
outsourced to private subcontractors. Reached in 1999 the low point of 19%, public 
employment size started to increase again following the boost of public expenditure 
promoted by Labour government in office between 1997-2010. 
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The English model of employment relations in the public sector is closer to the „model 
employer‟ (Bach and Bordogna 2011) where the central government as public employer 
set some good practices and example to the private sector „by endorsing principles of 
fairness, involvement and equity in its treatment of its workforce. These principles have 
been associated with the encouragement of trade union membership, support for 
centralized systems of collective bargaining and related forms of workforce 
participation‟ (Bach and Kolins Givan 2011: 2350). 
In contrast to most European countries, there has never been a clear-cut legal distinction 
between industrial relation in the public and private sector: public employees indeed 
enjoyed few special prerogatives attached to their status and faced only selective 
restrictions on the right to strike and to join a union, as in the armed forces and police 
corps. If until the 1970s „this was a consequence of the policy of legal abstentions (or 
voluntarism) in industrial relations, since then the rapid development of individual and 
collective employment law has rarely differentiated between public and private sector 
employees in significant ways‟ (Winchester and Bach 1999: 18). Nevertheless, until the 
1980s terms and condition of employment for public employees were characterized by a 
greater degree of job security, more clearly defined career patterns, and generally better 
pensions, sick pay scheme and other benefits than their private sector counterparts. 
These provisions of service were set up in national agreements and uniformly applied to 
the whole public sector, despite such expectations were not established by statute, nor 
explicitly recognized in common law (Bach and Winchester 2003).  
The lack of a strong and legally-based distinction in the status of public and private 
sector employment has facilitated restructuring processes towards privatization and 
contracting out and the subsequent transfer of personnel between sectors since it was 
leaving greater scope for governments to implement far-reaching reforms of the public 
sector starting from the late 1970s. The Conservative government of Mrs Thatcher 
elected in 1979, and in office until 1997, „rejected the presumption that a good 
employer obligation should prevail in the public services. Their policies encouraged 
greater diversity within the sector, by weakening national system of employment 
regulation and encouraging the devolution of management authority to the individual 
public service organization‟ (Winchester and Bach 1999: 21). 
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In the wake of an anti-union sentiment, the government pursued an anti-union neo-
liberal ideological program of reform in the public sector, driven by a strong belief in 
the superiority of market relations, competition and private sector management 
expertise and practices. First, the Conservative government, along with the privatization 
all nationalized industries, introduced market competition in the provision of public 
services: compulsory competitive tendering legislation indeed obliged in particular local 
authorities to test the market for specified service contracts, gradually increasing in 
number along the years. Also hospitals in the NHS were encouraged to invite tenders 
for a range of functions including also core healthcare services. Despite strong union 
opposition and management ambivalence, such policy was rigorously pursued by public 
organisations, leading to a substantial reduction in public employment. 
A second key-point of the reform concerns the emphasis on strengthening managerial 
prerogatives: public managers received greater operational control and autonomy, but 
are also subject to centralized forms of audit (Bach and Kolins Givan 2011). 
Thirdly the government introduced performance-based management, spreading the 
practice of performance-related pay (PRP): it represented an attempt to foster 
employees motivation by linking individual achievements and rewards, which 
contributed also to individualize employment relations. 
These reforms in public service employment policies gradually eroded many of the 
previous differences from private sector labour market, encouraging a convergence 
between public and private sector employment conditions and practices: „a degree of 
downward harmonization has resulted from government policies of labour market 
deregulation, with many employees in the public services facing the same degree of job 
insecurity, work intensification and limited promotion prospects as their private sector 
equivalents‟ (Winchester and Bach 1999: 22). 
The modernization agenda pursue by the Labour government in office from 1997 to 
2010 extended from certain points of view the Conservative agenda, especially the 
search for higher efficiency and the marketization program through the best value 
principle: indeed it kept on promoting the benefits in changing working practices 
stemming from private sector tools and policies. Unlike the previous government 
however, it sought to encourage unions to support its modernization agenda offering a 
moderately conciliatory approach to trade unions by institutionalizing partnerships 
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between social partners: at national level for instance created the tripartite Public 
Services Forum to strengthen dialogue on such issues, while at sectoral level tripartite 
partnership helped to bring about reform of pay and working conditions like Agenda for 
Change agreement in 2004 harmonizing pay scales in the NHS (Bach and Kolins Givan 
2011). Moreover the Labour government reached an agreement in 2004 with trade 
unions, the so-called Warwick Accord, which led to protect employment from two-tier 
workforce-related issues.  
To conclude, the „model employer‟ tradition in employment relation seems to have been 
overcome in the English public sector: indeed „the term social dialogue is not widely 
used in a UK context, reflecting more adversarial employment relations traditions and a 
less encompassing role for trade unions and employers in the administration of welfare 
services‟ (Bach and Stroleny 2014: 346). 
 
5.1.3 Social dialogue framework and institutions 
As far employment relations are concerned, England has traditionally been featured by 
voluntary relations between the social partners, with a minimal level of interference 
from the state in both public and private sector. However collective bargaining and the 
right to strike for most of public service employees have historically characterized pay 
determination system in the English public sector, endorsed also by governments as 
crucial element in the ideal of the state as a „good employer‟ (Winchester and Bach 
1999). Since there has been no legal obligation on employers to engage in collective 
bargaining as a consequence collective agreements are not legally binding between the 
parties, but they constitute recommendations to public employers. 
A centralised system of collective bargaining developed in the civil service and was 
then extended to the whole public service by the 1950s: at national level collective 
agreements generally established wage and salary structures, specifying a wide range of 
terms and conditions of employment in a prescriptive way (Bach and Kolins Givan 
2011). Moreover the widely accepted bargaining principle of „fair comparison‟ in the 
wage developments between public service employees and the rest of the economy 
helped in harmonizing salary increase across sectors. 
167 
An economy with double-digit inflation rate and the „winter of discontent‟ paved the 
way for a decisive shift in government policy on public employees‟ collective 
bargaining system: as a consequence the planning and control of public expenditure as 
well as the structure and outcomes of collective bargaining in public services have been 
significantly reformed (Winchester 1983). The Conservative government in office 
between 1979-1997 indeed soon demonstrated its priorities for the reform of pay 
determination: it advocated more decentralization in collective bargaining as a means to 
be more responsive to the need of managerial efficiency and labour market conditions, 
mimicking the highly decentralized system characterizing the private sector and it tried 
to erode the principle of „fair comparison‟, replacing it with the criterion of 
„affordability‟ defined as strict constraints on expenditure. In a more ideological way 
moreover, Mrs Thatcher „encouraged employers to resist trade union pay demands, and 
showed unusual willingness to accept the political risks and financial costs of protracted 
disputes‟ (Winchester and Bach 1999: 36). 
In practice such decentralization process developed „in a piecemeal and uneven manner 
with important variations between sectors‟ (Bach and Kolins Givan 2011: 2358). The 
Civil Service Act in 1992 delegated responsibility for negotiation pay and conditions for 
civil servants to individual departments and executive agencies: through the „delegated 
bargaining‟ each agency or departmental unit was demanded to develop its own scheme 
covering grading, appraisal, promotion, training and performance related pay.  
In the NHS conversely pay negotiations remained centralized: an independent pay 
review body was established for nurses and other health service professional staff. Pay 
review body collects detailed oral and written evidence from social partners ˗ 
government, employers and trade unions ˗, complemented by its own research and data 
analysis: through that it drafts recommendations to the government who is presumed to 
accept them, unless there are „clear and compelling reasons for not doing so‟ 
(Winchester and Bach 1999: 36). The new system removed NHS staff from the 
coverage of collective bargaining on pay, but it is also far removed from unilateral 
settlement from the government: „it is better view as a form of arm‟s length bargaining 
in which the argument of government ministers and senior civil servants, as well as 
those of employers and trade union officials, are scrutinized and often criticized in 
published reports‟ (ibidem). The attraction of pay review bodies for government is that 
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„they provide an arm‟s length way of dealing with sensitive public sector groups, 
distancing the government from unpopular public sector pay decision. At the same time, 
the government retains more influence over pay-bill than in traditional collective 
bargaining because it establishes the remit of each review body, and can choose to stage 
or reject the decisions of each review body‟ (Bach, Kolin Givan and Forth 2009: 322). 
The election of the Labour government in 2004 has been associate with a reassertion of 
centralized system of pay determination. Specifically in healthcare services, 
government, unions, employers and NHS Employer (employer association in healthcare 
services) negotiated a more centralized national pay framework, the so-called Agenda 
for Change (AfC) pay reform which harmonised pay scales and career progression 
arrangements across traditionally separate pay groups in the NHS. 
In local authorities the scope and the pace of bargaining reform have been greater than 
in the NHS since the 1980s, driven by increasing demand for less prescriptive and more 
flexible agreements than the two national agreements covering manual workers and 
clerical, professional staff. Such pressures stemmed both from unions which sought to 
negotiate improvements in benefits and pay increases at local level where labour market 
conditions and local authorities‟ finances allowed that, but also from public employers‟ 
side. Local governments indeed, especially Conservative-led, in open conflict with 
national negotiating machinery, struggled to have looser framework in national 
agreement as a means to increase their autonomy in recruit and retain employees, as 
well as set up terms and conditions of their employment. As a consequence local 
authority trade unions and employers agreed a radical reform of bargaining system, 
developing a new „single status‟ agreement in 1997 covering both manual and non-
manual workers In practice local authorities as independent employers might 
voluntarily adopt the national-level pay bargaining ˗ the National Joint Council (NJC) 
for Local Government Services ˗ which establishes pay and core national conditions: for 
instance the elimination of any gender-based pay gaps and the introduction of an 
'equality-proofed' pay model, harmonizing wage rate and terms and conditions between 
former manual and non-manual workers. In the meantime local authorities gained 
remarkable local flexibility to develop their own pay and grading structure: the new job 
appraisal scheme may be used by local authorities but without being compulsory; local 
grading reviews enable authorities to opt out of national grades and it allows to modify 
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service condition through local negotiations (Bach and Stroleny 2014). It constitutes 
essentially a national scheme for local application (Winchester and Bach 1999) offering 
greater legitimacy to local bargaining, but within a nation-wide framework agreement, 
the so-called NJC agreement (or the Green Book): it includes a range of core national 
conditions as sick pay scheme, a standard 37-hour week, annual leaves. 
Employer and union negotiating bodies include the Local Government Association 
(LGA ˗ the employer association representing local authorities) and the main local 
authority unions ˗ UNISON, Unite and GMB.  
Employees participation and representative bodies are featured by a multi-tiered nature. 
The main channel of employees‟ representation in England is via the recognition of 
trade unions by employers for the purposes of collective bargaining. Another channel of 
employee representation at workplace is the establishment of Joint Consultative 
Committees (JCCs) – sometimes known as works councils or employee forums: 
although in some cases JCCs are an alternative to, or substitute for, union 
representation, they are also prevalent in workplaces where unions are recognised. Such 
Committees are broadly concerned with consultation rather than negotiation and 
comprise employers, employees and elected councillors. The primary basis for both 
union recognition and the establishment of JCCs has traditionally been voluntary 
agreement between social partners: however, since 1999 in the case of trade union 
recognition and 2004 in the case of information and consultation arrangements, 
legislation has been implemented in the UK enabling unions and employees 
respectively to use statutory procedures to establish representation arrangements where 
not agreed voluntarily. Overall both union recognition (90%) and JSS are more 
widespread in public sector workplaces, compared to private sector where union 
recognition in 12%. 
 
5.1.4 Trade unions 
As part of the voluntarist system of employment relations in both public and private 
sector, also trade union organizations and representation-related issues have been 
traditionally subject to limited regulation: the law indeed was virtually silent on the 
freedom of association and union recognition for negotiation. Within this framework 
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however, until Mrs Thatcher came into power in 1979, government policies encouraged 
public employees to join union in a political climate of union acceptance. The 
Conservative government indeed, elected after a period of unprecedented industrial 
conflict in public services, embarked upon a series of legislative and administrative 
reforms purposely design to undermine unions in general, and in particular to weaken 
public service trade unions (Winchester and Bach 1999): it followed that since 1979 
overall union membership declined for unprecedented seventeen consecutive years. 
Membership gradually started increasing again with the New Labour Agenda between 
1997 and 2010, which promoted more consensual employment relations through social 
partnership and consultation. Such approach was finally reversed by the Conservative-
led coalition government: elected in 2010 it adopted a unilateral approach to reform 
which weakened social dialogue and set off a new adversarial phase in employment 
relations. 
As in most of European countries union membership has generally been dominated by 
public service membership: public sector union density is about 56% nearly four times 
the rate in the private sector where is 14% (Labour Force Survey 2012). The distribution 
of members mirrors the complex structure of trade unionism with membership 
distributed amongst general, industrial and occupational unions: the organizational 
principle of industrial or sectoral unionism in fact has never been institutionalized in 
Britain where competitive recruitment, inter-union rivalry and multi-union 
representation at workplace are at the basis of the system. 
Trade union structure has been rationalized through amalgamation and mergers, in 
particular during the 1970 and the 1980s: „there were 543 unions with 11.1 million 
members in 1970, compared with 245 unions with 7.9 million members at the end of 
1996 (Winchester and Bach 1999: 30). 
The largest union in the UK is Unite, formed in 2007 through the merger of the two 
large unions Amicus and the T&G. It had about 1,407,000 members in 2012 in large 
majority from public sectors of the economy, including motor manufacturing, finance, 
road transport and printing, but at least 200,000 members work in public services. 
UNISON, the second largest union with 1,317,000 members in 2012 organises 
primarily in the public services, although following privatization and subcontracting 
policies it has substantial membership in private companies as well. However its claim 
171 
to be „The Public Service Trade Union‟ is justified as it represents the large majority of 
manual and non-manual employees of local authorities (Winchester and Bach 1999). It 
formed in 1993 through the merger of three large health service union NALGO, NUPE 
and COHSE. UNISON represents most of clerical and administrative staff, the majority 
of ancillary staff members, many unqualified nurses (auxiliaries and health care 
assistants) and some qualified nursing staff. The last category of workers indeed is 
represented also by the Royal College of Nursing (RCN), with whom UNISON is in 
open competition for recruitment. 
The third largest union is the GMB with 610,000 members. Like Unite is a general 
union representing workers in both private and public organisations (especially local 
authorities), although they are more likely to be manual workers. The GMB was 
initially part of the merger discussion leading to the creation of Unite, but at the end it 
decided to remain independent. 
Together Unite, UNISON and the GMB account for 56% of total TUC membership, the 
single national union confederation. 
 
 
5.2 Government policies and austerity measures as drivers of outsourcing 
 
In England marketization processes in the provision of public services ˗ both in local 
authorities and in healthcare sector˗ stemmed from a double pressure: if on the one side 
since Mrs Thatcher was elected in 1979 government continually encouraged 
municipalities and hospitals to embarked upon contracting out by the means of 
legislative provisions, on the other side more recently austerity measures in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis directly or indirectly enhanced such pattern. 
 
5.2.1 Outsourcing and the central government political agenda 
The UK is considered one of the forerunner countries in the adoption of market-type 
tools, as part of a wider reform pattern of public sector inspired by NPM doctrine 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2013).  
Very emotive expressions such as „government is too big‟ or „the need to cut red tape‟ 
(Asher 1987) well express the popularity of outsourcing in England as an alternative 
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tool to provide public services since the 1980s: in quantitative terms, indeed is the 
country with the highest rate of public expenditure in outsourcing over public 
expenditure for in-house production (OECD 2005, Cepiku, 2006).  
The origins of the phenomenon dated back to a small group of Conservative-led local 
governments which voluntarily started testing the market. This alternative to the in-
house provision of services spread rapidly from the initial small scale to the central 
government and the health care sector. To give an idea of the scope of the phenomenon, 
between 1980 and 1985, the number of local authorities relying on contracting out 
jumped from two to two dozen. In the health sector, the hospitals which outsourced 
their cleaning activities rose from 40 to more than the double (around 100). 
At the same time, lobbying actions and efforts were disseminating the advantages of 
competitive tendering to policy makers‟ attention at national level. The Conservative 
party revealed itself being particularly sensitive on the issue. Accordingly, if the 
election of Mrs Thatcher government in 1979 established the turning point, the 
following years from 1980 to 1988 represented a kind of test bench for defining the 
regulatory framework on Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT). During that 
decade, pamphlets arguing in favour of outsourcing have been published – e.g. 
Reservicing Britain by Michael Forsyth –; ambitious pilot programs of competitive 
tendering have been implemented like the one in the Ministry of Defence in 1980 and 
different studies have been launched for determining the effects of these initiatives.  
The legislative framework associated with CCT began with the issuing of the Local 
Government Planning and Land Act in 1980 which encouraged contracting out in local 
authorities for a limited range of jobs, mainly blue-collars tasks as highways 
maintenance, building maintenance. Then, in 1988 it was extended via the reform of 
Local Government Act to most of the manual services in municipalities, covering refuse 
collection, street cleaning, school and welfare catering, grounds and parks maintenance. 
As a third step, the subjects covered by the Local Government Act had been widened in 
1992, including white-collars activity such as professional, financial and technical 
services. 
The marketization of services provision, through the introduction of CCT, at the 
beginning of the 1990s could be regarded as widely implemented. The White Paper 
„Competing for Quality‟ in 1991 marked a step further, setting out how the Government 
173 
intended to „extend competition in the provision of public services further and faster 
than ever before right across the public sector. That means providing incentives, 
removing obstacles, and enhancing purchasing skills (White Paper 1991). 
Savings in public expenditure and increasing services efficiency are well described by 
reports and studies. But these benefits were often fulfilled to the detriment of the public 
services quality. The New Labour government, elected in 1997, tried to cope with this 
shortcoming issuing the Best Value program for local authorities and Better Quality 
Services at central level. The new government „provided a new rationale for forms of 
service delivery, a shift from ideology to efficacy in determining the appropriate 
provider, but in practice this resulted in the continues, indeed the extended, involvement 
of private, and independent, sector contractors as public service providers‟ (Bach and 
Kessler 2012: 82). The CCT legislation, abolished in 2000, was replaced by a new 
version of competitive tendering, the benchmarking Best Value process in local 
government aiming at improving the quality of services, than simply reducing their 
costs and giving a more prominent role to citizens in the choice. Nevertheless the 
„precise role of competitive tendering in the Best Value regime in not yet clear‟ (Boyne, 
1998). Blair‟s policy created a continuous tension between the attempt to replace 
compulsion by exhortation in the government approach to competitive tendering on the 
one hand and, on the other hand, the idea that „competition will continue to be an 
important management tool‟ (Welsh Office 1997). So despite the ideological and 
economic-based approach to contracting out was softened, it kept intensifying pressure 
to outsource a wide range of public services in local authorities. 
The economic crisis in 2008 gave a renewed impetus to the phenomenon: budget cuts 
and public employment reduction, top-down imposed by central government, pushed 
public administrations to seek for short-term savings. The Conservative-led coalition 
government elected in 2010 indeed exploited the economic crisis to reshape public 
service provision and in the meanwhile developing  
a distinct narrative to legitimize these changes: it coined the phrase Big Society to 
„portray cuts in public services as distinct from 1980s-style Thatcherite expenditure 
cuts, providing opportunities for charities, mutual and social enterprises to replace 
unresponsive public services and, at the same time, rekindle civic activism‟ (Bach 2012: 
399). The Big Society promoted three main strands: community empowerment through 
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decentralization and localism; the enhancement of the role of charities by providing 
them finance as a means to help them tender and deliver public services; renewed 
emphasis placed on opening up public services to private providers. In a nutshell the 
Conservative coalition attempted to scale the state back, shrinking its role in service 
delivery and encouraging private and third sector organisations to provide public 
services in the market place. 
Notable marketization processes occurred in the healthcare sector as well, tracing their 
origins back to the NHS review agenda put forward by the then Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher since early 1980s. In 1983 through the Circular HC 83(18) of the 
Department of health and Social Security titled „Competitive Tendering in the Provision 
of Domestic, Catering and Laundry Services‟ the government embarked upon the first 
outsourcing policy in the healthcare sector, opening ancillary tasks and facilities 
management up to market competition in hospital with the aim to test whether it was 
cheaper to contract these services out. 
Then in 1988 marketization was gradually extended to clinical services as well: the 
government published two white papers „Working for Patients‟ and „Caring for People‟ 
where the principle of "internal market" into the supply of healthcare was outlined for 
the first time, then formally introduced in 1990 under the National Health Service and 
Community Care Act. It opened up the possibility to test the market for the provision of 
clinical services, which were till that time a prerogative of public organizations: this 
meant that health authorities ceased to run hospitals, gaining the discretion to manage 
their own budgets and buy healthcare from their own public hospitals or from external 
private providers. In order to be entitled to provide healthcare services, public hospital 
became NHS Trusts, independent organisations with their own managements which 
actually competed with private healthcare provider in the market place.  
These innovations were initially condemned at the time by the Labour Party, accusing 
the opposition to have triggered a path towards the privatization of the English NHS. 
Hence the Labour party came to power in 1997 with the promise to remove the internal 
market and abolish fundholding as Prime Minister Tony Blair declared in a speech 
given at the Lonsdale Medical Centre on 9 December 1997: „The White Paper we are 
publishing today marks a turning point for the NHS. It replaces the internal market with 
"integrated care". We will put doctors and nurses in the driving seat. The result will be 
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that £1 billion of unnecessary red tape will be saved and the money put into frontline 
patient care. For the first time the need to ensure that high quality care is spread 
throughout the service will be taken seriously. National standards of care will be 
guaranteed. There will be easier and swifter access to the NHS when you need it. Our 
approach combines efficiency and quality with a belief in fairness and partnership. 
Comparing not competing will drive efficiency‟. However in his second term Labour 
government renounced this direction pursuing measures to strengthen the internal 
market as part of a wider plan to modernise not only the NHS, but the whole public 
services. 
The Blair Government by issuing the NHS Plan in 2000, whilst leaving services free at 
point of delivery, encouraged outsourcing of medical services and support to the private 
sector as a means to improve the way health services were delivered and to expand the 
choices available to patients through „patient Choice‟ introduced in 2008. Patient may 
choose any provider ˗ NHS, private, not for profit ˗ for elective care. This meant 
introducing greater plurality in the provision also of specialist treatments and surgery: 
the legislation explicitly encouraged the private provision of such clinical services by 
the establishment of Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs), build by public 
authorities but run by private operators. They are substantially private-sector owned 
treatment centres contracted within the English NHS to treat NHS patients free at the 
point of use like any other NHS hospital. Moreover it expanded the role of Private 
Finance Initiatives (PFIs) for the building and management of new hospitals. 
General election in 2010 saw the election of a coalition government led by the 
Conservative party, supported by the Liberal-Democratic Party. The clear stance of the 
government in favour of a stronger marketization of healthcare service provision 
translated into the introduction of the „Any Qualified Provider‟ clause. It is a contractual 
system within the NHS internal market of healthcare service provision. The system was 
introduced under the Labour administration in 2009-10 when it was called „Any Willing 
Provider‟, but then the policy was accelerated under the newly formed coalition 
Government which changed its name in 2011 in „Any Qualified Provider‟. It consisted 
in a way in which more NHS services could be provided by external providers whilst 
patients could be given more choice in the selection of the provider they prefer. 
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5.2.2 Austerity measures 
More recently a series of austerity measure were implemented in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis, directly or indirectly targeting public services provision as well.  
When the Conservative-led coalition government replaced the Labour government in 
2010 immediately committed to fiscal consolidation with the purpose to achieve 
expenditure balance by 2015-16. The 2010 Comprehensive Spending review indeed 
included a deficit reduction from 8.4% of GDP in 2009 to 0.4% by 2015 with three 
quarters of deficit reduction linked to public expenditure cuts: tax increases indeed have 
not played an important role (Bach and Stroleny 2012). Such approach mirrored the 
underlying political ideology of government in office and the underlying economic 
assumptions which represented relevant drivers of austerity: the clear-cut stance to 
shrink the big government to replace it with the „Big Society‟ (Bach 2012) was 
immediately evident. 
Measures issued by the government have been dominated by quantitative cuts in both 
staffing and wages. More in detail since 2010 public sector workforce experienced a 
four year period of wage restraint ˗ two years of pay freeze followed by two-year when 
pay increases were limited to an average 1%. An additional instrument of austerity 
implementation was represented by tight financial control exercised by the Treasury: 
unlike many other countries the government opted for requiring to local employers the 
achievement of balanced budget through a certain degree of autonomy about how to 
reduce public spending, without setting fixed targets for staff replacement ratio. 
Employment reductions policies did not played a much relevant role: since there is no 
separate public sector employment statute in the UK, in a context of poorly regulated 
labour market local public employers have great discretion if they opt to reduce their 
staffing level. Following outsourcing and privatisation policies, complemented by 
balanced budget requirement, public workforce sharply declined: „the Office of Budget 
Responsibility (OBR) initially predicted in June 2010 that public sector employment 
would decline by 490,000 jobs by 2014-15 but this forecast has been increased several 
times and the latest forecast suggests that 730,000 jobs, around 13% of general 
government employment, will be removed by 2016-17‟ (Bach and Stroleny 2012: 8). 
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Local authorities have been most impacted by employment reductions, whilst they have 
been much less pronounced in the NHS. 
The two sectors under scrutiny have been impacted differently by budgetary reductions 
as well: local authorities has been particularly hard hit „bearing a disproportionate 
proportion of expenditure reductions as compared to higher priority services as the 
NHS. The Treasury in the 2010 spending review indicated that central government 
funding to local government would fall by around 27% between 2010-11 and 2014-15 
in real terms from £29.7bn to £22.1bn. Importantly there reductions were “front-loaded” 
with the steepest reductions during the period 2011-2013. Additional expenditure 
reductions of £445m for 2014-2015 were unveiled in Autumn 2012 supplemented in 
June 2013 with additional expenditure cuts for 2015-2016, comprising a total reduction 
in central government grant of in excess of 30%‟ (Bach and Stroleny 2014: 348). 
By contrast, healthcare sector not only remained relatively sheltered in real terms, but 
experienced unprecedented increases in funding prior to 2010 (Bach and Stroleny 
2012). 
 
 
5.3 The case of the English local authority 
 
The English local authority under scrutiny, selected according the criteria listed in the 
methodological chapter has a population of about 307,000 residents and it is located in 
the South-East area of England closed to London. The council has been historically 
ruled by the Labour party until 1978, when a radical shift occurred and Conservative-led 
majority took the power and remained in office continually until nowadays. In 1978 
indeed the Conservative party was elected for the first time in the local government on a 
mandate to reduce the poll tax ˗ a tax of portioned fixed amount applied to an individual 
in accordance with the census (property rates) ˗ which reached very high rates in the 
local government compared to the average rate across English municipalities as reported 
by the leader of Labour party in office at that time (Interview 31). 
Street cleaning has been the trailblazer service outsourced in 1980, which has been 
followed immediately after in 1982 by waste collection, whose externalization process 
stemmed from diverse intertwined pressures. The leader of the Labour group in the 
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council, elected the very first time in 1971 and in office as councillor until nowadays, 
clearly retraced the sequence of events that he experienced in first person:  
 
Tories took control in 1978 and they fallen into contracting out slightly by accident 
with refuse collection service for three main reasons: the first is that it happened in the 
municipality that workers collecting refuse on Christmas day asked for tips to 
residents and the Tories found it offensive for their constituency and frightening for 
people having workers knocking at their doors on Christmas day. A second reason was 
that it was expensive and frankly we haven't operated very well and there were some 
auditors reports saying that the cost of refuse collection in our council was over the 
average in all the municipalities. And the third one was that there were no workers at 
all from the minorities and they accused us to not have recruited the staff through open 
competition. So the Tories decided to tackle on these issues by privatizing. (Interview 
31)  
 
Hence the council embarked upon contracting out policies before at national level Mrs 
Thatcher government introduced the CCT legislation, making market testing 
compulsory for a wide range of blue-collar activities in 1988. As said, the search for 
economic savings and enhancing value for money drove outsourcing in the very early 
days: as explained by a Conservative councillor  
 
rubbish collection and street sweeping were the first areas outsourced in which the 
councils said: somebody else can do it better!. So the decision was taken to market test 
whether somebody could do us a better job at a cheaper price and with better 
responses for residents. (Interview 43) 
 
Between 1982 and 1985 further manual activities have been then outsourced, including 
parks and public gardens maintenance; vehicles maintenance; part of council housing 
estate maintenance; sports and leisure centres management. As commented a Labour 
councillor in office at that time:  
 
having broken the ice Tories councillors were keen to reduce more and more council 
tax, so started looking for more and more savings: the blue-collar area it‟s where they 
went for because it was easier to go there to test the market (Interview 31) 
 
Despite an evident enthusiasm towards market-type tools that in general the 
Conservative councils displayed ˗ in the wake also of national policies and ideology 
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promoted from Mrs Thatcher ˗, the Conservative council under investigation backed its 
own political stance by a more pragmatic approach towards marketization as the 
director of finance wanted to pinpoint:  
 
therefore the difference between our approach and a number of other councils and the 
central government is that we are not dogmatic about whether something is provided 
in-house or whether it is provided by the private sector. It‟s a question of what gives 
you the best value, or the best price against certain specifications: that‟ s the principle 
we have. Indeed we have got a number of services which are within the council that in 
some Labour-controlled councils are just outsourced. We kept them in-house because 
we can manage those services cheaper and better than the private sector. So that‟s the 
basic ethos we use in the local authority, it‟s not a question that everything has to go 
out or everything has to go in, if it can be done better in-house we keep it in-house, if 
it can be done better in the private sector it goes outside. Or we have some services 
which have gone out and came back. So our ideology is that we test the market, is not 
that we outsource. (Interview 34) 
 
Such pragmatism is mirrored by the decision to keep in-house for instance an 
operational service team of about 200 manual workers with different skills required to 
perform a wide range of technical activities in the municipality, ranging from building 
maintenance to vehicle maintenance, roads repairing and transport of the elderly. Such 
internal staff indeed provide quick and flexible response above all in case of urgency. 
Also in the case of council housing estate management the municipality adopted a 
pragmatic approach: given the complexity of the service ˗ consisting of a weekly 
appraisal of residents entitled to get rent benefits, collection of rents, maintenance of the 
properties ˗ the whole council property was split up into 50 small contracts and initially 
only a quarter was put out to tender to test the market for such kind of services. Given 
the limited success of the external contractors the local authority opted for keeping all 
the remaining contracts in-house where value-for-money was greater as commented by 
a Conservative councillor:  
 
at the end of the day we are buying a service, it doesn‟t matter where we are buying 
from. We only need to know that we are buying from the best provider. (Interview 43)  
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A sort of second wave of marketization of public services occurred during the 1990s 
involving white-collar and professional activities: the great part of legal services have 
been outsourced at the end of the 1990s except for a small team of internal lawyers; IT 
department was fully outsourced except for two contract managers and few IT advisors. 
Payroll service for municipal personnel and council tax collection went out for the first 
tender round but they came back in-house once the contract expired: the council indeed 
was unsatisfied with the quality of the services externally provided. Despite some 
contracts failure, in particular in white-collar service area, the council kept an 
enthusiastic stance towards marketization, deemed to be in any case the best tool to 
pinpoint the best provider as explained by the leader of the council:  
 
the advantages of all this both blue-collar and white-collar privatisation is that it first 
gives you the chance to evaluate what you need to do, to reassess the service each 
time: what exactly do we need to do? How much more do we need to do?. Second it 
gives you the insurance to get in a price that is the lowest but the best and gives you 
the insurance that if anything goes wrong you can start again, outside or in-house. 
(Interview 43) 
 
In the area of social and welfare services instead there has been a huge internal 
discussion concerning marketization between the council on the one side and the senior 
officers in social services department. The former indeed strongly pushed to outsource 
social services on the basis of economic evaluation as reported by the chief executive in 
office at that time:  
 
there was a lot of pressure from the council to outsource social services because they 
took the figures and said: look! Our homecare is costing £15 per hour and in the 
private sector is £10 per hour, lots of saving! But we replied that it was not so easy! 
For sure there was a 30% difference in hourly cost but the director of social services 
took a different stance and we had to justify this position‟ (Interview 32)  
 
Senior officers in social service department instead were reluctant towards externalizing 
such sensitive area of public services, deeming social workers as a core team within the 
local authority and social services as a strict public responsibility to perform directly in-
house: the director of department moreover was especially sensitive on the issue, stance 
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backed up also by a quality argument as reported by the chief executive involved at that 
time in the discussion:  
 
we did a survey on patients satisfaction and in-house and private care providers were 
quite close but the in-house team was however on top. So that‟s why we have never 
done a plan to fully outsource social services. It‟s a very sensitive area here, we have a 
very large home care and very high quality workforce. (Interview 32) 
 
The council ended up testing the market for a limited number of social services: home 
care is almost fully provided in-house (including rehabilitation services) as well as 
residential home services while day care has been put out to tender after a thorny 
incident occurred in the municipality as told by the chief executive at that time:  
 
as chief executive I received a lot of complaints on my desks about abuses occurred in 
our children homes so the director of social services was very keen to put out the 
services under reputable charities and voluntary sector and at least we weren‟t taking 
the risk anymore, it was someone else problem. In that specific case the director of 
social services had a very sensitive approach: he took very specialist groups where 
there were good providers in the volunteering sector and there weren‟t big savings, 
only at the margins, but the quality of services was guaranteed. (Interview 32) 
 
Day care services mainly provides adult and youth care to people with physical and 
mental disabilities, as well as youth care to children with learning disabilities provided 
by third sector organisations. 
In both manual activities and professional services outsourcing processes, the council 
has always included the internal bid through as a sort of benchmark to assess external 
bids form private providers:  
 
there is always a council own bid and you would measure the external bids against the 
internal bid. So that‟s how we could say we are getting an objective value for money 
in the service: we know how much it would cost so we measure the others bids against 
that. (Interview 43) 
  
The local authority finally embarked upon a sort of third wave of market testing since 
2012 for a new area of services, driven once again by a double rationale: a strong belief 
in market self-regulation back by the search for new source of savings in the aftermath 
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of the financial crisis and subject to increasingly stricter budget constraints from central 
government. In 2012 libraries management went out to tender, while at the end of 2013 
market testing was on-going for environmental health services and planning activities. 
Moreover the council opted for sharing pension scheme management with two other 
local authorities as a means to rationalize human and economic resources and realize 
economies of scale though a shared management. 
To sum up, the English local authority under investigation underwent a wide process of 
marketization of public services ˗ both in blue-collar and white-collar areas ˗ driven by a 
strong enthusiasm in NPM ideology that spread in the UK since the 1980s, in the wake 
of Thatcherism. Such ideological stance, featuring the council since 1978 when the 
Conservative group took ad maintained the majority until nowadays, has been however 
backed up by the search for increasing savings as part of the political agenda to reduce 
council tax during the 1980s and the 1990s, while more recently by budget constraints 
set up at national level within a package of austerity measure targeting municipalities‟ 
expenditure. A statement from the current chief executive recapped the council stance:  
 
so there is a continuity in council belief, that is our central belief, that only through 
market testing you can establish the correct value of the services, that is impossible to 
do otherwise, it‟s impossible to establish efficiency unless you compare. And it is 
important to note that the council does not oppose in-house provision, it‟s an 
important point about which people often get wrong about the council, they assume 
that the council is opposed to directly provide the services but this is not the case. In 
fact the council always said: whenever a service goes out in the market it always 
requires the existing managers in the council to put in an in-house bid as a benchmark 
against the private sector. And then the council simply goes wherever the best price is: 
now, it‟s often in the private sector, it can be internally. And the council still 
supervises some in-house services: so it‟s not an antipathy to in-house services, rather 
is a belief that competitive process it‟s the way in which value for money and the best 
services for the residents can be achieved (Interview 42) 
 
 
5.3.1 Impacts on terms and conditions of employment 
When the local authority under investigation embarked upon competitive tendering for 
street cleaning and refuse collection in the early 1980s adopted a sort of “non-
redundancy pattern” (Interview 34): indeed it asked to all bidders to consider taking on 
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the internal workers for their own workforce, while for those not offered work by the 
contractor were offered generous early retirement or severance terms, or again, to be 
redeployed within the municipality. The local government indeed consulted all 
workforce involved in order to allocate those workers who accepted to be transfer to the 
new private employer and to negotiate alternative allocation for those who firmly 
opposed the transfer. As reported by the chief executive in office at that time:  
 
we provided pretty generous redundancy packages. We had a statutory minimum from 
national scale but we paid double the national levels, it was quite a generous scheme. 
Initially I think we paid even more, two and half time the national scale and that was 
the way we made it a little bit easier for them and we thought: “ok it‟s tough, you have 
to go but with good severance terms at least”. (Interview 32)  
 
However this examples of soft touch represent unique cases: all the following tender 
contracts have been characterized by a relevant proportion of internal staff made 
redundant as reported by the director of finance:  
 
after 1983 the “non-redundancy agreement” went and staff was made redundant. So 
back in the 1980s we had fairly significant redundancies before TUPE applied. 
(Interview 34)  
 
Several redundancies have been indeed reported in parks and green areas maintenance 
services, council buildings maintenance, sport and leisure centres management which 
have been contracted out during the 1980s, before the introduction of the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) legislation in 1993. In addition severance 
terms got increasingly less attractive, rapidly equalling the minimum national standard 
(Interview 32). 
White collar public employees involved in externalization processes starting from the 
1990s conversely enjoyed employment protection right guaranteed by TUPE regulation: 
in IT services, payroll service, legal activities, libraries almost all the workforce has 
been instead transferred to private subcontractors, with the exception of few 
professionals that the council deliberately decided to keep internal as few lawyers, 
advisors and contract managers despite the services went out. 
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The implementation of TUPE legislation at all effect represented a watershed for terms 
and conditions of employment in the English scenario of marketization and 
privatization: the erosion of working condition and contractual provision for transferred 
workers during the 1980s was facilitated by the way in which the EU 1977 Acquired 
Rights directive was transposed into law in Britain. The 1981 Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) regulation indeed excluded the public sector for the first 12 
years of its operation, until the judgment in a major court case reversed this presumption 
in 1993 (Winchester and Bach 1999). What followed in the council indeed was a 
deterioration of terms and conditions of employment for all workers transferred to 
private companies before 1993: manual workers in particular have been hardly hit, as 
commented the chief executive in office at that time  
 
before TUPE it was very tough for workforce. A lot of these savings came about 
because obviously terms and conditions were much tighter: productivity may be a 
reason, but a lot were from lower terms and conditions in the blue-collar services. 
(Interview 32) 
 
What unions reported was a quick deterioration of terms and conditions of employment: 
in the case of refuse collection for instance a union official from Unite described as  
 
paying conditions were lowered and flexible work is a huge thing in private 
companies; the contract shifts from five to seven days in which instead of working 
five days from Monday to Friday you work over the whole week with no announces; 
and overtime is paid a flat rate. (Interview 45) 
 
Likewise the transfer to the private subcontractor negatively impacted on working 
conditions for gardeners carrying out parks and gardens maintenance: as a trade union 
official from GMB argued 
 
the system of management tended to be much stronger, much less sympathetic and a 
lot of people just left. I mean if you are used to a particular kind of work as gardener 
and you used to work in a particular garden or open space and then you are made part 
of a mobile unit, and you find yourself covering five or six parks all days travelling 
and so on and the travel time turned out not to be paid. So it is much tougher if you 
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have to report to different gardens and different places, it becomes a much more 
unpleasant and uncongenial job, so you leave. (Interview 26)  
 
A higher flexibility in working places associated to increasing workload and longer 
working hours since the travel time was excluded from the computation of daily 
working time ˗ hence even not paid ˗ triggered a gradual growth in turnover among 
gardeners in the local authority. 
The overall picture remarkably changed since 1993 for both transferred workers and the 
council when TUPE regulation was formally applied to English public sector as well. If 
the former got their terms and conditions finally protected at the point of transfer, for 
the latter  
 
some of those big savings we had at the beginning in blue collar services are very 
difficult now because of TUPE, which has greatly constraint the saving that can be 
achieved. It hasn‟t eliminated them, but it definitely reduce them because of course 
previously it was possible for subcontractors to decide to pay staff different rates, 
maybe lower rates. TUPE protects at the point of transfer, so there wasn‟t big savings 
on the wages. So that has had an impact. (Interview 42) 
 
It followed that the whole personnel employed in libraries, IT department and legal 
services moved to the private contractors at the same terms and conditions; likewise 
professionals involved in payroll and council tax collection services transferred out at 
the same contractual arrangements and when the services came back in-house they 
moved back as well with the same contract. 
More recently, the externalization of the 10 libraries employing 160 municipal 
employees led to the transfer of the whole staffing level to the new cooperative taking 
over the service, however maintain the same terms and conditions of employment.  
The most common complaints that workers reported in this phase after TUPE was 
applied dealt mainly with insecurity of work, more than the insecurity of paying 
conditions as reported by a union official from GMB:  
 
just to use one word: the jobs are more uncomfortable, there was greater 
inconvenience for the worker, less security in term of what he or she would be 
expected to do. (Interview 26)  
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If the legislation safeguarded working conditions, the frequent re-tendering process of 
services when contract expired triggered a raising feeling of uncertainty concerning 
employment among transferred workers as reported by the chief executive:  
 
of course if you move to the contractor that wins a contract for five years, anything 
might happen over the five years so there was a huge uncertainty for the staff and even 
after TUPE. (Interview 32) 
 
Despite safeguards to terms and conditions of employment guaranteed by TUPE, 
private providers leverage on the organisation of work as a means to raise productivity 
from the workforce: it followed an higher flexibility in working hours and higher 
mobility as reported by a union official from GMB  
 
there has been a much greater incidence in part time work. The part time working is 
very often connected with flexibility of hours, flexibility of hours determined by the 
employer. So many of the workers had their hours changed. The most important 
changes were: changes in the methods of work, much greater mobility, much greater 
flexibility of hours, much greater incidence in weekend working, much greater 
incidence in evening working. So the basic pay would tend to stay the same but the 
condition of service would change very rapidly. Also much greater flexibility of work. 
(Interview 26) 
 
Nevertheless the main issue for transferred staff after TUPE application was represented 
by pensions. Pension scheme entitlement indeed was excluded from TUPE protections: 
as explained by a shop steward from UNISON: 
 
one of the loopholes of TUPE was that it didn‟t protect pensions and that was the big 
saving after TUPE because pension scheme is very expensive in the council, is about 
the 19% of salary and if TUPE didn‟t protect this, it was a way big savings could be 
made by external providers because TUPE protected only job conditions. (Interview 
33)  
 
This has meant that most of the workforce did not have their pension scheme covered, 
since contractors to which they were transferred drastically reduced the amount of 
contributions they pay, as agreed in contracts. Such detrimental implication largely 
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affected manual workers transferred during the 1980s and in part white-collar 
employees as well.  
The severity of issue in English local authorities overall required the legislative 
intervention from central government which committed itself to ensure pensions 
protection. In June 1999 the HM Treasury issued the Statement of Practice on Staff 
Transfer from Central Government “A Fair Deal for Staff pensions”. It sets out a 
framework to be followed in case of staff transfer from the public sector to a contractor: 
„the new employer offers transferring staff membership of a pension scheme which 
though not identical is broadly comparable to the public service pension scheme which 
they are leaving. […] A broadly comparable scheme will be one which satisfies the 
condition that there are no identifiable employees who will suffer material detriment 
overall in terms of their future accrual of pension benefits under the alternative scheme‟ 
(A Fair Deal for Staff pensions 1999). This policy constrained private contractors taking 
over the service and the staff to offer comparable pension provisions to transferring 
workers but turned out to be rather ineffective in the local authority under scrutiny since 
most of the personnel was already gone prior to 1999. Furthermore the Fair Deal 
framework did not apply in case of staff transfer from a private provider to another 
when contracts were re-tendered, as often occurred in the municipality mostly in blue 
collar services like refuse collection and street cleaning. It followed that all these 
employees had their pension contribution already paid by the council up to the point of 
transfer frozen, and after they receive lower contribution in the private sector schemes. 
In 2013 The HM Treasury revised the Fair Deal for Staff Pensions policy, establishing 
that staff who are members of a public service pension scheme but compulsorily 
transferred out of the public sector will remain eligible to be members of their public 
pensions scheme. As recapped by the chief executive:  
 
what came out was a general requirement: when you put a service out to tender not 
only TUPE applies but also you have to provide comparable pension provision to the 
one in public sector. So either the provider has to allow you to enter the council 
pension scheme and the council has to agree to that or you have to offer a comparable 
pension scheme which is very expensive, it is a financial risk but it was compulsory 
that the contractors have to offer something to the transferred staff, a comparable 
provision. (Interview 32)  
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As explained by the chief executive: 
 
we have some private providers in our pension scheme. Now if a service transfers the 
staff have access to the pension scheme, but we can decide whether they are admitting 
body: in the past the council were very nervous about allowing other bodies to access 
the council pension scheme. (Interview 42)  
 
The council accepted as „admitting bodies‟ only companies who took over as public 
service providers after 2008 denying the entry to the rest of workforce transferred 
before: substantially only library workers kept their council pension scheme. In other 
cases, for instance in day care services „charities offered a pretty good pension scheme 
or they belong to a good umbrella pension scheme that they can join‟ (Interview 32). 
Beyond the detrimental consequences on terms and conditions of employment abode 
elucidated, the marketization of public services triggered the creation of a two-tier 
workforce. TUPE legislation indeed did not apply to new staff hired by private 
subcontractors which as a consequence started recruiting at lower terms and conditions: 
 
companies know that there is TUPE for transferred staff, but if they hire new staff, 
they may hire on a new, very different basis. They can easily move from our staff 
model to another staff model. (Interview 42) 
 
The creation of a two-tier workforce was particularly evident in social services ˗ part of 
home care which was outsourced, some residential homes and the day care. Indeed if 
the municipal social workers were all transferred under TUPE protections, as reported 
by a trade union official from UNISON specialized on social services area, newly 
recruited staff experienced  
 
a huge deterioration on terms and conditions: you have pension schemes cut off, 0-
hours contract, non-compliance even with the minimum wage in home care. Pension is 
non-existent in private social care, turnover is very high, something like 30% a year. 
Those who come from the council they got regular hours, pension schemes, training 
but the new staff moved towards a total casualization of that work. (Interview 44)  
 
In home care specifically there was a gap of 30% in pay rate between transferred 
employees and newly recruited social workers: the local authority indeed paid for the 
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former £15 per hours whilst only £10 for the latter. In addition private providers new 
personnel, by contact, had the travel time between patients not paid as witnessed by a 
union official:  
 
they have 0-hours contracts, people are paid less than the minimum wage or people 
are paid illegally. Furthermore people are not being paid for travel time between jobs, 
so people have to work for 15 minutes to provide care to elderly or vulnerable person, 
they get 15 minutes of work paid and then they have to be somewhere else, half an 
hour away and they get another 15 minutes of work paid. They should be paid the 
travelling time between the two places. (Interview 36) 
 
In 2004 the Labour-led central government reached an agreement with trade union, the 
so-called Warwick agreement, which led to safeguards relating to the two-tier 
workforce. According to the “Two-tier Code” contained into the agreement indeed new 
staff recruited by a private provider to work on a public sector service contract 
alongside staff transferred from the public authority should be offered employment on 
fair and reasonable terms and conditions that overall should be no less favourable than 
those of transferred employees.  
The shop steward from UNISON active in the council referred as the Code represented 
a useful legislative tool to leverage in case of private employers‟ non-fulfilment but that 
has never been actually exploited in the municipality under scrutiny. Moreover at the 
end of 2010 the Conservative-led coalition government withdrew the Code stating that 
„its rationale for abolition was that the Code prevented small and medium size firms 
bidding for public service contracts because they could not afford to adhere to the two-
tier code‟ (Bach 2011: 13). 
The increasing competition triggered by outsourcing policies within the local authority 
led the council to put increasing pressure on internal staff as well. In the case of 
operational service team of internal manual workers unions and the council after a four-
month negotiation reached the “Memorandum agreement” which corresponded 
basically to their individual employment contract annually renegotiated. The agreement, 
in majority voted by workers, set up no job evaluation, no incremental progression, 
lower sick pay and great flexibility in working hours on annual basis instead on weekly 
basis as explained by the leader of the council:  
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we negotiate annual contracts, so instead of working 40 hours a week only, we agree 
to work so many hundreds hours a year and then the managers would be able to 
allocate them: so in the summer you might work longer and people who throw salt on 
roads work longer hours in winter but then they would work shorter hours in summer. 
So instead of paying overtime in the summer and fixed money in the winter, we now 
equalize. And somehow unions have accepted that because the choice was that if you 
don‟t someone will lose the job. (Interview 43)  
 
Thus internal workforce, in return for continuity in public employment experienced 
increasingly lower contractual conditions and higher flexibility. 
Moreover the council decided to opted out sick pay scheme for municipal employees 
from the Green Book national agreement as a means to reduce public expenditure. For 
stall recruited after 2000 a different sick pay scheme is applied, overall more convenient 
for the council and less for the personnel as explained the director of finance:  
 
the council pays some legal paybacks which means that if you are off sick over a 
certain amount of time and particularly it‟s for long occasional period of sickness then 
the council can require to member staff to either work additional hours for no pay or to 
pay the council the money they give you as payback. Then since 2010 there is a new 
set of terms and conditions which came in which says: for the first 3 days of sick, on 
the first day we only pay 80%, and on the second and third day we don‟t pay any sick 
pay a part from statutory sick pay. The idea is that the council incurs less costs. 
(Interview 34) 
 
To conclude, what is peculiar in the English municipality is the fact that competitive 
tendering policies, associated with growing financial pressures from the central 
government in the form of austerity measures and budget cuts, led the council to 
exacerbate working conditions for internal personnel as well, as a means to reduce 
labour costs. Indeed when the council run out of the leeway to contain municipal budget 
through outsourcing and staff transfer, eroding terms and conditions of in-house staff 
represented the remaining workable path. 
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5.3.2 Impacts on employment relations structure and union strategy 
Despite the strong opposition of the Labour group in the council, the Conservative 
majority, once won local election in 1978, decided to test the market for the provision of 
street cleaning and refuse collection services. The initiative attracted a vehement 
opposition of the Labour group, which fought against outsourcing both at political level 
within the Council and campaigning, exposing in public their claim in favour of in-
house provision of public services, publishing papers to hand out also outside the 
council and participating to demonstrations. Such political opposition was backed up by 
a harsh industrial response from unions in the municipality which organized a one week 
strike where mainly manual workers took part, directly targeted by outsourcing policies 
in the early days and „going door by door saying why privatization is bad‟ (Interview 
33), organizing information and awareness campaigns among their members as reported 
by a shop steward from UNISON in first person involved in the initiatives. Despite a 
systematic opposition to marketization of public services, the council adopted a hard 
stance keeping on externalizing a wider range of services, driven by a clear-cut policy 
orientation well explained by the leader of the council:  
 
on our side in Conservative party there is a broad acceptance that market gives us the 
right answer but at the same time there are number of us who say: remember! Our job 
is to provide service to our people, that means that you should be free to buy them 
wherever you like. So market might give you the price but we are very very flexible 
and pragmatic about who do we buy from. The Labour group‟s view would be 
generally, or at least that‟s the way I understand it to be, they think that the council 
should be the provider, and that the council‟s job is to check that the internal staff is 
providing services effectively and in good value. Our view instead is that even the 
workforce has a market price and the contractor would pay the market price to get the 
right quality and the right number of workers. It‟s their business to hire the right 
quantity and the right quality of staff, he knows best what he needs, how much he 
needs to pay them, not our job to tell them what you should do. The other criticism put 
forward by the Labour councillors is that we are running this as a business, we are not 
concerning about providing employment for local people, we are not concerning about 
shaping what they should have or could have. And I think this is completely 
meaningless because is not local government‟s job to create jobs, it‟s our job to 
provide the service. We don‟t run the town hall for town hall staff, we run it for people 
living in the area. These are the basic differences between the two parties: Labour 
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think that we have duties about staff welfare, staff numbers, employment opportunities 
for local people. (Interview 43)  
 
Such diametrically opposed stances between parties persisted over time, getting 
increasingly harsh. The chief executive in office at that time noted that  
 
Labour leader hardly fought the Tories. He was such a brilliant leader of the 
opposition group. They were always very vigilant in finding the problems and expose 
them in public. You can never give away with anything with those councillors. It is 
wonderful to have such an active opposition, so effective. We were lucky here because 
you always have to do everything properly, contractors couldn‟t give away with poor 
results because it was shown. (Interview 32)  
 
In the early days in addition the council recognized several unions who actively 
organized and campaigned against outsourcing, particularly against the transfer of 
workforce out of the local government. Nevertheless all these actions turned out to be 
almost ineffective as dramatically admitted by shop steward from UNISON since:  
 
if you campaigned against privatization and then your members ended up in the 
private sector, it‟s your failure. (Interview 33) 
 
The gradual but persistent marketization process in the local authority, with detrimental 
consequences for terms and conditions of employment particularly before the 
implementation of TUPE legislation protections, triggered an unavoidable shift in union 
strategies and stance as well. 
Indeed the relation between trade unions and the council  
 
it was much more confrontational in the early days but later on it became a very 
reasonable discussion about things. In the early days they were very hostile people, 
unions opposed things vigorously in the 1980s, they fought for their members, but 
then they become more manageable under TUPE in the 1990s, after the Labour 
government, but there are still bitter arguments about outsourcing and negotiations: 
they try to get the best deal for their members. (Interview 32) 
 
One of the reason lies in the fact that 30 years of Conservative control and of 
continuous market testing weakened enormously trade unions‟ power, 
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lowering union membership, lowering our credibility, lowering our negotiating role. 
And the trade unions all together haven‟t been able to provide either an organizational 
or a political response. There are different models in union to survive legal, political, 
industrial ˗ but I don‟t know which is the right one. (Interview 33) 
 
On the other side the protections guaranteed by TUPE regulation softened the pressures 
towards trade unions role, buffering detrimental impact of outsourcing policies over 
union members‟ terms and conditions of employment. 
Overall union‟s capacity to organise and collectively represent workers in the local 
authority has been harshly undermined by outsourcing processes which fragmented 
social partner on the employer side, with whom unions have to deal with, as explained 
by a shop steward from UNISON: 
 
the problem for the union in public sector is that we normally have one union branch 
and one employer, in this specific case the UNISON branch I belong to and the local 
authority. Now the situation in the council is one UNISON branch and 20 employers. 
We have that problem since 1980 and we haven‟t solved it yet, and it‟s getting even 
worst (Interview 33) 
 
Moreover, the council itself along the decades harshened its approach towards unions. 
Firstly in 1992 it opted out the Green book clause regarding the monthly deduction of 
contribution for union membership from the salary: substantially it refused to collect 
contribution for internal personnel‟s union membership as a means to perplex union 
capacity to maintain and recruit members. Moreover as explained by a shop steward 
from UNISON: 
 
they stopped deduct from contribution our subscription fee for union membership and 
the political reason was that we devolved a lot of money every year to a local trade 
union council which was politically campaigning against privatization of services in 
the area. (Interview 33) 
 
Secondly the council cut off facility time for union activities and at the end of 2013 
when I went to the town hall to carry out fieldwork for the case study analysis the 
council was physically dismantling the office originally designated for shop stewards 
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and union activities. Thirdly, as reported again by the shop steward who experienced in 
first person all these changes  
 
they made very difficult for trade union to organise in the council with low facility 
time and no collection of subscription. Moreover they put a clause in the council 
individual contract initially saying that workers have the right to join a union, but then 
they changed the words writing in individual contract the clause: you may or may not 
join a union. (Interview 33)  
 
Council approach towards unions was clearly adversarial, mirroring the ideological 
campaigned carried out at national level to weaken union role and encouraging public 
authorities in doing the same. As a consequence union membership declined, not only 
because of market pressures but certainly they played an important role, as well as the 
number of shop stewards actively involved in the municipality declined from 5-6 
workers in the 1980s and the 1990s to only one during the last decade. The leader of the 
council from Conservative group commented these dynamics in the following way:  
 
Labour councillors say that we have killed unions off because we have now very very 
small manual labour force and the unions in the manual workforce were the strongest. 
Therefore they are not particularly powerful here. And Labour councillors have 
accepted that they have lost. So they accepted they have lost and we‟re moving on. I 
think that they‟ve also accepted that there is not intellectual coherence in saying that 
“public services have to be provided directly by public bodies”. I think that they have 
lost their arguments and we are moving on. So politically that is a looser argument 
because people know that it works. (Interview 43) 
 
Furthermore an acrimonious incident occurred when the council was discussing the 
externalization of manual activities. As above reported an operational service team was 
kept in-house instead of being transferred, as happened to all the rest of technical 
workforce, and the council agreed the Memorandum agreement containing contractual 
provisions for this group of workers. The agreements contained less convenient 
arrangements for workers compared to terms and conditions applied to the rest of public 
personnel and workers involved have been required to vote the application of such 
contract. The shop steward directly involved in the process recalled that: 
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most of workers in manual tasks are union members and they reported us that when 
they had to vote for the agreement they have been blackmailed by the council which 
said: if you don‟t vote we go for the private sector. Someone voted for someone 
against but the majority was in favour. It created a lot of acrimony between the unions 
and the council, between unions and between unions and union members. But they 
were workers poorly paid, a good proportion from minority so they accepted the 
agreement. (Interview 33) 
 
Unions recognized by the municipality are generally consulted when policies 
implementation has direct staff implications but as described by the chief executive in 
office during the last three decades when outsourcing occurred: 
 
we have to consult them and they have to right to give their views, they have the right 
to see papers two weeks before they go to the commission of the council, any 
objection has to be heard. We have a procedure we have to go through but at the end 
of the day they have just been listened to: if they got a point it wasn‟t impossible for 
them to get something achieved but basically most of the thing are done when we 
consult them, it‟s more an informal discussion on small things. (Interview 32)  
 
Hence union consultation turned out to be more a legislative fulfilment „to avoid to 
became vulnerable to legal challenge‟ (Interview 42) rather than an effective 
negotiations between social partners: „we don‟t really feel consulted‟ (Interview 33). 
Trade union operating within the Council however tried to maintain a strong bargaining 
position, facing steadfast resistance among private contractors, which accepted to sign 
framework agreements only to a limited extent. There are a few cases involving blue 
collar staff employed in big national companies. Furthermore they had to cope with the 
lack of information about pay and terms and conditions offered by private contractors, 
since they were very much reluctant in sharing their pay systems, and as reported by a 
union official from UNISON:  
 
there‟s no doubt about the fact that increasing fragmentation make more difficult for 
us to organise within the public sector. We have to build new relationships with new 
employees and that could change every five years if someone else wins the contracts 
with which we don‟t have a relationship and we have to start again. (Interview 36) 
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An additional challenge raised by the outsourcing is the fact that trade unions have to 
deal with a multi-level complex and intertwined relationship as described by a union 
official from his own experience in the local authority:  
 
the difficulty in the public sector is that you are dealing with a 3-4 level relationship. 
Public sector employment is driven by central government and the relationship with 
central government is adversarial. We can‟t pretend that we like what the current 
coalition government is doing; and neither what the previous Labour government did 
or even less what Mrs Thatched has done. On the other hand if you move down to the 
intermediate level you would talk about a sort of strategic overview: you can see more 
informal relationship and slightly better. And at local level it very much depends upon 
what happened in the past, what relationship has been in place in the past. The answer 
is not easy therefore the main driver is the central government with its policies of 
privatization and outsourcing and the relation with central government is bad. 
(Interview 35) 
 
As admitted by a union official from GMB, it took a long time to work out a reasonable 
response (Interview 26) but overall, unions based their strategy towards outsourcing 
policies on a twin-track approach. At national level union action is focused on opposing 
the marketization of public services, that is always backed up by a pragmatic response 
at local/workplace/plant level as a means to try to organize and maintain recognition of 
collective bargaining both in public authorities and in private subcontractors (Interview 
41). Nevertheless „neither strategies have been entirely successful. The danger is that we 
oppose the transfer, we support workers during transfer and then we walk away‟ 
(Interview 41): beyond a political opposition and a more industrial strategy to maintain 
collective representation at workplace, union overall tried to undertake an effective 
dynamic of internal both organizational and strategic renewal. An official from Trade 
Union Confederation (TUC) explained such kind of renewing process they are 
encouraging among their affiliated unions:  
 
the traditional approach ˗ ineffective and obsolete ˗ adopted by union branches is to try 
to keep that sort of union recognition agreement, the model agreement they use with 
the local authority and take it to the new private employer saying: “we have this”. The 
employers were resistant to have that kind of level of recognition and the workforce 
was less and less engaged with the union. So what they now are trying to do is not to 
approach new local authorities with a kind of model of recognition agreement but all 
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they have now is one demand for employers that is: “Can we talk to your workforce, 
can we come in, can we have access to your workforce?” and what they then do is to 
talk to workforce saying: “we are here, we can represent you, you need 
representation” and trying to get the membership in that way, trying to get recognition 
to the bottom-up and they found that more successful, because if they go to the 
employer and one ask “can we access to your workforce?” is less aggressive. And 
what also they try to do is to talk to that group of workers in the new workplace as 
employees of this new workplace, you know what do I mean? It is a bit of cultural 
shift to say you‟re now a new group, you‟re not the old group of workers who have 
been transferred, you are a new group of workers and we are trying to approach you 
like that. I mean that‟s one strategy employed by one union but I think is quite telling 
in this kind of paradigm shift (Interview 41) 
 
Unions responses have been backed up some legislative tool they could leverage to 
protect terms and conditions of employment during the externalization of public 
services followed by personnel transfer across organizational boundaries. Alongside the 
Two-tier Code agreed quite lately in 2004 ˗ after already two decades of continuous 
marketization ˗ and withdrew only 6 years later and the Fair Deal for Staff Pension 
(introduce in 1999 and recast in 2013) the most important role has been historically 
played by TUPE regulation. TUPE legislation remarkably contributed in safeguarding 
terms and conditions of employment during transfer, especially for manual workers:  
 
the conclusion I came about TUPE is that if you have a strong position into the labour 
market as an IT professional or a planner you‟ve got a particular expertise where there 
is demand, TUPE is well. But if you are an home care worker on the minimum wage 
position or a gardener than TUPE becomes a lot more important with the legal 
protection that you can get (Interview 33) 
 
Nevertheless the role TUPE regulation played raised a quite controversial debate among 
unions. One of the weaknesses of a legislative provision structured in such way is that 
its protections encompass a limited category on workers, gradually decreasing, since 
newly recruited staff is now covered, as well as the large majority of workers 
transferred before its actual application also in the English public sector in 1993. 
Moreover it triggered a more ideological and strategic question:  
 
I think there are some people in the unions that don‟t like TUPE because it represents 
a kind of acceptance of outsourcing just because people are protected by TUPE if they 
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go to the private sector. So if the manager decide to outsource they say “ok, no 
worries, they are protected by TUPE. It is not that it reduces the power of union but 
it‟s like an excuse used by managers for outsourcing. They say: if you go to the 
private contractor you‟ll be protected by TUPE, you‟ll maintain your pension scheme, 
you‟ll have the same salary. There still an ongoing discussion about TUPE: maybe it 
would have been better to keep on going on industrial action to stop privatization 
instead of accepting TUPE that applied to the private sector but not to the public 
sector initially. We should have brought central government to court for not 
implementing TUPE to public sector. And also after that there were loopholes in 
TUPE like the pension scheme, the TUPE non-application for economic reasons and 
so on. But in 1990s TUPE implementation was the cost we paid for stopping industrial 
action, political action. (Interview 33) 
 
Overall an official form TUC commented in such dramatic way the scenario in England:  
 
we have been in a defensive battle and we lost it in progressive stages. (Interview 41) 
 
 
5.4 The case of the English NHS foundation trust 
 
The NHS trust under investigation achieved the status of foundation in 2006, employing 
about 11,000 employees. It is located in the South-East area of England and provides 
healthcare services to a population of about 700,000 individuals. 
The discussion around marketization of public services in the English hospital started 
relatively late in the early 1990s in a climate of widespread reluctance as described by 
an officer from NHS Employers:  
 
there is a sort of different view on outsourcing in health sector. One of them was 
about: should the hospital be running something that is not equipped to do? So why 
should a hospital run a cleaning service? Its business is healthcare, not cleaning. Why 
not let these companies whose business is cleaning running? Similarly catering or 
whatever. The opposing view is: we are a team and we have to deliver healthcare 
together; everybody is important as the other, it doesn‟t matter whether you are the 
surgeon or the cleaner, we will run all this together. (Interview 27)  
 
That was the cultural climate surrounding marketizations of health services in the 
1980s, triggered also by some scandals of hospital acquired infections causing real 
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problems for mostly surgical and elderly patients: public opinion and unions put the 
blame on private subcontractors who were providing cleaning services. 
Nevertheless, driven by the search for some saving in public expenditure, the 
foundation trust embarked upon market testing exactly for cleaning service in 1991. 
This first successful tendering round was followed between 1993 and 1995 by few other 
ancillary activities including catering first, then waste management, laundry service, car 
parking management, porters and building maintenance. Such rapid escalation in 
outsourcing was essentially driven by an economic rationale: the search for greater 
value for money in the provision of support activities to core business of the NHS 
foundation trust. As the director of HR department argued:  
 
we are an healthcare organisation and our core business is healthcare, it‟s not cleaning, 
it‟s not recruitment, it‟s not payroll. (Interview 48) 
 
Moreover the 1990 National Health Service and Community Care Act introducing the 
“internal market” into the supply of health services played an indirect role in pushing 
the health organisation under scrutiny towards a rationalization process both in 
economic and in organisational terms. 
A second wave of outsourcing took place in late 1990s-early 2000s in the wake of the 
same strategy to economize and improve the quality of technical services, as a means to 
focus resources on healthcare services: it involved few white-collar activities like 
bedside facilities – the provision of internet connection and telephone line in each ward 
– and call-centre service which was subcontracted to an external company wholly 
owned by another NHS foundation trust but competing in the market place as any other 
private provider. 
If until the early 2000s marketization interested only the so-called support services, in 
2004 a long waiting list for rehabilitation services raised the necessity for the NHS 
foundation trust to find a further source to complement the insufficient internal supply. 
An Independent Sector Treatment Centre (ISTC) was established, built by the public 
hospital but run by a private operator: rehabilitation services have been in part 
contracted to the ISTC to treat NHS foundation trust patients free at the point of use. 
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The opening of internal market in the provision of clinical services continued in 2010 
when pathology services have been contracted to a joint venture made of the NHS 
foundation trust under investigation, a second foundation trust and the private company 
SERCO ˗ each owning one third of the shares.  
The joint venture was established first of all to boost the provision of pathology services 
under a constantly raising demand from an ageing and numerically growing population 
to which the hospital has to guarantee public care. Secondly, despite the NHS trust has 
not been affected by budget cuts, the competition between public and private health 
providers encouraged at national level associated to greater financial autonomy ˗ and 
subsequently financial risk ˗ since 2006 when the hospital achieved the status of 
foundation pushed the organisation under investigation to seek further source of 
economic revenues. The joint venture indeed was thought to compete I the market place 
in the same way as private providers. As explained by an officer from NHS Employers:  
 
trusts already had to make a lots of cost-efficiencies for other reasons, so we have to 
find a way to provide services differently and maybe to create some economies of 
scale in doing back-office functions or some clinical services in one place rather than 
several. That would require these trusts to cooperate rather than being in competition. 
(Interview 27) 
 
Finally, in 2012 the foundation trust outsourced payroll and recruitment services to the 
private subcontractors CAPITA for the main recurrent reasons as explained by the 
director of HR department:  
 
one was the financial constraints in the organisation and the requirements each year to 
make savings. This organisation is growing and we have been asked to provide the 
same level of service for an expanding organisation with a decreasing team. So I 
wanted to find solutions that would maintain or improve the quality of the services 
which we are delivering and doing it more efficiently. So it wasn't just about saving 
money, although it was one of the imperatives, it was about developing the quality of 
the service. (Interview 48) 
 
Such subcontracting process was rather peculiar since it traced its origin back to a joint 
decision of six different English trusts to test the market for these new services. As 
explained by the director of HR department directly involved in the process:  
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the process we went through was a soft market test to see what was available and then 
we went through a hard market test, the classic procurement process and we ended up 
with one single provider for all those services: CAPITA. They're based in the North of 
England, it's remote. We then want to make this contract agreement available to other 
organisations in the NHS so they don't have to go through all the procurement exercise 
that we 've got to go through. So we set up an agreement that other trusts may join 
without doing all the procurement process we did: other organisations can now 
approach that provider and use our framework agreement if they want to outsource 
payroll and recruitment activities. (Interview 48) 
 
Overall the picture in the English NHS foundation trust seems to be featured by a 
pragmatic approach towards marketization, backed by a certain degree of reluctance 
which somehow reflects the national trend as reported by diverse union officials 
interviewed:  
 
there has been much more reluctance in the NHS just because politically is seen as 
being more risky outsourcing in health and if something goes wrong in the hospital is 
a disaster. I think there is much more political difference between the health sector and 
local government. (Interview 45)  
 
I think that is politically still more sensitive to privatize health services, public opinion 
is more opposed to it, so that's probably the main difference. (Interview 44)  
 
Or again: 
 
the NHS sector has been a little more protected because in this country the NHS is a 
very popular public service, it‟s seen as a kind of sacred by people. So for long time it 
has been said: you shouldn‟t go there with the market. (Interview 36) 
 
  
5.4.1 Impacts on terms and conditions of employment 
On the whole restructuring process towards outsourcing in the NHS foundation trust 
under scrutiny has mildly impacted on terms and conditions of employment, above all 
in comparison to the scenario emerged in the English local authority. The contracting 
out of manual tasks indeed led to the transfer of the whole workforce involved to the 
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new private companies taking over as service providers: some redundancies have been 
reported in cleaning staff but overall the large majority of transferred employees 
maintained the employment. Such smooth process has been facilitated by two 
intertwined reasons as explained by union official involved:  
 
surely the trust board was prone to prevent industrial actions that could have had 
negative repercussions on care services and consequently on patients welfare. So we, 
together with the board of the trust and the private contractors found a kind of 
consensual solution to transfer the larger amount of personnel as possible. It‟s also 
true that such smooth transition has been eased by the application of TUPE regulation 
protections which constrained the companies to take on the workforce. (Interview 47) 
 
When clinical services have been involved instead marketization gave origins to a more 
patchy scenario. In the case of the ISTC providing rehabilitation services, all clinical 
personnel has been kept in-house to keep on carrying out the service internally while the 
privately-managed centre recruited new staff directly in the labour market. Such case 
was rather peculiar since the external provision has been exploited to widen the in-
house supply rather than to replace it. When pathology services have been outsourced to 
the joint venture the whole professional staff was seconded to the newly established 
company. Indeed the Department of Health in response to UNISON campaigning 
during the late 1990s on Private Finance Initiative (PFI) schemes developed the 
Retention of Employment model (RoE), a model that allows public sector employees to 
opt out of the transfer of their employment to a private sector provider under TUPE. 
Under the RoE model staff remain public sector employees and retain all of their terms 
and conditions of employment, with continuity of service preserved for all purposes, but 
it then work for the private sector provider on a secondment basis. 
Finally a third different solution has been applied for staffing level employed in payroll 
and recruitment services within the foundation trust as reported by the director of HR 
department:  
 
we had 25 persons internally in this organisation and we redeployed 20 of them 
internally, so we found them job elsewhere within the trust. The five that we weren't 
able to redeployed were transferred under TUPE to the new provider in the North of 
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England: severance terms were offered them as well for redundancy but all five opted 
for transferring to CAPITA. (Interview 48) 
 
Such smooth transition process is mirrored also by the repercussions that outsourcing 
had on terms and conditions of employment. As in the case of English local authority 
the turning point is represented by the application of TUPE legislation to transfer 
occurring in the public sector, which in this specific case happened just before 
externalization policies started. This has meant an extensive application of employment 
safeguards to the large majority of workers transferred: public sector employment 
conditions, rights and liabilities automatically transferred (Interview 27). This holds 
good for clinical professionals seconded to the joint venture as well providing 
rehabilitation services. 
Moreover in 2004 the Agenda for Change (AfC) agreement, signed by unions, 
employers and government introduced in the NHS a grading and pay system for all 
NHS staff. The purpose was harmonizing pay and career progression all along the 13 
traditionally separate pay groups. It represented a big change for transferred workers as 
well, since „now when they transfer under TUPE they go with Agenda for Change 
conditions‟ (Interview 27). Moreover, it sharply reduces wage differences between men, 
usually highly paid, and women. Agenda for Change also set the maximum number of 
weekly working hours equal to 37.5, constraining all the providers to consider any extra 
hours of work as over-time work. All social partners interviewed agreed on the fact that 
AfC represents a very good deal, a turnaround for workers in the health sector:  
 
it did a lot of work on getting everybody in the same box: it didn‟t matter if you are 
the porter or the gardened, or whether you are the laboratory manager or the senior 
nurse: you got the same terms and conditions. (Interview 27) 
 
Security in terms and conditions of employment has been however accompanied by 
increasing flexibility in working hours and longer shifts above all among manual 
workers: as explained by a trade union official from UNISON involved: 
 
when we talk to our members in cleaning and porter areas who were transferred they 
are satisfied because the salary is broadly comparable with the one in the NHS but 
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they complaint about longer hours during the day and greater flexibility in working 
time. (Interview 57)  
 
Overall an increase in workload has been reported:  
 
usually private subcontractors in case of workers‟ sick leaves or holidays demand 
longer working hours and overtime to the rest of the workforce, often obliged to work 
much longer that the 37.5 hours agreed in the national contract or 6-7 days a week 
instead of the contractually agreed 5 days a week. (Interview 47)  
 
Moreover the feeling of uncertainty linked to the potential change of employer each 
time the contract is re-tendered emerged as a relevant issue among blue-collar workers. 
Nevertheless the most relevant exception to employment protection guaranteed by 
TUPE regulation and AfC agreement is that all pension rights do not transfer. The loss 
of entitlement rights for the NHS pension scheme, quite generous compared to private 
sector pension schemes, constituted the main issue for manual workers subject to 
transfer during the 1990s: the large majority indeed experienced a huge decline in 
pension contributions paid by the private employers which they had to complement by 
further contribution they deposited. 
The introduction of the first Fair Deal for Staff pensions in 1999, constraining the new 
employer offers transferring staff membership a broadly comparable pension scheme to 
the public service pension scheme contributed to fix the problem despite only to a 
limited extent. The vague definition „broad comparable pension scheme‟ indeed 
constituted a loophole that private companies leveraged, above all small one, to 
circumvent legislation and keep on paying lower pension contributions: „it left too wide 
leeway to private subcontractors in the search for earnings‟ (Interview 47). 
The revision in 2013 of the Fair Deal for Staff Pensions represented a great change, 
establishing that staff who are members of a public service pension scheme and who are 
compulsorily transferred out of the public sector will remain eligible to be members of 
their public pensions scheme. As commented by a trade union official:  
 
the New Fair Deal is quite radical, what it does, it allows non-public sector providers, 
charities, other organizations, to apply to be part of the NHS pension scheme, so they 
can offer NHS pension scheme for people who transferred out of the public sector. It‟s 
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quite a radical step. I think that unions think is a very good deal. That was the biggest 
fear, you know, that they got pay terms and conditions protected to the initial transfer 
but their pension is only got to a broadly comparable extent and the argument for the 
trade union was: if you want to recruit, retain and keep those workers when you 
transfer, you have got to think about their pension because a lot of people think about 
pension arrangements, and most small providers can‟t really offer the pension 
schemes, there‟s anything like the NHS. They haven‟t got resources or the economies 
of scale to do that. So this is a good bid of work and it‟s great because of course in an 
ideal world when services go out the trust actually should allow transferring workers 
to get the deal, because they won‟t necessary have to get the pension when they get 
moved out by tendering process. (Interview 28)  
 
The NHS foundation trust accepted as admitting bodies in its pension scheme the joint 
venture (relatively to the group of professionals it directly employs but seconded to the 
private company) and CAPITA, allowing to the five transferred workers to keep public 
pension entitlement. All manual workforce was conversely excluded. 
A second remarkable implication following outsourcing was the creation of a two-tier 
workforce in particular in ancillary services as reported by a union official from 
UNISON:  
 
what happened after TUPE is that you found still contractors who win contracts but 
who have ended up paying people who transfer to them on the original pay rate of the 
hospital and then they recruit new staff on a lower rate. So you had workers working 
side by side at different pay rates and from the contractors point of view there was an 
incentive to loose people at the highest pay rate and to keep people at the lowest pay 
rate. (Interview 35) 
 
Indeed private subcontractors, according to the English system of employment relations 
were not legally forced to adopt AfC terms and conditions:  
 
NHS staff is all under the Agenda for change: if they move when the service is 
outsourced they will get the Agenda for Change when they get into the new job, but if 
you buy a new service and you don‟t have the staff you just tender the staff and they 
won‟t have Agenda for Change. (Interview 27)  
 
Likewise in the local authority case, the implementation of the Two-Tier Code in 2004 
partly contributed to prevent such detrimental repercussion or at least to contain the 
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phenomenon, despite already widespread in the NHS foundation trust under 
investigation. 
The case study analysis pinpointed a final interesting point concerning clinical staff 
employment conditions. As shown in the case study the foundation trust outsourced 
some healthcare services like rehabilitation or pathology but always internally keeping 
the staff: in the former case the whole staff remained in-house, in the latter professionals 
involved have ben seconded to the joint venture but however remaining NHS 
employees. The officer from NHS Employers explained such outcome as follows:  
 
another thing worth to mention is training. The NHS training is free for all its clinical 
staff. Some of them have to pay for their own degree and that‟s expensive; some of 
them, nurses, get a bursary, so they are not paying for their own degree but once they 
entered the NHS they have to still develop and get more training that is freely 
provided by the NHS. When they go out to the private sector contractors got good 
professionals, they got fully trained persons and that‟s annoying for the NHS. 
(Interview 27) 
 
 
5.4.2 Impacts on employment relations structure and union strategy 
At the outset, when the first outsourcing policies have been implemented in the NHS 
foundation trust, a strong national campaign against privatization was already 
underway. Competitive tendering in local authorities were getting more and more 
widespread, as well as the first evidences of deterioration in services quality. Unions 
strongly opposed the contracting out of ancillary services, exposing the chipping away 
effect on working condition and the progressively deterioration of wages as reported by 
a union official:  
 
unions were very concerned because usually when you see contracting out it means 
pay, terms and conditions deteriorated because they know what contracting out looks 
like for private companies: rationalizing expensive labour costs. (Interview 28) 
  
Unions in the foundation trust, in line however with the national tendency, opted for 
focusing their response on publicizing among workers ˗ members and non-members ˗ 
and across hospitals the potential repercussions of outsourcing on both working 
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conditions and on the quality of care services rather than taking industrial actions which 
might have had a disruptive effect for patients. Indeed as described by a union official: 
 
in the health service staff is closed to patients who are very sick so there isn't the same 
tendency to take industrial action, to go on strike. So workers in the NHS can take 
industrial action but they are very very reluctant, there's always a concern for the 
welfare of the patients. Even more industrial unions like UNISON would be reluctant 
to take industrial action because of the impact, because it may hurt patients. Instead 
what we try to do is to demonstrate, expose poor practices in local newspaper, a lot of 
lobbying activity a lot of getting messages to the general public through interviews in 
television, embarrassing poor employers. So it's a sort of different tactic rather than 
going on strike. (Interview 37) 
 
Overall in principle unions have adopted a longstanding stance against marketization in 
the NHS, in particular when core clinical services are involved:  
 
we have the view that the National Health Service and its core services, namely all 
services directly involving patients‟ care, have to remain public, they shouldn‟t go out 
to be market tested. That‟s the baseline of our action: we disagree with outsourcing. 
(Interview 47)  
 
Nevertheless as soon as the number of technical services outsourced started growing, 
along with the first clinical services union embraced a more pragmatic approach as a 
means to contemporary safeguard terms and conditions of employment and prevent a 
deterioration in service quality:  
 
we have to be pragmatic and it is very important because our job is to do the best for 
our members wherever they work and we think that a staff with good working 
conditions has more motivation and they deliver good quality services to patients, if 
they're not treated well they have low motivation and low morale. (Interview 37) 
 
In a nutshell, as in the English local authority, unions adopted a twin-track approach: 
the initial opposition to privatization, and subsequently to the transfer of workers, is 
complemented by a more pragmatic action to defend and represent workers if the 
process go ahead and the staff should change status and employer. 
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Nevertheless unions active in the NHS foundation trust have also tried to quickly adapt 
the new environment developing on purpose organizational strategies suitable for the 
fragmented scenario for workers.  
First of all they worked for maintaining ˗ or recovering ˗ a strong bargaining position 
and the capacity to collectively represent members in new effective ways as explained a 
union official from UNISON active in the NHS:  
 
we have to innovate and come up with new ways of organizing and new ways of 
talking to people about the things happening in their workplace and convince them 
that we are the right organisation to represent them and it could be done in a variety of 
ways. So previously the old style of organising was to say: “we are the union, we are 
strong, if you join us we represent you, we‟ll tell you what is good for you, to some 
extent”. Now there has been a move towards doing a lot more listening to people 
above all when you go in a new company, a new workplace. People usually are really 
annoyed about their workplace. One example I came across once I went in the hospital 
recruiting staff and listening to people: we understood that a big complaint of cleaners 
was that they didn‟t get enough mops and cleaning equipment to do their job properly 
because they were proud of their job, they wanted the hospital to be cleaned. We 
instead arrived there with the preconception that they were upset about long shifts or 
low sick pay. So this became part of the new campaign, it‟s not top-down anymore, it 
is more of a dialogue with our potential members, a bottom-up representation. 
(Interview 36) 
 
A sort of second step along this new approach consists of improving the organizational 
capacity to organise beyond the transfer:  
 
we lose people along the process of transfer but the biggest single problem is that we 
do not organize people more widely. We have the problem of continuous organizing 
process, we have to organise beyond the transfer: the danger is that we oppose the 
transfer, we support workers during transfer and then we walk away. A better 
approach would be to go in and to start organising back to the transfer and start saying 
to people who is newly employed by the firm or already working in the firm: why 
don‟t you join a union? We don‟t do that very well. (Interview 35)  
 
Terms and conditions of employment are indeed generally protected by the TUPE 
regulation when workers transfer from the foundation trust to private companies: 
nevertheless the main challenge for unions is preserving such contractual arrangements 
during transfer from a subcontractor to another when the contract is re-tendered. The 
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risk indeed is to lose track of the workers during further transfers which undermine 
unions capacity to protect working conditions. In most of these cases indeed neither 
shop stewards in the NHS foundation trust are able to monitor contract application 
given that  
 
you don't get the same amount of facility time from the private contractors ˗ when you 
get facility time ˗ that you would get from the hospital, so we have a number of people 
from local branches that work on the trust and the trust gives some amount of time to 
deal with these issues but specifying: we don't give you time off for workers who 
work for a different employer. (Interview 47) 
 
Facility time cuts are quite widespread encouraged by the coalition government and 
local branches are more and more employing people to work for the private contractors 
since shop stewards in the public sector did not get facility time for that.  
 
We are trying to develop an organising model that is about the idea that we need self-
sustainable organisations within contractors if you can't have a model where you rely 
on a small number of activists employed by the foundation trust. You have to rebuild 
the organisation within the companies which is more or less possible depending on 
patterns like: how big is the contract, how stable is the workforce. So in the care sector 
is really really difficult because it's actually difficult to meet the workers. So this is the 
thinking of unions: we need to have proper organisation within the private contractors 
and to maintain the membership. (Interview 44) 
  
In addition unions in the NHS foundation trust embarked upon a wide training program 
devoted to officials, activists and shop stewards as a means to provide them the 
necessary cognitive tool to tackle outsourcing process throughout all the steps, starting 
from the decision-making to the staff transfer as explained by a union official involved:  
 
UNISON is doing a lot of work in trying to train activists, going back right to the 
beginning of this where they would be aware if the trust would be considering 
outsourcing: we want to make sure that they understand procurement, that they know 
all the processes, they are able to scrutinize proposals and asks questions and raise 
concerns. So there' s a sort of political element we are using in the local democratic 
process to intervene at the right stages, to get all the documents. So we've done quite a 
lot of work trying to equip branches to know what to do because ideally you want to 
stop this in the first place. Sometimes these proposals rest on the very flimsy grounds 
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because you think: whow! we're saving a lot of money so I just ask a couple of 
questions on how many savings would be made. So we spend few years trying to build 
up a new full training program for our staff in local branches and activists. (Interview 
47) 
 
Beyond such stumbling blocks in union‟s traditional way of organising and 
representing, on the whole the relationship between social partners in the NHS 
foundation trust is featured by a longstanding tradition of social dialogue, specifically 
defined a partnership model of employment relations by both unions and employer and 
its representative association NHS Employers. The former indeed reported that:  
 
we cooperate a lot with NHS Employer. Firstly within health we have what we call a 
partnership approach to employment relation and managing change so instead of 
having the trade unions on the one side of the table and the employers on the other 
side of the table and very adversarial discussion, we try to do things to find a 
consensus and to try to negotiate our way through difficult challenging topics. 
(Interview 37)  
 
On the employer side the director of HR department confirmed that:  
 
it's partnership here and it works very well. I worked also in local government HRM 
department and it was quite different. Our employment relations developed quite well 
in the foundation trust, we have very good cooperative relations here. Of course 
unions, they don't agree on everything we do but we try to find a workable way 
through that is right for the organisation and its business and either for the staff. 
(Interview 48) 
  
Such partnership model well embedded in the NHS foundation trust mirrors a wider 
tradition developed and consolidated by social partners at national level. The Agenda 
for Change agreement represents an outstanding example of such cooperative relation 
based on negotiation, as well as the establishment of the Social Partnership Forum 
described by an official from TUC as follows:  
 
in terms of healthcare services, it is the only area of public services where there is a 
Social Partnership Forum: there is a very collaborative atmosphere, it‟ s a tripartite 
body and they have a national body and regional levels. It‟s the only place where we 
have the European style of social dialogue. In the forum we discuss about broader 
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things than industrial relations: like changes in NHS, productivity, and quality, and 
how can we work together, industrial issues and so on. That kind of culture prevail in 
the NHS, not everywhere. (Interview 41)  
 
Again, the Retention of Employment model has been adopted by central government as 
a means to take into account union request requests to enhance employment protections 
for workers transferred during restructuring processes, in particular in PFI.  
Union membership slightly declined in the last decades. Nevertheless unions play a 
relevant role in the NHS foundation, described by the director of HR department as a 
„highly unionized environment‟ (Interview 48) where 14 unions and staff associations 
are recognized and always consulted when a restructuring event involve internal staff. 
Workers‟ representativeness is guaranteed by the election of several shop stewards and 
the establishment of a Joint Consultative Committee chaired by a member of Unite and 
composed of employers representatives, employees‟ representatives and members from 
the board of directors of the trust. Given the voluntary basis on which such workplace 
representative body is grounded on, its establishment is quite revealing about the nature 
of the employment relations in the foundation trust. An event recalled by the director of 
HR department confirmed it:  
 
we have had in 2002 some union activities regarding the NHS pension scheme: there 
were several workers out on the picket line, above all nurses. But the atmosphere was 
very good: indeed we called them because we needed some of them in the wards and 
they came back to work. And I think that it is a reflection of our partnership working. 
(Interview 48) 
 
Nevertheless a concluding quotation of a union official from UNISON well synthetizes 
the deep feeling pervading unions in healthcare sector in England:  
 
I think that the difficulties we are facing are that we have been absolutely vehement in 
our opposition against privatization but privatization yet continues with the support 
certainly of the Tories but there are some indications that also Labour agreed with 
that. Moreover the 2008 economic crisis created too much pressure on public sector 
expenditure so we as union we‟ve got such duality, a sort of paradox where on the one 
hand we oppose privatization, but on the other hand we need to organize these 
workers in the private sector because if these workers are continuously exploited and 
their conditions are driven down and down by definition they became much cheaper 
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than the public sector so failing to organise workers simply make private sector more 
attractive. And I think that we failed. (Interview 35) 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
The two case studies in England display rather divergent patterns beyond some common 
features following competitive tendering in the provision of public services as 
summarized in table 5.1 and 5.2. 
Overall the local authority and the NHS foundation trust under investigation share the 
main rationale that drove them towards outsourcing: economizing in the costs of 
services provided and boosting value for money indeed represent the principal reason 
reported by key-respondents interviewed. The local council, in addition, showed a 
certain degree of ideological enthusiasm in market-type tool, despite it mainly mirrors a 
national stance encouraged by central government. 
Similarly contracting out involved both blue-collar technical and white-collar 
professional services in both cases, but with a predominance of the former in the 
foundation trust in particular. 
How outsourcing policies impacted on terms and conditions of employment markedly 
depended on the application of TUPE regulation. In the local authority, despite a limited 
exception in the first two tendering round where the council adopted a soft touch with 
its workforce, all staffing level involved was transferred to the private contractors taking 
over as service providers; furthermore before TUPE legislation several workers were 
also made redundant in manual services. The NHS foundation trust instead embarked 
upon outsourcing policies when TUPE legislation was already in force: it followed a 
stronger protection for employment which guaranteed the transfer to the new companies 
to the large majority of manual personnel ˗ only few cases of redundancy have been 
reported. Clinical professionals and white-collar employees involved in restructuring 
processes conversely were simply seconded to the external contractor (the former) or 
largely redeployed within the hospital (the latter). 
Secondly, a deterioration in pay rate and other contractual benefits interested workers 
transferred before 1993 from the municipality to private companies, whilst since TUPE 
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application was extended to public sector all the staff transferred under the same terms 
and conditions of employment contractually guaranteed by subcontractors as well. 
Pension schemes instead have been subject to a widespread deterioration given that they 
were not covered by TUPE legislation: it followed a sharp decline in pension 
contributions paid by private employers in both the sectors as long as the Fair Deal for 
Staff Pension in 1999 and in particular the New Fair Deal in 2013 were implemented to 
safeguard pension entitlement for transferred staff. Nevertheless when such legislation 
was issued the erosion of pension schemes was already widely underway. 
Further common implications include the creation of a two-tier workforce: such 
phenomenon became so widespread nationwide that in 2004 the Labour-led central 
government agreed with trade union the “Two-tier Code”: it required that the new staff 
recruited by a private provider to work on a public sector service contract alongside 
staff transferred from the public authority should be offered employment on fair and 
reasonable terms and conditions that overall should be no less favourable than those of 
transferred employees. The Code constituted an important legislative tool that union 
tried to leverage in the two case studies to protect working conditions but in several 
private companies a two-tier workforce was already sort of institutionalized. 
Beside cross-sector legislative protections to employment however, the NHS foundation 
trust enjoyed further sector-specific safeguards introduced to respond to the harsh 
campaign organized by trade unions: in particular the Agenda for Change agreement 
harmonized pay scale in the whole health sector while the Retention of Employment 
model guaranteed to healthcare staff to remain public sector employees and retain all of 
their terms and conditions of employment, with continuity of service preserved for all 
purposes, but then working for the private sector provider on a secondment basis. 
When employment relations between social partners are considered (see table 5.2), 
competitive tendering in the provision of public services triggered a vehement 
opposition of trade union in both the local authority and the NHS foundation trust: 
union campaigned against the marketization of public service provision, informing 
citizens and patients about the consequences of outsourcing for the quality of services, 
talking on local televisions, meeting workforce involved in the processes and taking 
industrial actions (much more in the municipality rather than in the hospital where there 
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has traditionally been more reluctance from workers and unions given the sensitivity of 
services). 
In both case studies however the strong opposition of the early days was then 
complemented ˗ and to a certain extent replaced ˗ by a more pragmatic approach 
focused on protecting and organising workers during transfer from the public 
organisations to private subcontractors, given the irreversibility of the phenomenon at 
that point. Hence a twin-track approach featured union response to contracting out: the 
political opposition to marketization at national level was always complemented by a 
strategic action to protect workforce at workplace/local level. 
Overall restructuring processes towards outsourcing undermined union capacity to 
collectively organise and represent workers dispersed along a fragmented production 
chain made of a plurality of employers: the traditional one-to-one relations (one union 
branch dealing with one public employer) was reversed obliging union branches to deal 
with an increasing number of private subcontractors. 
Beside such common challenges, the nature of employment relations appeared to be 
rather different in the two sectors. Local authority employment relations indeed have 
been featured by adversarial stances between unions and the council, where social 
dialogue was almost inexistent, only the main unions were recognized and unions 
consultation represented more a legislative obligation to achieve to avoid legal actions 
rather than an effective negotiation. Moreover the council purposely embarked upon an 
anti-union approach cutting facility time for shop stewards, opting out the Green book 
clause regarding the monthly deduction of contribution from the salary for union 
membership and dismantling the office in the past devoted to union activity. 
Conversely social partners in the NHS foundation trust defined their relationship a 
partnership model where unions and the board of director negotiate and collaborate in a 
positive way. Despite their stances clearly diverge, unions and employer have a 
longstanding tradition of social dialogue: the foundation trust recognize 14 unions, 
several shop stewards are elected by workers and a Joint Consultative Committee was 
established to constantly guarantee workers‟ consultation at workplace level. 
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Table 5.1 Labour-related variables affected by outsourcing in the English local authority and NHS foundation trust 
 
ENGLAND – LOCAL AUTHORITY ENGLAND – NHS FOUNDATION TRUST 
Public employment in services 
outsourced 
Soft touch in the first tenders: workers might choose 
whether be transferred, be redeployed or made 
redundant with high severance terms. 
Then all staff transferred 
Clinical services staff kept in-house or seconded to the 
private company 
White-collar tasks: workers redeployed in the trust 
Transfer of public personnel to 
private providers 
All public personnel transferred to private companies Blue-collar services: all staff transferred out 
Redundancy Several redundancies in blue-collar workforce Few manual workers made redundant 
Size of public employment Markedly decreasing Slightly decreasing  
Collective agreement applied 
Before TUPE: often employer‟s unilateral determination 
of terms and conditions 
After TUPE: private sector collective agreements and 
unilateral determination in few cases 
Private sector collective agreements for manual workers 
transferred 
Clinical staff: public sector collective agreement 
Since 2004: Agenda for Change agreement 
Wage rate 
Before TUPE: deterioration of salary 
After TUPE: rather similar pay rate guaranteed 
Same or similar wage rate for workers transferred 
protected by TUPE regulation 
Workload Increasing workload for manual workers transferred Increasing workload for manual workers transferred 
Pension scheme entitlements 
Declining for the large majority of manual workers 
before the 1999 Fair Deal. 
Few white-collar employees transferred recently 
admitted in the public pension scheme 
Declining in the first few tenders. 
Then broadly similar protected by 1999 Fair Deal. 
White-collar transferred employees admitted in the trust 
pension scheme 
Social clauses in tender to reintegrate 
the staff 
Never included Never included 
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Table 5.2 Employment relations-related variables affected by outsourcing in the English local authority and NHS foundation trust 
 
ENGLAND - LOCAL AUTHORITY ENGLAND – NHS FOUNDATION TRUST 
Union stance towards outsourcing 
First phase: strong opposition 
Then: pragmatic approach to protect workers 
Strong political opposition backed by pragmatic 
approach to protect workers 
Union strategy and responses 
Twin-track approach 
Bottom-up approach to organise 
Harsh industrial actions 
Campaign to inform employees and users 
Twin-track approach 
Bottom-up approach to organise 
Workplace representatives Only one shop steward still active  
Several shop stewards elected 
Establishment of a Joint Consultative Committee 
Union consultation 
Only formal consultation: not substantial involvement 
Few unions recognized 
Unions always consulted when staff is involved in 
restructuring processes 
14 unions recognized 
Relationship between social partners 
Adversarial relation. 
Council purposely weakened union (cut in facility time, 
no deduction of contribution for union fee) 
Confrontational approach from union 
Partnership and social dialogue between social partners 
Social partnership Forum  
Challenge to union  
Fragmentation of employment challenge the capacity to 
collectively organise and represent. 
Union weakened by the council 
Facility time cannot be used for union activity in private 
subcontractors 
Membership Markedly declining after the transfer 
Only slightly declining: employees keep the 
membership after the transfer 
Users’ involvement 
Users involved through campaign of information 
organized by unions 
Users involved through campaign of information 
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Chapter six 
The case of Denmark 
 
 
6.1 Public administration: structure, functions, employment relations  
 
6.1.1 Structure and functions 
Denmark is a small country with around 5,600,000 inhabitants (Statistics Denmark 2014 
at www.dst.dk) divided into three main levels of government: the central state is divided 
into five regions (regioner), each covering several of the 98 municipalities (kommuner), 
the only decentralized level considered local authority. Such territorial and 
administrative partition stemmed from the so-called Structural reform implemented in 
2007 which amalgamated 271 municipalities into 98 while 14 counties were liquidated 
and replaced by five wider regions (Mailand 2014). 
The Danish public sector has generally been seen as built on two opposite tendencies of 
centralized decentralization. Administrative responsibilities indeed are very 
decentralized with a strong emphasis on local governments which, thanks to a high 
degree of financial and decisional autonomy, allows local politicians to reach out to 
citizens‟ demands and needs. However, at the same time „the Danish public sector has 
never quite shaken its roots from a centrally organized state, formally headed by a king 
or a queen and run primarily by university-educated law professionals, and by 
economists since the World War-II‟ (Greve 2006: 162). 
The Danish government in 2002 appointed a commission of experts (Public Sector Task 
Commission) to investigate whether the public sector structure met the requirements of 
a modern society: among six different administrative models, most of them pointing 
towards larger municipalities, the model that was adopted has resulted in municipalities 
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with at least 20,000 (preferably 30,000) citizens. Municipalities with less than 20,000 
citizens were only accepted where a legally binding cooperation with a larger 
municipality was in place (www.kl.dk). Then all municipalities were requested by the 
Government to decide which neighbouring municipalities they wanted to merge: as a 
consequence a decentralised process took place where municipalities negotiated with 
their neighbours on the formation of new larger municipalities. Such voluntaristic 
approach which features the Danish decision-making tradition led to the establishment 
of new municipalities through a smooth process which gave rise to less conflicts than 
expected: indeed in only two cases the formation of new municipalities was decided by 
the state while many of the new local governments turned out to be even larger than was 
expected at the beginning of the reform process. Out the 98 new municipalities, seven 
have less than 20,000 inhabitants, but they are mostly small islands which opted for 
settling cooperation agreements with neighbouring municipalities. 
The Danish Government and Parliament also established a merger from 14 counties to 
five regions.  
The purpose of the Structural reform was to boost economies of scale by the creation of 
larger local authorities and to improve the provision of welfare services by reshuffling 
the allocation of responsibilities between the three main levels of government. Such 
process of decentralization in the allocation of competences across different levels of 
government traces its origins back to municipal reforms implemented during the 1970s 
„whereby several administrative functions were delegated to the municipal level. This 
required the formation of entities with an adequate population to justify allocation of the 
relevant functions and big enough to justify the costs of maintaining a professional 
administration‟ (Andersen et al. 1999: 161). 
Thus, following the 2007 reform the central state is responsible of several nationwide 
competences including defence and the juridical system; foreign relations and aid; tax 
collection; education and research; roads and railways; overall nature, environment and 
planning tasks; overall planning of health (Mailand 2014). Regions instead since 1 
January 2007 got the whole responsibility of healthcare services (including hospitals, 
practitioners and special practitioners) that constitutes their main purpose, 
complemented by few further tasks concerning institutions for people with special 
needs, regional development, earth pollution, the set-up of public traffic companies 
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(Mailand 2012). They are led by a Regional Council with 41 members, directly elected 
every four years: since as decentralized level of government they do not have the right 
to levy taxes, services and activities within their responsibility are financed by subsidies 
transferred from the municipalities and the state. 
The most decentralized administrative level, municipalities, were the „net-gainer of the 
reform‟ (Mailand 2014: 420) with their responsibilities now encompassing ˗ in order of 
budget size ˗ schools (including childcare, initial schooling up to 10th degree and 
education for adults with special needs); social services including day care, elder care, 
specialised social services for disabled people and young people with special needs; 
administration; water, gas and electricity management; employment services and local 
roads. 
The rationale driving the creation of larger municipalities was to improve their ability to 
handle such increasing number of tasks that local governments had taken over: 
employment policies represent a new responsibility delegated to local governments. 
Indeed the newly created employment system, based on local job centres allowing 
citizens and companies to have a single common access point to employment activities, 
replaced a less efficient shared system between the state and the municipalities. The 
primary revenue of municipalities comes from local income tax and real property tax, 
whose level varies from a municipality to another, complemented by an annual block 
grant transferred from the central government: financial negotiations over the next 
year‟s budgets are institutionalized in the annual economic negotiations that take place 
in June. 
Local governments, according to a centralized process of decentralization of 
administrative functions (Greve 2006), beyond financial autonomy, enjoy a high degree 
of decisional autonomy as well under the article 82 of the Danish Constitution which set 
the right of the municipalities to manage their own affairs independently under the 
supervision of the State. 
 
6.1.2 Status and structure of public employment 
About 32% of the Danish workforce is employed in the public sector, which, by 
European standards, is a relatively large proportion of employment. This share has 
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remained relatively stable over the past two decades despite increasing externalization 
of public services (Ibsen et al. 2011). If the large share of part-time employees, higher 
than in the private sector, are added, figures concerning public employment become 
probably larger than 32%.  
More than half of public employees works in the municipal sector (about 443,000 
corresponding to 59%), about 25% in employed in the state sector (about 183,000) 
while the remaining 16% works in the regional sector (about 122,000) most of whom 
specifically in healthcare (Statistic Denmark 2014). 
Likewise in the private sector, public sector employment relations are featured by a 
relatively strong tradition of collective bargaining which covers no fewer than 98% of 
public employees (Mailand 2014). The number of civil servants, whose terms of 
employment are set by unilateral legislation instead of by collective agreement and 
endowed with special statutory employment protection, indeed decreased over the last 
decades (Ibsen et al. 2011). Practically the Danish model of employment relations in the 
public sector came closer to the „model employer‟ than the „sovereign employer‟ (Bach 
and Bordogna 2011), shifting towards a context where almost all employees have their 
terms and conditions defined through collective bargaining at central or local level, 
instead of being unilaterally determined by the government. The civil servant status was 
maintained for a share of „crown servants‟(Ibsen et al. 2011:2297) including judges, 
police officers, the armed forces and prison staff, while for few civil servants at senior 
executive level the remuneration takes the form of individual contracts (Andersen et al. 
1999). The special status applying to about 2% of employees, beyond legally forbidding 
to resort to industrial action, provides for a statutory pension scheme in addition to the 
universal system of old age pension.  
The first collective agreements were signed in the 1920s and 1930s following the 
provision of the 1919 Civil Servants Act which de facto established the right to 
collectively bargaining over labour issue: „however, so that changes in working 
conditions were negotiated in advance with civil servants‟ organisations, in many cases 
reaching informal joint agreement on amendments before they were formally issued as 
unilateral directives‟ (Andersen et al. 1999: 177). Moreover the Civil Servants Act did 
not allowed to civil servants to take industrial action. Actual negotiation was established 
as common practice to set terms and conditions in public employment only in late 
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1960s-early 1970s following the recasting of Civil Servants Act in 1969 which formally 
set the right for civil servants to negotiate and sign collective agreements, but still 
without granting the right to resort to industrial action. Gradually then, since the 1990s 
the state as employer started a process of reform of public employment shifting the large 
majority of its employees from the status of civil servants to public employees whose 
contractual arrangements were agreed upon through collective bargaining. 
 
6.1.3. Social dialogue framework and institutions 
With its long democratic tradition, Denmark has one of the earliest institutionalized 
bargaining system among industrialised countries. The Danish model of labour market 
regulation indeed builds on a longstanding tradition of collective bargaining between 
strong social partner organisations in both the private and public sector, despite the 
exception for a share civil servants until the 1990s. All central issues in the matter of 
labour terms and conditions like wage, working hours, working conditions, workplace 
representative bodies are agreed upon in collective agreements, leaving to legislation 
only a residual competence. In such model indeed the government does not interfere in 
the negotiations letting social partners free to jointly define contractual arrangement, 
excluded some matters as working conditions and health and safety which are instead 
subject to government regulation. 
Article 78 of the Constitution of Denmark established the freedom of association, 
entitling country‟s citizens to form association of any lawful purpose without explicitly 
mention the right to join a union. Indeed questions about freedom of association of trade 
unions are primarily regulated by collective agreements concluded at national level. 
Collective bargaining system operates within a clearly defined structure characterized 
by a two-level negotiation and a centrally controlled decentralization ˗ often referred as 
„centralised decentralisation‟ (Jørgensen 2013). At national level, social partners 
negotiate agreements covering wages and all issues of working and employment 
conditions in bargaining rounds at sectoral level ˗ that is state, regions and municipal 
level ˗ which are then integrated into individual agreements for different occupations. 
However since the 1990s, the wage reform introduced also a decentralized tier of wage 
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bargaining at local level allowing for individual or group supplements within each 
administrative unit (Mailand 2012a).  
Every second or third year all the three main bargaining areas (state, regions and 
municipalities) negotiate sector-wide agreements covering the overall costs for the 
bargaining round as well as cross-occupations working and employment terms and 
conditions. At sectoral level the state, the regional and the municipal employers (and 
their associations) respectively bargain with bargaining cartels (coalitions) composed of 
representatives of the different unions. 
This first tier also include organisational bargaining where, simultaneously with the 
sector-level bargaining, individual trade unions bargain among themselves on all 
occupation-specific issues such as wage components, pensions and working conditions 
within a set financial framework (Mailand 2014).  
The second bargaining tier at workplace level gained increasing relevance following the 
decentralization process of functions ˗ and subsequently of public personnel ˗ from the 
central government to regions and above all to municipalities. Within each 
administrative unit, individual trade union decides who represents them locally, but as a 
general rule it is the trade union related shop-steward who is entitled. Beside wage 
increases, decentralized agreements may cover further issues as training policies, 
working time and policies for senior employees, complementing what already agreed 
upon at national level (Mailand 2012a). 
Moreover at workplace level a further form of social dialogue is implemented in the 
Danish context, based on the codetermination system. In 1996 a one-tier system of 
representation replaced the two-tier structure at workplace where coexisted the Health 
and Safety Councils (sikkerhedsudvalg) and the Co-determination Committee (MED-
udvalg), this latter made up of an equal number of representatives of employees and 
management, both elected as are the shop stewards. The Health and Safety Councils 
were then incorporated in the Co-determination Committees with the purpose to 
strengthen the cooperation between management and employees‟ representatives, also 
on these issues. The president of such Committees is usually the director of the 
municipality or region, while the vice-president is the joint shop steward. The merged 
Co-determination Committee provides, according to the so-called MED agreement, the 
employees the rights of consultation on personnel and HRM related issues of all kind 
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and health and safety issues (wage related issues are excluded). The rights on 
information and consultation on personnel related issues include also all the events of 
restructuring towards outsourcing, privatisation or transfer of undertakings. Such Co-
determination Committees are mandatory in each administrative unit with budget and 
personnel responsibility. However as representative bodies, they are not entitled to sign 
collective agreements at workplace level, where union‟s shop stewards have the 
prerogatives. 
Collective agreements have a coverage of the 100% of statutory public employees 
across the three areas (excluding civil servants with special status), higher than the 
coverage in the private sector where it is about 74% but however remarkable compared 
to the rate in other European countries.  
Collective agreements cover a wide range of working and employment issues ranging 
from recruitment procedures, pay, work organisation, working time, to parental leaves 
and certain elements of job security and employment protection. Legislation, although 
limited, plays an important role: the Salaried Employees‟ Act (Funktionærloven) 
establishes a minimum of three month of notice for public employees after a three 
months trial period and more favourable compensation terms than those applied to 
skilled and unskilled workers. Moreover legislative provisions define holyday 
regulation, parental leaves and working environment issues such as health and safety at 
workplace. Importantly, legislation sets employment protections in case of transfer of 
undertaking implementing at country level with the law 111/1979 the European 
Council‟s Acquired Rights Directive (77/187/EEC) (then modified by the law 
447/2001). 
Overall the Danish model of employment relations, is featured by some peculiarities: 
firstly, within a regime based on centralized decentralization, a strong role of 
coordination is played by the Ministry of Finance that controls the budgets available for 
state and regions/municipalities collective bargaining and acts as the employers‟ 
organisation of the separate ministries and institutions in conducting negotiation in the 
state sector. „Viewed in an international context, the choice of structure may appear 
odd: the ministry, rather than an independent agency or organisation separated from 
policy areas: personnel, administration and budgets. The result is that employer function 
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is firmly anchored in what may be regarded as the most central component in the state‟s 
political and administrative apparatus‟ (Andersen et al. 1999: 172). 
In second place, labour market regulation in Denmark is characterised by a pay 
adjustment scheme which links wage developments in the public sector to developments 
in the private sector as a means to ensure over the long term the same wage dynamics 
across the sectors. More in detail pay developments for public employees fluctuate 
according to the wage rate agreed upon in the private sector: „if the state sector pay 
development is below that of the private sector, the state sector wages and salaries will 
be adjusted upwards in the subsequent pay settlement period. If the opposite is the case, 
the central government wages and salaries will be adjusted downwards‟ (Jørgensen 
2008). 
A third peculiarity of the Danish model of employment relations is what is referred as 
„compromise equilibrium‟ to designate the outcome of organizational bargaining. At 
national level negotiations occurred between employers‟ organisations and bargaining 
cartels ˗ or coalitions ˗, the latter being composed of different individual trade unions, 
each representing diverse groups of employees from the highest to the lowest skilled, 
with a wide range of different and often diverging interests. This means that, prior to the 
formal bargaining phase with the employers, coalitions internally negotiate behind 
closed doors the allocation of resources between groups, as preparatory platform to later 
put forward during negotiations with the employer. „The collective bargaining system 
has thus assumed some coalition characteristics which largely determine its mode of 
functioning. This means that bargaining is intended not only to resolve a clash of 
interests between two opposing parties, but also to resolve conflicts of interest on each 
side of the negotiation table‟ (Andersen et al. 1999: 179-80). Similar negotiating 
procedures have been developed in all the three sectors of bargaining, namely the state, 
regions and municipal level, the latter however displaying a far more complex picture. 
 
6.1.4 Trade unions 
On the employer side, public administrations are represented by three main 
organisations covering the state, the regional governments and the municipalities. The 
Agency for the Modernisation of Public Administration (Moderniseringsstyrelsen) 
225 
negotiates in the central state on behalf of the Ministry of Finance, Local Government 
Denmark (KL) is the employer association for the 98 municipalities while Danish 
Regions (Danske Regioner) for the five regions in Denmark. 
Local Government Denmark (KL) is the interest group and member authority of Danish 
municipalities. It is voluntary to be a member of KL, but nevertheless all 98 
municipalities are members. The mission of KL is to safeguard common interests of the 
municipalities, assist the individual municipality with consultancy services and in 
addition ensure that the local authorities are provided with up-to-date and relevant 
information. 
KL is one of the largest employers‟ associations in Denmark, accounting for 47% of 
public sector employees hired by the municipalities: even though membership is 
voluntary nevertheless all 98 municipalities are members. The mission is to safeguard 
common interests of the municipalities, assist the individual municipality with 
consultancy services and collectively represent them during bargaining round with 
unions‟ cartels. Since municipalities through membership delegate their negotiating 
rights to KL, collective agreements signed by the association are binding for all the 
local governments. Moreover, as a private voluntary association KL resembles the 
employers‟ associations in the private sector. There is, however, a vital difference: KL‟s 
role is not restricted to that of municipal employer, as it also represents the 
municipalities in their capacity as democratic organisations exercising public authority. 
Its main function is to help to strike a balance between the exercise of authority at local 
and central levels‟ (Andersen et al. 1999: 173). 
Concerning public employees representation instead, in Denmark there are three main 
confederations of peak organisations based on occupational and educational lines 
following the tradition of the guild system, although boundaries between the three 
umbrella organisations are often blurred. By far the largest trade union confederation 
with about 1,122,000 members (Statistics Denmark 2012) is the Confederation of 
Danish Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen i Danmark ˗ LO) which organises skilled 
and unskilled manual workers, but also many salaried non-manual employees in both 
the public and private sector. The second biggest confederation with 353,000 members 
(Statistics Denmark 2012) is the Confederation of Salaried Employees and Civil 
Servants (FTF) which represents medium-salary employees with middle level 
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educational background: it is largely made up of unions organising public sector 
employees like civil servants, teachers and nurses; but it also include some private 
sector clerical staff particularly in banking and financing. The Danish Confederation of 
Professional Associations (Akademikernes Centralorganisation ˗ AC) with around 
142,000 members (Statistics Denmark 2012) organises highly educated personnel in 
both public and private sector. 
LO umbrella organisation, set up in 1898, has been formally tied to Denmark‟s Social 
Democrats (Socialdemokraterne) via interlinking directorates and financial support for a 
long time until 2003 when the LO congress cut any formal links with the party. The 
largest of the 18 unions affiliated to LO is the United Federation of Danish Workers 
(Fagligt Fælles Forbund ˗ 3F) representing mainly unskilled manual workers such as 
industry and construction workers in the private sector and cleaning and gardeners in 
the public one. 3F was formed by a merger between the General Workers‟ Union 
(Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark ˗ SID) and the National Union of Female 
Workers (Kvindeligt Arbejderforbund ˗ KAD) in 2005. A second large union 
representing shop and clerical staff in both public and private sector is the Union of 
Commercial and Clerical Employees (Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund ˗ 
HK), while the largest LO-affiliated union representing public employees is the Trade 
and Labour (Fag og Arbejde ˗ FOA): FOA mainly organises low-skilled workers in 
elder care, hospital and daycare. Overall the union structure composing LO is rather 
complex, with a combination of craft, industry and general unions which, despite some 
attempts to limit competition for membership through demarcation agreements, still 
raise the issue. 
FTF and AC are instead organized on a combination of an occupational and industry 
basis. FTF was founded in 1952 by white-collar unions and its most important member 
unions are the Danish Nurses‟ Organisation (DSR), the Danish Union of Teacher 
(Danmarks Lærerforening ˗ DLF) and the Danish Federation of Early Childhood 
Teachers and Youth Educators (Forbundet for Pædagoger og Klubfolk ˗ BUPL), all of 
which belong to both the regional and municipal level. 
Finally the most significant affiliated unions of AC in terms of membership rate are 
Danish Association of Lawyers and Economists (Dansk Jurist- og Økonomforbund ˗ 
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DJØF) and the Danish Association of Master and PhDs (Dansk Magisterforening ˗ 
DM). 
The Danish labour market has a longstanding tradition of a high rate of union 
membership, which is historically an effect to the connection to the unemployment 
funds (A-kasser). Although remaining still relatively high compared to other European 
countries, the proportion of employees organized in unions has progressively fallen in 
recent years. Union membership is equal to 83% in the public sector, higher as in 
several countries than in the private sector where it corresponds to 62% (ICTWSS 
database 2009). Also the density in employer organisations is rather high: in 2008 the 
60% of total employees was employed in a company that was member of an employer 
association (Eurostat). 
 
 
6.2 The drivers of outsourcing in public services 
 
Diverse government‟s policies and reforms have directly or indirectly pushed Danish 
municipalities and hospitals towards the implementation of market-type mechanisms for 
the provision of public services. Such measures stemmed from the purpose of 
governments that succeeded since the 1980s to modernize public sector structure and 
organisation, complemented by a new form of economic governance drawing on private 
sector management tools and techniques‟ (Ibsen et al. 2011). More recently instead 
crisis-related policies intervened, including some austerity measures: although they 
have been adopted in response to financial breakdown, their rationale was not 
exclusively about improving public finances, but combined long-term interventions to 
raise labour supply (Mailand 2012). 
In general „the Scandinavian marketization trends have been of a more incremental and 
gradual nature than the sweeping privatization reforms characteristic of many Anglo-
Saxon countries during the 1980s and the 1990s‟ (Petersen and Hjelmar 2014: 3). The 
Danish public administration underwent following reform waves highly inspired by 
NPM doctrine which, starting from the 1980s, gradually acted to modernize public 
sector on the whole (Ibsen et al. 2011). Indeed „Denmark has modernized to a great 
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extent and marketized to a lesser extent. Radical marketization strategies have been held 
back, as there has not been a majority in Parliament for such a strategy, and there is a 
consensus on developing the public sector rather than dismantling or minimizing it‟ 
(Greve 2006: 168). Within such reform path three different periods can be 
distinguished, each corresponding to different governments in office. 
The first reform wave called „The modernization program‟ (Moderniserings program) 
has been launched by the Conservative-led government in 1983, setting out an 
ideological shift „from Keynesianism and social democratic planning to Monetarism 
and NPM‟ (Ibsen et al. 2011: 2299).The program consisted of five main points: 
decentralization of responsibilities and decision-making competences; stronger 
customer orientation; focus on employee and management development; emphasis on 
the use of e-government and marketization policies, which included also consumer 
choice schemes. Overall a new form of economic governance arose building on private 
sector discipline and practices: „capped budgets, structural devolution and consumers 
choice initiatives were introduced. There were also experiments with local wage 
determination in various forms from 1987 onwards, intended to accommodate local 
employers‟ requests to align structural devolution to responsibility with increased 
human resources discretion. Vertical disaggregation of agencies also occurred, 
separating purchasers from providers, and creating opportunities for subsequent 
privatisation and contracting out‟ (Ibsen et al. 2011: 2299).  
Moreover in 1991 a government commission published a white paper that endorsed 
outsourcing for the provision of a number of tasks and services, despite all functions 
involving the use of public authority was still banned from being subcontracted (Danish 
Ministry of Finance 1991). A Council for Contracting Out was also established as a 
means to support government agencies and private companies in their effort to boost 
externalization (Greve 2001). 
However outsourcing and privatization policies were not implemented to any large 
extent due to the lack of large majority among political parties and the opposition of the 
minority forces: the political decision-making in Denmark indeed can be characterized 
as a „consensus democracy‟ with strong emphasis on cooperation and integration (Greve 
2006) and the lack of large consensus may lead to political stalemates. In addition the 
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Conservative-Liberal government was forced to resign in 1993 in the wake of a scandal: 
the future of the program was subsequently in doubt.  
As fruitfully summarized by a national official from the trade union FOA:  
 
they made the modernization plan, somehow inspired by Thatcher and the British way 
of doing things: it was very moderate but it was a part of the continuing process of 
some kind of modernization. That was the first step where you could also find some of 
the initiatives about competition inside the public, so that was the first step on the 
ladder for privatization. (Interview 59) 
 
The second main reform initiative stemmed from the Social Democratic-led government 
since 1993 which put forward its own version of the modernization plan called „A New 
Look on the Public Sector‟ (Danish Ministry of Finance 1993). The new program 
mostly focused on management by contract and performance-based, quality systems, 
employees involvement and citizen engagement. Overall, given the political orientation 
of the government „market mechanisms in the form of contracting out were tone down‟ 
(Greve 2006: 166), while stronger emphasis was placed on privatization policies. 
During the 1990s indeed public enterprises for 36 billion DKK were privatized, 
including the Copenhagen Airport, telecommunications (now TDC), postal services 
(Post Danmark) and the Danish State Railways (DSB), far more than the previous 
Conservative government managed to do. Moreover the Danish Ministry for Trade and 
Industry in 1994 issued a big report documenting various ways to actually implement 
public-private partnerships: among others a prominent suggestion was to ease 
outsourcing processes (Danish Ministry for Trade and Industry 1994). Simultaneously 
also private sector organisations engaged in promoting externalization in public 
administration as the private think-tank called “Mandag Morgen”. 
The national official from FOA described this second phase as follow:  
 
it wasn‟t outsourcing but the issue was making more competition inside public 
services, mainly between employees but also between institutions. Of course it could 
be looked upon as the second step for externalization because if you have to compare 
and compete you have to describe, and when you describe then is possible for the 
private sector to make a bid. During the 1990s the Social-Democrats at government, 
they would not argue that it should be externalized but they would argue that they 
need to compete to make better public services, but in the same moment they actually 
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took the next step for bringing forward outsourcing. So somehow it was in the agenda. 
(Interview 59) 
 
Contracting-out of core public services, as eldercare or social services, was still a 
political „hot potato‟, much resisted by voters and unions (Ibsen et al. 2011). 
The Social Democratic party indeed has been rather sceptical toward outsourcing during 
the 1990s: emblematic example for instance is represented by municipalities run by 
social democrats which have shied away contracting out policies. However since late 
1990s they started to shift their stance expressed by a more positive attitude of the social 
democratic Minister of Finance Mogens Lykketoft (Greve 2001). 
A third reform wave arose when a new Liberal-Conservative government came to 
power in 2001 launching the modernization plan called „Citizens at the Wheel‟(Danish 
Ministry of Finance 2002). 
Such program marked a jump behind, picking off where the previous Conservative 
government had left off in 1993: the key words were once again customer orientation 
and marketization. In particular market-type strategies were particularly stressed such as 
compulsory competitive tendering and the free customer choice in welfare services. The 
„free choice‟ system introduced for municipalities the duty to established competition in 
the provision of welfare and social services: it meant that alongside in-house provision, 
private providers had to be at disposal of citizens who may alternatively chose whether 
to opt for public or private services at the same service price. Hence municipalities are 
required to pay an agreed fee to private providers every time a citizen avails herself of 
private services in order to harmonized the cost of welfare services between the public 
and private provision. The rationale was on the one hand to improve the quality of 
services provided at local level through a competition between providers and on the 
other hand to increase citizens‟ satisfaction in municipal services by empowering them 
to choose the provider they prefer among a range. Indeed „you don‟t have competition 
on the price because the citizens don‟t pay the full price themselves, but they pay in any 
case the same: they can choose this instead of that buy they pay the same money, so the 
competition is on the substantial quality of what is provided for the citizens‟ (Rikke 
Haahr 20/05/2014). Moreover from 2011 the government put forward the so-called 
“Public-Private Collaboration‟ strategy (offentligt-privat samarbejde), once again 
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renewing the debate concerning impacts, advantages and drawbacks of contracting out: 
initiatives and proposals were mainly directed towards the municipal and regional levels 
of government (Danish Government 2011). 
In a nutshell, all governments have generally followed the same track, and although 
each decade has its version of the modernization plan, all measures adopted and issues 
addressed remained within and set by an overall framework: the modernization of 
public administration, not necessarily involving restructuring policies towards 
privatization and externalization. 
Beyond such gradual public administration reform process inspired to NPM doctrine, 
since 2008 the Liberal-Conservative government in power embarked upon a series of 
responses to the crisis, not directly targeting public expenditure but more generally 
introducing alongside austerity measures also stimulus-packages and welfare reforms. 
Indeed Denmark „entered the economic crisis in seemingly good conditions with very 
low unemployment and years of stable growth. However, unemployment nearly tripled 
in the first years of the crisis and recovery has since been slower than in neighbouring 
countries such as Germany and Sweden. Nevertheless, the public sector and the public 
finances remain in relatively good conditions, with a comparatively low level of general 
government consolidated gross debt (47% of GDP in 2011) and a low level of general 
public deficit (1.7% of GDP)‟ (Mailand 2014: 418). 
The tax reform in 2009 reduced the tax-burden on high and middle-level income groups 
as a means to stimulate the economy while stimulus packages in 2009 and 2010 were 
introduced, especially targeting construction sector, to boost the whole economy by 
increase public investments (Mailand 2012). Again in 2010 the reform of the early 
retirement scheme introduced the opportunity to take early retirement on transfer 
income that mostly was tax-financed for employees aged 60-64, expecting to increase 
employment and labour supply. The first real austerity measure was represented by the 
recovery plan 2010, implemented also via the Annual budgets for 2010 and 2011, which 
among other measures cut down municipal budget for a total of 0.6 billion euro: 
however the distribution of budget cuts was unequal across municipalities (KL 2012). 
The figures in the period from 2009-2012 show that: 
 7 municipalities have experienced service budget cuts of more the 7%; 
 18 have faced 5 -7% service budget cuts; 
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 50 have faced 2-5% cuts; 
 19 have experienced 0-2% cuts; 
 4 municipalities have experienced increased service budgets (KL 2012, 
Mailand 2012b). 
The following Social Democrat-led government elected in 2011 implemented a new 
crisis-related plan called “2020-plan”, which included also initiatives affecting the 
public sector: as the previous government it combined budgets cut with stimulus 
packages and measures to boost employment. The stimulus package (Kickstart) 2012-13 
indeed aimed at stimulating the Danish economy by injecting 2.3 billion euro in public 
infrastructure while the tax reform in 2012 was design to reduce tax on labour. The 
government moreover set up a tripartite negotiating dialogue with social partners with 
the purpose to agree upon a common strategy for improving competitiveness, growth 
and employment. More in detail „the aim was to create 20,000 new jobs and improve 
public finance by 0.5 billion euro. The issues on the table were increased labour supply 
(working time especially), education and training, youth unemployment, social dumping 
(due to labor migration), the steering of active labour market policy, and finally work 
environment‟ (Mailand 2012a). However such dialogue reached a stalemate due to 
union‟s disapproval of increasing working time in an era of increasing unemployment. 
As a whole austerity measures in Denmark have been relatively modest both involving 
local municipalities and above all affecting regions ˗ and subsequently the healthcare 
sector ˗. 
In the former case, specifically, the annual definition of planned spending within 
financial constraints agreed upon the government and the municipalities represents a 
further regulative arrangement that acts as sort of austerity measure keeping under tight 
control municipal public finance. The annual Economic Agreement (økonomiaftale) 
negotiated between the Ministry of Finance on behalf of the government and KL 
provides a double financial constraints for municipalities: firstly it defines the budget 
(planned spending) that all the municipalities have to comply with (column 3 in Table 
6.1.); secondly annual accounts have to respect the limits of Economic Agreement, 
namely the de facto spending reported early in the following year (column 4 in Table 
6.1.).In case of non-compliance some economic sanctions might be applied, such as cut 
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back in resources allocated for the following year. Such sanctions have been gradually 
tightened since 2009; moreover if until 2013 control and sanctions were collectively 
applied, since then 60% of reduction applied only to municipalities breaching financial 
cap (Mailand 2014). 
However although financial caps are specified, flexibility is left to municipal decision to 
some extent, coherently with their decisional and economic autonomy: indeed at 
individual level each municipality is allowed to spend more on some budget lines and 
less on others since what counts is the aggregate level of expenditure within single 
administration. Importantly, it is allowed for some municipalities to spend more than 
other given that also nationally the Economic Agreements have to be respected on the 
aggregate level. 
The table 6.1 shows the development in Economic Agreements, the total budgets for the 
municipalities and their annual accounts in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
  
Table 6.1 Municipalities’ economy in nominal prices 
 
Economic Agreement, total 
(billion Danish krone) 
Budget, net public services 
(billion Danish krone) 
Annual accounts, net public 
services (billion Danish krone) 
2009 286 (219 net public services) 228 233 
2010 310 (228 net public services) 231 233 
2011 315 (233 net public services) 228 222 
2012 340 (247 net public services) 241 236 
2013 344 (232 net public services) 231 n.a. 
2014 347 (230 net public services) n.a. n.a. 
Source: Mailand (2014) and Regeringen/KL: Aftale om kommunernes økonomi ˗ The Government and KL: 
Agreement on the economy of the municipalities (various years). 
 
 
The table shows modest increases in the Economic Agreements following the economic 
downturn: however in 2013 for the first time resources for public services declined. 
Interestingly in 2011, not only municipalities planned to spend less on public services 
than they were allowed according to the Economic Agreement, but they ended up 
spending even less than budgeted (Mailand 2012a). 
Further measures implemented during the public sector collective bargaining round in 
2011include a wage-freeze for 2011 and very limited wage-increases in 2012 for public 
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employees in all the three main sectors ˗ the state, the regions and the municipalities ˗ 
following the wage-development in the private sector according to the so-called 
„regulation-mechanism‟ (reguleringsordningen). However limited to municipal sector a 
„security fund‟ was introduced during the bargaining round in 2011 to finance training 
for employees made redundant (Hansen and Mailand 2013). 
Moreover, specific measures targeting the marketization of some public services have 
been recently introduced as integral part of public sector reform started in the 1980s, 
very much in line with the general marketization agenda and complementing austerity 
measures targeting municipal expenditure. In 2007 indeed KL and the government 
signed an agreement where they determined that the 25% of municipal public services 
that is allowed to legally subcontract should be „exposed to competition‟, meaning that 
municipalities have to test the market through tendering for at least one quarter of the 
services they are entitled to provide. The „Indicator for Exposure to Competition‟ called 
IKU (Indikator for Konkurrenceudsættelse) corresponds to services exposed to 
competition as a percentage of all services which is legally possible to expose. 
 
Table 6.2 Public services exposed to competition 2006-2012  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
IKU 
2012 
definition 
19.5 22.6 24.0 24.1 24.9 25.0 25.4 
Note: IKU indicator = services exposed to competition as a percentage of all services which is legally 
possible to expose. 
Source: KL 2012 
 
However, since it is possible for municipalities themselves to present their own bids the 
exposition to competition not necessarily translates into outsourcing: the internal bid 
may prevail during the tender and the service remains publicly provided. In 2011 a non-
binding target was set in order to increase the share to 31.5%. These figures correspond 
to the aggregate level of exposition to competition within all the 98 municipalities, 
which overall in 2011 over 25% of services tested in the market, 24.9 were actually 
subcontracted to private providers (Økonomi- og indenrigsministeriet 2013). It is worth 
noting that „the level of outsourcing (measured as the percentage of spending on 
services exposed to competition) remained the same before and after the crisis. 
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Exposure to competition increased substantially, but this occurred before the crisis and 
was a reaction to a political demand to increase exposure in connection with the 
Structural Reform‟ (Mailand 2014: 420-21) as indicated in table 6.2. 
The regional indicator for exposure to competition (RIKU) based on the same rationale 
of IKU was first calculated in 2009 and displays significant differences between regions 
(Petersen et al. 2011) but the regional councils have never been subject to any 
agreement on compulsory competitive tendering. 
To sum up, the development in Denmark of outsourcing policies diffusion, drivers, and 
political support may be split up into diverse phases, despite „compared with the 
widespread privatization initiatives associated with the Thatcher and Reagan 
governments and the New Public Management era, Denmark was a latecomer in terms 
of introducing initiatives aimed at promoting contracting out and competitive tendering 
in the public services‟ (Petersen et al. 2013: 4). Initially, during the 1980s and early 
1990s, roughly corresponding to the Conservative-led government contracting out was 
mostly considered ideological whereas „there are the social-democrats who are more 
sceptical and the liberal parties which are for the market and for the competition‟ 
(Interview 71).  
Such clear-cut ideological distance existing between the Conservative-Liberal parties 
and the Social-Democratic parties was gradually overtook, replaced by a more 
pragmatic approach put forward not only by all parties along the political spectrum but 
also by association representing public administration as KL, trade unions and citizens. 
Indeed as commentators report „the debate has also been heated at times but has been 
less ideological and more focused on evidence and documented pros and cons of public 
versus private delivery‟ (Petersen and Hjelmar 2014:3, Petersen et al. 2011). Residual 
opposing stance still persist above all at national level where both Social-Democrats 
actors and union display a certain degree of scepticism, if not even of open resistance to 
marketization developments. However at local level, excluding extreme cases, the 
picture is rather homogenous: a pragmatic view prevails blurring differences across 
parties. Surveys conducted al local government level for instance demonstrated how the 
political party leadership had no impact on the level of contracting out in Denmark 
(Pallesen 2004). 
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Locally, stakeholders and social partners mainly show the same pragmatic attitude 
towards the issue for several reasons. Firstly, as reported by an official from the 
economic department of KL: 
 
they‟re rather pragmatic about it because for all of them is touchy if something goes 
wrong. They are always taking political risks by outsourcing things because people 
don‟t really clap their hands only because they have saved some money. And it‟s 
difficult if something goes wrong in institutions run by private suppliers, it is always a 
scandal! Of course it is also a scandal in the public one but not in the same way. So 
it‟s touchy for everyone but of course more in the case of the some social-democratic 
mayors. (Interview 56) 
 
Secondly, not only locally but also at national level, political decision-making is based 
on „consensual decisions and crisscrossing alliances‟ (Interview 56):  
 
even if the liberal party has the majority in local governments they still have to take 
into consideration the opinion of other parties, they would like to base the decision on 
large majority so they don‟t go just in one direction. (Interview 71)  
 
KL, collectively representing all the municipalities despite run by councils from diverse 
political orientation, plays an important role of mediator among different stances, trying 
to prevent ideological clashes between parties and finding satisfying compromises and 
agreements. An emblematic example told by an official from KL well elucidates this 
point:  
 
in February 2014 we had this Productivity Commission in the government which 
published a report on the issue of contracting out and recommended a few things. The 
report that the Minister of Finance commissioned to McKinsey came the week after 
and trigged a very ideological debate mainly by national politicians but we can hear it 
also here that the socio-democrats were less pragmatic than they would usually be 
because the opinion pool of the government is very poor and they saw this as an 
opportunity to challenge their ideological profile. And this is something we always 
tried to avoid because we can‟t promote outsourcing in a practical way if it becomes 
and ideological issue because this is a consensual organization, all our influence 
depends on our board to be able to find a consensus across party lines so we can 
negotiate with the government. So that is something we always try to avoid. (Claus 
KL 02/04/2014) 
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A third factor explaining the widespread pragmatism towards marketization policies 
recall across-the-board pressures which affected similarly all municipalities. The 2007 
Structural Reform strongly pushed all local government not only to find innovative 
solutions to modernize and improve their bureaucracies, but importantly attributed to 
the most decentralized level of government a wide range of welfare services to a larger 
population. Such reallocation of competences and functions was also complemented by, 
although modest, austerity measures setting strict expenditure cap for the provision of 
public services that all municipalities are required to achieve. Likewise IKU agreements 
between the government and KL involved all the municipalities which at aggregate 
level have to expose to competition an established amount of public services. 
A national official from the collective bargaining area of KL synthetized somehow the 
organisation stance on such point:  
 
I think that mainly the mainstream is what is more convenient, how do we think we 
can conduct our business in the most efficient way. So you we‟ll see some social-
democratic municipalities have gone very far and other examples have been for 
instance more right-wing. It‟s the municipality itself that is contacting the business so 
it will be very different. Maybe there has been some local discussion about it, and if 
there‟s a strong opinion in favour in the local area then they are feeling most 
comfortable with outsourcing. The municipalities keeping the services in-house for 
instance they might have had one bad experience and then they have reacted taking 
back the service saying: oh we will not do more outsourcing, we will stay in the 
municipality! So I think is very local and perhaps it‟s just one experience that can be 
very decisive about what they are doing, about future decisions. (Interview 55) 
 
The pragmatic approach translated also in several tools that both the government and 
KL promoted to ease outsourcing policies, preventing potential detrimental 
repercussions and making the processes as smooth as possible.  
KL created an on-line platform called “Procurement portal” (www.udbudsportalen.dk) 
with the purpose to facilitate cooperation between companies and public 
administrations, offering to both  
public and private providers guidance, knowledge and tools during the whole process of 
contracting out, including consultancy and step-by-step assistance in drafting tender and 
bids. On such platform municipalities may also find best practices reported by other 
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local governments in order not only to share positive experience but also to advise in 
case of negative events. 
A second platform created by KL called “Supply” (www.udbud.dk) instead constitutes a 
central procurement platform where public administrations may advertise their tenders 
and private providers present their bids. 
On the initiative of the government‟s main lawyer, a sort of think-tank called “Forum” 
was created encompassing in a small board of discussion members from private sector 
companies and their organisations, KL and councillors: through four meetings per year 
stakeholders and central actors discuss several common issues concerning public-
private collaboration. Once again the rationale is to find shared solution and pinpoint 
pragmatic efficient suggestion and guidelines for dealing with marketization processes 
ongoing.  
In order to promote innovative and socially sustainable initiatives in terms of tendering, 
the government has instituted a symbolic prize awarded every year to the best tender 
notice drafted by municipalities. A commission assesses tender on the basis of four 
criteria: degree of innovation; capacity to value private provider‟s skills and know-how; 
value-for-money; social, ethic and employment-related sustainability of the tender. In 
addition the government provides so-called “Innovation Funds‟ allocated to improve the 
development of markets in the provision of public services. Municipalities, upon 
submission of outstanding projects concerning outsourcing processes, may get these 
funds to be invested in consultancy in order to develop their skills in drafting tenders, 
preparing internal bids and involve social partners for the construction of a sound 
dialogue around such issue. As commented by a public manager who got the funds for 
developing a project on outsourcing of elderly care „they can give you extra quality for 
the whole process‟ (Interview 70). 
In the end, some direct legislative provisions (as the IKU agreements) and indirect 
pressures like the reshuffle of responsibilities across levels of governments following 
the 2007 Structural Reform constitute relevant drivers of outsourcing, but never 
equalizing the financial pressures experienced by Italian public administrations or the 
normative impositions set by the Compulsory Competitive Tendering in the English 
context. 
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6.3 The case of the Danish municipality 
 
The Danish municipality under scrutiny with about 40,800 inhabitants, located in the 
region of Hovedstaden, was created on 1 January 2007 following the 2007 Structural 
Reform as a merger of two former municipalities. Since 1 January 2014 the council is 
run by a Conservative majority led by a mayor from the Venstre party (right-wing 
party): historically the municipality has been mainly ruled by right-wing parties, whose 
dominance however has been interrupted by some left-wing governments. 
Restructuring towards outsourcing started in 1996 when one of the municipalities (for 
sake of clarity called here G. while the second will be called H.) embarked upon 
contracting out of elderly home care services, driven by the search for lower costs in the 
provision of service as well as the purpose to increase competition on quality. These 
social services have since then been subject to several tendering rounds: the second one 
in 2000, then in 2005 and the last in 2013 including also the second municipality H. 
which for the first time subcontracted home care services. All residential homes and 
some special institutions for people with disabilities have been externalised by the 
municipality G. in 2000 during the tendering process for elderly home care, while in 
2013 two residential homes have been taken back in-house under the public provision.  
In the Danish context such processes of outsourcing/backsourcing occur in a very 
smooth way, usually following the decision of municipalities to participate to tender 
presenting their own internal bid. In the municipality under scrutiny the council decided 
to establish an external company fully owned and controlled by the municipality for the 
provision of welfare and social services. When the local government decides to test the 
market for such services, or in other words „to expose these services to competition‟, the 
municipality prepares an internal bid fulfilling all the requirements set for private 
providers. The internal bid was submitted unsuccessfully during the tendering rounds 
both in 2000 and 2005, while in 2013 the municipality awarded its external company 
with a contract for running two residential centres for the elderly. 
The municipality G. then outsourced cleaning service in public buildings, including 
municipal offices, schools and kindergartens during early 2000s, extending the contract 
the second municipality H. during the tendering round that followed the merge in 2007. 
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In 2010 job centres have been externalized to a company in majority owned by the 
municipality while the company Randstad participated as minority shareholder. Due to 
economic problems and a steep decline in the quality of services provided, job centres 
were wholly taken back in-house after only one and half year. As very openly told by 
the mayor of the municipality who during the events was a member of the municipal 
council with functions in the economic committee:  
 
we tried to outsource our job-centres and that didn't work really this time, within the 
next years we can try again. It was in 2009-10 and we only did it for one and half year 
then it didn't work so we took the service in-house again and now we have the job 
centres internally again because the quality of the service went down, not to be quoted 
but yes!. I can put the blame both ways because I think we have been too quick doing 
the invitation to tender, we didn't do our own work properly and there were too many 
holes in the contract and didn't do the right follow up. So if we look internally we 
made some faults. And of course there were also faults on the other side: they were 
not professional in economic level, they didn't for instance make the budget that was a 
surprise for everyone, they didn't make the necessary controls on employees, they 
didn't make sure that the employees had the right qualifications. So there were faults 
on both sides. And it was good that we stopped so quickly so we could say that we 
didn't take the contract too long. We could do that again another time, but not just now 
because the confidence everywhere is not big enough. (Interview 69) 
 
Further externalization policies have been implemented after the 2007 merger, hence 
involving both municipalities since the beginning: this is the case of roads and parks 
maintenance services and waste dump management.  
Surprisingly, compared to the solution adopted in all the other cases investigated, 
catering services have been always kept internal, directly provided by the municipality. 
During the last years moreover the municipality embarked upon a public-private 
partnership for building a new public school: the construction works and the 
maintenance of the building for the following 25 years have been subcontracted to a 
private company while the ownership still remained public as explained by the mayor:  
 
we own the building, we paid for the building with loans. We pay each year for 
normal maintenance so the same guys building it are those who maintain it and that‟s 
important because then they had an economic incentive to do the right things. 
(Interview 69) 
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The main rationales which drove the municipality towards restructuring processes 
mirrored the developments occurring at national level. At the very early stages a strong 
ideological belief in market competition led the Conservative-led council in 
municipality G. to embark upon the first externalization processes of welfare services, 
despite all around the country similar experience were still very rare. The ideological 
approach soon turned into a more pragmatic stance, oriented to cope with an increased 
range of services to provide, strict budget constraints for the provision of public services 
which however left some leeway and the political will to guarantee high quality 
services. The mayor of the municipality witnessed that: 
 
the right-wing had this discourse since the last 20 years and there was a lot of ideology 
at that point but now it has gone. Now it's a question of doing things in the right way, 
making the best with the public money, that kind of question. When we discuss 
internally I can hear that that's the question, it is not a question that everyone should 
do it, everywhere. This is a question of doing in the right way and in the right place. 
(Interview 69) 
 
As reported by a municipal official in HR department employed in municipality G. prior 
to the merger:  
 
it was political the reason why they wanted to do this. True story is that the early 
director of municipality [G.] was a genius in innovation and he tried all this tools: of 
course for the economy but also for the services and the quality for the citizens in the 
municipality and that's why started in 1996. We tried a lot of projects about 
outsourcing but it was a pragmatic decision. (Interview 75)  
 
Such pragmatism pervading the council was mentioned by the mayor who explained the 
two-step procedure the municipality follows to outsource services as a means to 
illustrate the point:  
 
my distinction is that outsourcing has two steps. First step of outsourcing is to sit 
down in your organization and say: ok let's look at a specific area, is there market for 
it in Denmark? It should be in Denmark but we can also look abroad for some of the 
areas. And if there's a market and the prices on the market are free, they‟re not 
monopolized and you can go everywhere, then you can go to step two and say: ok this 
is actually an area where we can tell to the market that we are interested in and then 
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they will bid for it. And if we get a good offer then we go into the market but not 
before we are sure that the market is professional and the prices are not set from the 
actors in the market but from the market itself. So before opening the formal invitation 
to tender we test the market. That' s very important otherwise you create another 
monopoly and you won‟t get all different set of prices. That's very important. 
(Interview 69) 
 
Or again the director of welfare and social service department in the municipality 
argued that: 
 
I don't know if I would call ideological the reason, but it was political pragmatism: the 
political system, the political leadership wanted to try new ways of running eldercare 
and I actually think it's a really important point that you have to have political support, 
political opinion on if you should outsource or not because if during the outsourcing 
something goes wrong it's important that you also have the political system which will 
take the responsibility. We always have had the political system which has been really 
involved in making the contracts. (Interview 70) 
 
As elucidated up ahead this pragmatic approach is clearly reflected also in the 
implications that followed for both employees involved and for the relationship with 
unions. 
 
6.3.1 Impacts on terms and conditions of employment 
Restructuring events towards outsourcing in the Danish context are always followed by 
the transfer of the whole staff involved in public services exposed to competition. This 
translated in 600 employees transferred from the municipality to two main private 
company providing social and welfare services: Attendo and Aleris. Outsourcing of job 
centres instead has led to the transfer of about 100 employees, then taken back in the 
municipality after one and half year when the services was insourced. In all 150 workers 
involved in cleaning instead have been transferred, 70 previously employed in 
municipality G. and about 80 in municipality H.. 
The picture shows a massive transfer of municipal personnel towards the external 
subcontractors in case of externalization of public services: in no case workers were 
redeployed within the municipality, but they all followed the tasks where they were 
previously employed. The analysis however sheds light also on same cases of 
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backsourcing of activities, like the job centres and two residential homes: such events 
triggered an inverse process for workforce as well, who was transferred back to the 
municipality again. 
Despite national legislation enables public administrations to dismiss employees in case 
of reduced activity or to make staff redundant, that has never been the case in the 
municipality under scrutiny. Social and employment clauses specified in the contracts, 
complemented by a priori dialogue with both unions and private providers have 
traditionally ensured employment to the whole staffing level involved in restructuring 
processes, as reported by a municipal official in HR department:  
 
we never fire people. It's a statement we have: we work a lot with outsourcing but we 
also care about our employees so we have never been in a situation where we needed 
to fire people. Sometimes private companies have fired workers but we didn't. We said 
that when we do outsourcing we concern about the employees and also in the contract 
we describe a lot about which terms the new company should respect for the 
employees and of course we have social dumping clauses and working clauses. 
(Interview 75) 
 
The director of social service department confirmed such modus operandi adopted by 
the municipality during outsourcing:  
 
eldercare was private so all the workers were transferred to the external providers: that 
has always been the way things were outsourced and workers were transferred to the 
other companies. We have good dialogue with the companies and the trade unions 
actually to have good process with them. If you have situations where the level of 
activities is reduced then of course whether is public or private you have to reduce the 
number of employees. We also have good experiences with that and we have had a 
good understanding between the companies and also most of the workers, not in 1996 
when there was a huge rough strike against this political decision but all in all we went 
through and they outsourced it. (Interview 70) 
 
Such rather smooth paths of personnel transfer from the public administration to private 
companies was guaranteed, as above mentioned, by a proactive approach the 
municipality displayed with the purpose to safeguard all public employees, supported 
by the application of Transfer of Undertaking (Protection of Employment) Legislation 
(TUPE) which ensured to all staff to carry on their job for a different employer. 
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Although such protective framework applies especially in the short term, workers 
transferred might experience detrimental repercussions in the long run as explained by a 
national official from KL:  
 
there is a law regulating transfers called TUPE: those who are employed in the public 
sector, when you outsource, they are transferred to the private company but I don‟t 
think that they are required to take all of them if it‟s not necessary for doing the task 
but they are transferred. And as long as that collective agreement is running, two or 
three years usually is the duration period, if they are in the middle of that period they 
have the same working conditions after the transfer, but when it‟s ended then they are 
transferred to the private companies collective agreements. So it‟s always regulated in 
the short term. (Interview 56) 
 
Employment became more unsecure following the transfer to private subcontractors 
which, when the public sector collective agreement expires, are allowed to reduce the 
workforce through dismissals and making workers redundant. That occurred when 
cleaning services were outsourced in the municipality H. involving the transfer of 80 
workers:  
 
in cleaning area over 80 people were involved in outsourcing and half of them were 
fired afterwards. It was a bad contract because of some of the terms: it was the first 
time we made that kind of outsourcing and the company which bid on the job had 
another idea of the work (where you should clean and so on), so they said: we can do 
that with half of the staff and therefore they fired half of those who were transferred. 
The company is ISS. It's not the same quality now, the quality is not good and often 
we have to call and say: there has been no cleaning today and yesterday; the garbage 
bins are full, toilet paper is missing. (Interview 75) 
  
Redundancy occurred also during the second tender round for roads maintenance tasks: 
if during the first tender all workers in the service were transferred to a private 
company, when roads maintenance was subcontracted the second time the new provided 
winning the contract took the decision to fire six workers. The dismissal triggered a 
vociferous campaign against outsourcing since those employees were all resident in the 
municipality. Finally a small part of nurses involved in welfare services were made 
redundant by the private companies. 
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To sum up, all public employees in the municipality have been transferred to 
subcontractors following the tasks where they were involved: as a consequence they all 
shifted from the status of public employee to that of private sector employee. Despite 
rare, in some cases group of workers experienced also the inverse process of transfer 
from the private sector to the municipality ˗ as in the case of job centres ˗, subsequently 
modifying their status again. The application of TUPE regulation, which safeguard 
terms and conditions of employment during restructuring events, backed by collective 
agreements signed by social partners in both public and private sector every two-three 
years, guarantees high and encompassing employment protections for transferred 
workers. Indeed according to TUPE they are all transferred at the same condition, hence 
maintaining the contractual arrangements agreed upon the public sector collective 
agreement as long as it is valid. When expired, it is substituted by the private sector 
collective agreement of reference signed by the private companies and unions. In 
addition the pay adjustment scheme which links wage developments in the public sector 
to developments in the private sector, as a means to guarantee over the long term the 
same wage dynamics across the sectors, ensured broadly similar terms and conditions in 
both public and private collective agreements. A national official from the union FOA 
argued that:  
 
actually we have collective agreements with almost all the big companies, so even 
though yet you have this competition between providers, we as trade union still have 
the members and all in all the collective agreements in the private sector. More or less 
conditions are the same, at least the cost, maybe there‟s some difference in how big 
part of the salary is used for pension fund and so on that could be different, but still 
the total cost of an employee is the same in the public and in the private sector. We 
had a good result. (Interview 59) 
 
Moreover the municipality, as stable working practice, includes in tenders both social 
and employment clauses that subcontractors have to achieve to win the contract. 
Employment clauses concern mainly the reintegration of the whole staffing level, the 
application of collective agreements, stability in workplace and anti-social dumping 
clauses. Social clauses instead deal with a sort of social function that the winning 
subcontractors have to fulfil for the local community as explained by the municipal 
official in HR department:  
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when we do outsource, we concern about the employees and also in the contract we 
describe a lot about which terms the new company should respect for the employees 
and of course we have social dumping clauses, working clauses and social clauses that 
we describe in the contract. For instance in the green areas contract since we have 
people with disabilities we said that if they want to bid for the contract they have to 
take these people and care about them, give them a job for having a better life. Then 
there is a clause also for students: if they want to bid they have to take also students. 
In this way the municipality and the private companies together work for maintaining 
students. These are social, then there are clauses about salaries and about jobs in 
private companies: if you want to bid you have to respect these job terms. And 
specifications also about period of notice for workers when the contracts finish, to 
inform workers. We include a lot of clauses that we want the companies accept if they 
want to bid on the contract. (Interview 75) 
 
Such scenario applied to most of municipal employees involved in outsourcing 
processes, despite with some differences. As a general rule it holds true what the 
national negotiator in collective bargaining from KL pinpointed:  
 
we have in the public sector, I think, better conditions for the blue-collar workers than 
in the private sector. In simple way, we have better wage conditions and better 
working conditions for low-levels employees while the for the high-level employees 
it‟s better to be in the private sector. That‟s a challenge. I think is very common but I 
think we have a lot of areas, we have better wages for the lower level of the 
employees, for blue-collar workers in the public sector and we have better, for 
instance, maternity leaves, sick leaves and a lot of better conditions in this sense. 
(Interview 55) 
 
The externalization of green areas maintenance led to the transfer of 20 gardeners from 
the municipality to a private company called KL Group: the private sector collective 
agreement, applied when the public one expired, guaranteed more or less the same wage 
rate, slightly higher in the public sector, but rather different in terms of other allowances 
and benefits. Public sector collective agreement indeed provides for higher pension 
schemes, better paid holidays and higher sick-leaves payments. Moreover contracts in 
the private company are remarkably more flexible: if the municipality guarantees the 
job during the whole year, the subcontractor reduced staffing level during the month 
when the labour demand decreases as in winter for gardeners as reported by two trade 
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union officials from the local branch of 3F representing gardeners in both public sector 
and private companies (Interview 65, Interview 64). 
Also cleaning staff transferred to the private companies experienced detrimental 
repercussion on their terms and conditions of employment as argued by a union official 
from FOA:  
 
now it is still on lower conditions, not so much on the salary, but very much on the 
working conditions – how fast are you able to do the cleaning of a classroom in a 
public school for instance. And this is because the labour market is well organized so 
you have almost the same salary both in public and private, almost. There are issues 
also in cleaning, whether they are lower paid in the private sector, but somehow it has 
more been as I said on how fast can you go and also there has been competition on 
salary but that is when you have private companies which recruit in Poland or in 
Rumania nowadays. (Interview 59)  
 
If wage rates are broadly similar, benefits and allowances are instead more convenient 
in the public sector as described by a trade union official from the local branch of FOA:  
 
in cleaning if you get pregnant in the private company you can stay at home 3 months 
with your full salary, but if you work in the public sector you get payment for 6 
months.  
In the private company older people (workers with high seniority) have no specific 
care for them; in the public sector you can work less hours and still have the same 
pension. And when you turn 58, you have 1 week more of holiday every year in the 
public. It‟s a big difference I think for the old people and for the people who want to 
have babies. Another difference regards further education: for example when there is a 
new treatment, if you are in the public sector, it provides to you training for free, while 
in the private you have to pay by yourself the training. (Interview 62) 
 
The collective agreements applied to nurses in social and welfare services are instead 
more convenient for workers in the private companies in terms of wage rate as 
pinpointed a municipal official in HR department:  
 
they would change collective agreements from public to private but we can see here 
from the 1 June 2014, when we took back in-house some residential homes and we got 
40 employees from Aleris to the municipality, we could see that Aleris had higher 
salaries in the social eldercare and also see that Attendo almost the same but in Aleris 
they were higher than the public. We made agreement with their union that they have 
248 
to maintain the same terms and conditions when they came back, so I think workers 
are happy. (Interview 75)  
 
Moreover private companies agreed upon in the contract to pay extra-money as 
rewarding bonus to nurses who continuously work for at least three months without 
interruptions for leaves or sickness (Interview 62). Higher salaries however are often 
back by lower benefits for nurses as explained in detail by the municipal official from 
HR department:  
 
in the private sector you get the money for any extra hour while in the public you have 
better terms, maybe not better salaries but actually you have 2 paid days for parental 
leaves if your children are sick. So for every child until they are 7 years old you have 
2 days free to take off every year and if you are older than 58 you have one extra week 
of holyday per year that we call "senior days", and the salary the public pays for 
vacation is higher than the private. So if you take these conditions, they are better in 
the public even if the salaries are maybe lower or the same. Employees are not used to 
have these conditions, therefore in their world the most important thing is the salary 
and not if you have free days to take off to take care of children. I think they are not 
used to have all those benefits in the private companies. (Interview 75) 
 
Further differences between public and private sector collective agreements concern the 
lunch break and pension schemes. Traditionally all public employees have half an hour 
paid each working pay for lunch break, while most of private companies providing 
manual services did not agreed upon paid lunch break within the contracts (Interview 
71). Pension schemes display different rate as well: if in the local government an 
average corresponds to 14.55% of the wage, in private sector is lower, corresponding to 
12% of the wage, of which in same contracts a share has to be directly paid by workers 
themselves (Interview 51). 
In a nutshell, the exposition to competition of public services in the Danish municipality 
triggered massive processes of staff shift from public to private collective agreements, 
leading to negative implications if not so relevant in terms of salary, remarkable when 
further benefits or allowances are involved as pension scheme, maternity leaves, 
holidays and sick-pay scheme. 
Importantly, as pinpointed by several key-respondents interviewed, a widespread 
repercussion experienced by personnel transferred to private subcontractors is the 
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increase of workload. The most emblematic case is represented by cleaning services 
where different standards in the speed of work have been set up by contractual 
arrangements: collective agreements in private companies indeed agreed upon a specific 
amount of square meters to be cleaned in a given amount of time. To figure out to what 
extent workload increased, union officials repeatedly used the following figure:  
 
there has been a change of workload as they have to do the same things faster, so there 
has been a change in how many square meters you are able to clean in how many 
hours, it has been increased the amount. More precisely you have work-speed that was 
110, let‟s say, in the public and now is 130 in the private. I don‟t know the precise 
way how to figure out it but it has been increased. (Interview 59)  
 
A raise in workload for cleaners, in addition, was driven by a reduction in working 
hours to perform a task, as in the case of cleaning of municipal offices reported by a 
councillor:  
 
in the cleaning area it was usual that cleaners got 35 hours a week to clean the town 
hall, but when they were transferred to the private they maybe get 10-12 or 15 hours 
for the same area. Or you get the double area for the same time. So when you move 
from the public to the private you have to work very hard and of course it gets very 
bad. (Interview 64) 
 
Nurses transferred to private companies experienced a growth in workload as well as 
underlined by a union official from the local branch of FOA:  
 
if they had to take care of 5 people in 1 hour in the municipality, when they come to 
the private sector they maybe have 8 people, so it‟s a very high speed of work. So 
there is no place for people if they have a little bit of injuries: for instance if an old 
patient need extra-care or more time, you don‟t have the time for that. (Interview 62) 
 
Overall however employees involved in outsourcing policies are broadly satisfied with 
both their job and working conditions, thanks to employment protections guaranteed by 
TUPE regulation and the application of collective agreements in both public and private 
sector. A trade union official from FOA argued that:  
 
I guess that if you ask our members: what would you prefer? they would prefer to be 
public employees but if you ask to our members transferred in the private sector they 
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would mainly say they are satisfied. I guess they are mainly satisfied with their 
employers and very often they have big groups of private companies which sign good 
contracts with us‟ (Bang 10/04/2014). Beyond such rationale based on the economic 
appraisal of working conditions, often personnel transferred, above all in manual 
services, is even more satisfied in private companies because it feels part of the core 
business: „in the private company they are the company, in the public they are so little, 
they are just a number, there are people from the administration, teachers, many 
works, so care or cleaning are only a little part of the public services. (Interview 62) 
 
A bleak side however is also reported by public employees to shop stewards and local 
union branch: an increasing feeling of insecurity indeed stemmed from the exposition to 
competition of public services: despite legislative and contractual protections of 
employment, workers involved in transfer experienced changes in collective agreements 
every two-three years, often changes in their employer and a sort of constant threat to be 
made redundant in case of reduced activity (Interview 65). 
 
6.3.2 Impacts on employment relations structure and union strategy 
When the municipality G. embarked upon the first tender of elderly care services, union 
response, backed by the support of public opinion in the local community and citizens, 
was extremely harsh in opposing outsourcing policy. As reported by a municipal official 
in office at that time, a widespread resistance to externalization and privatization 
processes featured union stance in early stages. Such fierce disagreement towards the 
marketization of public services mirrored a wider nationwide ideological opposition 
featuring not only unions‟ national boards but also the Social-Democratic parties. 
Unions organized several campaigns against the privatization of public services, 
informing citizens about the risks that might follow, writing newspaper articles, 
speaking out on television (Interview 59, Interview 62, Interview 63). Their action was 
often backed by the organisations representing retired workers which in turn 
campaigned fearing a reduction in the quality of social and welfare services following 
the marketization. 
Union approach at local level however evolved, as long as outsourcing debate and 
practices were catching on during the late 1990s and above all in the 2000s, shifting 
towards a sort of cautious acceptance of the phenomenon. Never openly endorsing 
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restructuring processes, union local branches ˗ practically dealing with outsourcing of 
public services and personnel transfers in the municipality ˗ adopted a more pragmatic 
approach. Such shift traced back to an increasing awareness that both public employees 
involved and quality of public services were well sheltered from negative repercussions, 
awareness achieved through a sound longstanding tradition of dialogue between social 
partners during restructuring processes. The national negotiator in collective bargaining 
from KL argued that: 
 
trade unions ˗ I think ˗ they basically don‟t like outsourcing but they respect that the 
decision can be made by the municipalities and when the decision is made we have a 
sort of a process about what the municipality has to do. It‟s a process that includes 
also the trade unions, the shop stewards and the employees and I think that basically 
the process is a sort of accepted and it is in the daily life now. When the decision is 
made it is a sort of consensus between partners about what to do and you will discover 
that in the municipalities they are trying to conduct it in a good dialogue with the 
employees and the representatives of the employees. (Interview 55) 
 
Unions indeed have had since the beginning a wide range of legislative tools and 
employment relations institutions to leverage in order to protect terms and conditions of 
employment during outsourcing events. Firstly all unions‟ confederations and KL in 
1996 signed the so-called “MED agreement” which established Co-determination 
Committee (MED-udvalg), mandatory in each administrative unit with budget and 
personnel responsibility. These Committees are workers‟ representative bodies at 
workplace level, through which employees are compulsory informed and consulted on 
all kind and health and safety, personnel and HRM related issues, including all range of 
decisions concerning events of restructuring towards outsourcing, privatisation or 
transfer of undertakings which involve internal personnel. The municipal council under 
investigation, since the very first tendering round, used to inform and consult workers‟ 
representative during the early stages of each outsourcing process as reported by a union 
official from FOA:  
 
usually we get information about the plans and we might get an opportunity to an 
opinion, to have a say on how to do it, maybe well not do it or how to do it. So usually 
the council follows that condition: it is actually a part of the collective agreement on 
public service that if you have a task that is in risk of being outsourced, before the 
252 
decision is made, you have a right to have your say and this is what used to happen. 
(Interview 59) 
 
Such preventive dialogue with employees and their representatives in the local 
government has been traditionally set up not only as legal obligation, but pushed by the 
relevancy attributed to its function as explained by an official from KL:  
 
you are obliged to always have a dialogue with the employees when you make a 
decision on outsourcing, there is a rule for that: at the very early stage you have to 
discuss with them, with the small board of employees' representatives. But there's also 
this law that whenever you outsource a task then the employees should follow, and if 
you transfer employees which are very unhappy and very demotivated it's very 
difficult for a private company to take in these employees and actually make good 
quality so the process of informing and having a dialogue with employees is 
considered to be very important because if they are unsatisfied it's very difficult to 
have a good start in that way. So the process is very important. (Interview 71) 
 
A second set of tools at unions‟ disposal already discussed above is represented by 
TUPE regulation which protects employment arrangements during transfer and the 
Danish model of industrial relations based on the application of collective agreements 
negotiated by social partners every second-third year which provides for high 
contractual standards for both public and private sector employees. A union official 
from 3F cleverly explained as:  
 
the TUPE and the Danish system do help to keep better agreements, better standards 
as long as unions are still around 68-66% organized then we will be able to do that. 
(Interview 51)  
 
In the municipality under scrutiny unions signed collective agreements with almost all 
private subcontractors which took over as services providers; moreover as witnessed by 
a union official representing private sector workers from a local branch of 3F:  
 
in case of outsourcing we want collective agreement with private providers and if they 
do not accept I go talking to the councillor and I insist because they must have the 
agreement. Indeed councils are very sensitive about agreements because outsourcing 
to private companies without collective agreement is a political suicide. No 
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municipality would contract a service out to a company without agreements: it‟s really 
a political suicide. (Interview 65) 
 
This intertwined double level of protection that union can leverage during outsourcing 
processes has been well summarized by the national negotiator in collective bargaining 
from KL:  
 
during contracting out you have to regard some rules on two levels: for the employees 
as individuals but also for representatives of the employees and this sort of double 
level has been emphasized in connection with the EU because the EU gives rights for 
the individuals and you can say that the Danish model gives rights for the 
representatives. We are working in the Danish model, in a system of representatives 
and the EU is fundamentally a system for the individual, providing rights for the 
individuals. Indeed the law of transfer of business is mainly directed to individual 
workers they are taking care of, and in this system ˗ our system ˗ the collective 
agreements with trade unions and shop stewards provide collective rights for the 
employees. So we have this sort of double regulation of all these issues related to 
outsourcing. (Interview 55) 
 
Such framework is complemented by a third tool, namely the application of social and 
employment clauses within tenders, requiring to all bidders to take on all the workforce 
involved in the service subcontracted and to guarantee the application of collective 
agreements and related job protections.  
 
Unions are working with clauses they want when the municipality outsources, the 
trade unions want to make those clauses part of the contract, where they can specify 
that transferred workers have to work in similar conditions as the collective agreement 
in the area, but also that private subcontractors have to provide a certain level of 
training. That‟s part of the discussion in connection with outsourcing and the trade 
unions are very pushy about this matter: and if there are not such clauses, in that case 
they go straight to the politicians. (Interview 55) 
 
As a whole, the relationship between social partners may be described as highly 
collaborative above all at local level where almost all key-respondents used the word 
„dialogue‟ to represent a context where unions, workers‟ representative at workplace, 
shop stewards, municipal council and KL meet with the purpose to reach, when 
feasible, consensual decisions or at least supported by a large majority, but always 
254 
preceded by mutual information, consultation and negotiation. Such longstanding 
partnership has been confirmed, through triangulation, by all the main stakeholders 
involved in outsourcing decision-making within the Danish municipality. For instance a 
municipal official from HR department argued that:  
 
we work together with the union because when we say something they have to say the 
same otherwise employees are confused. We do a lot about working with the unions to 
take care of employees; when we do outsourcing it should be a good experience for 
the employees, therefore we need to have good relations with unions. We have FOA, 
DSR, 3F, in total we deal with 18 unions in our areas. Relationship with unions is 
good but unions have their own interest in employees: when they have been 
outsourced we had a lot of negotiations with unions and sometimes is good, 
sometimes is not so good but when we talk about outsourcing is usually rather good 
even if they tried to convince us to not outsource anymore. We have a good 
relationship with unions when we talk about outsourcing also because they know that 
we have tried this for a lot of years and they know that we concern about the 
employees and we concern about making the best terms for them. And they know that 
we are not trying to cheat and therefore we have a good relation. (Interview 75) 
 
The national negotiator in KL, from her experience in collective bargaining with union 
witnessed that: 
 
you can say that this dialogue is often due to the fact that the employees are electors as 
well, they are part of the citizenship in the municipality; but they [the politicians] are 
very concern about the conditions and the feelings, what employees are experiencing 
the process. I think that in the municipality they think that all these rules they have to 
discuss with the shop stewards and the trade unions are useful, I think that they 
appreciate that there is this dialogue with the shop stewards and the trade unions 
because it makes the process less adversarial. 
For instance we had in 2007 a huge restructuring of the public, the municipalities were 
reformed and we had this dialogue with the trade unions and I think it was a very 
important part because we could make this huge reform with very few conflicts, it was 
a very smooth process with the employees. 700,000 public employees had a new 
employer and it was a very smooth process, I think that if we have had this result was 
due to this dialogue, because we collaborate with the trade unions in the process. So 
both the employers and the trade unions just said to employees: calm! we are dealing 
with this process in a good way for you and we have made agreement about how you 
are treated and how you are going to have dialogue in each working place.  
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So in these outsourcing process I think we have a huge advantage that we had this 
tradition for dialogue on the working place and often it is a dialogue with a tendency 
for less conflict than in many other countries. (Interview 55) 
 
On the opposite side union official argued that: 
 
we are always consulted and our position is usually taken into consideration, of course 
with differences from case to case. We have had other cases of municipalities which 
have overnight decided to outsource but still we have been involved in the process. 
Usually we get information about the plans and the opportunity to express an opinion, 
to have a say on how to do it, maybe well not do it or how to do it. So usually they 
municipality actually follows that condition: if you have a task that is in risk of being 
outsourced, before the decision is made, we have the right to have a say. (Interview 
59)  
 
Or again referring to dialogue at workplace between unions and private subcontractors: 
 
we have our representatives both in the public and in the private. In the private we 
have 5-6 shop stewards and we have very good relations with these companies, we 
talk to them in a very good relationship. And private companies, they are very happy 
to have shop stewards because they take care of the whole things in the working 
places. (Interview 63) 
 
To sum up restructuring processes towards outsourcing in the Danish municipality 
occurred in a context of dialogue and collaboration on the whole between the local 
government supported by KL, unions and their representatives at the workplace and 
private companies taking over as subcontractors. Such dynamics did not translate as 
union claimed in the backsourcing of public services, but guaranteed a smooth process 
of transition of employees from public to private sector, where personnel enjoy 
remarkable levels of protection of their terms and conditions of employment. 
Exposing public services to market competition however triggered critical situations 
and challenges for union‟s capacity to collectively organise and represent workers. Not 
rarely in fact private companies subcontracted tasks or part of the services to further 
subcontractors along a complex production chain. That was the case for instance of 
Aleris and Attendo, the two companies taking over as social services providers which 
subcontracted catering service for the patients they took care of to a third company 
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(Interview 75). Or again in green areas maintenance services, the company KL-Group 
who won the contract with the municipality then subcontracted some activities to the 
company TMN Crew which in its turn recruited staff from the a temporary work agency 
called MEA Contractor (Interview 65). A third example is represented by public-private 
partnership the municipality embarked upon to build a new school: in such case the 
private company subcontracted tasks to another company which used to recruit illegally 
Polish workers without employment contracts (Interview 75). This fragmentation of 
production chain necessarily weakened union‟s capacity to monitor employment 
conditions for all workforce involved, leading to detrimental repercussions for salaries 
and working conditions. Specific training and information on these issues for both shop 
stewards and workers helped in coping with such challenge: in most of the cases indeed 
unions discovered critical situations of social dumping or non-application of collective 
agreements through warnings reported directly by workers‟ representatives at the 
workplace.  
A further challenge is represented by small private providers newly constituted in the 
marketplace which, in order to be more competitive reduced labour costs by applying 
individual contracts instead of collective agreements: that was the case for instance of a 
small company called Cura Pleje which won a contract for providing welfare services in 
the municipality. Once expired the public sector collective agreement for workers 
transferred they initially refused to sign a new contract with unions (Interview 62). The 
joint pressure of the local branch of FOA and the municipality, leveraging on 
contractual obligation to respect social and employment clauses fixed the problem.  
Moreover as argued by a union official: 
 
what is actually one of our main challenge is that it is difficult, it is more difficult to 
organize, to make a trade union working in small private companies than those big 
companies where we used to work inside. Things like having shop stewards is more 
difficult in these small companies. (Interview 59) 
 
Union membership has overall remained rather stable despite the intensive processes of 
workers‟ transfer and in general very high in both public and private sector: the rate is 
historically equal to about 60-65% in the local branches representing both the 
municipality and private companies operating in the local area (Interview 62). However 
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although at aggregate level membership rate is stationary, the transfer across 
organizational boundaries triggered a sort of internal competition among unions to 
recruit members. The main unions organizing in the municipality, indeed, are FOA and 
3F: the former mainly represents public employees while the latter has internal 
categories for both public and private sector workers. It follows that 3F through a cross-
sectoral structure may easily follows its members during the transfer, guaranteeing them 
the shift from public to private sector collective agreement as reported by one union 
official:  
 
the main part of 3F has agreement both in the public and in the private and that‟s 
different for example from FOA which are mainly public and they don‟t have 
agreements with the private, so they are a union in another situation. But we have one 
agreement for public cleaners and another agreement for private cleaners. So workers 
simply move from one agreement to the other but they just stay in the union. 
And we are working together because the outsourcing is ongoing, we are working 
together, me and my colleague who has the private companies to help workers who 
change sector. (Interview 64)  
 
A second union official from 3F added that: 
 
we talk in this house together, me and my colleagues in the private sector trying to 
improve the conditions for the people working on public sector jobs but on private 
negotiating settlements, so we are working on that. (Interview 55) 
 
Conversely FOA runs the risk to loose members when they leave the municipality as 
explained by a union official from FOA:  
 
we organize in public cleaning, so if the cleaning is privatized they will become 
members of 3F, but in the eldercare and the childcare the membership continues in 
FOA. That‟s part of tradition. (Interview 59) 
 
As external observer daily dealing with both unions in collective bargaining, a national 
negotiator from KL pinpointed an underlying competition between unions triggered by 
outsourcing policies, even if they formally denied it:  
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because you have the 3F and FOA which represent most of these blue-collar workers 
and they are sort of competing trade unions, they won‟t tell that but they are 
competing, because FOA is mainly representing the public area, they are a very big 
trade union in the municipalities, I think they are representing about a third of our 
employees but in the private area the 3F is the biggest trade union and often when 
employees go from public to the private market, they go from a collective agreement 
with FOA to a collective agreement with 3F. So it‟s also a change of trade union and 
in that way it‟s also a threat against the trade union FOA: if there‟s a lot of 
outsourcing they will be minimized, but today they are still very big. And that creates 
of course a double challenge for FOA because it‟s a challenge for members but also 
for them as trade union. (Interview 55) 
 
FOA union, well aware of the development occurring in the labour market following 
outsourcing events, adapted its approach also modifying its name in 2005 from FOA ˗ 
Forbundet Af Offentligt Ansatte (National trade union of public employees) to FOA ˗ 
Fag Og Arbejde (Trade and labour): the new name was purposely selected to 
encompass also workers from private sector, removing the exclusive reference to public 
employees. The shift was not only symbolic but, more importantly, structurally the 
union tried to adapt to the new developments that its members were experiencing as 
explained by a union official:  
 
it is not a symbolic change, it was also a change because we knew we have to organize 
inside the private sector, so we actually had a wrong name. My point was also that the 
tradition of being public services or being public employees is very strong. Every shop 
steward, everyone working in local trade union, the local branches and in this house 
has his/her own career being public employees, so it is really in our mind-set and we 
also have the challenge that we also think that it should be public. So sometimes we 
meet both private members and potential private members with an approach that is not 
as open as it should because they are paying the same membership fee and they have 
the same rights. (Interview 59) 
 
So for FOA outsourcing processes triggered a further internal challenge, since often 
members in private companies they represent: 
 
refer to me as negotiator that they feel they are looked upon as second class members 
so it is very important that we change our way of working. We have to do our own 
work also to change our culture: we have to face that challenge in a way that private 
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members also feel very welcome and private companies have to think we are an 
interesting partner in collective bargaining. It is difficult. (Interview 59) 
 
 
6.4 The case of the Danish hospital 
 
As anticipated in the introductory section, the 2007 Structural reform transferred the 
responsibility to provide healthcare to the five regions, established merging 14 previous 
counties, with the exception of homecare which remained a function of the 
municipalities. Following the reform, decision-making processes occurred at regional 
level, where the elected council is entitled to schedule financial and organizational 
planning for all the hospitals encompassed within the geographical area. Hence a region 
has been selected for the analysis as starting point where decisions concerning also 
outsourcing/backsourcing policies are made; then within such region the research 
focused on one hospital reflecting the criteria listed in the methodological chapter. 
The region under scrutiny encompasses about 800,000 inhabitants spread across 22 
municipalities: healthcare services are provided by 10 hospitals operating in the area, 
employing overall about 17,000 employees. 
Prior the 2007 reform only a few activities were outsourced in the hospitals belonging 
to the region, limited to cleaning services within the buildings and windows cleaning. 
Indeed healthcare sector on the whole has been almost exempt from any kind of 
financial or legislative pressures to expose services to competition. The administrative 
reform instead played a role in reshuffling responsibilities attributed to regions, entitled 
to manage almost exclusively the healthcare services through budgetary transfers 
directly from the central government: regional authorities indeed are not allowed to levy 
taxes, hence fully depending from the state from a financial point of view. However, as 
the finance manager of the region reported, such rationale has overall not affected the 
political decisions concerning outsourcing policies: money transfer from central 
government indeed has generally been consistent with the overall costs that region has 
to bear, thanks to the role played by the association representing regions called Danish 
Regions (Danske Regioner) which negotiates the annual financial frames of the regions 
with the Ministry of Finance. 
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The main reason underlying policy choices made by the regional council is ascribable, 
likewise in the Danish municipality, to a pragmatic approach towards services 
provision, free from ideological stance: restructuring processes towards externalization 
have been driven by the search for more efficiency in service provision, higher quality 
and whether feasible also lower costs. Such pragmatism is mirrored by the decision 
either to take services back in-house following negative experiences with private 
subcontractors ˗ like in the case of cleaning and catering ˗ or to keep internal provision 
of ancillary tasks as laundry and transport services ˗ generally exposed to competition. 
More in detail, transport services both internally for patients and externally for good 
across hospitals have always been performed in-house, as well as laundry service until 
2007: after the reform indeed the region exposed to competition the tasks in few 
hospitals, for taking it back in-house once the contract expired. Laundry service indeed 
has been fully centralized in two big public laundry centres which supply all the 10 
hospitals within the region. Specifically, in the hospital under scrutiny, the task has 
always been internally performed. 
Conversely windows cleaning and polishing service have been outsourced during the 
late 1990s and the exposition to competition lasted until nowadays according to a 
specific business plan as explained by the development manager of the region who 
supervised all externalization processes:  
 
we have outsourced small tasks like windows polishing mainly for safety reasons 
because when you have to clean those windows at the fifth or sixth floor is dangerous; 
and then is rather expensive and you have to have two or three specialized people to 
do it, so it‟s cheaper to have a private company which comes with the crew and the 
equipment and they can do it safely and cheaper. We don‟t have the machinery for 
cleaning the windows so it‟s easier to let the job to private companies which take also 
some other companies in the area. (Interview 53) 
 
Green areas maintenance has been subject to the first tender round in 2007: following 
the administrative reshuffle the regional council opted for splitting the geographical area 
in three parts ˗ the north, the middle and the south ˗ and to expose to competition the 
three areas separately. During the first tender round the service for the whole region was 
subcontracted to a company called LK Group; instead during the second round in 2013 
the control bid presented by the region won the contract in the southern area where the 
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service was insourced while LK Group got a new contract in the remaining areas. In this 
service indeed the council opted for opening the competition also to an internal public 
bid called “control bid” which, as explained by the manager of outdoor areas 
maintenance in the region consists of:  
 
the price at which we work at because we describe the standards of the green areas as 
it is in the bid, we don‟t describe the way we think it should be or the way we like it to 
be, we describe exactly the way it works at the moment. We describe it and we give 
our own bid: that‟s the control bid. (Interview 68)  
 
If the control bid turns out to be better off than external bids the service ˗ or part of it as 
in this case ˗ returns to the region. Such policy-making process mirrors once again the 
pragmatic approach the region displayed towards outsourcing: the market-type tool 
indeed was adopted only whereas it was clearly an efficient alternative to public 
provision. This stance is confirmed by the manager of outdoor areas maintenance who 
pinpointed that:  
 
the principle is to save money but since everybody says that they can do it better and 
cheaper, we sent it out a pre-qualification, that means that not everybody can bid for 
the green areas. They have to be ascertained and have to have certain qualifications, 
certain background and economic stability: then we invite the best qualifiers to present 
their bid. So the main reasons for outsourcing is saving money. But today it‟s not only 
about saving, but also how you treat the environment, whether you use electric car 
instead of petrol car, and if your people get the right qualifications which is a good 
thing. (Interview 68)  
 
In the hospital under investigation, green areas maintenance services have been 
externalized since 2007. 
Catering service was exposed to competition starting from 2007 and the picture that 
emerged is multifaceted. In six hospitals out of ten the service remained in-house, while 
in two other hospitals the regional council embarked upon a new organizational project 
together with two municipalities located closed to the hospitals. The three 
administrations established a joint-stock company, where the region entered as minority 
shareholder, with the purpose to jointly renew and run a kitchen centre called “Common 
kitchen” (Fælleskøkken) producing and delivering meals for both two hospitals and the 
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two municipalities: the underlying rationale was the search for economies of scale in 
catering services. The new kitchen, located on the upper floor on one hospital, was 
supposed to be operative since 1 January 2014, but at the time of the last interview in 
the region on 11 June 2014 with the manager of catering, the service was still closed, 
temporary supplanted by the internal service. As reported by the manager of catering 
service in the region:  
 
it is a small hospital and we have a kitchen placed at the fifth floor, very wise, with 
two small elevators: rather expensive to run because it was in the same building of the 
hospital, just on the top of the hospital, why not in the basement? It was very stupid so 
we had to do something about this kitchen to manage this business right. We had these 
two municipalities available and the politicians thought it could be a good idea to 
create a joint-stock company together to renew our kitchen where we can prepare 
hospital food, food for meals on wheels for elderly citizens and for nursing home. 
They thought it was a very good business. We, in this office, analysed the plan and 
said: you can‟t put these three things into the same kitchen because they are three 
different things, different food, different techniques, different qualifications to 
maintain the contract in nursing home, in a hospital and some local citizens where you 
have one-to-one business. From this office we told to politicians that it was not a good 
idea to put 65 million dkk in that kitchen, sitting there and doing nothing. But it was a 
political decision made against the advice from us, and we were right: now they are 
running this kitchen only for meals on wheels for citizens and the manager was fired. 
(Interview 74)  
 
Finally in two remaining hospitals, including that under investigation, catering was 
outsourced to an external provider called KRAM. 
Cleaning service has remained in-house in eight out of ten hospitals, while in the 
remaining two ˗ including the hospital under investigation ˗ was externalized in the 
early 1990s. Following the structural reform, the regional council initially opted for 
outsourcing cleaning again in these two hospitals to a subcontractor called ISS: once the 
contract expired however the service was taken back in-house as in the rest of the 
region. The region, together with the manager of cleaning in the two hospitals in 
September 2013 launched a new organisational plan called “service assistant plan” 
(Serviceassistent projektet): the project aimed at training a new internal professional 
figure defined “service assistant” designated to perform both cleaning tasks and 
transport of patients and goods within the hospitals. A two year training program was 
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scheduled for both cleaners and porters, including theoretical courses such as Danish 
lessons (the large majority of the workforce was indeed non-native speaker) and 
practical activities: all workers involved were then expected to work as both cleaners 
and porters appointed to transport patients and goods inside the hospital. The rationale 
driving such backsourcing process has been clearly elucidated by the development 
manager in the region:  
 
we have taken the task back home but also with the focus on reorganizing it. When 
you consider activities like this one, you can look at the circle of taking care of people 
or you can look at circle of taking care of services and we wanted to focus a bit more 
on the circle of taking care of people and therefore we tried to take some of the 
services a bit closer to the health circle and that‟s in fact what we are doing now. We 
are going to educate a lot of people from being just cleaners to be more 
multifunctional that can go in the wards and make other tasks, helping in the health 
circle. That‟s in fact the project that has been running now for over a year and will run 
more than two years before we are really feeling the difference out in the health sector. 
(Interview 53)  
 
Moreover as reported by cleaning manager in the hospital „staff is expected to be more 
qualified, quality of their life should increase and the service will be more flexible 
within the hospital‟ (Interview 60), expectation confirmed also by the union official 
from the local branch of 3F representing the large majority of workers involved: „it was 
good because many of them got an education through the project, so they could do a 
little more than cleaning‟ (Interview 67). 
The overall picture following restructuring processes in the hospital is then featured by 
a limited number of activities outsourced: if core healthcare services have never been 
exposed to competition, ancillary tasks have been subject to marketization processes 
only to a limited extent and not rarely taken back in-house for organizational and 
strategic reasons. 
 
6.4.1 Impacts on terms and conditions of employment 
What followed in terms of implications for working conditions and terms and 
conditions of employment broadly mirror the paths pinpointed in the Danish 
municipality. In case of restructuring of public services towards outsourcing workers 
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involved have always been transferred to the private providers taking the task as 
confirmed by the special consultant in the legal office for negotiation in the HR 
department of the region who followed all these processes (Interview 52). More in detail 
in the hospital under investigation three workers in windows cleaning services were 
transferred at the very early stage; about 100 workers in cleaning were instead taken 
back in-house shifting from the private to public employee status, while few more 
workers were hired (Interview 60); out of 50 workers involved in catering two were 
redeployed within the hospital to perform other ancillary tasks while all the rest was 
transferred to KRAM (Interview 74); finally in green areas maintenance 22 workers 
were employed overall: after the transfer 4 were made redundant by the private 
subcontractor LK Group (Interview 68). In a nutshell almost all the workforce involved 
kept the employment shifting the status from public to private one, except for cleaners 
who have been recently subject to the opposite shift as well.  
Likewise the municipality, in the Danish hospital the intertwined protections set by 
TUPE regulation and the tradition of collective bargaining in both public and private 
sector every second-third year guaranteed to all the workers transferred the same terms 
and conditions of employment as long as the public sector collective agreement was 
valid, as confirmed by the special consultant in the legal office for negotiation in the HR 
department of the region:  
 
we have the law about transferring tasks, and since we have usually the working 
conditions in the agreement which are not the same then companies have to negotiate 
with the unions to get the workers from that conditions to their conditions. By law you 
have to maintain the same agreement until is valid and then there are negotiations 
about working conditions every second year in Denmark. As Region we have an 
interest that all our employees are following the working conditions that they had with 
the Danish Region. (Interview 52)  
 
Once expired, it was replaced by private sector collective agreements which ensure 
rather similar wages thanks to the pay adjustment scheme which links wage 
developments in the public sector to developments in the private sector as a means to 
ensure over the long term the same wage dynamics across the sectors. 
Beyond such general framework however, some differences emerged on contractual 
arrangements and working conditions following outsourcing processes.  
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In green areas maintenance the shift from public to private sector has meant a reduction 
in working time: in rotation during winter-time when the activities to perform decreased 
7 workers were temporarily suspended as told by the manager of outdoor areas 
maintenance in the region:  
 
seven gardeners have been sent home in winter, it‟s quite a normal process here in the 
winter, because there‟s not so much to do. LK Group company send them home from 
the end of November to the beginning of April, when they are re-employed again: this 
is what you are allowed to do, the unions agreed with this, it‟s a special rule about 
winter rotation. But we have never sent people home in the winter: we didn‟t really 
need those people in winter but we kept them for the winter-work even if for most of 
the time they really didn‟t do anything during the day. But at least we could call them 
during the night in case of need. Whereas in the private sector they don‟t do that: 
you‟re either in or you‟re out!. (Interview 68) 
 
Beyond such reduction in working time during the year, gardeners transferred were also 
asked to work across different working places, often travelling during the daily shift. 
The private company KL Group established by contract to exclude travel time from the 
computation of the actual working time, in exchange for a fixed-rate paid to workers for 
each kilometre covered as explained by the manager of outdoor areas maintenance: 
 
if you are employed at the hospital, that‟s where you start at 7 o‟clock in the morning 
and at 3 p.m. you go home. So if you are at the hospital X and you have to work at 
hospital Y, they still start at the hospital X at 7 o‟clock, pick up a van and drive down 
there and it‟s 1 hour and half drive each way. So it‟s more than 3 hours gone just in 
driving but now the new way the firm does, which is a pretty good way, they pay 
people driving money, you get a fixed rate that is 3.81 dkk per kilometre but it means 
that if you have to work at hospital Y you have to be there at 7 in the morning and you 
have the whole day for working. It‟s best in the long run because it costs in driving 
money but you get people ready at workplace at 7a.m.. Now there‟s much more 
control and better management. (Interview 68)  
 
To sum up gardeners transferred to private company have been subject to longer 
working hours and increasing flexibility in workplace, complemented by rather similar 
wage rate and allowances, still slightly more convenient in public sector collective 
agreement as reported by a union official from the local branch of 3F representing these 
workers also in the private sector (Interview 67). 
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Also in the case of catering, staff transferred to KRAM private company, although 
overall terms and conditions of employment were rather similar still: 
 
if you are in the public there are some agreements with unions, if you are in the private 
there are other agreements, they are not the same. In the private company workers are 
less paid, have less holidays and more working hours. Whereas here in the region I‟m 
not allowed to pay them that less, I‟m not allowed to make them work that much. 
(Interview 74)  
 
Again wage rate is more convenient in the public sector compared to the private which 
in addition asked workers to bear increasing workloads. 
Staff involved in cleaning services instead experienced an improvement in terms and 
conditions of employment shifting from the company ISS back to the region as 
commented by the special consultant in the legal office for negotiation in the HR 
department of the region who negotiated with unions: „the experience we had when we 
took the tasks in the area of cleaning home again to the region is that the wages raised 
when we took back because ˗ this is my idea ˗ the private company has to earn some 
money when they get the task, therefore they have to pay low wages‟ (Interview 52). 
The union official from the local branch of 3F interviewed ˗ representing cleaners in 
both public and private sector ˗ was involved in both processes of outsourcing and 
backsourcing of cleaning staff: when the region embarked upon the “service assistant 
project” taking back in-house also the personnel, she very punctiliously pinpointed all 
the differences in terms and conditions of employment between public and private 
sector collective agreements applied to cleaner, summarized in table 6.3 that she 
circulated among 3F members involved in restructuring process. When the project 
started indeed workforce involved fearing detrimental consequence for their job, en 
masse questioned union‟s representatives for clarifications: as a means to provide 
satisfactory and clear responses the 3F local branch instructed such table to present in a 
general meeting to all workers involved.  
Some differences indeed emerged between collective agreements: wage rate is slightly 
lower initially in the public sector compared to the private one, but it increases more in 
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the long term; moreover maternity leaves, holidays and sick pays scheme are more 
convenient in the public sector contract. The public collective agreement in addition 
provides for further day-offs linked to the worker‟s seniority at the same monthly wage 
rate, not agreed upon in the private company, complemented by more convenient 
severance pay and notice period for the public workers compared to the private one (see 
table 6.3). Overtime regulation is also different since in the private sector each extra-
hour of work is regularly paid whereas in the public administration workers, instead of 
being paid, at the end of the month computed the total amount of extra-hours worked 
are then allowed to take off those hours from work: after three months remaining extra-
hours are finally paid. 
Overall contractual provisions are better off in the region compared to private 
companies, despite differences are marginal. Outsourcing policies however led also to 
increasing workload for workers involved in various tasks: gardeners were demanded to 
work longer hours covering several working places, that meant also travelling a lot 
during the shift while cleaners despite they reduced the speed of work shifting from the 
private company to the region they were now trained to perform more tasks including 
transport of goods and patients within the hospital. 
However key-respondents interviewed reported how workers were on the whole 
satisfied to work in the private companies since they felt part of the core company and 
had the possibility to earn extra-money working overtime. The emblematic example is 
constituted by cleaners taken back in the region when the service was insourced: they 
were really worried about terms and conditions of employment because the large 
majority of the workforce preferred working longer hours for getting paid higher than 
having the possibility to convert extra-hours in leaves as explained by the manager of 
cleaning of the hospital:  
 
all these workers were outsourced until last year when we took over all the same 
people. Salaries and working conditions remained almost the same when we took 
them in-house: almost because they went a bit up but there are some differences in the 
way we pay the people. In the ISS they all get a little bit extra when they work in the 
evening and ISS paid that amount of extra-hours; in our organization they go into a 
bank where you save the time so you can get off those hours another time. And if they 
haven‟t took the time off for that extra-hours within three months, it goes out in 
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Table 6.3 Terms and conditions of employment for cleaners: differences between public and private sector collective agreements 
 Collective agreement applied by the region 
Collective agreement applied by the private 
subcontractor ISS 
Wage payment period  
1-31 of the month 
paid the last working day of the month 
15 in a month to 14 next month 
paid the last working day of the month 
Pay supplement paid following month paid the same month 
Pay component Fixed salary + supplements 
129.31 hourly rate for all hours 
Service supplements 3.65 for all hours 
seniority allowance 4.65 for all hours (after 1 year) 
free to select (paid or pension) of 1% of salary (paid monthly) 
(equivalent to 138.99 Danish crowns per hour) 
service assistants + 4 Danish crowns + 1% per year hour 
Public holidays Fixed monthly salary Sunday/holiday charge 3.5% of the salary paid by the  
Additional holydays 
5 extra days of holiday.  
Fixed monthly salary 
5 extra days of holiday.  
Holidays 
5 week vacation.  
Fixed monthly salary 2.35% holiday bonus 
5 week vacation. 
12.5% of wages paid through holiday cards 
Extra work (to replace 
sick colleagues) 
Normally, you have to cover sick colleagues area for up to 3 days at 
no extra charge. 
Doing only the most necessary 
If you are going to cover an area for sick colleagues, fill out a chart 
of the tasks that cannot be solved (form attached). 
Make a sick colleague's work, you should be paid for their hours 
Dismissal 
According to the Salaried Employees Act: 
- for the first 6 months: 1 month notice for the employer/ 1 month 
notice for the employee 
- from 6 months to 3 years: 3 months / 1 month 
 - 3-6 years: 4 month / 1 month 
- 6-9 years: 5 months/1 month 
- more than 9 years: 6 months/1 month 
Notice apply from the end of a month 
Notice:  
- first week: same day 
- first 6 months: two weeks/2 weeks 
- 6-12 months: 2 months/1 month 
- 12 months to 3 years: 3 months/1 month 
- more than 3 years: 4 months/1 month 
Notice apply from the same day 
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 Collective agreement applied in the region 
Collective agreement applied by the private 
subcontractor ISS 
Severance pay  
After 12 years: 1 month salary 
After 15 years: 2 month salary 
After 18 years: 3 month salary 
After 10 years: 1 month salary 
Sickness pay full pay during illness full pay for 56 calendar days within 12 months 
Child sickness leave full pay the first 2 days full pay first day 
Days off for seniority 
58 years: 2 days 
59 years: 3 days 
60 years: 4 days 
No days off 
Pension scheme 
12,75% 
waiting period of 10 months 
final wage in the pay check is the net one 
deducted from the own contribution to the pension 
12,15% 
after 10 years of 12.75% 
waiting period of 2 months 
 
Health scheme no health system in addition to any local agreements paid health care system through pension Denmark 
Maternity leave  
fully paid 8 weeks before and 14 weeks after. 
If employers are reimbursed 
fully paid 4 weeks before and 14 weeks after the employer get 
refund 
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money. People have had hard time understanding that it‟s a different way of doing that 
because they prefer having money immediately. (Interview 60)  
 
The general feeling that officials from both the region and unions experienced however 
was a widespread insecurity and fear concerning changes: the staff, beyond a personal 
preference in working either with a public or private employer, does not like frequent 
changes in working conditions and contractual arrangements as argued by a union 
official from the local branch of 3F:  
 
workers are not happy to go back to the region because they like what they know: 
when they moved to ISS they said “oh the wage is so low, it‟s too fast!” but then when 
they went back to the public they said again “I don‟t understand, the wage is so low!”. 
So I think that people like the things they know and it will take one or two years for 
understanding and say “ok this is better”. (Interview 73)  
 
Or again an official from the region confirmed that:  
 
they are not that happy, not everybody was happy, actually someone were rather 
unhappy. I think it‟s not because of politics, it‟s not because of union, it‟s because of 
the human being: they don‟t like changes, the want safety, they wanted no changes 
and stability in their lives; you want to know what you are pay for, this is Maslow, 
basic!! I think is that. I know what I have, I don‟t know what I‟ll get. (Interview 74) 
 
Such feeling of insecurity was reported also by gardeners transferred to the private 
subcontractor LK Group as explained by the manager of outdoor areas maintenance in 
the region:  
 
I‟m still in contact with people who moved to the private and those who want to work 
they think it‟s ok, if you are flexible they got a good job. Of course it‟s different but 
the biggest fear was before it happened, they anguished about what was going to 
happen: they had the same job for 25 years, then was the terrible fear of the unknown 
that prevailed. Workers grumbled saying “this is not what we are used to do”. But 
after that they are happy because they realized that it‟s union who decides and controls 
the transfer: they got to have a warm room to sit in and things are not much different. 
(Interview 68)  
 
 
271 
6.4.2 Impacts on employment relations structure and union strategy 
Given the limited number of services exposed to competition in the hospital, unions 
have never organized structural strategies of resistance or opposition to restructuring 
policies: the processes have traditionally been strongly governed by unions who take an 
active part during personnel transfer. Moreover workers‟ representatives elected in Co-
determination Committee enjoy the rights of information and consultation on personnel 
and HRM related issues, also related to restructuring towards outsourcing, privatisation 
or transfer of undertakings events. Employees and their representatives are thus always 
informed and consulted during externalization process: although they can barely oppose 
the process, their involvement ensures to workers the respect of TUPE regulation about 
transfer of undertaking and the application of collective agreement of reference as 
explained by a trade union official from the local branch of 3F (Interview 67). The 
manager of outdoor areas maintenance in the region added that:  
 
unions have been involved from the start, not right from the start but actually as soon 
as we started building up the contract concerning the groups of employees. We met 
with everybody and the union‟s representatives from the different parts came as well 
for being part of the process. They didn‟t want to outsource but they are aware it‟s a 
political decision, they can‟t say that they didn‟t want to change anything. They just 
made a point saying: we don‟t thing is a good idea. Their job was mainly to make sure 
that all the EU laws were obeyed, so that‟s why they were invited to be part of that 
process. (Interview 68) 
 
Shop stewards are elected in both the hospital and private companies taking over the 
service, enabling unions to closely monitor working conditions and the application of 
collective agreement at workplace as reported by a trade union official from 3F:  
 
we have shop stewards elected every two years and the companies accept them, in 
Denmark is normal to respect workers who are elected at workplace as representative. 
If people have problems the shop steward speaks to them and then speaks to the 
employer. If people have to work too much and they should have a speak with the 
leader, the shop steward goes with them and if something is not right he tries to fix it. 
He has a good relationship with the leader of the company, that‟s the normal way 
usually. And then we have a representative from union for security at work, that‟s 
another kind of representative that is elected: it is called “safety representative” (AMR 
˗ arbejdsmiljørepræsentant). He‟s job is to check that people don‟t work with stuff 
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which are not allowed or that they work in positions which are always good or safe. 
These representatives are elected one from the workers and one from the employer 
and they have to work together on such safety-related issues. (Interview 73) 
 
Unions, thanks also to a longstanding tradition of collective bargaining in both public 
and private sector, were able to sign agreements in all the private companies providing 
services for the regional hospitals.  
The overall scenario in the hospital regarding employment relations between unions, the 
region as employer and private companies subcontracting public services is featured by 
a sound collaboration between social partners, as already pinpointed also in the Danish 
municipality. Each single restructuring processes is carried out through dialogue and 
negotiation between parties involved which usually tries to overcome divergences in 
their stances in order to reach shared decision. For instance the special consultant in the 
legal office for negotiation in the HR department of the region reported an interesting 
example of such collaborative relations:  
 
when we took back the task of cleaning in the hospital, one of the official from union 
who normally represents the private area came and she was very sceptical about the 
shift of her members from the private company to our working agreement because she 
was worried they were very different in the built up, and actually it‟s quite different. 
She was very sceptical but we used lot of energy to convince her that we provide in 
fact better working condition in our agreement. We came to an agreement when she 
really understood how it was. (Interview 52)  
 
On her side, the union official involved in the processes replied that: 
 
I think that our relation is not so bad. Together with the manager of cleaning in the 
hospital we made a lot of education, so it wasn‟t so bad. We got about 100 people that 
took that education and a lot of them were from different countries, they didn‟t speak 
Danish and we put extra teachers on it: that was possible because we worked together 
with the hospital. (Interview 67)  
 
As above reported unions used to have a collaborative partnership with private 
companies as well. Another example regarding the nature of relation between unions 
and the region as employer is reported by the manager of outdoor areas maintenance:  
 
I have a good relations with unions but personally I know people in my job that have 
hard time with unions in other regions. Unions representing the gardeners they‟re on 
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my side and I‟m on their side because we just want things to work. We hadn‟t got such 
strict rules, we wanted just to get home with the job. Me and the representative of 
gardeners, we were sit in different sides of the table but we always ended up with 
agreements because he‟s calm and sensible, he does the best for his people and I tried 
to listen to his sides of the argument. Out of the recorder, we keep each other 
informed, we just checked how it is going and that‟s a very good thing. (Interview 68) 
 
In general union membership remained stable despite restructuring events: not only 
outsourcing involved a limited number of workers, but the large majority were 
represented by 3F union which ˗ as extensively explained in the case of municipality ˗ 
represent manual workers in both public and private sector. So during transfer workers 
renewed the membership in the new category of reference.  
To conclude, exposition to competition in the hospital triggered some challenges for 
unions. Firstly private companies imposed to transferred workers increasing workload, 
higher flexibility in working time and working place and longer shifts: unions faced 
difficulties in coping with such issues that were all agreed in collective agreement. A 
second challenge was represented by foreign workers, who gradually grew in number in 
the technical tasks outsourced: as reported by the union official from 3F: 
 
these workers are from many different countries, European, Asian and African 
countries, China and Japan, many from Turkey and it was rather difficult to organize 
these people since they don‟t speak Danish and do not understand our tradition of 
being member of a union. (Interview 73)  
 
Overall however outsourcing events did not particularly undermined the Danish 
tradition on employment relations in the healthcare sector. 
 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
 
Exposition to competition in the provision of public services in Denmark has 
traditionally been characterized by a pragmatic approach: put aside the ideological 
stances of the early days during the 1980s (Pallesen 2004), outsourcing constituted a 
manageable market-type tool to exploit whereas suitable to improve quality of services 
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through competition, able to boost value for money. Despite some differences still 
present between Conservative-Liberal parties on the one side and Social-Democratic 
parties on the other side, the prevailing attitude mirrored a pragmatic political will to 
find an efficient solution in services provision, reached through an encompassing 
dialogue among parties which should led to a large majority decisions, if not even 
consensual. Such pragmatisms is reflected also by the several cases of backsourcing 
implemented by political council of both orientation in the municipality as well as in the 
hospital, when the internal provision turned out to be the most convenient.  
Local government and healthcare sector have been subject to marketization pressures of 
different extent: if pressures on the latter were almost inexistent ˗ neither legislative or 
financial ˗, conversely in the former case the increasing range of functions attributed to 
municipalities following the 2007 structural reform, complemented by, despite limited, 
budget cuts played a remarkable role towards outsourcing, together with agreements 
negotiated between KL and the government pushing municipalities to test the market 
for an established rate of public services. 
As a consequence indeed the municipality under scrutiny outsourced a larger number of 
activities compared to the hospital, including also core services such as home care, 
residential care and social services for people with disabilities. Conversely the hospital 
limited market testing to few manual services. Interestingly cases of backsourcing have 
been reported in both sectors. 
Implication for terms and conditions of employment followed in the two cases a 
common pattern as summarized in table 6.4.: all workforce involved was transferred to 
private subcontractors taking over the service at the same terms and conditions of 
employment. According to TUPE regulation public sector collective agreement was 
applied as long as it was valid, then replaced by respective private sector collective 
agreements negotiated between unions and private employers. A longstanding tradition 
of negotiation every second-third year in both public and private organisations, a high 
coverage of collective agreements as well as the role played by the pay adjustment 
scheme ˗ which links wage developments in the public sector to developments in the 
private sector as a means to ensure over the long term the same wage dynamics across 
the sectors ˗ ensured rather similar conditions to all personnel transferred. 
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Such positive outcome was feasible, beyond employment regulation and institutions 
above mentioned, thanks to a longstanding tradition of dialogue and negotiation 
between social partners ˗ unions and their representative, regional and municipal 
councils and their representing associations (KL and DR), private companies and their 
association reported by table 6.5. Despite the negotiations did not prevent from 
outsourcing public services, certainly ensured the application of the most convenient 
conditions for staffing level out of those processes. 
In addition, institutional bodies for workers‟ representative at workplace such as the Co-
determination Committee (MED-udvalg) played a relevant role in informing and 
consult workforce regarding all personnel and HR-related issues are discussed, 
including the transfer to private subcontractors following services outsourcing. 
The analysis however sheds light on some differences across sectors as well. As 
anticipated, exposition to competition interested a higher number of services in the 
municipality compared to the hospital, and as a consequence a larger workforce, 
including both low-skilled and high-skilled workers as nurses. Not only a remarkable 
amount of public employees was transferred to private sector companies at different 
working conditions, but some cases of dismissal and workers made redundant were 
reported in the municipality. 
Finally, although the relation between social partners is rather collaborative in both 
sectors, several frictions occurred in the municipality along the years between the 
council and unions: the marketization of social and welfare services in Denmark still 
constitutes an “hot potato”, a sensitive issue for both trade unions and citizens as users 
of the services. 
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Table 6.4 Labour-related variables affected by outsourcing in the Danish municipality and hospital 
 
DENMARK - MUNICIPALITY DENMARK – HOSPITAL 
Public employment in services 
outsourced 
The whole public personnel was transferred to private 
subcontractors 
The whole public personnel was transferred to private 
subcontractors. 
2 workers in catering relocated within the hospital. 
Cleaning staff taken back in-house in 2013 
Transfer of public personnel to 
private providers 
All public personnel transferred All public personnel transferred. 
Redundancy 
Some cases in private companies where public 
employees were transferred  
Very few cases in private companies where public 
employees were transferred 
Size of public employment 
Decreasing following outsourcing: several public 
employees transferred to private companies 
Rather stable: outsourcing limited to few services 
Collective agreement applied 
Public sector collective agreement after the transfer as 
long as it is valid, then replaced by private sector 
collective agreement of reference 
Public sector collective agreement after the transfer as 
long as it is valid, then replaced by private sector 
collective agreement of reference 
Wage rate 
As long public sector agreement is valid: same wage. 
Then rather similar but lower in private sector 
As long public sector agreement is valid: same wage. 
Then rather similar but lower in private sector 
Workload Highly increasing in private companies Increasing in private companies 
Inequalities in contractual provisions 
Differences between public and private sector collective 
agreements concerning maternity leaves, pensions 
scheme, sick pay scheme and holidays 
Differences between public and private sector collective 
agreements concerning maternity leaves, pensions 
scheme, sick pay scheme and holidays 
Social clauses in tender to reintegrate 
the staff 
Always included Always included 
Workers’ issues  
Increasing feeling of insecurity due to continuing re-
tendering. 
Multi-tier workforce in social services. 
A case of subcontracting in contracted company 
Initial concern for cleaners when they were taken back 
in-house 
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Table 6.5 Employment relations-related variables affected by outsourcing in the Danish municipality and hospital 
 
DENMARK - MUNICIPALITY DENMARK – HOSPITAL 
Union stance towards outsourcing 
Initial opposition to outsourcing, above all concerning 
social and welfare services. 
Then pragmatic approach oriented to protect working 
conditions for workers transferred 
Traditionally a pragmatic approach oriented to protect 
terms and conditions of employment for workers 
transferred 
Union strategy and responses 
In the early days: harsh campaigns to oppose 
outsourcing. 
Then monitoring the application of TUPE and collective 
agreements 
Monitoring the application of TUPE and collective 
agreements 
Workplace representatives 
Shop stewards always elected in both public 
administration and private subcontractors. 
Co-determination Committee provide employees‟ 
representative the rights of consultation on personnel and 
HRM related issues. 
Shop stewards always elected in both public 
administration and private subcontractors. 
Co-determination Committee provide employees‟ 
representative the rights of consultation on personnel and 
HRM related issues. 
Union consultation 
Unions are always consulted when workforce is involved 
in transfer.  
Unions are always consulted when workforce is involved 
in transfer. 
Relationship between social partners 
Social dialogue; collaborative partnership despite 
strongly different stances between union and council 
Social dialogue; collaborative partnership 
Challenge to union  
Negotiation in small companies and problem of 
subcontracting in private companies 
Difficulties in organising non-Danish workers: raising 
number in private subcontractors 
Membership 
Generally stable and rather high in both public and 
private sector. 
Some difficulties in recruiting members in private sector 
for union FOA. 
Generally stable and rather high in both public and 
private sector 
Users’ involvement 
Union representing retired workers campaigned with 
union for the quality of elderly care 
n.a. 
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Chapter seven 
Outsourcing in public services:  
a comparative perspective 
 
 
Empirical evidence presented in the three previous chapters shows that restructuring 
processes towards outsourcing in the provision of public services impacted on working 
conditions and industrial relations structures in a wide array of ways. Indeed the first 
objective of the present study is to investigate the impacts of outsourcing process of 
public services on terms and conditions of employment and industrial relations 
structures in different European countries and across diverse public administration sub-
sectors. Through a case study analysis in six organisations, the present research 
identified several diverse repercussions affecting terms and conditions of employment ˗ 
ranging from employment status, wage rate, sick pay scheme, pension scheme, working 
hours ˗ as well as industrial relations structure such as collective bargaining, employees‟ 
representations and union consultation procedures. However, unlike the main stream of 
literature investigating the vertical disintegration processes in private companies has 
suggested a great deterioration in the variables at stake (Kelleberg 2003, Doellgast et al. 
2009, Flecker and Meil 2010, Jaehrling and Méhaut 2013), restructuring in public 
administrations not necessarily led to detrimental implications for employees. 
Conversely the scenario is patchy: in the public sector the interplay of higher regulative 
employment protections and a more encompassing scope of collective bargaining acted 
as a buffer ˗ if not preventing ˗ in sheltering public employment from erosion in given 
institutional and legislative circumstances. 
As elucidated in the methodological chapter, the present research is built upon a double-
level comparative research design which enabled to investigate whether such 
consequences on working conditions and employment relations of outsourcing 
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processes, embedded in different national institutional contexts and diverse segments of 
public administration do follow convergent trajectories along the same pattern, or 
conversely, whether they do diverge according to different legislative and institutional 
national arrangements and/or to different peculiarities and constraints characterizing 
public sub-sectors. The research question lying at the heart of the dissertation can be 
reformulated as follows: does the country matter? Does the sector matter? 
Literature on value chain analysis indeed has formulated different hypothesis as regards 
the impacts of vertical disintegration of service provision on employment relations 
strategies and implications for labour, lying on a set of various explanatory factors. 
More specifically these structures and outcomes are understood to vary according to 
four main criteria: the degree of influence of lead firm in determining employment 
relations strategies and practices in supplier firms; the level of skills and knowledge of 
employees at disposal of supplier firms, which is tightly related to the nature of 
activities to perform; stability of employment (tenure and type of employment) in the 
supplier firm; national institutions and legislation shaping supplier employment 
structures (Lakhani et al. 2013). 
Furthermore the drivers of such marketization processes in public service provision 
might have played a role in shaping outcomes for labour. Consequences for 
employment structure in fact may vary depending on whether public administrations 
embarked upon outsourcing as a means to downsize public employment (Alonso et al. 
2013), to reduce labour cost (Quiggin 2002) or conversely if market competition is 
driven by the search for greater flexibility in service provision (Atkinson 1984). 
Implications indeed, despite some common trajectories across the three countries and 
the two public sub-sectors under scrutiny, display rather clear-cur divergent models 
which trace back to different national institutional contexts, as well as sector-specific 
characteristics. 
The overall picture in Italy is featured by a preponderant stability in employment status 
for public employees involved in subcontracted services: in both sectors the large 
majority of personnel has been redeployed within the public organisation at the same 
terms and conditions while wider transformations in employment status and working 
conditions affected a marginal proportion of temporary public employees. Likewise 
industrial relations structures displayed a certain degree of continuity in their traditional 
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role to collectively represent workers despite the increasing fragmentation of 
employment triggered by outsourcing policies. 
Conversely public employment in England has been subject to remarkable changes in 
terms and conditions of employment and job organisation following a massive transfer 
of the whole staffing level from public administrations to private subcontractors taking 
over as service suppliers: the shift across organizational boundaries ˗ which became 
increasingly blurred and overlapping ˗ not only deteriorated working condition but 
importantly weakened union structures and capacity to organise and protect workers.  
The Danish cases instead represent a sort of intermediate pattern where features of both 
the Italian and the English scenarios are recalled. On the whole indeed public staff 
experienced several transfers between organisations ˗ from the public administration to 
private companies, between external providers, as well as from the private sector back 
to the public one ˗ which led to transformations in their terms and conditions of 
employment. Nevertheless such changes have not been necessarily detrimental thanks to 
a longstanding strong tradition of social dialogue between social partners which 
outsourcing did not undermine. 
The double-level comparative perspective of the research however highlights a second 
track. Repercussions following externalization processes indeed to a certain extent 
diverged between the two sectors under scrutiny within each national context, 
displaying sectoral-specific convergent trajectories across countries. More in detail in 
local government outsourcing policies more harshly and more extensively impacted on 
working conditions and employment relations structure compared to healthcare 
organisations where less adversarial and stronger social partners collaborated to prevent 
severe repercussions for working conditions, on the whole more protected. 
Similarly market-type policies triggered a tough increase in workload and the 
institutionalization of a two-tier ˗ or even multi-tier ˗ workforce, regardless either 
national legislative arrangements or sector-specific structures. Even if to a diverse 
extent and through different processes, thus, the consequence of vertical disintegration 
in the six public administrations has been that formerly unitary structure internally 
providing all the services now host a multiplicity of employment arrangements within 
their organizational borders. As a consequence the traditional representative structure of 
trade unions built exclusively around public employment started to teeter. 
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In the previous chapters the case studies analysis has untangled how outsourcing 
impacted on working conditions and employment relations within three countries – 
Italy, England and Denmark– across two different sectors of the public administration – 
local government and health care sector. The present chapter provides instead a 
comparative account of implications following outsourcing firstly across national 
contexts and then between sectors. A complex and differentiated picture emerged from 
the six public administrations in-depth investigated: evidence from organisations at 
micro-level indeed enabled to trace national macro-level and sectoral meso-level 
trajectories. 
 
 
7.1 National distinctiveness 
 
The overall picture is dominated by a growing fragmentation of employment conditions 
and a deterioration of work (Marchington et al. 2005, Flecker 2009). Employment has 
generally become more insecure and flexible, in terms of both working hours and 
workplace flexibility. Greater demands are placed on work tasks, including increasing 
workload, longer shifts and higher speed in work. Additionally, terms and conditions of 
employment established by private providers underwent a sharp worsening, if not so 
relevant in term of salary, rather harsh as regards pension scheme, maternity leaves, sick 
pay scheme and holidays. As far employment relations structure is concerned, 
outsourcing undermined union capacity to collectively represent and organise 
employees in fragmented production chains where boundaries between organisations 
and between public and private sector are increasingly blurred and overlapping. 
Restructuring towards outsourcing moreover triggered the creation of a two-tier ˗ or 
even multi-tier ˗ workforce where workers with similar educational background at the 
workplace perform the same task but under different contractual arrangements 
according to the nature of their employer ˗ whether public or private.  
Nevertheless the argument put forwards is that trajectories following restructuring 
processes are shaped by specific national legislative frameworks and institutional 
configurations (Flecker 2010, Vraengbæk et al. 2013). Findings indeed highlight the 
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complexity and the resilience of state tradition in reforming public service employment 
relations, tackling market-like pressures of the same kind (Bach and Bordogna 2011). 
We can observe indeed how different countries likewise reforming their public service 
provision through outsourcing policies display divergent configurations in employment 
structures: a significant contrast in policy-making process and intensity in policy output 
emerged between countries in respect to both sectors. Given that countries dealt with the 
same process by implementing externalization policy in similar services and involving 
comparable skills, the degree of difference stands as a remarkable tribute to divergent 
influence of the respective legislative and political framework (Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2011) 
The most clear-cut difference between countries concerns the structure and the status of 
terms and conditions of employment resulted from restructuring processes across 
organizational boundaries, as summarized in table 7.1. In both the municipality and the 
LHA in Italy the large majority of public personnel involved in outsourced services has 
been redeployed within the public administration where they belonged, thus preserving 
their status of public employees. As a consequence public sector collective agreements 
applied before contracting out of the service remained in force, as well as the 
employment protections attached to the public status, much greater than those applied in 
the private sector. Transfer of personnel across organizational boundaries has involved 
only a residual portion of temporary public employees, who shifted their terms and 
conditions of employment in private sector arrangements, traditionally less convenient 
and less protective for the worker. Finally an even smaller number of public employees 
has been moved on functional secondment basis to the external providers, but remaining 
formally employed by the public administration. Overall the picture in the Italian 
scenario is featured by a highly protective employment scheme for public personnel set 
by legislation and strengthened by a tradition of strong unionism in public sector 
(Bordogna and Neri 2011) which applied during restricting processes as well. 
Conversely in the English context both the cases of the local authority and the NHS 
foundation trust witnessed a massive transfer of public staff towards private 
subcontractors taking over as service providers. Despite few initial tendering rounds 
backed by a „soft touch‟ as regards workers (Interview 32) on the whole public 
personnel was subject to a remarkable erosion of terms and conditions of employment 
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when transferred to private sector contracts: detrimental consequences include a decline 
in wage rate, sick pay scheme and maternity leaves. This is particularly true before 
TUPE regulation safeguards were compulsorily applied to public sector as well in 1993. 
A further harsh consequence was represented by a cut in pension entitlements under the 
private employer‟s regime. Moreover outsourcing policies led several workers to be 
made redundant. As far industrial relations are concerned indeed voluntary relations 
between the social partners prevailed in England, where the level of interference from 
the state in both public and private sector is minimal. Such tradition is reflected also on 
employment arrangements for transferred workers during outsourcing, where social 
partners free from legislative constraints may establish working conditions. Furthermore 
the balance of power between unions and employers has shifted decisively in favour of 
the latter during the last decades (Bach and Kolins Givan 2011), driven by a national 
politics under Conservative-led governments determined to encourage a more abrasive 
style management about labour-related issues and to marginalize union‟s influence.  
In Denmark instead exposing to competition the provision of public services has 
triggered a dynamic flow of workforce transfer across organizational borders in both 
directions. Staffing indeed has been transferred out during outsourcing events and taken 
back in-house when ˗ not rarely ˗ in both municipality and the hospital services have 
been insourced. Terms and conditions of employment remained almost unaltered during 
transfers even though the personnel shifted from public to private employers and vice 
versa. Changes in working conditions have been reported in private sector, in particular 
as regards salary, paid overtime, holidays and sick pay scheme which became less 
convenient for transferred workers. Nevertheless such difference between public and 
private contractual arrangements has been traditionally rather limited thanks to 
intertwined protections set by TUPE regulation and the longstanding tradition of 
collective bargaining every second-third year between social partners in both public and 
private sector, where agreements have a remarkably high level of coverage. In addition 
the pay adjustment scheme, linking wage developments in the public sector to 
developments in the private sector as a means to ensure over the long term the same 
wage dynamics across the sectors guarantees broadly similar conditions in the two
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Table 7.1. A comparative perspective: impacts of outsourcing on terms and conditions of employment 
 
ITALY ENGLAND DENMARK 
MUNICIPALITY 
LOCAL HEALTH 
AUTHORITY 
MUNICIPALITY 
FOUNDATION 
TRUST 
MUNICIPALITY HOSPITAL 
Public employment in 
services outsourced 
Large majority 
relocated within the 
administration 
Large majority 
relocated within the 
administration 
Large majority 
transferred to private 
companies 
Manual: transferred 
Clinical: in-house or 
seconded 
Clerical: redeployed 
All transferred to 
private companies 
All transferred to 
private companies 
Redundancy None None 
Several in blue-collar 
workforce 
Few manual workers  
Some cases in private 
companies 
Few cases in private 
companies 
Main collective 
agreement applied 
Public sector  Public sector  
Employer‟s unilateral 
regulation and private 
sector  
Private sector  
Public sector until is 
valid, then private 
sector 
Public sector until is 
valid, then private 
sector 
Wage rate 
Same for public staff 
Lower for staff in 
private companies 
Same for public staff 
Lower for staff in 
private companies 
Before TUPE: lower  
After TUPE: rather 
similar  
Similar for workers 
transferred 
Very similar Very similar 
Workload Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing 
Inequalities in 
contractual provisions 
Two-tiers especially 
in social and 
educational services 
n.a. 
Decline in pension 
schemes, sick pay, 
maternity leaves and 
holidays 
Decline in pension 
schemes for manual 
workers 
Small differences in 
maternity leaves, 
pensions scheme, sick 
pay, holidays 
Small differences in 
maternity leaves, 
pensions scheme, sick 
pay, holidays 
Social clauses  Always included Always included  Never included Never included Always included Always included 
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sectors of the economy. Such employment relations structure prevented also from 
redundancies which indeed have been very limited in number. 
The second wide difference across countries is grounded on the impacts that 
outsourcing processes had on employment relations structure and union role to tackle 
with challenges for employees triggered by restructuring events as summarized in table 
7.2. 
In Italy indeed collective bargaining kept a central role in setting terms and conditions 
of employment in both public and private sector while union remained the stronghold in 
the public organisations where they have been traditionally informed and consulted 
during restructuring processes involving staff (at least until the 2009 Brunetta reform 
but the large majority of outsourcing events under scrutiny occurred before 2009). 
Union overall succeeded in their strategy to safeguard public employment where terms 
and condition of employment remained rather protected and union density high. The 
institutionalisation of a two-tier workforce in public services conversely showed how 
their action turned out to be more ineffective when private sector workers recruited by 
external subcontractors were at stake, due to the lack of a structural dialogue between 
union categories representing respectively public and private sector employees and to a 
strict focus on defending public employment. 
In Denmark overall collective bargaining and social dialogue between union and 
employer remained the main coordination mechanism to set terms and conditions of 
employment during restructuring processes towards outsourcing in both public and 
private sector. A systematic information and consultation mechanism with employees‟ 
representatives at workplace enabled union to settle convenient arrangement for workers 
across organisational boundaries. Moreover despite outsourcing policies, a steadily high 
union membership rate conferred a remarkable representative power upon union. 
Conversely in England competitive tendering policies further weakened the role of 
union in collectively organise and represent employees. Collective bargaining has been 
replaced by employers‟ unilateral regulation in some private subcontracting companies 
while unions‟ role as interlocutor in restructuring events involving staff and HR-related 
issues was notably squeezed. Compared to the scenario observed in the other two 
countries union response has been certainly prompt and more systematic, grounded on a 
twin-track approach to overcome the dilemma that outsourcing triggers to union role: 
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Table 7.2. A comparative perspective: impacts of outsourcing on employment relations structure 
 
ITALY ENGLAND DENMARK 
MUNICIPALITY 
LOCAL HEALTH 
AUTHORITY 
MUNICIPALITY 
FOUNDATION 
TRUST 
MUNICIPALITY HOSPITAL 
Union stance towards 
outsourcing 
Fragmented 
opposition 
Systematic 
opposition 
Initially strong 
opposition 
Then: pragmatic 
approach to protect 
workers 
Strong political 
opposition backed by 
pragmatic approach to 
protect workers 
Strong political 
opposition backed by 
pragmatic approach to 
protect workers 
Traditionally a 
pragmatic approach 
oriented to protect 
workers 
Union strategy and 
responses 
Focus on keeping 
core services and 
public employment 
Focus on care 
services and public 
employment 
Twin-track approach 
Harsh industrial 
actions 
Twin-track approach 
Campaign to inform 
employees and users 
Harsh campaigns to 
oppose and to monitor 
contract application  
Monitoring the 
application of TUPE 
and agreements 
Workplace 
representatives 
Always elected in 
municipality and 
private companies 
Always elected in 
municipality and 
private companies 
Only one shop 
steward 
Several shop stewards 
and Joint Consultative 
Committee  
Shop stewards and 
Co-determination 
Committee 
Shop stewards and 
Co-determination 
Committee 
Union consultation 
Always consulted 
before Brunetta 
reform. Then only 
informed 
Always consulted 
Symbolic 
consultation: no 
substantial 
involvement 
Unions and JCC 
always consulted 
Always consulted Always consulted 
Relationship between 
social partners 
Fulfilment of 
minimum legislative 
requirement. Union 
seen as an obstacle 
Collaborative long-
standing tradition of 
social dialogue 
Adversarial relations 
Council purposely 
weakened union 
Partnership and social 
dialogue between 
social partners 
Social dialogue; 
collaborative 
partnership despite 
different stances 
Social dialogue; 
collaborative 
partnership 
Challenge to union 
action  
Two-tier workforce 
in crèches and social 
services 
n.a. 
Fragmentation of 
employment  
Facility time cannot 
be used for activity in 
private companies 
Negotiation in small 
companies 
Difficulties in 
organising non-
Danish workers 
Membership Decreasing Rather stable Decreasing Rather stable Rather stable Rather stable 
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namely whether they should primarily focus on either opposing privatisation or 
protecting employees. Nevertheless neither strategy has been successful. 
Beyond inner differences, the cross-country comparison seems to pinpoint two main 
divergent trajectories for labour following outsourcing of public services. A first cluster 
encompassing Italy and Denmark ˗ for both sectors ˗ is featured by relatively well-
safeguarded terms and conditions of employment for public personnel involved in 
restructuring processes. As far industrial relations are concerned a central role is still 
played by collective bargaining institutions while unions kept a relevant degree of 
representativeness.  
The second ˗ thus divergent ˗ cluster including England is characterized instead by an 
erosion in contractual provisions applied to transferred public employees by private 
subcontractors and a weakening of industrial relations structure, on the one hand 
undermining union capacity to influence the processes whilst on the other hand 
increasing employer‟s discretion in setting working conditions. 
Several observations have to be introduced here to elucidate these patterns. Diverse 
institutional explanations indeed can be put forward to disentangle the development of 
such divergent configurations: however the various explanations are not competitive but 
instead they complement themselves in an intertwine web of mutual influence. 
 
7.1.1 The role of employment relations regime 
First, as already anticipated political, institutional and legislative constraints affected the 
way in which outsourcing policies have been implemented in the different countries, 
and subsequently the outcomes. Impacts indeed vary according to the regime of 
industrial relations to which each country answers (Flecker 2009, 2010). As literature 
has showed an extended labour market regulation as well as strong employment 
relations structure may act as mediators in alleviating and controlling the negative 
impacts of restructuring process (Vrangbæk et al. 2013, Jaehrling 2014). This is the 
case of Denmark which is featured by an inclusive regime where regulations and 
policies are designed to extend employment and employment rights as largely as 
possible, providing welfare and security to all workers, minimizing differences within 
the labour market (Gallie 2007). Accordingly high protection to weaker categories of 
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workers is guaranteed (Hansen and Mailand 2013). Moreover organized labour has a 
strongly institutionalized role, interacting with the state and employers‟ associations for 
an almost universalized protection of work terms and conditions. Importantly, 
membership rate is very high in both employees‟ organisations and employers‟ 
associations while collective bargaining coverage, slightly higher in the public 
compared to the private sector, is above the 80% (Bechter and Brandl 2012). 
The assumption holds true for the case of Italy as well, characterized by a rather high 
degree of union density, above all in the public sector where the rate is around the 50% 
and a very high collective bargaining coverage, around the 80% at national level, but 
with a percentage amounting to 100 in the public sector (Bechter and Brandl 2012). 
Furthermore as far industrial relations are concerned Italian approach grounded on 
voluntarism between social partners where legal institutions are limited while autonomy 
of the parties involved is rather high: traditionally social partners have exploited such 
leeway to establish a strong tradition of collective bargaining in the private sector of the 
economy. The public sector instead represents an exception to the voluntarist approach: 
it has been shaped indeed by a long tradition of state intervention in the definition of 
procedural rules for collective bargaining and in the issue to negotiate (Bordogna and 
Neri 2011). The legislation historically provided public employment with high job 
protections and very convenient conditions.  
Conversely a market employment regime (Gallie 2007) like in England might have 
paved the way to detrimental consequences for terms and conditions of employment 
given that it is a model which puts emphasis mainly on market adjustments and self-
regulation, hence minimizing the role of employment regulation and organized labour 
institutions seen as negative rigidities (Bach 2012). Accordingly, employment 
conditions and job rewards are self-regulated by the well-functioning market, while 
institutional role and controls by organized labour are reduced to the lowest level: terms 
and conditions of employment indeed are regarded as a matter of individual employers 
rather than a collective issue. Such framework could have enhanced perverse effects of 
marketization process of public service delivery. 
Hence implications over working conditions and collective labour institutions following 
vertical disintegration towards outsourcing are crucially embedded in the employment 
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relation regime to which the country answer. The effects moreover might be shaped also 
by further institutional and regulative mechanisms purposely enacted.  
Findings clearly show how encompassing labour market national institutions like the 
one in Denmark and Italy, despite do not preventing from outsourcing, mediate the 
effects of outsourcing and act as a buffer bringing up terms and conditions of 
employment. Conversely a decentralized prerogative of employers in setting working 
conditions where the role of union and collective bargaining institutions is minimize 
pave the way to a progressive erosion of terms and conditions of employment as in the 
case of England.  
Indeed industrial relations regime and legal context set boundaries which may constraint 
managerial practices and leeway in dealing with restructuring of service provision. 
Within such boundaries however public employers and private subcontractors have a 
range of options to design their strategies, while they may also explore how boundaries 
can be stretched. In Italy legislative and cultural constraints to public employers‟ leeway 
are rather tight: a strict regulation protecting public employment, including long-life 
employment security backed by an established tradition of collective bargaining 
between social partners on HRM and labour-related matters have historically bound 
employers‟ strategies as regards outsourcing policies. So the state legislation has gained 
importance as a coordination mechanism and an institutional anchor for job quality 
(Jaehrling and Méhaut 2013, Jaehrling 2014). Public personnel, as rule of thumb, was 
relocated within the administration while savings through a reduction in labour costs 
were dumped over workers recruited by private companies taking over as service 
suppliers.  
Such pattern developing in the Italian scenario retraces a clear dynamic of labour 
market dualization whereas outcome of institutional structures affecting labour market ˗ 
such as labour market regulations and social policies ˗ is reflected in a sharp distinction 
between internal and external market arrangements (Doeringer and Piore 1971). 
Accordingly workers belonging to the internal segment enjoy job stability, high salary, 
opportunities for career mobility and fair treatment in the workplace, while conversely 
workers who gain access only to secondary sector are poorly paid, unstable, 
characterized by high turnover and bad workplace conditions. Moreover, given the 
limited mobility between the two segments, once trapped in the secondary market the 
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possibility to move to the primary are very limited. Indeed as hypothesized by Palier 
and Thelen (2010) these inequalities are more likely to become institutionalized, rather 
than transitory.  
In the Danish corporatist context instead constraints have been voluntary set up by 
social partners through negotiated agreement. Boundaries include a collective 
bargaining structure where the parties renew collective agreement every second-third 
year in both public and private sector, complemented by the pay adjustment scheme that 
link wage developments in the public sector to developments in the private sector as a 
means to ensure over the long term the same wage dynamics across sectors. In addition 
both employees‟ organisations and employers‟ association in the public and private 
sectors of the economy share a very high density rate: it followed a relative high 
coverage of negotiated agreements between parties in almost all the companies: rarely 
private firms refuse to sign collective agreements with unions. Hence such framework 
has limited not only the range of practices at local public employers‟ disposal to 
implement outsourcing policies but also the leeway for private subcontractors to boost 
earning through an erosion of terms and conditions of employment. Outsourcing 
translated in fact in rather stable terms and conditions of employment for employees 
transferred through a smooth and employment-friendly transition across sectors. What is 
left for public administrations is the leverage of flexibility through subcontracting 
mirrored in the dynamic possibility to handily transfer personnel out and back in-house. 
Conversely, in England the market-type employment relations regime and the liberal 
background denoted the possibility to open up new strategies for employers to 
implement outsourcing policies. The search for savings which pushed outsourcing 
translated into a race to the bottom in labour costs through a deterioration of terms and 
conditions of employment for employees in large majority transferred out, partly made 
redundant. Indeed the great degree of managerial discretion in setting contractual 
conditions in the private sector seemed to have triggered what Jaehrling and Méhaut 
(2013) defined a „change through avoidance‟: institutional changes in contractual 
provisions resulted from employers‟ strategies undercutting or circumventing 
employment standards set in public sector collective agreement through a shift towards 
the more competitive and less strictly regulated private sector labour market. 
Outsourcing is exploited to evade collectively agreed terms and condition in the public 
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sector, encouraged by the wage differentials between public and private sector and 
backed by an employment relation regimes that leaves great leeway in that sense. 
Furthermore the slack boundaries that the national institutional arrangements set to 
managerial discretion led the employer to devised a strategy of internal distribution of 
uncertainty (Crouch and Keune 2012). Empirical findings in the English municipality 
pinpointed that the council not only decided to circumvent public sector collective 
agreement by outsourcing as a means to reduce labour costs by dumping inequalities 
and uncertainty in working conditions on transferred employees, but it dumped part of 
such burden on internal public personnel as well. On the one hand indeed it undermined 
collective labour institutions for public employees ˗ it cut down facility time, reduced 
the number of recognized union, stopped collecting contributions for union membership 
fee ˗ whilst on the other hand it opted out the Green book unilaterally reducing sick pay 
scheme for internal staff and eroding terms and conditions of employment applied to an 
in-house team of manual workers as described in chapter five.  
Although visibly different in their configurations and outcomes, the English and the 
Danish model share a trajectory in public service outsourcing that put into question the 
basic assumptions of dual labour market perspective (Doeringer and Piore 1971) 
according to which „firms actively pursued a strategy of separation of the workforce, 
which divided employees into core and fringe workers‟ (Hassel 2012:3) as a mean to 
achieve savings and flexibility through more liberal employment rules for peripheral 
workers. Thus outsourcing it has been argued to be beneficial for core workforce, since 
it can work as a buffer, sheltering them from company restructuring, budget constraint 
and market fluctuations and pouring all these risks on peripheral workers. 
The English and Danish institutional structures affecting labour market instead paved 
the way to a more liberal framework for setting conditions of employment where both 
core public employees and private sector workers at the periphery indeed are potentially 
subject managerial strategies to reorganise the production change. Outsourcing, instead 
of cushioning core workers, negatively affects this workforce segment as well (Flecker 
2009, MacKenzie 2009), putting growing pressure even on permanent workers in 
standard employment relations and raising the „levels of insecurity even within the zone 
of integration‟ (Dorre 2005, Flecker 2009). Restructuring processes in these institutional 
settlements indeed challenge the traditional idea that core and periphery are clearly 
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distinguished according to level of skills and commitment required by the lead firm, 
raising the need to reconsider the core/periphery model (Purcell and Purcell 1998). 
Indeed outsourcing of public services seems to modifie the „power relations between 
employers and labour and thus put pressure on the core workforce to make concession 
of their employment conditions‟ (Flecker 2009:253, Caprile 2000, Marchington 2005, 
Doellgast and Greer 2007) as findings from the English local authority demonstrate.  
Of course so far the extent to which detrimental consequences have impacted on core 
segment are more limited in their extent in the Danish corporatist regime compared to 
the market-type model applied in England. Nevertheless in the Danish case „the 
insecurity of the periphery that may have initially sheltered the core tends to gradually 
creep into the core as well: the working conditions of the peripheral workers begin to 
act as a benchmark for the core workers who feel increasingly pressured to accept a 
worsening of their working conditions‟ (Gavroglou 2007:15). 
To sum up national institutional arrangements as well as employment relations regimes 
set a specific boundaries where public administrations may devise their strategies 
towards outsourcing which vary across countries. As a consequence employers‟ 
practices of contracting out triggered divergent trajectories in their outcomes as regards 
terms and condition of employment and union responses according to the different 
institutional opportunity structure they face at national level (Jaehrling and Méhaut 
2013). 
Interestingly the comparative perspective highlighted a specific labour-related issue that 
have been equally affected across all the six case studies under investigation: workload. 
Restructuring events towards outsourcing indeed triggered an increase in workload, 
meant as a raise in speed of work or in the number of tasks to perform in the same 
amount of time. Such common detrimental consequence seems to endorse what said so 
far about the role of national institutional arrangement in shaping consequences of 
marketization in public service. All the other dependent variables scrutinized to 
disentangle how outsourcing as independent variable impacts on working conditions 
and employment relations represent labour institutions (see tables 7.1 and 7.2). Such 
institutional factors may embody the double role of dependent variable as well as 
intervening factors affecting consequences of outsourcing. This holds true for instance 
when collective bargaining institutions, union membership rate or industrial action are 
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at stake since they contextually both shape and constraint outsourcing outcomes and are 
at their turn affected by the process itself according to the feature they present. All the 
institutional variables for intrinsic and context-related reasons displayed divergent 
trajectories across countries.  
Workload instead is a labour-process variable whose repercussions following 
outsourcing similarly deteriorate across all national boundaries. The lack of adequate 
safeguards to labour process dynamics such as workload or speed of work may have 
represent a legislative loopholes that employers exploited cross-country to increase 
workforce productivity and contain labour costs wherein alternative institutional 
solutions (cut of wage rate for instance) were not workable or prevented by legislative 
protections. 
 
7.1.2 The tradition of public administration 
A second explanation of national distinctiveness traces its roots back to the tradition of 
comparative public administration studies. Scholars in the field put forward that a given 
tool or practice ˗ in such case outsourcing as market-type tool inspired to NPM-doctrine 
˗ may give origin to quite different implications and outcomes for labour in different 
institutional circumstances (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). It is indeed the interplay of the 
intervention and the country-specific legal and cultural context which triggers 
nationwide distinctive outcomes in the way a policy tool is implemented and results 
(Bach and Bordogna 2011, Bordogna and Neri 2011, Pollitt and Dan 2011). The focus 
on organisational and managerial practices needs to be complemented by an 
understanding of the institutional context in which policies are implemented and the 
distinct role of the state as employer (Bordogna 2008). 
Italy is clustered as „modernizer‟ (Pollitt, van Thiel and Homburg 2007) where NPM-
inspired reforms have traditionally coexisted with a greater resilience on legal provision 
to regulate employment relations: this enabled union to challenge the market-type 
reform that breach long-established constitutional principle and administrative 
provisions. A strong state tradition is seen as „the irreplaceable integrative force of the 
society, with a legal personality and operative value system that cannot be reduced to 
merely the private sector discourse of efficiency, competitiveness and consumer 
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satisfaction‟ (Pollitt, van Thiel and Homburg 2007:20). Italy has been clustered by 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) as new-Weberian state where a modernization of the 
Weberian tradition (employees selected through public competition based on universal 
criteria, lifelong employment security, rewards based predominantly on seniority and 
predictable career based on objective promotion criteria), and not its outright rejection 
in favour of the market model, occurred: NPM elements were added ˗ rather than to 
replace ˗the state tradition. Moreover a high union density rate in the public sector 
complemented by a central role played by union in administrative reform affecting 
public employment led to a „union-oriented or union-conditioned NPM model‟ 
(Bordogna and Neri 2011:2329). 
The Anglophone countries, not by chance, has been defined as marketizer (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011) since they have generally moved faster and further to reform their 
public bureaucracies by importing private sector tools and practices, as well as eroding 
the distinctive status and connected peculiarities of public employment to simulate 
competitive relationships in the private sector (Dell‟Aringa, Della Rocca and Keller 
2001). On a fertile ground of liberal ideology and a rhetoric of anti-state minimization, a 
larger role has been conferred to market-type governance mechanisms within a 
nationwide political agenda oriented to constraint the role of public administration and 
weaken union influence seen as a negative rigidity since Mrs Thatcher came into power 
in 1979. 
The Danish NPM reforms are better captured by the term modernization rather than 
marketization (Greve 2006), featured by a cautious attempt to enact a new governance 
model drawing on private sector management practices through a pragmatic approach, 
preferring piecemeal changes to public sector (Ibsen et al. 2011) as described in chapter 
six. Moreover the reform of public service provision has been processed in a „specific 
Scandinavian/Nordic manner where collective bargaining actors are incorporated rather 
than overturned in the process of reforming public sector employment‟ (Ibsen et al. 
2011:2307) without undermining collective bargaining institutions. Outsourcing has 
been filtered, modified and translated in Denmark in a pragmatic and corporatist manner 
in which unions, key actor in setting terms and conditions of employment, are partners 
rather than adversaries and collective bargaining is not seen as a source of rigidity in 
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labour market. Such outcomes, of course, are grounded also in high union density rates 
and resilient union organisation. 
Hence outsourcing as NPM-inspired practice to reform public administration impacted 
on public employment and industrial relations displaying a clear path-dependent 
trajectory in the various countries in accordance with national institutional constraints 
(Hall and Taylor 1996, Pierson 2000). Findings enabled to pinpoint such legacy, 
highlighting how the same operative force does not generate the same outcomes 
everywhere but conversely are „mediated by the contextual features of a given situation 
often inherited from the past‟ (Hall and Taylor 1996:941).  
Outsourcing implications in Italy indeed mirrored the strong legalistic tradition which 
ensured high degree of protection to public employees also during externalization 
processes, strengthened by union involvements in decision-making and an historical 
union‟s retrenchment when public employment is at stake. In England repercussions for 
terms and conditions of employment and collective bargaining institutions followed a 
progressive decline: CCT policies were enacted indeed as part of wider political agenda 
purposely designed to minimize the role of collective organisations of labour, 
decentralizing negotiation over labour issue providing greater leeway to local public 
employers. A clear path towards the „hollowing-out‟ of the state was underway. The 
Danish corporatist model featured by pragmatic collaboration between social partners 
during decision-making processes is reflected in the consensual manner in which 
outsourcing issues and relating repercussions have been handled in Denmark.  
Such findings allow to put forward a preliminary attempt to address the scholarly much-
debated NPM theoretical expectation of double-convergence between public and private 
sectors and between bureaucracies across countries (Bach and Bordogna 2011). 
Pollitt (2001:938-40, 2007:14-17) distinguished between four levels (or stages) of 
convergence: discursive, decisional, operational and results. The first type concerns 
convergence in reform talk, rhetoric and vocabulary utilized by policy makers; the 
second type refers to convergence in reform decisions which can be traced in public 
document and legislative provisions. The third type points to convergence in 
implementation and how policies are translated into operational practices. The last type 
concerns convergence in outcomes and results which can be assessed through 
comparative evaluation (Bach and Bordogna 2011).  
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Undoubtedly restructuring practices towards outsourcing contributed in approaching 
public service provision to private management style of providing services through 
market competition in all the countries under scrutiny and especially in England where 
the institutional background was more receptive and policy makers more incline 
towards marketization. Surely the diffusion of outsourcing in discourse and rhetoric has 
interested the public administrations across national boundaries, followed by a certain 
degree of convergence in decision making then translated into actual practices. 
Nevertheless such convergent trajectory has known rather diverse degrees of diffusion 
and implementation. As described in chapter five in England CCT vigorously entered 
the political agenda since the early 1980s and then became a sort of common thread for 
both Conservative-led and Labour-led governments until nowadays. The multiplication 
of reform policies across sectors and regulations boosting outsourcing and market 
competition in service provision quickly translated into a nationwide adoption of 
contracting out practices. The same enthusiasm cannot be tracked down neither in Italy 
or in Denmark despite an increasing rhetoric encouraging the use of market-type tools. 
Several legislative provisions enacted by central governments since the 1980s and in 
particular during the 1990s converged with English pattern of marketization as 
described in chapter four and six respectively for Italy and Denmark, despite to a much 
more limited extent. Likewise the implementation has been significant but much less 
significant than the English scenario. Trajectories of outcomes and results instead have 
remarkably gone in countertrend, displaying clear divergences across countries: the 
three-country comparison indeed clarified how particular kinds of administrative system 
and legislative set-up produce particular pattern of change (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). 
 
7.1.3 The drivers of outsourcing 
The drivers of outsourcing in the different countries can be seen as having a significant 
role within national institutional arrangements in shaping outcomes.  
Economizing and reducing expenditure in the provision of services has traditionally 
constituted the prevailing reason to outsource gathered from the literature (Domberger 
et al. 1986, Domberger and Hall 1996, Domberger and Jensen 1997, Savas 2000, Blom-
Hansen 2003). On the basis of economic appraisal indeed opening service provision to 
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market competition is expected to achieve a cost reduction (Greve 2008), since private 
providers in a competitive regime are expected to realize economies of scale and to raise 
effort or productivity with a given input/workforce-combination. A more sceptical 
stream of literature conversely started questioning not only the magnitude but even 
more importantly the actual source of this expenditure reduction (Jensen and Stonecash 
2005): unquestionably, outsourcing has promoted a model of competition, but that is 
often largely based on the reduction of labour costs and not on the improvement of 
quality and innovation. Empirical evidence increasingly emerged, arguing that cost 
savings may simply correspond either to reduced employment (Quiggin 2002, Alonso et 
al. 2013) or to an erosion of terms and conditions of employment (Flecker and Hermann 
2009, Petersen et al. 2011) given that in labour-intensive services like those provided by 
public bureaucracies labour cost constitute the greater item of expenditure. 
Maximizing value for money has overwhelmingly constituted the main rationale that 
public employers pursued in the six case studies under scrutiny by outsourcing in a wide 
array of public services. Nevertheless such broad purpose has been differently codified 
across the three national contexts: this variance seems to have contributed in explaining 
the divergent patterns of working conditions and employment relations structure that 
countries display. Findings indeed broadly confirmed the theoretical expectation that 
savings tracked back to a decline in labour cost, but across the three countries very 
different segments of the workforce bear such labour erosion and to a rather different 
extent. Hence three main pattern emerge in rationale underlying outsourcing, each 
triggering a diverse configuration in working conditions and employment relations 
structure. 
In Italy drivers of outsourcing mirrored the search for increasing flexibility in service 
provision (Atkinson 1984). Contracting out indeed enabled to gain financial and 
numerical flexibility as a means to overcome strict legislative constraints. 
Reduced transfers from central government in conjunction with stricter austerity 
measures and importantly a cap on personnel expenditure linked to the freeze of any 
hiring of permanent or temporary staff represent the main drivers of outsourcing in the 
Italian context, despite much more severe in the local government than in the healthcare 
sector. Outsourcing enabled Italian public administrations to tackle harsh staffing 
shortage due to limitations set on new staff recruitment and the constraints on personnel 
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cost. Private subcontractors took over as service providers with their own staff whilst 
public employees previously involved in the service were relocated inside the 
administration to fill vacancies. Hence outsourcing represented an effective market-type 
mechanism to cope with financial constraints and circumvent legislative personnel 
restrictions dumping labour flexibility and insecurity ˗ associated with less convenient 
terms and conditions of employment ˗ on private sector workforce, while internal 
employees are relocated as a means to fill vacancies at the same contractual 
arrangements.  
In England conversely an institutional isomorphic trajectory has taken shape. In an 
perspective based on historical institutionalism in order to disentangle policy choices 
made by a government it is necessary to understand its policy and political histories 
(Hall 1986): indeed policy choice made in a specific institutional setting, namely when 
an institution is shaped, will inevitably have a widely determinate influence over the 
policy decisions that will follow. A crucial role in the establishment of institutions is 
played by ideas: exerting an independent role, they constraint and limit the available 
range of acceptable decisions that agents might adopt, providing a set of ready solutions 
for each policy problem arising in a specific domain. Accordingly, institution formation 
derives from the collective acceptance of an idea which consequently becomes 
embodied into the structural persistent form of an institution, influencing future policies. 
Importantly institutions as socially constructed entities ˗ in the sense that embody 
shared cultural understandings, cognitions and interpretative frames ˗ inevitably 
constitute a legacy of concrete historical processes (Thelen 1999) constraining all 
following actions and decisions. 
In such perspective public employers‟ strategies in the English cases are clearly 
unraveled. Economizing indeed was backed by a strong ideological diffusion of market 
discipline and practices carried out at national level not only in public service provision 
through outsourcing and privatization but also in employer‟s strategies to manage 
staffing level and employment relations. About due decades of overwhelming 
Conservative control in central government led to a wide diffusion of competitive 
tendering in public service provision complemented by a strong emphasis on public 
employer‟s discretion in setting terms and conditions of employment as a means to 
299 
shape jobs their specific demand and removing the rigidities link to collective 
bargaining with unions.  
In Denmark instead more strategic considerations flanked the search for savings.  
The municipality and the hospital indeed took advantage of outsourcing practices to 
gain sustained competitive advantage through the optimal allocation of resources 
(Barney 1991). According to this resource-based perspective the organisations identify 
and differentiate between resources which support competitive advantage through their 
intrinsic attributes from other less valuable resources, featured by low potential. It 
necessarily follows that firms should keep internally and develop valuable, rare 
resources and capabilities, difficult to identify and understand, hardly imitable by other 
organisations, not replaceable in the marketplace and imperfectly transferable; whilst 
conversely they should be encouraged to trade or transfer to other competitors those 
resources endowed with low potential in term of value and rarity, easily replicable and 
perfectly transferable in the marketplace (Barney 1991, Grant 1991, Peteraf 1993). The 
Danish public employers clearly grounded their approach towards outsourcing on 
strategic appraisal, mirrored by the frequent dynamic flows of transfer out and back in-
house of services and personnel as a means to achieve the most efficient organisational 
configuration. Thus rationale contributes in explaining outcomes for terms and 
conditions of employment and industrial relations. To sum up national distinctiveness 
emerged as regards drivers of outsourcing as well, leading to different configurations as 
regards labour-related issues and employment relations structure. 
The comparative perspective has provided an instructive window on the relationship 
between actors‟ strategies and drivers towards outsourcing and the institutions as played 
out at workplace level, embedded within specific boundaries set by national institutional 
arrangements which feature employment relations regime and the administrative 
tradition. Empirical evidence supports the idea of national distinctiveness in 
implications on terms and conditions of employment and industrial relations structures 
following restructuring towards outsourcing which reflected divergent trajectories. 
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7.2 Sectoral variation  
 
Beyond national distinctiveness, empirical findings outlined a second track in 
configurations of working conditions and employment relations structure which has 
taken shape at sectoral level.  
The cross-cases comparative perspective of analysis indeed highlights divergent 
trajectories within each country between local government and healthcare; furthermore 
such internal divergent configuration between sectors displayed a convergent pattern 
across the countries. Substantially consequences of outsourcing showed similar 
characteristics in the three municipalities investigated while in parallel the hospitals 
developed their own peculiar trajectory across countries. Such considerations of course 
have to be interpreted in the light of the scenario elucidated within each national context 
which constitutes the starting point for the present sectoral comparison to take into 
account. 
Firstly marketization in public services has encompassed both blue-collar ancillary 
activities and white-collar services in the three municipalities: outsourcing indeed 
spread across a wide range of diverse areas of responsibility of local government 
involving a large number of public employees compared to healthcare sector. In the 
latter indeed overall externalization processes involved peripheral technical services 
(except for few clinical services in the English NHS foundation trust) affecting a more 
limited share of public employees, to be intended always in relative terms within each 
country.  
Secondly outsourcing triggered harsher consequences for terms and conditions of 
employment and working conditions compared to softer impacts emerged in hospitals. 
Few empirical examples are reported on this point. In the Italian municipality, other 
conditions being equal with the LHA scenario, public and private sector employees 
have been subject to an higher increase in workload following outsourcing while mixed-
management configurations in social services and nursing schools led to a sort of 
institutionalization of a two-tier workforce with severe repercussions on workers‟ 
morale. In England the belated application of TUPE regulation protections only in 1993 
paved the way to detrimental consequences for municipal employees, in large majority 
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transferred out before these employment safeguards were in force, whilst the 
„latecomer‟ externalization wave occurred in the NHS foundation trust guaranteed 
higher legislative protections to transferred personnel. As a consequence the municipal 
workforce experienced a decline in wage rate, cuts in sick pay and pension 
contributions, higher flexibility in both working hours and working place, as well as 
several cases of redundancy. Furthermore council strategy went to the detriment of in-
house staff as well by the means of a cut in sick pay contributions and less convenient 
contractual provisions for a the remaining in-house manual workforce. In Denmark 
beside overall similar picture, in the municipality employees experienced an increasing 
feeling insecurity due to the frequent re-tendering rounds. Moreover likewise in Italy 
social services marketization led to the creation of a multi-tier workforce made up of 
public, public transferred out and private employees working side by side with ˗ despite 
limited ˗ different contractual arrangements. 
A third remarkable difference between sectors concerns employment relations structure 
and union strategies following outsourcing. Findings display much more adversarial 
relations between social partners in local government where unions are not always 
consulted or even not recognized as in the English case study. Industrial action indeed 
played a central role in union strategies to oppose marketization processes in public 
services in a context of increasing difficulty for employees‟ representatives to 
collectively organise and represent their members and declining membership. On the 
employer‟s side moreover actors took a more confrontational stance whilst in the 
healthcare sector a collaborative stance prevailed. Collective bargaining and union 
consultation lied the core mechanism to deal with restructuring processes involving staff 
and HR-related issues. Unions overall opted for a softer strategy grounded on 
campaigning and information rather than undertaking industrial actions. 
Several observations have to be introduced here to elucidate these patterns. Diverse 
factors indeed can be put forward to disentangle the development of such divergent 
trajectories whose mutual influence is strictly intertwined. 
A first explanations is grounded on the different financial and regulatory constraints set 
for the two sectors. In all the three countries indeed central government has undertaken 
extensive austerity plans to constraint local government expenditure capacity, as regards 
personnel costs as well. Tight financial targets have been set for Italian local 
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government to achieve Internal Stability Pact requirements, complemented by more 
recent austerity measures purposely targeting municipal expenditure. English local 
authorities instead have been hardly hit in their decisional leeway by Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering set of legislation, replaced then by the Best Value program and 
more recently by the Big Society policy agenda. Recently further austerity measures and 
cut in transfer from central government intensified the top-down pressure on 
municipalities. The Danish government enacted a set of Modernisation programs 
targeting in particular local government organisation and service provision, 
complemented by the 2007 Structural reform which attributed an increasing range of 
responsibilities to the most decentralized level of government. Conversely pressure on 
healthcare sector have been much milder and limited in their scope. Austerity packages 
have been set in Italy only very recently and in a softer manner compared to local 
government ones, while in the Danish context healthcare has traditionally been very 
protected and profusely financed by the central government. A partial exception is 
represented by the English NHS which was subject to growing pressure towards 
outsourcing by CCT legislation and various NHS plan, but still tighter than the 
regulatory framework issued for local authorities. 
A second reason concerns the inherent nature of the two public sub-sector at stake. 
Healthcare indeed seems to embody the public service par excellence in the three 
countries under investigation: the national health service, universal provider of care free 
at the point of use represents for citizens as users the last stronghold of the public 
service that should remain publicly-provided. Given such premises, marketization in 
healthcare structures clearly bump into a stronger resistance ˗ or scepticism at least ˗ 
from public opinion and users which translated into cautious outsourcing policies from 
public employers. Few quotations are reported from key-respondents interviews to 
exemplify such reluctance in opening healthcare services to market competition that 
conversely has not been tracked in local government:  
 
there has been much more reluctance in the NHS just because politically is seen as 
being more risky outsourcing in health and if something goes wrong in the hospital is 
a disaster. I think there is much more political difference between the health sector and 
local government. (Interview 45)  
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I think that is politically still more sensitive to privatize health services, public opinion 
is more opposed to it, so that's probably the main difference. (Interview 44)  
 
Or again: 
 
the NHS sector has been a little more protected because in this country the NHS is a 
very popular public service, it‟s seen as a kind of sacred by people. So for long time it 
has been said: you shouldn‟t go there with the market. (Interview 36) 
 
The smooth approach towards outsourcing adopted in healthcare might have translated 
into softer repercussions for employees and social dialogue. 
A third argument brings into contention the role played by social dialogue and the 
stance of social partners. Findings displayed a predominant collaborative approach that 
employers and unions put in place in healthcare: social partners indeed voluntary opted 
for social dialogue and partnership as core mechanisms to deal with restructuring events 
and HR-related issues within hospitals. Consultation and negotiation are on the agenda 
as soon as outsourcing policies involved staff and are formally implemented at 
workplace level through Employees‟ Representative Body (RSU) within the Italian 
LHA, the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) in the English NHS foundation trust and 
the the Co-determination Committee (MED-udvalg) in the Danish hospital. 
Conversely adversarial stances have featured the relationship between social partners in 
local government where, within the boundaries set by national institutional 
arrangements, local employers tried to erode union influence on processes involving 
HR-issues and in the determination of terms and conditions of employment. A 
weakened union, on its side, adopted a confrontational approach often resulted in harsh 
industrial actions. Hence despite not preventing from outsourcing the partnership 
between social partners as well as central role played by collective bargaining in set 
terms and conditions of employment might have led to smoother development in 
healthcare sector compared to local government where the wider erosion in working 
conditions and the weakening of industrial relations institutions might have been 
triggered by a confrontational approach. A quote from the English case well illustrate 
such point: 
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in terms of healthcare services, it is the only area of public services where there is a 
Social Partnership Forum: there is a very collaborative atmosphere, it‟ s a tripartite 
body and they have a national body and regional levels. It‟s the only place where we 
have the European style of social dialogue. In the forum we discuss about broader 
things than industrial relations: like changes in NHS, productivity, and quality, and 
how can we work together, industrial issues and so on. That kind of culture prevail in 
the NHS, not everywhere. (Interview 41)  
 
A last explanation concerns the role of professionalism and occupational groups 
involved in the restructuring and their position within the labour market (Freidson 2001, 
Neri 2008). In local government the central role in decision-making as regards 
outsourcing policies is played by elected political representatives supported by few 
municipal officers in executive positions: the large majority of internal staff, with 
medium-low qualifications highly replaceable in the labour-market and low bargaining 
power has no voice in the on-going processes of marketizations. Conversely in 
healthcare sector clinical staff (doctors and nurses) constitute the most relevant 
professional group, not only in numerical terms but importantly able to influence 
decision-making process at hospital-level. Except for Denmark indeed clinical staff is 
directly involved in executive boards which set restructuring plan towards outsourcing, 
enjoying a remarkable discretion establishing which range of services put out in the 
market and how to manage the process (Vicarelli 2012). Moreover they embody a 
professional group with great bargaining power in the labour market: the high 
qualification make them lowly replaceable. Such difference in occupational group 
involved in decision-making might explain the difference in services outsourced and 
outcomes. In local government indeed marketization processes involved both manual 
and professional personnel impacting on their organisation of work. Conversely in 
healthcare the boards of directors opted for limiting outsourcing mainly to support 
ancillary activities while keeping direct provision of clinical services. The English NHS 
foundation trust represents an exception where few clinical core tasks were put out to 
tended as well. Nevertheless employment relations and terms and conditions of 
employment of professional staff involved enjoyed remarkable protections, much 
convenient than those applied to manual staff. 
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7.3 Does the country matter? Does the sector matter?  
Concluding remarks 
 
The three-country two-sector has provided an instructive window on the interplay 
between actor strategies, institutions ˗ national and sectoral ˗ and outcomes for labour as 
they develop at workplace level following outsourcing in public services. The main 
findings pinpointed that impacts on working conditions and employment relations 
structure have taken different configurations, unleashing a twofold dynamic. 
Implications indeed developed along country-specific divergent trajectories shaped and 
constrained by national legislative, administrative and cultural arrangements, the 
employment relations regime to which country answer, as well as by the main rationales 
underlying marketization process in public services (Flecker 2010).  
Contextually market-type practices in public service provision unleashed a second 
dynamic within national boundaries and constraints: different sectors of public 
administration developed divergent configurations in outcomes of outsourcing (Bechter 
Brandl and Meardi 2012) shaped by sectoral legislative and financial constraints, as 
well as sector-specific features like the nature of services provided and the kind of 
professionalism at stake. Interestingly such divergence between local government and 
healthcare sector displaced similar developments across the three countries, suggesting  
international sectoral trajectories.  
Hence, my argument is that outsourcing is unleashing a twofold dynamic in its impact 
on terms and conditions of employment and industrial relations structure. The result of 
this twin dynamic is a remarkable divergence across countries, where specific 
institutional configurations shape national patterns, but at the same time also a 
considerable convergence between sectors across national boundaries, driven by sector-
specific features. Outsourcing appears to be simultaneously prompting both convergent 
and divergent developments, (Marginson and Sisson 2002), paralleling the idea of 
„converging divergences‟ (Katz and Darbishire 2000). 
Nevertheless the leading force is exercised at national level. A central role in particular 
has been played by the state as „socially responsible customer‟ (Jaehrling 2014) which 
sets the framework in which public procurement takes place, defining rules for actors, 
constraints and employment regulation. Hence encompassing labour market regulation, 
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as well as the strength of industrial relations institutions and collective agreements ˗ 
despite not preventing from outsourcing ˗, can mediate the effects and outcomes for job 
quality. In such legislative set-up terms and condition of employment or public 
personnel are safeguarded, as well as differential between public and private sectors are 
reduced, and thereby diminishing one important incentive for public employer to 
outsource services (Grimshaw et al. 2012). 
On the other hand, procurement-related specific provisions set at national or 
supranational level ˗ respectively the Two-Tier Code and TUPE regulation in the 
English context ˗ play a compensatory role in areas in which the traditional institutions 
extending employment protections to the weaker segments of the labour market are 
absent or insufficient. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
The thesis has been moved by the interest in exploring how outsourcing in public 
services impacted on working conditions and employment relations structure. Over the 
last three decades indeed both public and private organisations have been subject to 
vertical disintegration of the production chain shifting the traditional in-house provision 
towards market place competition. Literature in industrial relations has repeatedly 
suggested how on the whole such restructuring processes in private companies led to a 
fragmentation of employment (Marchington et al. 2005) and to an erosion of working 
conditions across organisational boundaries increasingly blurred and overlapped 
(Doellgast et al. 2009, Flecker 2010). Nevertheless the limited research attention 
devoted to outcomes of outsourcing in public sector has never allowed to univocally 
untangle the interplay between actor strategies, institutions, and outcomes for labour as 
they develop at workplace level from a broader comparative perspective.  
Thus the present research through a three-country (Italy, England and Denmark) two-
sector (local government and healthcare sector) comparative investigation has tried to 
provide a cautious preliminary contribution to the debate. Firstly the analysis has shown 
that outsourcing has not necessarily gone to the detriment of staff involved in services 
put out to the market. A pivotal role in sheltering working conditions and employment 
relations institutions is played by the state as „socially responsible customer‟ (Jaehrling 
2014) which sets the framework in which public procurement takes place, defining rules 
for actors, constraints and employment regulation. 
Hence encompassing labour market regulation, as well as the strength of industrial 
relations institutions and collective agreements ˗ despite not preventing from 
outsourcing ˗, can mediate the effects and outcomes for job quality acting as „market 
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embedding‟ mechanism as opposed to „market-making‟ (Jaehrling 2014). In such 
legislative set-up terms and condition of employment or public personnel are 
safeguarded, as well as differential between public and private sectors are reduced, and 
thereby diminishing one important incentive for public employer to outsource services 
(Grimshaw et al. 2012). On the other hand, procurement-related specific provisions set 
at national or supranational level ˗ for instance the Two-Tier Code, the Retention of 
Employment model and TUPE regulation in the English context ˗ play a compensatory 
role in areas in which the traditional institutions extending employment protections to 
the weaker segments of the labour market are absent or insufficient. 
Nevertheless industrial relations regime and legal context constraint managerial 
practices and leeway in dealing with restructuring of service provision setting 
constraints and limitations, within such boundaries however public employers and 
private subcontractors have a range of options to design their strategies, while they may 
also explore how boundaries can be stretched. 
The overall picture is dominated by a growing fragmentation of employment conditions 
and a deterioration of work in private companies. Employment has generally become 
more insecure and flexible, in terms of both working hours and workplace flexibility. 
Greater demands are placed on work tasks, including increasing workload, longer shifts 
and higher speed in work. Additionally, terms and conditions of employment 
established by private providers underwent a sharp worsening, if not so relevant in term 
of salary, rather harsh as regards pension scheme, maternity leaves, sick pay scheme and 
holidays compared to those established in public sector collective agreement. As far 
employment relations structure is concerned, outsourcing undermined union capacity to 
collectively represent and organise employees in fragmented production chains where 
boundaries between organisations and between public and private sector are 
increasingly blurred and overlapping. Restructuring towards outsourcing moreover 
triggered the creation of a two-tier ˗ or even multi-tier ˗ workforce where workers with 
similar educational background at the workplace perform the same task but under 
different contractual arrangements according to the nature of their employer ˗ whether 
public or private.  
Beyond such general consequences the research project pinpointed that outsourcing in 
public services has unleashed a twofold dynamic. Implications over working conditions 
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and employment relations institutions developed along country-specific divergent 
trajectories shaped and constrained by national legislative, administrative and cultural 
arrangements, the employment relations regime to which country answer, as well as by 
the main rationales underlying marketization process (Flecker 2010).  
Contextually market-type practices in public service provision triggered a second 
dynamic within national boundaries and constraints: different sectors of public 
administration developed divergent configurations in outcomes of outsourcing (Bechter 
Brandl and Meardi 2012) shaped by sectoral legislative and financial constraints, as 
well as sector-specific features like the nature of services provided and the kind of 
professionalism at stake. Interestingly such divergence between local government and 
healthcare sector displaced similar developments across the three countries, suggesting  
international sectoral trajectories. What the findings highlighted are „converging 
divergences‟ (Katz and Darbishire 2000): outsourcing prompted simultaneously 
prompting a remarkable divergence across countries complemented by a considerable 
convergence between sectors across national boundaries. 
 
The introduction of market discipline in public services provision represents also a tile 
within a broader mosaic of public bureaucracy reform, an „unending wave of reforms‟ 
(Pollitt 2002) that has expanded progressively since the 1980s across all European 
governments under the label of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991). This 
doctrine aimed to remove any difference between public and private sector as a way of 
increasing efficiency and effectiveness: thus governments imported in their public 
bureaucracies business-like tools and values, alongside with market-type mechanisms 
from the private sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Literature in comparative public 
administration has for long vigorously supported the idea of double convergence 
following NPM-related reforms ˗ that is to say converge between public administrations 
across countries associated to a convergence pattern between public and private sectors 
within each country, put into contentious by a more recent stream which instead 
embraced the idea that, instead of an all-encompassing trend of convergence, countries 
clustered according to similarities in their national institutional and legislative setup 
(Bordogna 2008, Bach and Bordogna 2011, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). The present 
research has tried to sketch a cautious response to such theoretical puzzle as well. 
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Empirical evidence indeed endorses the latter position showing a clear path-dependent 
trajectory in the various countries in accordance with national institutional constraints 
(Hall and Taylor 1996, Pierson 2000). The comparative perspective adopted in the 
analysis enabled to pinpoint such legacy, highlighting how the same operative force 
does not generate the same outcomes everywhere but conversely the interplay of the 
intervention and the country-specific legal and cultural context triggers nationwide 
distinctive outcomes in the way a policy tool is implemented and results (Bordogna and 
Neri 2011, Pollitt and Dan 2011).  
Further research, in particular at comparative level, should encompass a wider range of 
national contexts and sectors, to be intended as institutional arrangements where to test 
the soundness of the argument put forward and their explanatory power in a different 
legal, administrative and cultural set-up. 
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Interviews list 
 
 
The case of Italy 
Sector 
 Interview 
number 
Position Date 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 1 
General secretary CGIL-FP  
(region Emilia-Romagna) 
21/07/2014 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 2 
General secretary CGIL-FP  
(local branch) 
28/07/2014  
Local government Interview 3 
Responsible for local government  
CGIL-FP (local branch) 
28/07/2014 
Healthcare Interview 4 
Responsible for healthcare  
CGIL-FP (local branch) 
28/07/2014 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 5 General secretary CGIL-FP (national level) 31/07/2014 
Local government Interview 6 Officer in procurement office 01/08/2014 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 7 
General secretary CISL-FP  
(region Emilia-Romagna) 
27/08/2014 
Local government Interview 8 President ANCI (region Emilia-Romagna) 08/09/2014 
Local government Interview 9 
Responsible for local government  
CISL-FP (local branch) 
16/09/2014 
Healthcare Interview 10 Director of procurement office of LHA 18/09/2014 
Healthcare Interview 11 Officer in procurement office of LHA 18/09/2014 
Local government Interview 12 
Responsible for local government  
CGIL-FP (national level) 
19/09/2014 
Healthcare Interview 13 
Responsible for healthcare sector  
CISL-FP (local branch) 
23/09/2014 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 14 
General secretary CISL-FISASCAT (local 
branch) 
23/09/2014 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 15 
Responsible for international relations in CGIL 
(national level) 
29/09/2014 
Local government Interview 16 Director of HR department of the municipality 10/10/2014 
Local government Interview 17 
Director of social service department of the 
municipality 
15/10/2014 
Healthcare Interview 18 Administrative director of LHA 16/10/2014 
Healthcare Interview 19 
Responsible of healthcare structures in the 
regional department 
20/10/2014 
Local government Interview 20 
Council member in transport and environment 
committee and ex-general secretary CGIL-FP 
(local branch) 
21/10/2014 
Healthcare Interview 21 Director of logistic department in LHA 21/10/2014 
Healthcare Interview 22 
Ex-director of procurement office LHA 
Manager in AVEN 
27/10/2014 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 23 General secretary UIL-FPL (local branch) 31/10/2014 
Local government Interview 24 Director of educational service department  24/02/2015 
Healthcare Interview 25 
Responsible for healthcare CGIL-FP (national 
level) 
02/03/2015 
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The case of England 
Sector 
 Interview 
number 
Position Date 
Local government Interview 26 General secretary of GMB 22/10/2013 
Healthcare Interview 27 National bargaining official in NHS Employers 31/10/2013 
Healthcare Interview 28 National official in RCN 08/11/2013 
Healthcare Interview 29 Director of PSIRU 11/11/2013 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 30 Researcher from EPSU 14/11/2013 
Local government Interview 31 Labour councilor 15/11/2013 
Local government Interview 32 Ex-chief executive in the local authority 19/11/2013 
Local government Interview 33 
Shop steward from UNISON in the local 
authority 
19/11/2013 
Local government Interview 34 Director of finance 20/11/2013 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 35 National official from UNISON 22/11/2013 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 36 National official from UNISON 26/11/2013 
Healthcare Interview 37 National bargaining official in RCN 27/11/2013 
Local government Interview 38 Labour councilor 29/11/2013 
Healthcare Interview 39 King‟s Fund 02/12/2013 
Healthcare Interview 40 Administrative director of NHS foundation trust 05/12/2013 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 41 National official from TUC 06/12/2013 
Local government Interview 42 Chief executive  10/12/2013 
Local government Interview 43 Conservative leader of the council 10/12/2013 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 44 National official from UNISON 16/12/2013 
Local government Interview 45 National official from Unite 08/01/2014 
Local government Interview 46 Official from BWTUC 14/01/2014 
Healthcare Interview 47 Official from UNISON (local branch) 17/01/2014 
Healthcare Interview 48 Administrative director of NHS foundation trust 21/01/2014 
Healthcare Interview 49 Chair of JCC from Unite 21/01/2014 
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The case of Denmark 
Sector 
 Interview 
number 
Position Date 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 50 National official in OAO 12/03/2014 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 51 National official in 3F 25/03/2014 
Healthcare Interview 52 
Special Consultant in the Office for Legal and 
Negotiation in the HR Department in the region 
26/03/2014 
Healthcare Interview 53 Development manager in Region 26/03/2014 
Healthcare Interview 54 Director of finance in the region 26/03/2014 
Local government Interview 55 National bargaining official in KL 27/03/2014 
Local government Interview 56 National official in KL (economic department) 02/04/2014 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 57 National official in DNO 03/04/2014 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 58  National official in DNO 03/04/2014 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 59 National official in FOA 10/04/2014 
Healthcare Interview 60 Cleaning manager in the hospital 11/04/2014 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 61 Researched from KORA 11/04/2014 
Local government Interview 62 Official from FOA (local branch) 15/04/2014 
Local government Interview 63 Official from FOA (local branch) 15/04/2014 
Local government Interview 64 Official from 3F (public sector -local branch) 15/04/2014 
Local government Interview 65 Official from 3F (private sector -local branch) 15/04/2014 
Local government Interview 66  
Director of procurement office in the 
municipality 
22/04/2014 
Healthcare 
Local government 
Interview 67 Official in DNO (local branch) 24/04/2014 
Healthcare Interview 68 Manager of green area department in the Region 25/04/2014 
Local government Interview 69 
Director of social service department in the 
municipality 
12/05/2014 
Local government Interview 70 Mayor of the council 12/05/2014 
Local government Interview 71 National official in KL 20/05/2014 
Local government 
Healthcare 
Interview 72 Expert from CBS 26/05/2014 
Healthcare Interview 73 Official from 3F (local branch) 27/05/2014 
Healthcare Interview 74 Director of catering department in the region 11/06/2014 
Local government Interview 75 Director of HR department in the municipality 20/06/2014 
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